Judicially Modified Democracy - Court and State Pre-Emption of Loc
Judicially Modified Democracy - Court and State Pre-Emption of Loc
Judicially Modified Democracy - Court and State Pre-Emption of Loc
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
71
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
72
[Vol. XXVI:71
Genetic Engineering Industry, 15 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POLY J. 213, 216 (2014) (The Genetically
Modified Organism . . . debate [in Hawaii] has become so contentious that there is little room
for productive conversation.); Amici Curiae Center for Food Safety, et al.s Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts One and Two of Plaintiffs
Complaint at *9, Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Assn v. Cty. of Haw., No. 00267-BMK, 2014 WL
5359758 (D. Haw. Sept. 18, 2014) (Hawaii has been the epicenter of controversial GE
organism commercial development for nearly two decades, and its lawfulness has been the
subject of litigation in this Court going back more than a decade.).
6. Gibson, supra note 5, at 21415, 23132; see also HAWAII CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY,
PESTICIDES IN PARADISE: HAWAIIS HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT AT RISK, at 5 (2015), available
at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/reports/3901/pesticides-in-paradise-hawaiis-health-andenvironment-at-risk (Hawaii leads the nation in GE crop field trials, with tests on 1,141 sites in
2014 alone, representing a far higher density of field tests than on larger mainland states . . . .)
[hereinafter HAWAII REPORT].
7. HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 2223.
8. See Gibson, supra note 5, at 215 (Many residents oppose the [genetic engineering]
industrys presence in Hawaii . . . .); discussion infra pt. III.
9. HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6, at 3132.
10. See discussion infra pt. III.
11. See discussion infra pt. III.
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
73
12. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480,
at *12 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015) (holding that a Maui ban on genetically engineered organisms
permitted by federal regulation is expressly pre-empted by federal law and impliedly preempted
by state law); Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Assn v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14-00267 BMK, 2014 WL
6685817, at *9 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014) (holding that a county ban on the dissemination of
genetically engineered plants that are regulated by the Secretary of Agriculture is expressly preempted by federal law and impliedly preempted by state law); Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of
Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *9 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014) (holding that a
local ordinance imposing reporting requirements on GMOs was impliedly pre-empted by state
law).
13. Peter Whitfield, Baker Hostetler Maui GMO Ban Overturned; Federal Court Remains
Consistent on Pre-emption Analysis, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STRATEGY (July 2, 2015),
http://www.environmentallawstrategy.com/2015/07/maui-gmo-ban-overturned-federal-courtremains-consistent-on-pre-emption-analysis/.
14. See Peter Whitfield, Baker Hostetler Federal District Court Doubles Down, Vacates
Hawaii County GMO Ban, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STRATEGY (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.environmentallawstrategy.com/2014/12/federal-district-court-doubles-down-vacateshawaii-county-gmo-ban/ (discussing the Hawaii county case and similar laws that may be
impacted by pre-emption rulings) [hereinafter Whitfield, Court Doubles Down].
15. See discussion infra pt. V.
16. See discussion infra pt. IV.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
74
[Vol. XXVI:71
17. See Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified
Foods, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 40607 (2002) (describing technology used to introduce
genes from one organism into another for genetic modification). The terms genetically
modified, genetically engineered, GM, GMO, and agricultural biotechnology will all
be used in this article to refer to crops or plants that have genetic characteristics not normally
occurring in nature and introduced through human intervention.
18. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 5, at 21819 (noting that genetic engineering could include
creating: tomatoes with fish genes, potatoes with mouse genes, apples with chicken genes, and
even pigs with human genes.).
19. McGarity, supra note 17, at 406; see also NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY
MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION, 2425 (2000) (discussing
emergence of different methods of introducing foreign genes into an organism).
20. See Debra M. Strauss, Defying Nature: The Ethical Implications of Genetically
Modified Plants, 3 J. FOOD L. & POLY 1, 2 (2007) (Genetically Modified Organisms . . . are
created when the genes of one organism are inserted into the DNA of another organism,
causing the target trait to be expressed in that non-related species.).
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
75
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
76
[Vol. XXVI:71
to insect and herbicide resistance, approximately 1% of current GE food crops in the United
States are engineered to be virus resistant, such as the GE Hawaiian Papaya, and certain
zucchini and crook neck squash. Gibson, supra note 5, at 221.
27. HAWAII REPORT, supra note 6 at 2122; IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 1.
28. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 17, at 41718. Note that this article uses the word
pesticides to refer to both insecticides (bug killers) and herbicides (weed killers) collectively.
29. RAMON J. SEIDLER, PESTICIDE USE ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 3 (Sept.
2014),
available
at
http://static.ewg.org/agmag/pdfs/pesticide_use_on_genetically_
engineered_crops.pdf (noting that the USDA itself has indicated that since 1996, glyphosate
use has increased some 12-fold during the GE crop era, with overall herbicide usage increasing
by more than 500 million pounds.); see also, IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 34 (describing
steady increase in herbicide usage between 1996 and 2011).
30. Daniel Cressey, Widely Used Herbicide Linked to Cancer, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
(Mar. 25, 2015), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/widely-used-herbicidelinked-to-cancer/. Glyphosate has also been linked to a number of other significant health
issues. See, e.g., Michael Antoniou et al., Roundup and Birth Defects: Is the Public Being Left in
the Dark?, EARTH OPEN SOURCE (June 2011), http://earthopensource.org/wpcontent/uploads/RoundupandBirthDefectsv5.pdf (discussing various glyphosate studies
suggesting serious risks of human health harm); Leah Schinasi & Maria Leon, Non-Hodgkin
Lymphoma and Occupational Exposure to Agricultural Pesticide Chemical Groups and Active
Ingredients: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 11 INTL J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH
4449 (2014) (analyzing studies which suggest a link between an increase in non-Hodgkins
lymphoma and pesticide use); see generally Anthony Samsel & Stephanie Seneff, Glyphosate,
Pathways to Modern Diseases III: Manganese, Neurological Diseases, and Associated
Pathologies, 6 SURG. NEUROL. INTL 45 (2015) (investigating a link between Roundup pesticide
and manganese deficiency which may lead to more serious health problems).
31. JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL., U.S. DEPT OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH
SERV., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Feb. 2014), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1282246/err162.pdf [hereinafter USDA REPORT].
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
77
32
32. IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 4; see generally Angelika Hilbeck et al., No Scientific
Consensus on GMO Safety, 27 ENVTL. SCI. EUR. 1 (2015) (discussing a lack of conclusive
evidence regarding the safety of genetically modified foods in the human diet).
33. See McGarity, supra note 17 (Unlike Bt microorganisms, which rapidly break down in
the environment, human consumption of the Bt toxin in GM plants is virtually assured.).
34. BRIAN TOKAR, INST. FOR SOC. ECOLOGY BIOTECHNOLOGY PROJECT, DEFICIENCIES
IN FEDERAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS, at *6 (2006),
available at http://environmentalcommons.org/RegulatoryDeficiencies.html; see also Krystle B.
Blanchard, The Hazards of GMOs: Scientific Reasons Why They Should Be Regulated, Political
Reasons Why They Are Not, and Legal Answers to What Should Be Done, 27 REGENT U. L.
REV. 133, 140 (2014) ([T]he EPA recently increased the legal limit for glyphosate in
corn . . . .).
35. See TOKAR, supra note 34, at 6 (Meanwhile, the EPA has used its authority under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to exempt the pesticides currently produced by GE
plants from any limit on human exposure.); Blanchard, supra note 34, at 140 (B.t.s natural
occurrence is one reason the FDA presumes both that there can be no material difference
between GM plants and natural plants and that this GM technology is safe; thus, the FDA
requires no independent studies of the effects of the B.t. bacterium when used by GM
technologies.).
36. IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 310; Emily Montgomery, Genetically Modified Plants
and Regulatory Loopholes and Weaknesses Under the Plant Protection Act, 37 VT. L. REV. 351,
357 (2012).
37. Montgomery, supra note 36, at 357.
38. Id.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
78
[Vol. XXVI:71
39. See generally IRT REPORT, supra note 26 (describing various studies on animal
consumption of genetically altered foods and noting that [n]early every independent animal
feeding safety study shows adverse or unexplained effects.); see also JOHN FAGAN, MICHAEL
ANTONIOU & CLAIRE ROBINSON, GMO MYTHS AND TRUTHS 12744 (2014), available at
http://earthopensource.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/GMO-Myths-and-Truths-edition2.pdf.
40. IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 310; see generally Gilles-Eric Serallini et al.,
Republished study: long-term toxicity of a Roundup herbicide and a Roundup-tolerant genetically
modified maize, 26 ENVTL. SCI. EUR. 14 (2014) (liver and kidney damage in rats); FAGAN,
ANTONIOU & ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 14757.
41. See IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 10.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 8.
44. See generally Anthony Samsel & Stephanie Seneff, Glyphosate, Pathways To Modern
Diseases II: Celiac Sprue and Gluten Intolerance, 6 INTERDISP. TOXICOL. 159 (2013).
45. IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at *9. Other studies have indicated that Bt toxin is not
fully destroyed in the human stomach during digestion, and that a section of its amino acid
sequence is identical to a known allergen (egg yolk). Id.; see also Blanchard, supra note 34, at
13940 (describing health effects observed in humans exposed to Bt).
46. See IRT REPORT, supra note 26, at 34 (stating that the unpredictability of genetic
mutations in genetically altered foods can lead to unforeseen effects on health).
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
79
47. DRUKER, supra note 25, at 130 (The industrys priority was to get the new products
marketed as quickly as possible, not to minimize the attendant risks . . .); FAGAN, ANTONIOU
& ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 89.
48. FAGAN, ANTONIOU & ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 89; Hilbeck, supra note 32, at 1
(noting that independent researchers wanting access to industry GE materials have been denied
access unless willing to sign contractual agreements with the GMO developers, which would
confer unacceptable control over publication of the results); Muramoto, supra note 21, at 325
(noting public statement to the EPA by 26 scientists complaining that Monsanto and other GE
companies were restricting them from engaging in independent research by using restrictive
technology agreements that would require company approval of the research and results).
49. Muramoto supra note 21, at 321.
50. Id. at 328.
51. Hilbeck, supra note 32, at 12.
52. Id.; but see Commonly Asked Questions about the Food Safety of GMOs,
MONSANTO.COM, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/food-safety.aspx (claiming that
governmental regulatory agencies, scientific organizations, and leading health associations
worldwide agree that food grown from GM crops is safe to eat.) (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
80
[Vol. XXVI:71
53
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
81
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
82
[Vol. XXVI:71
67
67. See Gibson, supra note 5, at 24953 (describing processes of gene flow and instances
in which gene flow was a concern); Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property Rights
and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 216 (2002) ([W]ind blown pollen, commingled
seeds and black-market plantings mean that GM products extend beyond the acres officially
planted to GM crops. (quoting David Barboza, As Biotech Crops Multiply, Consumers Get
Little Choice, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/10/us/as-biotechcrops-multiply-consumers-get-little-choice.html)).
68. Institute for
Responsible
Technology, Dangers to
the Environment,
http://www.responsibletechnology.org/gmo-dangers/dangers-to-the-environment (last visited
Nov. 4, 2015).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Haw. 2006)
(Because these crops produce experimental pharmaceutical products . . . their effect on
Hawaiis ecosystem (especially Hawaiis 329 endangered and threatened species) is unclear. . . .
[T]hese experimental crops could cross-pollinate with existing food crops, thus contaminating
the food supply.).
71. Muramoto, supra note 21, at 345 (discussing the ProdiGene case); MICHAEL R.
TAYLOR, JODY S. TICK & DIANE M. SHERMAN, PEW INITIATIVE, TENDING THE FIELDS: STATE
& FEDERAL ROLES IN THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 27 (2004).
72. Muramoto, supra note 21, at 344 (discussing the StarLink corn episode); TAYLOR,
TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71 (also discussing StarLink).
73. See Muramoto, supra note 21, at 34344 (noting that repeated incidents of cross
contamination all illustrate significant and glaring defects in the regulatory framework for
agricultural biotechnology including: (1) a lack of systematic risk assessment prior to the release
or marketing of the GE product in question, (2) a lack of surveillance or monitoring of the GE
product after it has been released into the environment or marketplace, and (3) a lack of
coordination between the agencies during all stages of the risk management process); Gibson,
supra note 5, at 24647 (discussing insufficiency of the Federal Coordinated Framework to meet
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
83
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
84
[Vol. XXVI:71
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
85
87. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302,
23303, 23306 (June 26, 1986) (Existing statutes provide a basic network of agency jurisdiction
over both research and products; this network forms the basis of this coordinated framework
and helps assure reasonable safeguards for the public.).
88. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 7714 (2002).
89. Gibson, supra note 5, at 234; USDA REPORT, supra note 31, at 4.
90. TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 44.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Muramoto, supra note 21, at 318.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
86
[Vol. XXVI:71
97. Id.
98. TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 45.
99. Muramoto, supra note 21, at 319; Tokar, supra note 34, at 2.
100. Muramoto, supra note 21, at 319.
101. Id. at 367.
102. See id. at 318 (Prior to conducting a field trial of a new transgenic plant, a developer
must perform a risk evaluation on the plant to determine whether [it] may be a plant pest. No
consideration of any other risks, such as other human health or environmental risks is
required.) (internal citations omitted); see also Gibson, supra note 5, at 239 (noting that of the
90 crops that have been deregulated, APHIS has conducted only two Environmental Impact
Statements, both as a result of court orders).
103. Gibson, supra note 5, at 239.
104. Id.
105. See U.S. DEPT OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT:
ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE CONTROLS OVER ISSUANCE OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS RELEASE PERMITS, AUDIT #50601-8-TE, iiv (Dec.
2005) (discussing the weaknesses in the APHIS regulations and internal management controls).
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
87
EPA
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
88
[Vol. XXVI:71
115
FDA
115. TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 51. The primary concern of planting
restrictions is to prevent the development of superbugs resistant to Bt toxin, which would result
in loss of effectiveness for both GM plants and the traditional use of Bt toxin by organic
agriculture. Id.
116. Id.
117. Tokar, supra note 34, at 6.
118. Muramoto, supra note 21, at 32021 (noting that the USDA regulates meat and
poultry).
119. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301399d (2006).
120. Food and Drug Administration, Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant
Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992).
121. Id. at 22,990 (When the substance present in the [genetically modified] food is one
that is already present at generally comparable or greater levels in currently consumed foods,
there is unlikely to be a safety question sufficient to call into question the presumed GRAS
status of such naturally occurring substances and thus warrant formal premarket review and
approval by FDA.).
122. Id. at 22,989.
123. Id.
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
89
requiring any pre-market safety testing, the FDA also does not
require GM producers to: (a) notify the FDA prior to putting a new
GRAS GM food product into the food supply; or (b) label food
products as containing GMOs, despite widespread consumer desire
124
for this information.
Although the FDA has issued voluntary
labeling guidelines for GMO producers who wish to provide GMO
information to consumers anyway, these voluntary labeling guidelines
have not been followed by a single GM food producer in the roughly
125
fifteen years they have been in place.
GMO critics have long argued that the FDA violated its own
stringent regulations in granting GM food products presumptive
126
GRAS status.
This is because under the terms of the FFDCA, a
GRAS determination must meet two criteria. First, there must be
127
technical evidence of safety, usually in published scientific studies.
Second, the technical evidence must be generally known and accepted
128
A severe conflict among
by the relevant scientific community.
129
experts should preclude a finding of GRAS.
Thus, because there
remains a deep scientific divide as to the safety of GM foods, critics
contend that the FDAs granting of presumptive GRAS status for
130
GM foods has been deeply political and highly irregular.
Nevertheless, the FDA has not elected to amend its controversial
1992 policy, and in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, the federal
district court of the D.C. Circuit determined that the FDAs decision
to grant GM foods the presumption of GRAS status was not
131
arbitrary and capricious.
124. See All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 166, 176 (D.D.C. 2000) (explaining
lack of requirements for GM producers); Kopicki, Strong Support for Labeling, supra note 58
(identifying a New York Times Poll conducted this year, with 93 percent of respondents saying
that [genetically modified or engineered] foods containing such ingredients should be labeled);
see also Muramoto, supra note 21, at 320 ([I]t is the manufacturer, not the FDA, which makes
the initial determination whether a food or food additive is GRAS.).
125. See Muramoto, supra note 21, at 33839 (noting that, rather than regulating GMO
producers, the FDA focuses its regulatory attention on non-GMO producers who wish to label
their products GMO-free).
126. See generally DRUKER, supra note 25, at 12766.
127. All. for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also DRUKER, supra note 25, at 14144.
131. All. for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
90
[Vol. XXVI:71
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
91
138
provisions narrowly.
Moreover, due to the difficulty in determining
Congressional intent, implied pre-emption is even less favored, and
courts considering whether a state statute or local ordinance is
impliedly pre-empted by existing federal law are required to begin
with the presumption that the state statute or local ordinance was a
139
valid exercise of authority.
Of the three primary federal statutes regulating GMOs, only the
140
PPA has an express pre-emption provision. Thus, states and local
governments should have considerable authority to regulate GMOs
141
concurrently with the federal framework.
1.
States have long held the right to control plant pests and noxious
142
Accordingly, most states have a variety of
weeds intrastate.
agricultural, quarantine, and/or other public health laws that address
or seek to prevent the importation and/or the spread of plant pests
143
and noxious weeds within their borders.
However, because the
federal PPA also attempts to control and prevent the importation,
exportation, and spread of plant pests and noxious weeds interstate,
and because the majority of current GM plants are considered to be
potential plant pests under the PPA, there is uncertainty over
whether the express pre-emption provision of the PPA precludes
wholly intrastate regulation of GM plants considered to be potential
144
plant pests.
138. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
139. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 61114 (1991) (holding that FIFRA
is not so comprehensive a federal regulation that it impliedly pre-empts state regulation);
Maureen Bessette, Genetic Engineering: The Alternative of Self-Regulation for Local
Governments, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1121, 1140 (1988) (stating that there is a presumption that
the Supremacy clause does not pre-empt state or local regulation of matters related to health
and safety).
140. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 7756(b)(1) (2006).
141. See generally Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 136, at 473 (concluding that there is no
Congressional intent specific to biotechnology to reference when determining whether a state
statute is pre-empted).
142. TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 39.
143. Id.
144. Compare Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 136, at 462 (suggesting that the PPA leaves
little room for states to regulate PPA regulated articles once APHIS has acted), with Gibson,
supra note 5, at 24041 (Although the PPA contains a pre-emption provision, states are clearly
free to address local plant pest concerns if no interstate or foreign commerce is involved, and
they can regulate movements in interstate commerce if APHIS has not acted.) (internal
citations omitted); see also Thomas Connor, Genetically Modified Torts: Enlisting the Tort
System to Regulate Agricultural Contamination by Biotech Crops, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1200
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
92
[Vol. XXVI:71
The answer seems fairly straightforward. The express preemption provision of the PPA explicitly states that it seeks to
preclude a state from regulating the movement in interstate
145
commerce of any articles also regulated under the PPA.
This
suggests that wholly intrastate regulation of GM crops, even those
considered to be potential plant pests under the PPA, would not
146
fall within the express pre-emption provision. Recently, however, in
both Hawaii Floriculture v. County of Hawaii and Robert Ito Farm,
Inc. v. County of Maui, the federal district court of Hawaii interpreted
the pre-emption provision of the PPA expansively to include preemption of wholly intrastate plant pest regulation, despite the narrow
147
language of the express pre-emption provision itself.
2.
n.83 (20062007) (Because the use of biotech crops implicates both national and local
concerns, courts and legislatures should be wary of overly broad federal preemption of state
attempts to regulate distinctly local matters such as land-use and growing procedures . . . .).
145. 7 U.S.C. 7756(b)(1) (2006).
146. Id.
147. Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Assn v. Cty. of Haw., No. 14-00267 BMK, 2014 WL
6685817, at *79 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014); Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14-00511,
14-00582 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *914 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015); see discussion infra
pt. IV.
148. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (When considering preemption, we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.).
149. 7 U.S.C.A. 136v(a)(b) (West 2015).
150. TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 53. For example, although FIFRA only
requires EUPs for experimental field testing on 10 acres or more, in Hawaii an EUP is required
for experimental use testing on greater than a quarter acre. Id.
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
93
151
Finally, states have an interest in food purity and food safety and
all states have regulatory laws that authorize them to remove
155
adulterated or misbranded foods from the market. However, states
generally do not require any pre-market testing of new food products,
156
including any testing of genetically engineered food products.
Still, food safety has long been considered a recognized area of
local concern, and the FFDCA does not contain any express pre157
emption provisions. Thus, states presumably should be permitted to
enact more stringent regulations governing GM food products than
the FFDCA without risk of federal pre-emption, as long as there is no
direct conflict between state law and existing federal regulations, and
as long as the state regulations do not unduly burden interstate
158
commerce.
Because there are no express pre-emption provisions in the
FFDCA, states should also be free to require GMO producers to
label their GM food products within the state. Although the FDA
issued voluntary labeling guidelines for GMO producers back in 2001,
the guidelines are not federal regulations and are not mandatory on
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
94
[Vol. XXVI:71
159
159. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, DRAFT GUIDANCE
VOLUNTARY LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT
BEEN DEVELOPED USING BIOENGINEERING; AVAILABILITY at 67 (2001).
160. 21 U.S.C.A. 343-1(a)(1)(5) (West 2015).
161. Grocery Mfrs. Assn v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-117, 2015 WL 1931142, at *2425 (D. Vt.
Apr. 27, 2015).
162. Id. at *2.
163. See generally, Charles J. Bussell, As Montville Goes, So Goes Wolcott, Vermont? A
Primer on the Local Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 727
(2010) (explaining that local government may have increased interest in GMO regulation).
164. Bessette, supra note 139, at 1125.
165. Id. at 1142.
166. Id. at 113536.
FOR INDUSTRY:
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
95
167
167. See Edens & Whitfield, supra note 3. As of the completion of this article, local
regulations of GMOs were in effect in California (Marin, Medocino, Santa Cruz, and Trinity
counties, and the cities of Arcata and Point Arena), Oregon (Jackson and Josephine counties),
Washington (San Juan county), and Maine (town of Montville). See id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Although outright bans of GMO cultivation and field testing may seem extreme in
the United States, GMO cultivation and field testing is currently banned in numerous countries.
See Walden Bello & Foreign Policy in Focus, Twenty-Six Countries Ban GMOsWhy Wont
the U.S.?, THE NATION (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/176863/ twenty-sixcountries-ban-gmos-why-wont-us.
170. See generally Bussell, supra note 163 (discussing the regulation of GMOs in effect in
Montville, Maine).
171. Id. at 73839.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 735.
174. Bessette, supra note 139, at 1137.
175. Id. at 113738.
176. See Randall E. Kromm, Town Initiative and State Pre-emption in the Environmental
Area: A Massachusetts Case Study, 22 HARV. ENTL L. REV. 241, 25657 (1998) (listing three
distinct ways in which state law may supersede local initiatives); Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1127 (2007) ([I]t is now widely acknowledged that there are
matters of mixed local-statewide concern in which both the state and city may legislate, thus
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
96
[Vol. XXVI:71
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
97
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
98
[Vol. XXVI:71
producer of GM seed corn and, despite its small size, has hosted more
193
In 2014 alone, 178
cumulative field trials than any other state.
different GMO field tests were conducted on over 1,381 sites in
194
Hawaii, compared with only 175 sites in all of California.
In
addition, more people live in closer proximity to the GMO fields in
195
Hawaii than residents in any other state.
Most field-testing on Hawaii is conducted by GMO industry
giants Monsanto, Dow-Chemical, Syngenta, DuPont-Pioneer, and
BASF, all of which own or lease prime agricultural land on Oahu,
196
Kauai, Maui, and Molokai. Although the majority of GM field tests
in Hawaii are for corn and soy crops, other crops, including
197
experimental biopharmaceutical crops, have also been field-tested.
Herbicide resistance is the most frequently tested trait in
198
Hawaii.
Data suggests that GMO producers on Hawaii use an
estimated eighteen tons of pesticides on their GM plots each year,
with stacked pesticide formulations containing upwards of sixty
199
active toxic ingredients.
Applications of restricted use pesticides
(RUPs), which are considered the most toxic to human health and
require application by specially trained workers, are also far greater
200
than the national average.
With residents so close to GMO fields, there has been intense
concern over the health impacts of pesticide drift, with anecdotal
evidence suggesting that nearby residents have already been
201
sickened. For example, in 2013, after RUP applications to a nearby
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
99
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
100
[Vol. XXVI:71
zones between GMO fields and nearby residential areas, does not
require any disclosures to the local communities about GMO
activities, and does not have a pesticide poisoning surveillance system
210
in place.
Beyond health concerns, Hawaii citizens have also expressed
concern about the GMO industrys potential impact on biodiversity
211
and the environment. Hawaii is home to nearly 9,500 species found
212
nowhere else on the planet.
It has also been named the
endangered species capital of the world, with roughly 75% of
documented species extinctions in the United States occurring
213
there.
Evidence suggests that the pesticides and pesticide run-off
from the GMO fields have already contributed to coral reef decline,
amphibian malformations, bee colony collapse, and rare bird
214
extinctions.
Another concern is the contamination of non-GM crops by
215
GMOs through gene drift and cross-pollination.
In 2004, for
example, a citizens group investigating nearly 20,000 papaya trees on
the Big Island of Hawaii revealed that fifty percent of the trees were
genetically modified, even though eighty percent of that genetically
216
modified portion were trees from organic farms.
Preservation of
organic agriculture is particularly important in Hawaii County, where
certain types of GMO crops have already been prohibited in order to
217
protect the countys organic coffee and taro industries.
Despite attempts to resolve these various issues through the state
legislature, all bills introduced to require more protective regulation
218
of GMOs at the state level have failed to pass.
Frustrated by the
one occasion, county ordinances enacted to protect residents from pesticide drift were declared
invalid under state law after being challenged by chemical corporations).
210. Id. at 19, 33.
211. Id. at 3, 29.
212. Id. at 29.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 3032 (discussing various studies that have shown the negative effects that
atrazine, chlorpyrifos, synthetic pyrethoids, neonicotinoidsall pesticides used in Hawaiihave
on coral, ambhibians, birds, and bees).
215. See Gibson, supra note 5, at 25053 (noting that cross-pollination already poses
significant threats to Hawaiis non-GM coffee, macadamia, and papaya industries).
216. Strauss, The Role of Courts, supra note 55, at 291.
217. Hawaii Cty. Code 14-92 (prohibiting cultivation and testing of GM taro); Hawaii Cty.
Code 14-93 (prohibiting cultivation and testing of GM coffee).
218. See, e.g., Right to Know GMO Hawaii, RIGHT TO KNOW GMO,
http://www.righttoknow-gmo.org/states/hawaii (last visited Sept. 16, 2015) (discussing various
GMO labeling bills introduced in the state legislature that did not pass); Hosmer, supra note 6,
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
101
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
102
[Vol. XXVI:71
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
103
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
104
[Vol. XXVI:71
242
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
105
final nail in the coffin for local GMO regulation in Hawaii, the same
federal district court determined that the Maui Initiative was
252
pre-empted by state and federal law. Specifically, the court agreed
with the earlier Kauai County and Hawaii County determinations,
namely that various Hawaii state agricultural laws and the states
responsibility to promote agriculture indicated a legislative intent to
253
preclude all local GMO regulation. Thus the court found that the
proposed ordinance was both expressly and impliedly pre-empted by
254
the PPA.
IV. WHY LOCAL DEMOCRACY SHOULD HAVE TRUMPED
PRE-EMPTION CLAIMS IN HAWAII
In its final Hawaii pre-emption decision, the district court in
Robert Ito Farm asserted that its decision to invalidate a voterapproved local GMO ordinance was not about determining whether
GE activities are good, bad, beneficial, or dangerous, or about
255
whether citizens may participate in the democratic process.
However, by finding that the local ordinances were pre-empted by
state and federal law, the district court did make the radical decision
to remove local citizen participation in the democratic process. In
addition, unless reversed, these pre-emption decisions will
undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences for other local
jurisdictions attempting to address GMO concerns through local
256
regulation.
Yet, neither Hawaii state law nor the express
pre-emption provision of the federal Plant Protection Act justified
the district courts expansive findings of pre-emption, and all three
decisions should be reversed.
A. State Pre-Emption of the Local Ordinances
In enacting their local GMO ordinances, all three counties relied
upon their broad police powers granted to them under Hawaii
Revised Statute 46-1.5(13), which provides that:
Each county shall have the power to enact ordinances deemed
necessary to protect the health, life, and property, and to preserve
252. Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 14-00511 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at
*1 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015).
253. Id. at *1620.
254. Id. at *916.
255. Id. at *1.
256. See, e.g., Whitfield, Court Doubles Down, supra note 14 (predicting that this
interpretation of federal law will likely serve as a harbinger of future cases outside Hawaii).
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
106
[Vol. XXVI:71
the order and security of the county and its inhabitants on any
subject or matter not inconsistent with, or tending to defeat, the
intent of any state statute where the state statute does not disclose
an express or implied intent that the statute shall be exclusive or
257
uniform throughout the State.
257. HAW. REV. STAT. 46-1.5(13) (2015). Both Hawaii County and Kauai County also
cited to Hawaiis Constitutional Public Trust Doctrine, Hawaii Constitution, Article XI sec. 1, as
further authority to regulate to protect and preserve Hawaiis natural resources. Although the
district court in its Hawaii pre-emption decisions erroneously refers to Hawaii as having a
Dillons Rule relationship with its local counties, which significantly restricts local county
regulatory authority, the Hawaii Supreme Court itself recognizes that Hawaii is a home rule
state, which grants broad powers to its local counties to regulate locally. See Richardson v. City
& Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1213 (Haw. 1994) (acknowledging that Hawaii recognizes
home rule, with certain stipulations).
258. HAW. REV. STAT. 46-1.5(13).
259. See Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *5
(D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014) (stating that Ordinance 960 does not directly conflict with HRS
149A-31.2 or the Right to Farm Act).
260. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, No. 1400511 SOM/BMK, 1400582, 2015
WL 4041480, at *1620 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015); Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Assn v. Cty. of
Haw., No. 14-00267 BMK, 2014 WL 6685817, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014); Syngenta Seeds,
Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 14-00014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *56 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014).
261. See, e.g., Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817, at *9.
262. Vaubel, supra note 180, at 685.
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
107
263
263. See, e.g., Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 121213 (Haw. 1994)
(explaining that co-existence doesnt necessarily equal pre-emption); Diller, supra note 176, at
1116 (noting that courts have applied pre-emption tests inconsistently); Vaubel, supra note 180,
at 684 (stating that states often enact laws without having any intention of superseding
municipal legislation).
264. See, e.g., Richardson, 868 P.2d, at 121213 (stating that the Trustees are mistaken to
argue that the ordinance is in conflict with state law because the two are coextensive).
265. See Diller, supra note 176, at 1116 (noting that courts have applied implied preemption tests inconsistently, sometimes upholding local authority and sometimes constricting
it).
266. Vaubel, supra note 180, at 684.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 68485.
269. Diller, supra note 176, at 1155.
270. Id.
271. Vaubel, supra note 180, at 68586.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
108
[Vol. XXVI:71
legislative intent in favor of local power in any of the three preemption decisions. Instead, the district court in the Syngenta, Hawaii
Floriculture, and Robert Ito Farm decisions elected to deny all three
counties the authority to regulate GMOs locally by creatively finding
both (1) a comprehensive regulatory scheme and (2) an implied
legislative intent to preclude all local GMO regulation, where neither
existed.
1. There is no comprehensive regulatory scheme fully
embracing the same subject matter as the local GMO
ordinances.
Under Hawaii law, in order to find that a local ordinance is field
pre-empted by existing state law, a court must find that: (1) the local
ordinance attempts to regulate the same subject matter fully
embraced by an existing comprehensive regulatory scheme; and (2)
the comprehensive regulatory scheme evidences a clear legislative
intent to be both uniform and exclusive throughout the state, leaving
272
no room for local regulation.
In all three Hawaii pre-emption decisions, the district court
determined that the local ordinances attempted to regulate in the
273
same subject matter areas as existing state statutes. However, all
three local ordinances attempted to regulate in a subject matter area
for which there are currently no existing state statutes. Specifically, all
three local ordinances concerned the regulation of genetically
modified organisms cultivated and field-tested within their own local
274
counties. For instance, Kauai Countys Ordinance 960 attempted to
impose an annual reporting requirement on GMO producers that
would have provided Kauai County citizens with basic, vital
information relating to the GMO crops grown and the pesticides
275
Additionally, Hawaii Countys
sprayed near local residences.
Ordinance 13-121 would have prohibited the open air testing and
cultivation of most GMOs, in order to promote eco-friendly
276
agriculture in Hawaii County.
Finally, Maui Countys proposed
272. Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1209 (Haw. 1994).
273. Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 1400511 SOM/BMK, 1400582
SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *1620 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015); Haw. Floriculture & Nursery
Assn v. Cty. of Haw., 2014 WL 6685817, at *46 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014); Syngenta Seeds, Inc.
v. Kauai, 2014 WL 4216022, at *89 (D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014).
274. See generally KCC 2223; HCC 14-128; Maui Initiative, supra note 242.
275. See generally KCC 2223.
276. See generally HCC 14-128. Hawaii Countys ban would have allowed closed facility
cultivation and testing of GMOs and also allowed companies to apply for emergency
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
109
exemptions to the ordinances prohibition on open air cultivation and testing. Id.
277. Maui Initiative, supra note 242.
278. See Montgomery, supra note 36, at 352 (GM crops engineered with genetic materials
that are not considered to be plant pests themselves are not regulated under the PPA).
279. See TAYLOR, TICK & SHERMAN, supra note 71, at 176; Gibson, supra note 5, at 245,
257 (Hawaii has not enacted any legislation to regulate future GE release of biopharmaceuticals
or open-air field testing).
280. HAW. REV. STAT. 321-11.6 (2003).
281. Gibson, supra note 5, at 24546, 257, 28083.
282. Reply Brief for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants, supra note 208, at 2628.
283. See, e.g., Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 1210 (Haw. 1994)
(finding that because a local ordinance had no counterparts in the various state statutes cited for
a pre-emption challenge, the local ordinance could not be said to cover the same subject matter
embraced within an existing statutory scheme).
284. Reply Brief for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants, supra note 208, at 26.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
110
[Vol. XXVI:71
285
285. See Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No. 1400014 BMK 2014 WL 4216022, at * 9
(D. Haw. Aug. 25, 2014) (noting that although the provisions relating to the identification of
plants that may be harmful to the environment does not speak directly to reporting
requirements for GMO crops, the statutory scheme is so framed to encapsulate the GMO
notification provision in Ordinance 960 and is thus pre-empted by state law).
286. Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Assn v. Cty. of Haw., No. 1400267 BMK, 2014 WL
6685817, at *5 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014); see also Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 14
00511 SOM/BMK, 1400582 SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *1620 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015).
287. Syngenta, 2014 WL 4216022, at *9; Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817, at *5.
288. Syngenta, 2014 WL 4216022, at *9; Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817, at *5; Robert
Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *1620.
289. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. 150A-6 (1973) (prohibiting plant importation).
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
111
290. Richardson v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193, 120809 (Haw. 1994).
291. Id.
292. Id. (distinguishing In re Application of Anamizu, 481 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1971), which
addresses the statewide licensing of building contractors, and Citizens Util. Co. v. Cty. of Kauai,
814 P.2d 398 (Haw. 1991), which addresses the state-wide regulation of public utilities).
293. Id.
294. See id. at 1209.
295. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. 150A-6, and HAW. REV. STAT. 152-6, with HAW. REV.
STAT. 147-121 (lacking explicit language granting the state regulatory authority), and
Richardson, 868 P.2d at 120809 (finding that explicit language indicated state authority to preempt local law).
296. Richardson, 868 P.2d at 120809.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
112
[Vol. XXVI:71
297
297. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 1400511 SOM/BMK, 1400582
SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *19 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015) (asserting that pre-emption was
justified even if the various agricultural laws fail to explicitly mention GMOs because the scope
of those state statutes and regulations reach GE organisms); but see Richardson, 868 P.2d at
1209 (failing to analyze the extent of the reach or whether this constitutes a full embrace of
the local regulation subject matter as required by Hawaii field preemption law).
298. See supra pt. III.C.
299. Id.; see also Pac. Intl Servs. Corp. v. Hurip, 873 P.2d 88, 9394 (Haw. 1994).
300. Richardson, 868 P.2d at 1209.
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
113
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
114
[Vol. XXVI:71
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
115
309
309. Id.
310. Vaubel, supra note 180, at 685. In addition to the pre-existing local GMO regulations
in Hawaii County, the district court in Robert Ito Farm also ignored the fact that two GMO bills
that would have precluded local regulation failed to pass in the state legislature just prior to the
courts final pre-emption decision, which also suggests that the legislature, as a whole, had no
intent to preclude local regulation. Id.
311. Diller, supra note 176, at 1155.
312. See HAW. REV. STAT. 205-43; HAW. CONST. art. XI, 1.
313. In the Syngenta decision, the federal district court also found that Kauai Countys
pesticide provisions contained in Ordinance 960 were also preempted by the existence of
various Hawaii state pesticide laws constituting a comprehensive regulatory scheme intending to
be uniform and exclusive throughout the state. See Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kauai, No.
1400014 BMK, 2014 WL 4216022, at *58 (Aug. 25, 2014). While there are some out-of-state
cases that support the district courts implied pre-emption decision on this issue, other courts
have declined to find implied pre-emption of local pesticide regulation solely on the basis of
existing state regulation. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing People v. Cty. of
Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150 (1984) where the court declined preemption of local pesticide
ordinance despite existence of state statute); but see Town of Wendell v. Atty Gen., 476 N.E.2d
585 (Mass. 1985) (state statute pre-empted local pesticide ordinance). Here, because Ordinance
960 covered subject matter areas not covered by any Hawaii state pesticide law (e.g., the
establishment of buffer zones between pesticide application areas and sensitive areas), the
district court should have required the state of Hawaii to make any legislative intentions to preempt local pesticide regulation explicit. Nonetheless, this article does not address this aspect of
the Syngenta decision because the author believes that Kauai County could have more properly
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
116
[Vol. XXVI:71
addressed the problems of pesticide applications associated with GMO operations by regulating
or banning GMOs directly. See, e.g., Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *21.
314. Haw. Floriculture & Nursery Assn v. Cty. of Haw., No. 1400267 BMK, 2014 WL
6685817, at *79 (D. Haw. Nov. 26, 2014).
315. Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *41.
316. Id.; see also Whitfield, Court Doubles Down, supra note 14.
317. Cippolone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
318. Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 517.
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
117
319
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
118
[Vol. XXVI:71
324. Id.
325. Haw. Floriculture, 2014 WL 6685817, at *89 (finding that because the Secretary of
Agriculture issued the regulations in 7 C.F.R 340.0 (2015), which restrict the introduction of
regulated articles generally, the Secretary had issued a regulation preventing the dissemination
of that plant pest or noxious weed, which satisfied the second part of the PPAs express preemption test).
326. See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (When the text of a pre-emption
clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily accept the reading
that disfavors pre-emption.); Cippolone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) ([W]e
must construe [preemption] provisions in light of the presumption against the preemption of
state police power regulations.).
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
119
327. Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 1400511 SOM/BMK, 1400582
SOM/BMK , 2015 WL 4041480, at *915 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015).
328. Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 518.
329. Id. at 517.
330. Robert Ito Farm, Inc., 2015 WL 4041480, at *15.
331. Id. at *914.
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
120
[Vol. XXVI:71
332
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
121
338
commerce.
The district courts finding of express pre-emption should be
reversed because (1) the express pre-emption provision of the PPA
should be interpreted plainly by its own terms; (2) the provision
clearly delineates what state and local governments can and cannot
regulate with respect to PPA-regulated articles; and (3) the proposed
Maui County local GMO ordinance did not attempt to exceed the
permissible scope of intrastate regulation.
In addition, although the court indicates that it had no need to
proceed to an implied pre-emption analysis, it elected to do so
anyway, despite its general obligation not to proceed beyond the
339
confines of the express pre-emption provision itself. Specifically, in
Robert Ito Farm, the court declared that even if there were no express
pre-emption of Maui Countys proposed local ordinance, the local
ordinance would be impliedly pre-empted because it frustrates the
purpose of the PPA, which the court determined to be about setting
a national standard governing the movement of plant pests and
340
noxious weeds in interstate commerce based on sound science.
Yet, in actuality, it appears that a local regulation that is also
concerned, in part, with prohibiting potential plant pests would be
complementary to the PPA, rather than frustrating to its purpose. In
addition, the claim that the PPAs primary purpose is to set a national
standard based on sound science is unpersuasive, given that
determinations of plant pest risks under APHIS regulatory
procedures are not based on sound science but rather on selfinterested determinations by the regulated GMO entities
341
themselves. Most significantly, even if the PPAs purpose was to set
a national standard governing the movement of plant pests and
weeds in interstate commerce, it is difficult to understand how the
local regulation of GMOs in Maui County frustrates this purpose.
For all of these reasons, the district courts implied pre-emption
analysis should also be rejected.
The Hawaii pre-emption decisions are currently on appeal to the
342
Ninth Circuit.
If not reversed, these three pre-emption decisions
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
122
[Vol. XXVI:71
are likely to have a significant adverse impact on all future local and
state GMO regulation. Not surprisingly, the removal of all local
county authority to regulate GMOs by a single district court has
prompted many Hawaii citizens and GMO activists to take their
343
battle to the state legislature.
At the same time, despite preemption victories at the district court level, the GMO industry
continues to lobby the state legislature to expressly pre-empt local
344
authority to regulate GMOs.
At the time of this articles
completion, the Hawaii legislature had not yet enacted any express
pre-emption law, and two bills introduced in the 2014 legislative
session that would have pre-empted GMO local regulation failed to
345
pass.
Still, the Hawaii governors assertion that GMO regulation
should be conducted at the state level and significant industry
influence in the legislature both suggest that Hawaii may soon join
346
the express-pre-emption states.
For the reasons discussed below,
however, Hawaii should decline to exercise its denial authority, unless
it is prepared to enact substantive GMO legislation of its own.
V. WHY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
REGULATE GMOS ABSENT SUFFICIENT
STATE OR FEDERAL OVERSIGHT
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
123
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
124
[Vol. XXVI:71
Research Without Informed Consent?, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 201, 20607
(2014) (noting that legislatures and executive branches have maneuvered around public
resistance to fluoridation programs by mandating fluoridation by executive fiat or by enacting
state-wide compulsory water fluoridation schemes that remove any ability to put the issue to a
local public vote).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Diller, supra note 176, at 113940 ([E]xamples abound of state legislatures overriding
[local] ordinances at the behest of the business community.); Porter, supra note 4, at 1315.
355. Kromm, supra note 176, at 257.
356. Porter, supra note 4, at 15; Bailey, supra note 188.
357. Porter, supra note 4, at 15; Bailey, supra note 188 (The virtually identical language
used in different states pre-emption bills illustrates a systematic and ordered approach to
stifling community decision-making by passing laws that prevent local governments [from]
regulating genetically modified seeds.).
358. Porter, supra note 4, at 15; Bailey, supra note 188 ([S]tate preemption laws can do
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
125
Yet, there are many reasons why states should decline to preempt local GMO regulation in this way. First, allowing local
governments to experiment with local GMO policies may help to
generate innovative solutions that balance citizen and industry
interests and that may ultimately find application on a wider scale.
Second, because many of the actual adverse impacts of GMOs are
first felt locally, allowing local governments (and local communities)
to participate in finding solutions will enhance local democracy,
community diversity, and industry responsiveness to legitimate local
concerns.
A. Permitting Local GMO Regulation Fosters Policy Innovation
Local government scholars have noted that local governments
are often at the forefront of innovative policies that have gone on to
359
spur others to also take action. A regulation instituted by one local
government may end up proving to be so successful that it may end
360
up percolating out to other cities and up to the state level.
Some of the most innovative policies now implemented on a
statewide or even national level were, in fact, the result of local
361
government innovation.
State-wide smoking bans in restaurants,
and domestic partnership benefit laws, for example, were first birthed
362
through local innovation.
Of course, the converse could also be
true: an experimental local regulation or policy could prove to be
unworkable upon implementation. Local experimentation would
allow it to be dismantled far more easily than after a state-wide roll
out. Accordingly, local governments might best be seen as policy
incubators, and given room to experiment with new and interesting
policies that, for whatever reason, the state and federal governments
363
may be unprepared or politically unable to adopt.
Indeed, by
allowing local experimentation, local governments may prove the
value of a particular policy, which may in turn compel state
two things. They can overturn the will of the people in the event an initiative has passed, and
they can prevent the introduction of laws on the same subject from being introduced in the
future.).
359. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 176, at 111819.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 112930 (Cities often lead in setting policy that Congressmen and state
legislators have failed to address, whether due to greater policy risk aversion or fear of
offending entrenched and well-financed interest groups that wield significant interest.).
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
126
[Vol. XXVI:71
364
364. Id.
365. See supra pt. I and III; see also Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 18 (Many of
these risks have already become a reality both in initial studies and alarming incidents.).
366. See supra pt. I and III.
367. See Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW 253, 260
61 (2004) (Democracy requires that those bound by a local government action have the
opportunity to participate in the local decision making process.).
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
127
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
128
[Vol. XXVI:71
in that locality means that those most impacted by the GMO industry
and its under-regulation are least able to participate in the decision377
making process. Without the ability to participate in the decisionmaking process, local citizens become little more than the guinea
378
pigs in a grand experiment without their knowledge and consent.
Allowing local participation in GMO decision-making increases both
379
the effectiveness, and the legitimacy, of governmental action.
Finally, although businesses and industry are often the first to
challenge more stringent local regulation, local oversight is likely to
result in a more responsive and responsible industry. This in turn
could reduce much of the resentment felt by local communities
adversely affected by under-regulated or unregulated industry
operations. Not surprisingly, due to unprecedented under-regulation
of GM foods and crops and the GMO industrys refusal to either label
their GM products or provide local communities with important
information concerning their GMO operations, the GMO industry is
perceived by many to be an industry that is wholly unconcerned with,
380
and unaccountable to, local communities or consumers. There is a
risk that U.S. citizens may eventually reject agricultural
biotechnology altogether if this impression of industry arrogance and
single-minded focus on profits continues to spread among educated
381
citizens. Local GMO regulations that place reasonable restrictions
on the industry and that require industry responsiveness to
community health, environmental, and economic concerns would go a
382
long way towards citizen-industry reconciliation. It might also lead
377. Vaubel, supra note 180, at 652 (Ultimately, authorizing legislative definition of
municipal power fails to recognize the importance of municipal power as the vehicle for
municipal citizens to participate in decisionmaking.).
378. Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 19; see also Bailey, supra note 188 (The
legislators introducing these bills concerning [GMO] seeds are not acting on behalf of the
people; they are acting despite the will of the people.).
379. Vaubel, supra note 180, at 652.
380. See, e.g., Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 29 (In the United States, the
public outrage at being denied a choice [about GMO consumption] has generated a grassroots
political effort to raise consciousness of consumers and alert them as to what they are not being
told, while advocating labeling.); McGarity, supra note 17, at 473 (The U.S. biotechnology
industry entered the GM foods debate with an arrogance reminiscent of the nuclear power
industry in the 1950s.).
381. See, e.g., Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 29 (noting that European
opposition to GMOs was based on ethical grounds as a reaction to being denied a choice when
GMO and non-GMO varieties could not be differentiated); Hosmer, supra note 5, at 67172
(Protests such as Occupy Monsanto have increased in regularity and size and activists have
increased coordination with other state and nationwide initiatives.).
382. See McGarity, supra note 17, at 473 (The agricultural biotechnology industry will
Fall 2015]
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
129
succeed only if the public is convinced that the industry and the regulatory agencies that
legislatures have created to protect consumers are trustworthy.).
383. See McGuire Woods, State of the GMO Union: Courts Address Localism, Federalism
Amid New Legislation, MCGUIRE WOODS (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/
Client-Resources/Alerts/2015/1/State-of-the-GMO-Union.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2015)
(discussing current legislation and lawsuits throughout the U.S. on GMO issues).
384. See Strauss, Defying Nature, supra note 20, at 29 ([T]he European regulatory
approach arose in part as a solution to [the] ethical and practical duty to inform.).
385. Id. at 3031.
386. See State of the GMO Union, supra note 383.
387. See Robert Ito Farm, Inc. v. Cty. of Maui, Nos. 1400511 SOM/BMK, 1400582
SOM/BMK, 2015 WL 4041480, at *1 (D. Haw. June 30, 2015) (Robert Ito Farm, Inc., Hawaii
Farm Bureau Federation, Maui County, Molokai Chamber of Commerce, Monsanto Company,
Agrigenetics Inc., Concerned Citizens of Molokai and Maui, Friendly Isle Auto Parts &
Supplies, Inc., New Horizon Enterprises, Inc., and Hikiola Cooperative, opponents of the
initiative, sued the County of Maui by filing the Robert Ito Farm action in this court.); State of
the GMO Union, supra note 383 ([A] mandatory-labeling measure on the ballot in Washington
failed after a sustained and expensive campaign by opponents.).
388. See State of the GMO Union, supra note 383 ([T]wo court decisions since August 2014
have delighted opponents of GMO regulation and previewed the challengespre-emption in
2/9/2016 4:55 PM
130
[Vol. XXVI:71