Diaz V Encanto Et Al.

Diaz v Encanto et al. (G.R. No.
171303)
Date: January 20, 2016
Ponente: Justice Leonardo-de Castro
Facts:
Petitioner Diaz has been a professor in UP since 1963. In 1988, she applied for sabbatical
leave with pay for one year. The Chair of the Broadcast Department initially recommended
to CMC Dean Encanto that Diazs sabbatical application be granted. Thereafter, Encanto
referred Diazs sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P., recommending its denial.
Encanto also requested the her salary be withheld effective July 1, 1988 until further notice
since her sabbatical application has not yet been approved and that she did not teach that
semester.
On July 4, 1988, it was recommended that Diaz be granted a leave without pay in order to
enable the CMC to hire a substitute. The next day, the U.P.s Secretary referred to the VicePresident for Academic Affairs, the fact of denial of such sabbatical request, for his own
recommendation to the U.P. President. On July 8, 1988, Abad returned the Reference Slip
indicating therein that Diaz had promised him to put down in writing the historical backdrop
to the latest denial of her sabbatical leave, but she did not do so. On Diazs request to teach
for that semester, the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and the HRDO Director instructed
Encanto that until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty, accomplishes the Certificate of Report
for Duty, and the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report for duty, she is considered
absent without official leave.
On November 8, 1988, Abad, issued a Memorandum to Diaz to confirm as valid Encantos
reason of shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical. Later, he also informed Diaz
of her lack of service during the first semester of AY 1988-89, hence she is not entitled to be
paid. While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89, she was not
able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the Report for Duty Form.
Diaz instituted a complaint against U.P., Abueva, Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Pasig
RTC praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages. She
claimed, among others, that
They conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in
the first semester of academic year 1988-89, for the entire period when her sabbatical
application was left unresolved, as well as the salaries she earned from teaching in the
second semester from November 1988 to May 1989. She likewise claimed moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The RTC held that Diaz was entitled to a sabbatical
leave and that they delay in the resolution of her application was unreasonable and
unconscionable but the CA reversed it on appeal, ruling that there was neither negligence
nor bad faith in denying her application and withholding her salaries.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents acted in bad faith when they resolved Diazs
application for leave thus entitling her to damages
Ruling: No, they did not act in bad faith. Diazs complaint for recovery of damages before the
RTC was based on the alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for
sabbatical leave vis--vis Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Xxxxx Article 19 of the Civil
Code prescribes a primordial limitation on all rights by setting certain standards that must
be observed in the exercise thereof. Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the
following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
xxxxx
The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the RTC to this Court, have already
established that a sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore petitioner Diaz cannot
demand its grant. It does not matter that there was only one reason for the denial of her
application, as the approving authorities found that such reason was enough. Moreover, not
only the Court of Appeals but also the Ombudsman, and this Court, have ruled that the
respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner Diazs sabbatical leave application was
denied. Those three separate rulings verily must be given great weight in the case at bar.
The Court does not find any reason to disregard those findings, especially when our own
perusal of the evidence showed no traces of bad faith or malice in the respondents denial of
petitioner Diazs application for sabbatical leave. They processed her application in
accordance with their usual procedure with more leeway, in fact, since petitioner Diaz was
given the chance to support her application when she was asked to submit a historical
background; and the denial was based on the recommendation of
respondent Encanto, who was in the best position to know whether petitioner Diazs
application should be granted or not.
xxxxx
Nevertheless, on the question of whether or not there was bad faith int he delay of the
resolution of petitioner Diazs sabbatical leave application, the Court still rules in the
negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that
the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. Petitioner Diaz has
failed to prove bad faith on the part of the respondents. There is nothing in the records to
show that the respondents purposely delayed the resolution of her application to prejudice
and injure her. She has not even shown that the delay of six months in resolving a sabbatical
leave application has never happened prior to her case. On the contrary, any delay that
occurred was due to the fact that petitioner Diazs application for sabbatical leave did not
follow the usual procedure; hence, the processing of said application took time.
xxxxx
Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should not be held liable for
any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have been
appropriately denominated damnum absque injuria. Similarly, the Court cannot grant
petitioner Diazs claim for attorneys fees as no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his
rights, still attorneys fees may not be awarded where there is no sufficient showing of bad
faith in a partys persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.

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