Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S.

104 (1911)
Syllabus
The charter of a corporation which is subject to the usual reserved
powers to alter or repeal is not impaired unless the subsequent statute
deprives it of property without due process of law.
The broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment are not to be pushed to a
drily logical extreme, and the courts will be slow to strike down as
unconstitutional legislation of the states enacted under the police power.
Where the mutual advantage is a sufficient compensation, an ulterior
public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking of
private property for what in its immediate purpose is a private use. The
police power extends to all the great public needs, Canfield v. United
States, 167 U. S. 518, and includes the enforcement of commercial
Page 219 U. S. 105
conditions such as the protection of bank deposits and checks drawn
against them by compelling cooperation so as to prevent failure and
panic.
The dividing line between what is and what is not constitutional under the
police power of the state is pricked out by gradual approach and contact
of decisions on opposing sides, and while the use of public credit to aid
individuals on a large scale is unconstitutional, a statute compelling
banks to contribute to a guarantee fund to protect deposits, such as that
of Oklahoma under consideration in this case, is constitutional.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit states from forbidding a
man to do things simply because he might do them at common law, and
so held that, where public interests so demand, that Amendment does
not prohibit a state's placing the banking business under legislative
control and prohibiting it except under prescribed conditions.
The Acts of December 17, 1907, and March 11, 1909, of Oklahoma,
subjecting state banks to assessments for a Depositors' Guaranty Fund
are within the police power of the state, and do not deprive banks
assessed of their property without due process of law or deny to them the
equal protection of the law, nor do they impair the obligation of the
charter contracts.
22 Okl. 48 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Bank
Depositors' Guaranty Fund Acts, are stated in the opinion.
Page 219 U. S. 109
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a proceeding against the Governor of the State of Oklahoma and
other officials who constitute the State Banking Board to prevent them

from levying and collecting an assessment from the plaintiff under an act
approved December 17, 1907. This act creates the Board and directs it to
levy upon every bank existing under the laws of the state an assessment
of one percent of the bank's average daily deposits, with certain
deductions, for the purpose of creating a Depositors' Guaranty Fund.
There are provisos for keeping up the fund, and by an act passed March
11, 1909, since the suit was begun, the assessment is to be five percent.
The purpose of the fund is shown by its name. It is to secure the full
repayment of deposits. When a bank becomes insolvent and goes into
the hands of the Bank Commissioner, if its cash immediately available is
not enough to pay depositors in full, the Banking Board is to draw from
the Depositors' Guaranty Fund (and from additional assessments if
required) the amount needed to make up the deficiency. A lien is reserved
upon the assets of the failing bank to make good the sum thus taken from
the fund. The plaintiff says that it is solvent and does not want the help of
the guaranty fund, and that it cannot be called upon to contribute toward
securing or paying the depositors in other banks, consistently with Article
I, 10, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The petition was dismissed on demurrer by the supreme court of
the state. 22 Okl. 48.
The reference to Article I, 10, does not strengthen the
Page 219 U. S. 110
plaintiff's bill. The only contract that it relies upon is its charter. That is
subject to alteration or repeal, as usual, so that the obligation hardly
could be said to be impaired by the Act of 1907 before us, unless that
statute deprives the plaintiff of liberty or property without due process of
law. See Sherman v. Smith, 1 Black 587. Whether it does so or not is the
only question in the case.
In answering that question, we must be cautious about pressing the
broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment to a drily logical extreme.
Many laws which it would be vain to ask the court to overthrow could be
shown, easily enough, to transgress a scholastic interpretation of one or
another of the great guaranties in the Bill of Rights. They more or less
limit the liberty of the individual, or they diminish property to a certain
extent. We have few scientifically certain criteria of legislation, and as it
often is difficult to mark the line where what is called the police power of
the states is limited by the Constitution of the United States, judges
should be slow to read into the latter a nolumus mutare as against the
lawmaking power.
The substance of the plaintiff's argument is that the assessment takes
private property for private use without compensation. And while we

should assume that the plaintiff would retain a reversionary interest in its
contribution to the fund, so as to be entitled to a return of what remained
of it if the purpose were given up (see Receiver of Danby Bank v. State
Treasurer, 39 Vt. 92, 98), still there is no denying that, by this law, a
portion of its property might be taken without return to pay debts of a
failing rival in business. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the logical form of
the objection, there are more powerful considerations on the other side.
In the first place, it is established by a series of cases that an ulterior
public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking of
private property for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private use. Clark
v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361; Strickley
Page 219 U. S. 111
v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 200 U. S. 531; Offield v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 203 U. S. 372; Bacon v. Walker, 204
U. S. 311, 204 U. S. 315. And in the next, it would seem that there may
be other cases beside the everyday one of taxation in which the share of
each party in the benefit of a scheme of mutual protection is sufficient
compensation for the correlative burden that it is compelled to
assume. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190. At least, if we have a
case within the reasonable exercise of the police power as above
explained, no more need be said.
It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the
great public needs. Canfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518. It may be
put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare. Among matters of that sort,
probably few would doubt that both usage and preponderant opinion give
their sanction to enforcing the primary conditions of successful
commerce. One of those conditions at the present time is the possibility
of payment by checks drawn against bank deposits, to such an extent do
checks replace currency in daily business. If, then, the legislature of the
state thinks that the public welfare requires the measure under
consideration, analogy and principle are in favor of the power to enact it.
Even the primary object of the required assessment is not a private
benefit, as it was in the cases above cited of a ditch for irrigation or a
railway to a mine, but it is to make the currency of checks secure, and by
the same stroke to make safe the almost compulsory resort of depositors
to banks as the only available means for keeping money on hand. The
priority of claim given to depositors is incidental to the same object, and
is justified in the same way. The power to restrict liberty by fixing a
minimum of capital required of those who would engage in banking is not

Page 219 U. S. 112

denied. The power to restrict investments to securities regarded as
relatively safe seems equally plain. It has been held, we do not doubt
rightly, that inspections may be required and the cost thrown on the
bank. See Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S.
386. The power to compel, beforehand, cooperation, and thus, it is
believed, to make a failure unlikely and a general panic almost
impossible, must be recognized, if government is to do its proper work,
unless we can say that the means have no reasonable relation to the
end. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 177 U. S. 188. So far is that
from being the case that the device is a familiar one. It was adopted by
some states the better part of a century ago, and seems never to have
been questioned until now. Receiver of Danby Bank v. State
Treasurer, 39 Vt. 92; People v. Walker, 17 N.Y. 502. Recent cases going
not less far are Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489, 211 U. S. 496; Kidd,
Dater and Price Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 U. S. 461.
It is asked whether the state could require all corporations or all grocers
to help to guarantee each other's solvency, and where we are going to
draw the line. But the last is a futile question, and we will answer the
others when they arise. With regard to the police power, as elsewhere in
the law, lines are pricked out by the gradual approach and contact of
decisions on the opposing sides. Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 209 U. S. 355. It will serve as a datum on this
side that, in our opinion, the statute before us is well within the state's
constitutional power, while the use of the public credit on a large scale to
help individuals in business has been held to be beyond the line. Loan
Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454.
The question that we have decided is not much helped by propounding
the further one whether the right to engage in banking is or can be made
a franchise. But as the latter question has some bearing on the former,
and as it
Page 219 U. S. 113
will have to be considered in the following cases, if not here, we will
dispose of it now. It is not answered by citing authorities for the existence
of the right at common law. There are many things that a man might do at
common law that the states may forbid. He might embezzle until a statute
cut down his liberty. We cannot say that the public interests to which we
have adverted, and others, are not sufficient to warrant the state in taking
the whole business of banking under its control. On the contrary, we are
of opinion that it may go on from regulation to prohibition except upon
such conditions as it may prescribe. In short, when the Oklahoma

Legislature declares by implication that free banking is a public danger,

and that incorporation, inspection, and the above-described cooperation
are necessary safeguards, this Court certainly cannot say that it is
wrong. North Dakota v. Woodmansee, 1 N.D. 246; Brady v. Mattern, 125
Ia. 158; Weed v. Bergh, 141 Wis. 569; Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164
Pa. 306; Myers v. Irwin, 2 S. & R. 368; Myers v. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio
283, 302; Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co., 2 Johns.Ch. 371, 377.
Some further details might be mentioned, but we deem them
unnecessary. Of course, objections under the state constitution are not
open here.
Judgment affirmed.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. 14078, March 07, 1919
Facts: The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, selected a site in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of
the revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the vicinities of
the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan are directed to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Mangyanes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held
on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
Issue: Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a
person of his liberty of abode and is therefore unconstitutional
Held: No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. The court further ruled that section
2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power
and
thus
constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.
Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the. Manguianes is considered.
They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is
shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be

confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good
of the country.

Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co. L-24670
(December 14, 1979)
Posted on October 23, 2012
G.R. No. L-24670
94 SCRA 533
December 14, 1979
Facts:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the
public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with
Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots
Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962
the vendees transferred their rights and interests over the said lots to Emma
Chavez. The plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of
Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements
and the deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the
parcels of land subject of the deeds of sale shall be used by the Buyer
exclusively for residential purposes. The restrictions were later annotated in
the Transfer Certificates of Titles covering the said lots issued in the name of
Chavez.
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building
restrictions also annotated in their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought
directly from Chavez free from all liens and encumbrances while Lot No.6
was acquired through a Deed of Exchange from Republic Flour Mills.
Plaintiff claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general
building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the
Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where
commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established.
Defendant maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from
Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and
industrial zone, per ResolutionNo.27 of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong. It alleges that plaintiff completely sold and transferred to third
persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it only on June 23, 1962 or more than 2 years
after the area xxx had been declared a commercial and industrial zone.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a
building devoted to banking purposes but which it claims could also be used
exclusively for residential purposes. The following day, the plaintiff demanded
in writing that the construction of the commercial building be stopped but the
defendant refused to comply contending that the construction was in
accordance with the zoning regulations.

Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.
2. Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
Held:
1. Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was
impliedly admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not
dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution,
plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.
However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question the validity of the
said resolution, the posture is unsustainable.
Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) to to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
for the municipality. The law does not restrict the exercise of the power
through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No.27 is not an
ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the
word regulation under the provision.
An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the implied power of a
municipality should be liberally construed in its favor and that any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in
favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist. An exception
to the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the
exercise of its powers will conflict with vested rights arising from contracts.
The exception does not apply to the case at bar.
2. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is
not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
police power. Invariably described as the most essential, insistent and
illimitable of powers and the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government, the exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.
Resolution No.27, S-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA from Shaw
Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial or commercial zone was
passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong in the exercise of police
power to safeguard/promote the health, safety, peace, good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of
the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are
located. EDSA supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity,
noise and pollution which are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. The Municipality of Mandaluyong was
reasonably justified under the circumstances in passing the subject
resolution.

Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
may be subjected to all kinds of restraint and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, and to this fundamental
aim of the Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.

Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995
May 31, 1957
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other
alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by
the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, "An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business," filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed
or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage
in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII
and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination
or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved;
or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can

the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not

merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of
any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the
State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there
is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and
a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not
only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the
title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and
the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or
any other conventional agreement.