Albert C. Dayton v. Consolidation Coal Company Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 953 F.2d 637, 4th Cir. (1992)

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953 F.

2d 637

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of


unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
Albert C. DAYTON, Petitioner,
v.
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY; Office of Workers
Compensation
Programs, Respondents.
No. 89-3203.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.


Submitted Sept. 12, 1991.
Decided Jan. 13, 1992.

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 90-114.
Thomas Roy Michael, Michael & Kupec, Clarksburg, W.Va., for
petitioner.
David Allen Barnette, Jackson & Kelly, Charleston, W.Va., Jerry G.
Thorn, Acting Solicitor of Labor, Donald S. Shire, Associate Solicitor for
Black Lung Benefits, Sylvia T. Kaser, Counsel for Appellate Litigation,
Robert Edward Kirschman, Jr., United States Department of Labor,
Washington, D.C., for respondents.
S.Ct. [ON REMAND FROM 111 S.CT. 2524].
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Before WIDENER and K.K. HALL, Circuit Judges, and JOSEPH F.
ANDERSON, JR., United States District Judge for the District of South
Carolina, sitting by designation.
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

On June 24, 1991, the Supreme Court reversed our earlier judgment and
remanded this case for further proceedings. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,
111 S.Ct. 2524 (1991), rev'g, Dayton v. Consolidation Coal Co., 895 F.2d 173
(4th Cir.1990). The Court ruled, contrary to our holdings in this case and in
Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 895 F.2d 178 (4th Cir.1990), that the rebuttal
criteria available under the Department of Labor's interim regulations, 20
C.F.R. Part 727, are not "more restrictive than" the criteria formerly applied by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare under interim regulations at
20 C.F.R. Part 410. Though we apply the Part 727 rebuttal criteria, we adhere
to our earlier judgment, and reverse.

I.
2

The administrative law judge (ALJ) found rebuttal established under 20 C.F.R.
727.203(b)(2) (the claimant is able to do his usual coal mine work) and (b)(4)
(the claimant does not have pneumoconiosis). The Benefits Review Board
(BRB) affirmed only the (b)(4) rebuttal, and did not address (b)(2).
Accordingly, in our first opinion, we held that Securities and Exchange
Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943), precluded affirmance based
on (b)(2) rebuttal. The Supreme Court did not address this holding, and we
maintain it.

Consequently, the only issue remaining is whether substantial evidence


supported the ALJ's conclusion that the employer rebutted the interim
presumption by showing that Dayton does not have pneumoconiosis.

II.
4

All of the physicians, including those offered by the employer, agree that
Dayton has a respiratory impairment. The employer's physicians suggest that
his disability is caused by obesity and cigarette smoking.* However, these
opinions suffer from various defects. Dr. Jones found no evidence of
"pneumoconiosis," but did not address whether Dayton's pulmonary condition
was related to dust exposure; accordingly, his opinion provides no evidence to
rebut the presumption that Dayton suffers from "pneumoconiosis" in its legal,
as opposed to its narrow clinical, sense. Dr. Bellotte said that Dayton's
emphysema is "probably related to his smoking history," and "little of this
impairment is due to any coal dust exposure." (Emphasis added.) Dr. Renn did
state flatly that "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty," Dayton's

emphysema resulted from cigarette smoking; however, he offered no


explanation of the basis of his opinion. Finally, the employer also offered the
report of Dr. Kress, who did not conduct a physical exam of the claimant. From
his review of the reports of others, Dr. Kress offered the armchair opinion that
"there is insufficient objective evidence to justify a diagnosis of coal worker's
pneumoconiosis," and "I would not attribute [Dayton's emphysema] to his prior
coal dust exposure, but would feel that it has to be related to his prior smoking
habits." The claimant's experts, Dr. Rasmussen and Dr. Sine (his longtime
treating physician) concluded that dust exposure contributed to his respiratory
impairment.
III.
5

The employer, perhaps sensing the infirmities of its rebuttal evidence, argues
(at p. 7 of its brief) that "the expanded [that is, legal] definition of
pneumoconiosis does not apply in this case." The employer does not cite
anything in support of this astonishing conclusion. The Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs takes no position on the merits of the (b)(4)
issue, but does urge that the legal definition of pneumoconiosis applies to (b)(4)
rebuttal.

The Act specifically defines "pneumoconiosis," 30 U.S.C. 902(b), and we see


absolutely no reason why it should not carry that definition through every
reference in the Act and regulations. Finally, we note that the employer
conceded this point before the Supreme Court:

Rebuttal may be established under [ 727.203(b)(4) ] if the proof affirmatively


demonstrates that the miner does not have clinical pneumoconiosis (diagnosed
by x-ray, biopsy or autopsy evidence) or so-called "legal" pneumoconiosis
defined as a "respiratory or pulmonary impairment arising out of coal mine
employment." Rebuttal of the [Part 727 interim] presumption is accomplished
only by strongly persuasive evidence demonstrating the falsity of a presumed
fact.

Brief of petitioners Clinchfield Coal Company and Consolidation Coal


Company, U.S.Sup.Ct. Nos. 89-1714, 90-113 and 90-114 (December 13, 1990)
(cites ommitted).

The employer cites a Fifth Circuit case that holds that emphysema is not
pneumoconiosis. United States Steel Corp. v. Gray, 588 F.2d 1022 (5th
Cir.1979). In reply, the claimant cites this circuit's rule, announced in

Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120, 124 (4th Cir.1984), that the
employer's rebuttal burden where multiple causes contribute to the disabling
respiratory condition is to prove that the miner's "primary condition, whether it
be emphysema or some other pulmonary disease, was not aggravated to the
point of total disability by prolonged exposure to coal dust." As the employer
admitted in the Supreme Court, this proof "is accomplished only by strongly
persuasive evidence demonstrating the falsity of a presumed fact." Rebuttal
evidence must be strongly persuasive, because doubts in the evidence must be
resolved in favor of the claimant. Greer v. Director, OWCP, 940 F.2d 88 (4th
Cir.1991). The medical reports submitted by the employer in this case do not
meet this standard. Consequently, we hold that the ALJ's finding that the
employer established rebuttal under 727.203(b)(4) is not supported by
substantial evidence, and the presumption that the miner suffers from
pneumoconiosis stands.
10

The decision of the Benefits Review Board is reversed, and the claim is
remanded with instructions to award benefits.

11

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Dayton smoked a pack of cigarettes a day for twenty or more years, but stopped
around 1970

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