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    922 F.2d 836 Unpublished Disposition: United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

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    1. John Taylor, an inmate, was placed in administrative segregation pending a criminal investigation into anonymous allegations against him. He was not informed of the reasons for his segregation until after his initial classification hearing. 2. Maryland prison regulations created a liberty interest for inmates in not being placed in administrative segregation without due process. Taylor was not provided adequate notice or opportunity to be heard to satisfy due process. 3. While the outcome may have been the same, procedural due process violations entitle Taylor to nominal damages. The case was remanded to determine if Taylor's due process rights were violated.

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    922 F.2d 836 Unpublished Disposition: United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

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    1. John Taylor, an inmate, was placed in administrative segregation pending a criminal investigation into anonymous allegations against him. He was not informed of the reasons for his segregation until after his initial classification hearing. 2. Maryland prison regulations created a liberty interest for inmates in not being placed in administrative segregation without due process. Taylor was not provided adequate notice or opportunity to be heard to satisfy due process. 3. While the outcome may have been the same, procedural due process violations entitle Taylor to nominal damages. The case was remanded to determine if Taylor's due process rights were violated.

    Original Description:

    Filed: 1991-01-02 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Citations: 922 F.2d 836 Docket: 90-6872

    Original Title

    John William Taylor, and Wayne Darnell Potter, James Brown, Thomas Arrington v. Fred Jordan, Commissioner of Corrections, Robert A. Harleston, Warden, Kathleen Green, Assistant Warden, Mrs. Powell, Classification Adm. Seg. Board, Mr. Bozman, Classification Counselor H.U. 4, R. Turkington, Co II Internal Investigator, H. Ward, Jr., Co II Internal Investigator, W. Hines, Sergeant H.U. 6 R. Breeden, Officer Basil, D. Evans, Co Ii, A. Gumpman, Co Ii, Officer Laird, Co Ii, R. Wells, Co Ii, T. Long, Co Ii, M. King, Lieutenant H.U. 4, Captain Edwards, Maryland State Police Investigator, Susan Donohue Landon, Co II, 922 F.2d 836, 4th Cir. (1991)

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    1. John Taylor, an inmate, was placed in administrative segregation pending a criminal investigation into anonymous allegations against him. He was not informed of the reasons for his segregation until after his initial classification hearing. 2. Maryland prison regulations created a liberty interest for inmates in not being placed in administrative segregation without due process. Taylor was not provided adequate notice or opportunity to be heard to satisfy due process. 3. While the outcome may have been the same, procedural due process violations entitle Taylor to nominal damages. The case was remanded to determine if Taylor's due process rights were violated.

    Copyright:

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    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    49 views6 pages

    922 F.2d 836 Unpublished Disposition: United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

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    Scribd Government Docs
    1. John Taylor, an inmate, was placed in administrative segregation pending a criminal investigation into anonymous allegations against him. He was not informed of the reasons for his segregation until after his initial classification hearing. 2. Maryland prison regulations created a liberty interest for inmates in not being placed in administrative segregation without due process. Taylor was not provided adequate notice or opportunity to be heard to satisfy due process. 3. While the outcome may have been the same, procedural due process violations entitle Taylor to nominal damages. The case was remanded to determine if Taylor's due process rights were violated.

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    of 6

    922 F.

    2d 836
    Unpublished Disposition

    NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of


    unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
    res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
    service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
    Circuit.
    John William TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant,
    and
    Wayne Darnell Potter, James Brown, Thomas Arrington,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    Fred JORDAN, Commissioner of Corrections, Robert A.
    Harleston, Warden, Kathleen Green, Assistant Warden, Mrs.
    Powell, Classification Adm. Seg. Board, Mr. Bozman,
    Classification Counselor H.U. # 4, R. Turkington, CO II
    Internal Investigator, H. Ward, Jr., CO II Internal
    Investigator, W. Hines, Sergeant H.U. # 6; R. Breeden,
    Officer Basil, D. Evans, CO II, A. Gumpman, CO II, Officer
    Laird, CO II, R. Wells, CO II, T. Long, CO II, M. King,
    Lieutenant H.U. # 4, Captain Edwards, Maryland State Police
    Investigator, Susan Donohue; Landon, CO II, DefendantsAppellees.
    No. 90-6872.

    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.


    Submitted Sept. 28, 1990.
    Decided Jan. 2, 1991.

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
    at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CA-89-2643-S)
    John William Taylor, appellant pro se.

    Glen William Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Md., for


    appellees.
    D.Md.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    Before MURNAGHAN, SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:

    John William Taylor appeals from the district court's order dismissing as to
    some defendants and granting summary judgment as to those who so moved, in
    his claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and the fourteenth, eighth, and
    first amendments. Our review of the record and the district court's opinion
    discloses that the appeal with respect to the eighth and first amendment claims
    is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court
    as to these issues. Taylor v. Johnson, CA-89-2643-S (D.Md. July 20, 1990). For
    the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand with respect to the
    fourteenth amendment due process claim.

    Taylor is an inmate at the Eastern Correctional Institution in Maryland. On


    June 23, 1989, he was taken out of the general population in the prison and
    placed on administrative segregation pending the outcome of a criminal
    investigation. On June 27, he received an initial hearing before the
    classification team. Appellant contends (and it is undisputed) that at the initial
    hearing, neither appellant nor the classification board knew the reasons for the
    administrative segregation at that time. The next day, appellant was given a
    "Notice of Assignment to Administrative Segregation." The notice indicated the
    reasons for assignment were (1) reason to believe that he was a threat to the
    security of the institution, and/or inmates, and/or staff, and (2) a pending
    criminal investigation.

    On July 3, 1989, Taylor was informed by Warden Harleston of the precise


    nature of the investigation. Namely, an investigation was being conducted as to
    the accuracy of an anonymous note, sent to the warden, that Taylor was
    involved in a drug and sexual relationship with one of the prison guards. Taylor
    was released upon termination of the investigation on July 26, 1989, after no
    basis was found for the allegations in the anonymous note.

    The liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth

    amendment may arise from the clause itself or from the laws of the states.
    Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). When the state imposes limits
    on discretion, it creates a liberty interest which is protected by the due process
    clause regardless of whether the limits imposed stem from statute, rule, or
    regulation. Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.Supp. 397, 402 (N.D.Cal.1976), aff'd,
    434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
    5

    A prison regulation creates a protected liberty interest where it imposes


    "substantive limitations on official discretion," Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
    238, 249 (1983), by using "language of an unmistakably mandatory character,
    requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed, ... and that
    administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive
    predicates." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983). The regulation at
    issue here is Division of Correction Regulation (DCR) 110-19, which
    establishes policy and procedure for the use of administrative segregation in the
    state's correctional institutions. To the extent that this regulation creates a
    liberty interest, denial of such liberty without process is protected by the due
    process clause.

    This court has previously considered the provisions of DCR 110-19 in


    Vandiver v. Haunbaker, No. 89-6238 (4th Cir. Aug. 24, 1984) (unpublished). It
    concluded that the policy and procedure outlined in the regulations did create a
    liberty interest. In so finding, the court recognized the mandatory language used
    and the specific procedures to be followed by prison officials when assigning
    prisoners to administrative segregation.*

    Having concluded that a liberty interest is implicated in this case, we must now
    determine what process appellant was entitled to after being placed in
    administrative segregation. This court recently held that minimum due process
    is determined by the constitution rather than the statutory or regulatory
    provisions at issue. In other words, the state was not required to follow its own
    state-created procedures. Riccio v. County of Fairfax, Va., 907 F.2d 1459 (4th
    Cir.1990).

    In the prison context, the Supreme Court in Helms held that "[a]n inmate must
    merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to
    present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to
    transfer him to administrative segregation." 459 U.S. at 476. The case
    elaborated in a footnote that notice must occur "within a reasonable time
    following an inmate's transfer, taking into account the relatively insubstantial
    private interest at stake and the traditionally broad discretion of prison
    officials." Id. at 476, n. 8.

    In this case, Taylor was not given notice of the reason for his assignment to
    administrative segregation until one day after his initial hearing. Furthermore,
    no one at that hearing had any idea why he was so placed. The regulations
    provide for review of administrative segregation cases every 30 days or upon
    request of the warden or other appropriate staff. (DCR 110-19, V. 7. a).
    However, appellant's case was not reviewed until the full thirty days had
    elapsed. The net result was that appellant was not given an opportunity to be
    heard on the reason for his assignment to administrative segregation until 34
    days after he had been so placed. The timing of the notice was not reasonable
    because it prevented appellant from presenting his side of the case at the initial
    hearing before the classification team. Further, the Supreme Court has held that
    "[s]egregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may violate due process if
    the postponement of procedural protection is not justified by apprehended
    emergency conditions." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 11 (1980). No such
    emergency conditions appear on the face of the record.

    10

    The notice that appellant was finally given also raises important due process
    considerations. It simply stated that he was under criminal investigation. Even
    if he knew this much before the initial hearing, it would probably be
    insufficient information to respond. Some amount of specificity would be
    necessary to insure a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue of
    whether probable cause existed to continue the investigation. See Helms, 459
    U.S. at 476-477. This is especially true when, as here, even the board reviewing
    appellant's status was unaware of the circumstances surrounding his placement.

    11

    The district court emphasized the fact that appellant's situation would have
    changed little, if at all, had he been given proper notice. However, we disagree
    that due process deprivations may be so easily dismissed. "[T]he right to
    procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense that it does not depend upon the
    merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, and because of the importance to
    organized society that procedural due process be observed...." Carey v. Piphus,
    435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). The net result is that appellant may be entitled to
    relief regardless of whether administrative segregation was, in fact, appropriate
    in his case.

    12

    This Court has held that although the de minimis nature of a constitutional
    violation may affect the amount of damages, it may not limit the right of action.
    Pritchard v. Perry, 508 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.1975). Thus, when procedural due
    process rights are denied, nominal damages may be presumed. Carey, 435 U.S.
    at 266; Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613 (4th Cir.1978) (interpreting Carey ). If the
    district court, on remand, finds that Taylor's due process rights were violated, it
    may award nominal damages regardless of whether he is able to prove actual

    injury.
    13

    The case is remanded for further proceedings with regard to the fourteenth
    amendment due process claim. We dispense with oral argument because the
    facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

    14

    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

    The exact wording of DCR 110-19 has undergone some changes since
    Vandiver was decided. The relevant provisions of the regulations in their
    present form are as follows:

    Policy:
    It is the policy of the Division of Correction to utilize administrative
    segregation when an inmate requires close supervision and segregation from
    the general inmate population.... Administrative segregation may be used to
    ensure the safety and security of the institution....
    VI. Procedure

    The procedure outlined below shall be used in placing inmates on


    administrative segregation
    ***

    Administrative segregation is to be used for custody and control purposes and


    not for punitive reasons. Administrative segregation shall be used for reasons
    such as:
    a. To prevent escapes, where reasons exists to believe the inmate to be an
    escape risk.
    b. When an inmate is under sentence of death, where such housing is deemed
    necessary.
    c. When reasons exists to believe an inmate is dangerous to the security of the
    institution, and/or inmates, and/or staff.

    Notification

    a. Within forty-eight (48) hours after placement on administrative segregation,


    the inmate shall be provided written notice specifying the reason for same....
    4

    Disposition at initial hearing


    a. Within ninety-six (96) hours after placement on administrative segregation,
    the inmate shall be seen by the classification team and given the opportunity to
    be heard as to whether or not he/she should be continued in this status.

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