Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,082, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,502 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 4th Cir. (1974)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,082, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,502 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 4th Cir. (1974)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,082, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,502 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 4th Cir. (1974)
2d 250
the Acts. The breaches are said to have been committed in the sale of
unregistered securities, 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77e, and by the
employment of false representations in their sale, 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. 78j, and Rule 10b-5 of the Commission, 17 CFR 240.10b-5.1
2
Summary judgment went for the defendants, and the Commission appeals. We
reverse.
The pattern3 of the spin-offs in each instance was this: Without any business
purpose of its own, Datronics would enter into an agreement with the principals
of a private company. The agreement provided for the organization by
Datronics of a new corporation, or the utilization of one of Datronics'
subsidiaries, and the merger of the private company into the new or subsidiary
corporation. It stipulated that the principals of the private company would
receive the majority interest in the merger-corporation. The remainder of the
stock of the corporation would be delivered to, or retained by, Datronics for a
nominal sum per share. Part of it would be applied to the payment of the
services of Datronics in the organization and administration of the proposed
spin-off, and to Datronics' counsel for legal services in the transaction.
Datronics was bound by each of the nine agreements to distribute among its
shareholders the rest of the stock.
Act, supra footnote 1, in that Datronics caused to be carried through the mails
an unregistered security 'for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale'.
Datronics was actually an issuer, or at least a co-issuer, and not exempted from
5 by 4(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 77d as 'any person other than an issuer'.
7
Datronics and the other appellees contend, and the District Court concluded,
that this type of transaction was not a sale. The argument is that it was no more
than a dividend parceled out to stockholders from its portfolio of investments.
A noteworthy difference here, however, is that each distribution was an
obligation. Their contention also loses sight of the definition of 'sale' contained
in 2 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77b. As pertinent here that definition is as
follows:
'(3) The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of
a security or interest in a security, for value. The term 'offer to sell', 'offer for
sale', or 'offer' shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value . . ..'
10
11
statutes. Further, the market and the public character of the spun-off stock were
fired and fanned by the issuance of shareholder letters announcing future spinoffs, and by information statements sent out to the shareholders.
12
13
II. The Commission charged a violation by Datronics and its officers of 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j, and of Rule 10b-5. The breach occurred through
untrue factual statements incident to the spin-offs. The District Court quite
justifiably found that 'in certain instances misleading statements were made by'
Datronics and the individual defendants. This finding was reiterated by the
District Court in discussing the announcements which were made to Datronics'
stockholders with each spin-off.
14
15
Since, however, the District Court was of the opinion that the distribution of
the stock among Datronics' shareholders was not a sale, it held that the
'misleading statements' were not outlawed by 10(b) or by Commission Rule
10b-5. These provisions condemn such misrepresentations only when they are
used 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security'. Inasmuch as we
believe there was a sale in each spin-off, we cannot agree with the District
Court's determination. See Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2 Cir. 1968 en banc), cert. denied, Coates v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 394 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 1454, 22 L.Ed.2d
756 (1969).
16
This was one of the trial court's reasons for not granting an injunction. Other
16
This was one of the trial court's reasons for not granting an injunction. Other
grounds were that there was no indication that in the future the defendants
might violate the statutes in suit; that the officers and agents who formulated
and executed the spin-offs were no longer connected with Datronics; and that
the present officers and agents assured the District Court that no more spin-offs
of this kind would be indulged in. Moreover, the Court felt that by its
interpretative releases the Commission had led Datronics and its codefendants
to believe that spin-offs were not proscribed by these statutes. The Court was
also persuaded by the failure of the Commission to act more vigilantly. While
the issuance of an injunction is discretionary, it seems to us that overall,
notwithstanding these considerations, the facts in this case warranted the grant
of an injunction. See United States v. Parke, davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47, 80
S.Ct. 503, 4 L.Ed.2d 505 (1960).
17
18
We cannot read the releases or letters of the Commission or its abstention from
earlier suits as evincing express or implied approval of the repeated and largescale violations as are here. The releases do not approve or condone a
campaign, such as Datronics engaged in, to develop means and opportunities to
promote spin-offs. Indeed, one of Datronics' agents was a 'finder' of
opportunities for spin-offs.
19
The dismissal order of the District Court will be vacated, and the cause
remanded for the entry of a judgment sustaining the appellant's motion for the
preliminary injunction sought in its complaint.
20
21
22
In regard to the injunction the Court notes the stressed reassurance, in the
petition and the accompanying affidavit, of the owners of a majority of
Datronics Engineers, Inc.'s stock that no more spin-offs would be undertaken,
that the majority stockholders will not vote their stock in the future for any
spin-off transactions or to elect as a director any person who would so vote, that
the principals involved in the challenged spin-offs are no longer associated with
Datronics, and that a merger of Datronics with another firm is in contemplation.
In these circumstances the Court apprehends that its direction to the District
Court to issue an injunction might have a punitive effect, which was not
intended, and disturb the proposed merger.
23
Therefore, the Court rescinds so much of its initial opinion as requires the trial
court to award a preliminary injunction, and in lieu thereof the cause is
remanded for a determination by the District Court, consistently with the
remainder of the opinion, of whether an injunction should or should not be
issued restraining Datronics in respect to such transactions as the opinion of the
Court declares to be impermissible. Nothing herein shall be construed as
prohibiting or directing the issuance of an injunction, and the District Court is
authorized to consider, if it sees fit, the bona fides of the merger asserted to be
in prospect.
24
In view of the foregoing decision upon the petition of Datronics Engineers, the
Court is satisfied that nothing would be gained by extending the time for the
appellees, Sylman I. Euzent and John T. Gauthier to file requests for a
rehearing, and their requests are denied.
25
No judge in regular active service or a member of the panel that rendered the
instant decision on appeal having requested a vote on the appellees' suggestion
for a rehearing in banc, such a rehearing is denied. Although ordinarily a
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a request by the court for an
answer to the petition for rehearing, instantly we deemed an answer
unnecessary. See FRAP 40(a).
WIDENER, Circuit Judge (concurring):
26
27
28
I note that the opinion of the court may not be broadly enough read to cast
doubt upon the legitimate business acquisition of one company by another, or
the legitimate business merger of two companies, although a market for
securities spun off as a consequence of the transfer may be thereby created; for,
as the opinion of the court recites, the market created by Datronics' spin-offs
was spurious, doubtless meaning illegitimate, however actual it might have
been, and Datronics caused the consummation of the transactions complained
of without any business purpose of its own.
29
In one or two instances, there was some variation in these mechanics, but there
was no deviation in principle from the plan