F. W. Pitts v. William B. Camp, Comptroller of The Currency of The United States, 463 F.2d 632, 4th Cir. (1972)

Download as pdf
Download as pdf
You are on page 1of 4

463 F.

2d 632

F. W. PITTS et al., Appellants,


v.
William B. CAMP, Comptroller of the Currency of the United
States, Appellee.
No. 71-1965.

United States Court of Appeals,


Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 7, 1972.
Decided June 28, 1972.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 30, 1972.

Benny R. Greer, Darlington, S. C. (Greer & Chandler, Darlington, S. C.,


on brief) for appellants.
Walter H. Fleischer, Atty., Dept. of Justice (L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Stanton R. Koppel and Robert E. Kopp, Attys., Dept. of
Justice, and John K. Grisso, U. S. Atty., and Wistar D. Stuckey, Asst. U.
S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.
Before BRYAN, BUTZNER and FIELD, Circuit Judges.
ALBERT V. BRYAN, Circuit Judge:

An application for the organization of The First National Bank of Hartsville,


South Carolina, was filed by F. W. Pitts and others with the Comptroller of the
Currency in August 1967, under the provisions of the laws of the United States,
12 U.S.C. Secs. 21-27.1 The request was rejected originally on April 15, 1968,
and upon reconsideration on July 29, 1969. The soul of the Comptroller's
decision was that "we were unable to reach a favorable conclusion as to the
need factor". (Accent added.) The determination was stated in letters from the
Comptroller to the applicants' attorney.

Concededly, the application complied with all of the statute's essentials. On that
basis, suit was brought in the District Court to compel the Comptroller to grant

the bank charter. No evidence was taken, decision going for the Comptroller on
his motion, with affidavits, for summary judgment. Appealing, the applicants
attack the denial on the ground that no hearing was granted them by the
Comptroller prior to his decision. Also, it is averred that his action was
arbitrary and capricious, wholly without supporting proof. Lastly, the
appellants assert that the need for a new bank is a factor beyond the
Comptroller's scope of consideration.
3

The District Judge upheld the Comptroller, although he was doubtful that the
statute "commits the determination of * * * need to the Comptroller's
discretion". However, he was persuaded by the "long and continued practice of
the Comptroller of considering the need of the community". Continuing he
said, "Although acknowledging that the plaintiffs presented a convincing case
in favor of establishment of their bank, the court cannot say that the conclusion
of the Comptroller is not adequately supported under the substantial evidence
rule."

It is unnecessary, we think, to discuss the separate assignments of error ascribed


by the appellants to the District Court. This is because in itself the ruling of the
Comptroller is unacceptable. It does not comply with the bare, fundamental
principle of agency decision: that its basis must be stated. FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 92 S.Ct. 898, 31 L.Ed.2d 170 (1972). Sperry
reiterated the precept of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94, 63 S.Ct. 454,
87 L.Ed. 626 (1943), that "[t]he orderly functioning of the process of review
requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly
disclosed . . . ." 405 U.S. at 249, 92 S.Ct. at 907. Indeed, the review of the
agency action, and relief from any error therein, assured by sections 10(a), (b),
and (e) (B) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 702, 703 and
706(2), would be impossible without a statement of such grounds. That the
judicial review provisions of the Act apply to the Comptroller is unmistakably
written in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 156-157, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).

Even a cursory reading of the Comptroller's pronouncement here exposes his


failure to observe the insistence of the law that the ground of determination be
avowed. To begin with, the first word of the charter's denial appears in this
brief letter to plaintiffs' counsel:

6"Dear Mr. Herring:


7
"This
will confirm our telegram of today's date regarding the application submitted
by you and your associates to organize a National Bank at Hartsville, South

Carolina.
8 the basis of information developed by our Field Investigation, together with all
"On
other pertinent data relating to the proposal, we have concluded that the factors in
support of the establishment of a new National Bank in this area are not favorable.
9"We regret to inform you that the application has been disapproved."
10

The Comptroller's response to the request for reconsideration of his initial


ruling was likewise embraced in a letter:

11 have carefully considered the various material developed in connection with the
"We
reconsideration of an application for a new National Bank at Hartsville, South
Carolina, filed by you and your associates. This review included all of the material
submitted by you at various times since the disapproval of the application in April of
1968, as well as the material developed during the course of the most recent field
investigation by a National Bank Examiner.
12 and the members of the group would be less than human not to feel strongly
"You
on this question which is of such importance to you. On each application we
endeavor to develop the need and convenience factors in conjunction with all other
banking factors and in this case we were unable to reach a favorable conclusion as to
the need factor. The record reflects that this market area is now served by the
Peoples Bank with deposits of $7.2MM, The Bank of Hartsville with deposits of
$12.8MM, The First Federal Savings and Loan Association with deposits of
$5.4MM, The Mutual Savings and Loan Association with deposits of $8.2MM and
the Sonoco Employees Credit Union with deposits of $6.5MM. The aforementioned
are as of December 31, 1968.
13 was a difficult case and you and your associates certainly presented your side of
"It
the case with fairness and diligence. We are unable to find any basis to change the
decision as rendered. All we can say to you is that we did give this matter the most
meticulous consideration and reached a conclusion contrary to what you had
sought."
14

Assuming that "need" is a factor to be considered in chartering a bank,


obviously the Comptroller did not explain what was embraced in that concept.
Questions immediately arising are, for example, whether the need is that of
corporate or individual borrowers, local or non-resident depositors, mercantile
or development capital, or the creation of desirable competition. Reasonably
imaginable are other areas of pertinent consideration, untouched in the
Comptroller's communications. Thus upon review, we cannot distinguish what
specific factors were considered by the Comptroller, nor whether in denying

the application he acted within permissible bounds of discretion.


15

Consequently we must vacate the judgment of the District Court. Since the
Comptroller has twice inadequately and inarticulately resolved the appellants'
presentation, we remand the cause for a trial de novo before the District Court
rather than to the Comptroller for further consideration. The charter aspirants
will open the trial with proof of their application and compliance with the
statutory inquiries, and proffer of any other relevant evidence. Testimony may
then be adduced by the Comptroller or intervenors manifesting opposition, if
any, to the new bank. Thereupon the District Judge will determine, upon a
statement of his findings of fact and conclusions of law, whether the appellants
have shown by a preponderance of evidence that the Comptroller's ruling is
capricious or an abuse of discretion. First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield, North
Carolina v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 271-272 (4 Cir. 1965).

16

Vacated and Remanded.

ORDER DENYING REHEARING


17

Upon consideration of the petition of the appellee, William B. Camp,


Comptroller of the Currency, of the United States, for a rehearing by the
original panel of the court and a rehearing en banc, and the panel being of the
opinion to deny a rehearing and no judge of the court requesting an en banc
rehearing, it is

18

Ordered that the said petition be, and it is hereby, denied.

It is to be noted that this case involves the original establishment of a national


bank, and not a question of allowing the creation of a branch to an existing
institution. The latter is covered by 12 U.S.C. Sec. 36(c) and is the subject of
the more frequent precedents, such for example as First-Citizens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Camp, 409 F.2d 1086 (4 Cir. 1969)

You might also like