United States v. Robert Medley, 976 F.2d 728, 4th Cir. (1992)

976 F.
2d 728
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of

unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert MEDLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-5897.
United States Court of Appeals,

Fourth Circuit.
Argued: June 5, 1992
Decided: September 11, 1992
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, District Judge. (CR-90188)
Harold Johnson Bender, LAW OFFICES OF HAROLD J. BENDER,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Frank DeArmon Whitney, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Thomas J. Ashcraft, United States Attorney, Gretchen C. F. Shappert,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
W.D.N.C.
AFFIRMED.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, and MERHIGE,
Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia,
sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
OPINION
1
Appellant Robert Medley was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute in excess of five (5) kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
846 (1988). He has filed this appeal seeking reversal of his conviction on the
following three grounds: (1) Appellant assigns error to the trial court's joinder
of three indictments for trial, (2) Appellant assigns reversible error to the trial
court's admission of expert testimony concerning the street value of cocaine
and (3) Appellant assigns several errors to the trial court's application of the
sentencing guidelines in computing Appellant's sentence. For the following
reasons, this Court disagrees with Appellant's contentions and affirms the
decision below.
On December 12, 1990, two indictments were issued. The first, No. 90-188,
charged Appellant and Walter Lee Chambers ("Chambers"), as well as eleven
other individuals, with violating 21 U.S.C. 846 by allegedly conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C.s 841(a)(1) and 843(b) (hereinafter "drug conspiracy").
On that same day, Chambers, James Isaac Johnson ("Johnson"), and twenty-one
other individuals were charged in a second indictment, No. 90-186, with a
conspiracy to engage in illegal gambling and money laundering (hereinafter
"money laundering conspiracy"). Appellant was not referred to in this
indictment.
Still another indictment, No. 91-87 (hereinafter"added drug conspiracy"), was

issued on June 3, 1991, mirroring the drug indictment of January 19, 1990,
charging Johnson as sole defendant. This indictment named various individuals,
including Appellant and Chambers as co-conspirators.
On June 21, 1991, the United States moved the court to consolidate Docket
Numbers C-CR-90-186-MU ("drug conspiracy"), C-CR-90188-MU ("money
laundering conspiracy") and C-CR-91-87-MU ("added drug conspiracy").
Chambers supported this motion and Appellant objected.
The court, in granting the motion, found as follows:
6
That
the defendants charged in the three indictments are alleged to have participated
in the same series of transgressions and that these acts or transgressions are
connected together or constitute part of a common scheme or plan. Therefore,
joinder of these actions is proper under Rule 8(a) and (b).

7
The court went on to find that the joinder would not unfairly prejudice
Appellant.
The record reflects that by the time of trial only three defendants remained:
Appellant, Chambers and Johnson. The record further reflects that apparently
33 of the 36 original defendants had entered into plea agreements with the
government.
The court's decision to allow joinder of the indictments and trial is one which is
to be reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. See United
States v. LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
Santoni, 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1978).
10
The propriety of allowing joinder of indictments is governed by Rule 8(a)-(b)

Fed. R. Crim. Proc., as well as Rule 13, Fed. R. Crim. Proc.
11
Among the factors to consider with regard to the issue of separate trials, a trial
court must weigh the inconvenience and expense to the government and
witnesses of separate trials against the prejudice to the defendants inherent in a
joint trial. The trial court's determination in this regard is not to be disturbed
unless the denial of a severance deprives a defendant of a fair trial and results in
a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d at 674.
12
We cannot from this record find any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
judge, nor can we find any miscarriage of justice. Indeed, overwhelming
evidence was presented against Appellant. The inculpating evidence was
supplied to a great extent by his co-conspirators.
13
The record reflects that the consolidated "drug indictments" were mirror images
of each other and could not possibly have caused any confusion in the minds of
the jurors. The slight difference between the two is simply that in drug
indictment 90-188, Appellant, Chambers and a number of other parties were
named as defendants, while in drug indictment 91-87, only Johnson was a
named defendant; Appellant, Chambers and others were, insofar as that
indictment reflected, unindicted co-conspirators. Money-laundering indictment
90-186, while not naming Appellant as either a defendant or a co-conspirator,
named both Chambers and Johnson as defendants along with a number of other
individuals.
14
Moreover, the trial court was sensitive to the defense's concern regarding the
joinder and reminded the jury a number of times that Appellant was not on trial
for money laundering. See United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir.
1987), United States v. Cole, 857 F.2d 971, 974 (4th Cir. 1988).
15
Appellant's reliance upon United States v. Goss, 329 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1964),
is misplaced. In Goss, a number of defendants were indicted in a one count,
single conspiracy which the evidence disclosed contained, in fact, multiple
conspiracies. In the instant case, separate conspiracies for separate criminal
conduct, all constituting a common scheme or plan, were alleged and proved.
16
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of
an officer of the Vice and Narcotics Bureau of the Charlotte Police Department.
His testimony dealt with the retail street cost of a kilogram of cocaine in
Charlotte, North Carolina, during the period of the alleged cocaine conspiracy
for which the defendant was indicted. In addition to the trained officer's
testimony, a number of co-conspirators testified as to the highest and lowest
amount of currency that they had either handled or seen while engaging in and
associated with their illegal drug activities at what was known as a drug house.
We find it not unusual that the average layman inexperienced in the operations
of cutting, bagging and retailing cocaine would have little or no knowledge of
its worth. The testimony of the officer as well as that of the co-conspirators is
both relevant and of intended assistance to the jury in determining the value of
the drugs involved in Appellant's drug indictment. See United States v. Safari,
849 F.2d 891, 895 (4th Cir. 1988).
17
In addition to the testimony already referred to, a special agent of the IRS
Criminal Investigation Division testified regarding the quantity of cocaine
distributed. Appellant's contention that such testimony was cumulative is
simply not tenable. At the very least, it corroborated the testimony of other
witnesses including the Charlotte Police Officer.
18
Even if this Court were to conclude that the admission of the testimony was
error, harmless error applies. As stated in United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174,
177 (4th Cir. 1990), the test for harmless error is whether it is "clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty" without
the testimony of either the Charlotte Police Officer or the special agent of the
IRS Criminal Investigation Division. Indeed, the evidence was overwhelming
as to not only the defendant's guilt, but the quantity of cocaine involved in his
conspiracy.
19
Appellant also maintains that the trial court erred in computing his base offense
level in denying his motion to adjust his criminal history category as applied to
the sentencing guidelines. Under United States Sentencing Guidelines
1B1.3(n)(1), a defendant is held "accountable" for "criminal activity [of the
conspiracy] that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant." The evidence
disclosed that the defendant had been involved in a conspiracy for more than
forty months; in addition, he was described as a tough manager by one of his
codefendants, and the district court which heard the testimony specifically
found that the appropriate offense level was 34 (for the distribution of 15-50
kilograms of cocaine). The evidence fully supported the trial court's conclusion
in this regard.
20
Appellant's contention that it was improper for the court to place his base
offense level higher than those of his co-defendants who entered into plea
agreements is fallacious. Defendant may not challenge his sentence on the
ground that a co-conspirator "was sentenced differently." See United States v.
Cough, 907 F.2d 1441, 1447 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Pearce,
893 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 1990).
21
Lastly, the defendant contends that the court had inappropriately considered
what he believes was an unconstitutional misdemeanor conviction in 1981. That
conviction was recorded on a 3 X 5 card instead of a certified judgment and
conviction form. Though one may be critical of the manner in which the
convicting court maintains its records, that has no effect on the validity of the
conviction. The district court was well within its power in considering the
misdemeanor conviction shown by the record of the clerk of the convicting
court.
22
Thus, in view of the foregoing, Appellant's conviction and sentence are
23
AFFIRMED.

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976 F.

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of

United States Court of Appeals,

Appellant Robert Medley was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to

Still another indictment, No. 91-87 (hereinafter"added drug conspiracy"), was

The court, in granting the motion, found as follows:

joinder of these actions is proper under Rule 8(a) and (b).

The propriety of allowing joinder of indictments is governed by Rule 8(a)-(b)

Thus, in view of the foregoing, Appellant's conviction and sentence are

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