United States v. Reyes-Marquez, 4th Cir. (2011)

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4942
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
JOSE JAVIER REYES-MARQUEZ,
Defendant Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00155-JAB-1)
Submitted:
March 14, 2011
Decided:
April 4, 2011
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,

Assistant
Federal
Public
Defender,
Winston-Salem,
North
Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley E. Rand, United States
Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose
Javier
Reyes-Marquez
was
convicted
of
bank
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d) (2006), and

use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) (2006).
He served his
active sentence and was released to supervision in September

2007.
After learning that Reyes-Marquez had been arrested by
North Carolina authorities, his probation officer petitioned the

district
court
to
revoke
supervised
release.
Reyes-Marquez
admitted the violations, and the district court sentenced him to

thirty-six
months
imprisonment
as
to
Count
One,
to
run
consecutively to a twenty-four-month sentence as to Count Two.

This appeal followed.
Reyes-Marquez
challenges
the
substantive
reasonableness of his supervised release revocation sentences. *

He concedes that the Guidelines instruct courts to impose such a
sentence
to
run
consecutively
defendant
is
serving,
authority
to
order
the
and
to
that
sentences
the
any
other
district
here
to
sentence
court
run
had
the
the
consecutively.
However, Reyes-Marquez contends that the cumulative effect of

imposing the maximum sentence on each count, consecutive to each
Reyes-Marquez
does
not
reasonableness of his sentences.
contest
the
procedural
other and to the state and federal sentences underpinning the

release
violation,
renders
his
sentence
plainly
unreasonable.
We affirm.
We review the sentence under the plainly-unreasonable
standard.
See United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546
(4th Cir. 2010).
The
first
step
in
this
review
requires
determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable.

States v.
initial
Crudup,
inquiry
461
takes
F.3d
a
433,
more
438
(4th Cir. 2006).
deferential
appellate
United
This
posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than

reasonableness
review
for
[G]uidelines
sentences.
United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439) (applying plainly-unreasonable standard
of review for probation revocation).
procedurally
or
substantively
Only if the sentence is
unreasonable
does
the
inquiry
proceed to the second step of the analysis to determine whether

the sentence is plainly unreasonable.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-
39.
A sentence imposed on revocation of supervised release
is
substantively
reasonable
if
the
district
court
stated
proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the

sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
court
need
revocation
not
be
sentence
as
detailed
as
it
or
must
specific
be
Id. at 440.
when
when
imposing
imposing
A
a
a
post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement

of reasons for the sentence imposed.
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court did not exceed the statutory
maximum, see 18 U.S.C.
924(c)(1)(A)(i), 2113(d), 3559(a),
3583(b), and we conclude that the court stated a proper basis

for the sentence imposed.
The district court recognized that
the policy statement range under the Guidelines was fifteen to

twenty-one months, but it determined that such a sentence would
be insufficient because of the Defendants extensive history of
violent
conduct.
Instead,
the
district
court
imposed
sentence within the statutory maximum sentence for each count,

stating that, given the nature and circumstances of the case,
imposing such a sentence was necessary to meet the sentencing
objectives
of
punishment
and
deterrence
[and
to],
provide
protection for the public.

Accordingly, we affirm the district courts judgment.
We
dispense
with
oral
argument
because
the
facts
and
legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

March 14, 2011

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d) (2006), and

active sentence and was released to supervision in September

After learning that Reyes-Marquez had been arrested by

North Carolina authorities, his probation officer petitioned the

admitted the violations, and the district court sentenced him to

consecutively to a twenty-four-month sentence as to Count Two.

reasonableness of his supervised release revocation sentences. *

However, Reyes-Marquez contends that the cumulative effect of

other and to the state and federal sentences underpinning the

See United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546

(4th Cir. 2010).

determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable.

(4th Cir. 2006).

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than

Only if the sentence is

proceed to the second step of the analysis to determine whether

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-

proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the

post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547

(internal quotation marks omitted).

924(c)(1)(A)(i), 2113(d), 3559(a),

3583(b), and we conclude that the court stated a proper basis

The district court recognized that

the policy statement range under the Guidelines was fifteen to

sentence within the statutory maximum sentence for each count,

protection for the public.

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

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