United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

763 F.
2d 625
119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2903, 103 Lab.Cas. P 11,493
Jane C. TRIPLETT, Appellant,

v.
The BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND
STEAMSHIP CLERKS,
FREIGHT HANDLERS, EXPRESS AND STATION
EMPLOYEES, LOCAL LODGE
NO. 308, a labor organization affiliated with The
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks,
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees; The
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks,
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, a labor
organization; and The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Company,
a corporation, Appellees.
No. 84-1697.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued March 4, 1985.
Decided June 4, 1985.
George A. Stolze, Huntington, W.Va., for appellant.

John A. Edmond, Washington, D.C., William C. Beatty, Huntington,
W.Va., (Joseph Guerrieri, Jr., Highsaw & Mahoney, P.C., Washington,
D.C., Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, Huntington, W.Va., on
brief), for appellees.
Before HALL and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH,
Senior Circuit Judge.
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:
Jane C. Triplett appeals from an order of the district court granting summary
judgment for defendants, the International and local chapter of the Brotherhood
of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks (the "union") and Chesapeake and
Ohio Railway Company ("C & O"). We reverse and remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings on the basis of recent precedent in this
Circuit which we find to be controlling.
On June 27, 1979, Triplett filed in the district court sitting in the Southern
District of West Virginia a complaint pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq. Triplett alleged that her employer, C & O, had breached
the applicable collective bargaining agreement by wrongfully terminating her
employment on July 14, 1977, and that her union had breached its duty of fair
representation in the handling of her subsequent grievance.
In 1984, the district court dismissed Triplett's action, concluding that it was
barred by retroactive application of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103
S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). In DelCostello, the Supreme Court held
that the applicable statute of limitations for breach of contract/duty of fair
representation claims brought pursuant to Sec. 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, was the six-month limitations period for
filing an unfair labor practice charge under Sec. 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b).
On appeal, Triplett contends that her action was timely under the two-year
statute of limitations set forth in the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153
First (r), for judicial review of awards of the National Railway Adjustment
Board ("NRAB"). Alternatively, she argues that the decision in DelCostello
should not be applied retroactively in her case. We reject Triplett's argument
under the Railway Labor Act, but agree with her that, under the circumstances
of this case, retroactive application of DelCostello is not warranted.
45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (r) provides that:
All actions at law based upon the provisions of this section shall be begun
within two years from the time the cause of action accrues under the award of
the division of the Adjustment Board, and not after.
On its face, the two-year limitations period applies only to actions to review an
award of the NRAB, and not to actions alleging the failure to obtain an award.
As the Third Circuit reasoned in Sisco v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 732 F.2d
1188, 1193-94 (3d Cir.1984):

7
[T]he
nature of judicial review of a Board order is very different from that
appropriate to DFR [duty of fair representation] proceedings. Board awards are
reviewed under a narrow standard of review. The award on its face provides
sufficient information for the reviewing court to exercise the requisite narrow scope
of review. In a DFR claim for failure to bring a claim to the Board, in contrast, the
inquiry is entirely distinct. The relevant question is whether the union discriminated
or acted arbitrarily in failing to prosecute the claim during the limitation period
prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement. Because these claims need not be
exhausted before the Board, evidence must be taken by the trial court on the union's
conduct during the contractual limitation period. There is a federal interest in the
prompt resolution of these evidentiary disputes, especially in the collective
bargaining context. Nothing suggests that the two-year limitation period for review
of Board orders, which is peculiarly appropriate to our standard of review over those
orders, would also be an appropriate limitation period on DFR claims. Thus, the
two-year period of section 153 First (r) is not attuned to the proper balance of
interests in DFR litigation.
8
(citations and footnotes omitted).
The Circuits which have considered the question have uniformly concluded that
the limitations period announced in DelCostello for breach of contract/duty of
fair representation claims under Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act applies with equal force to similar claims brought pursuant to the Railway
Labor Act.1 We agree that DelCostello 's six-month limitations period will
ordinarily govern actions under the Railway Labor Act for breach of contract
and breach of the union's duty of fair representation. Nevertheless, we find that,
on the basis of this Court's recent decision in Zemonick v. Consolidation Coal
Co., 762 F.2d 381 (4th Cir.1985), the district court erred in dismissing Triplett's
action. In Zemonick, the majority concluded that retroactive application of
DelCostello 's six-month rule was not warranted in a West Virginia case, like
Triplett's, brought for breach of contract/duty of fair representation. The Court
in Zemonick noted that before DelCostello West Virginia plaintiffs had clear
past precedent from this Circuit indicating that such actions were governed by
West Virginia's five-year statute of limitations for oral contracts. Kennedy v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 81 L.R.R.M. 2349, 69 CCH Labor Cases p
12,980 (4th Cir.1972). See also Howard v. Aluminum Workers International
Union, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.1978). We conclude that the reasoning in
Zemonick is equally applicable to the facts of this case and that Triplett's
action, which was filed within two years of her discharge, is, consequently, not
barred by limitations.
10
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below is reversed and this matter is
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
11
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Barnett v. United Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358, 363-64 (10th Cir.1984);
Welyczko v. U.S. Air, Inc., 733 F.2d 239, 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984); Sisco v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 732
F.2d 1188, 1192 (3d Cir.1984); Hunt v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 729 F.2d 578,
581 (8th Cir.1984); Ranieri v. United Transportation Union, 743 F.2d 598, 600601 (7th Cir.1984)

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763 F.

Jane C. TRIPLETT, Appellant,

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

George A. Stolze, Huntington, W.Va., for appellant.

1188, 1193-94 (3d Cir.1984):

(citations and footnotes omitted).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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