United States v. Lord, 4th Cir. (2010)

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-5043

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LYNN LORD,
Defendant Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00274-1)

Submitted:

July 20, 2010

Before KING and


Circuit Judge.

SHEDD,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

August 19, 2010

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Donald Cowan, Jr., Heather H. Wright, ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP,


Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael A. DeFranco,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Christopher
written

plea

Lynn

agreement,

Lord
to

pled

one

guilty,

count

of

pursuant

using

to

interstate

commerce to attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a


minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, * in violation of
18 U.S.C.

2422(b)

(2006).

The

district

court

calculated

Lords Guidelines range at 235 to 293 months imprisonment, see


U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2006), and sentenced Lord to
235

months

release.

imprisonment

and

twenty-five

Lord timely appealed.

years

supervised

On appeal, counsel has filed a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in


which he raises two sentencing issues.

Lord has filed a pro se

supplemental brief raising several sentencing challenges and a


challenge to his conviction.

We affirm.

Counsel questions whether the district court erred in


denying

Lords

Guidelines range.

request

for

variant

sentence

below

the

However, a district courts refusal to depart

from the applicable Guidelines range does not provide a basis


for appeal under 18 U.S.C. 3742(a) (2006), unless the court
failed to understand its authority to do so.
Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008).
*

United States v.

After review of the

Specifically, the indictment alleged that the sexual


activity would violate N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-202.1 (2009), which
prohibits taking indecent liberties with a minor.

record, we find no evidence that the district court failed to


understand its authority to impose a below-Guidelines sentence.
Accordingly, this claim is not cognizable on appeal.
Turning to the sentence imposed, we review it under a
deferential

abuse-of-discretion

standard.

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).


must

first

ensure

that

Gall

v.

United

In conducting this review, we

the

district

court

committed

no

significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or


improperly

calculating)

the

Guidelines

range,

treating

the

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]


3553(a)

[(2006)]

factors,

selecting

sentence

based

on

clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the


chosen sentence.

Id. at 51.

When rendering a sentence, the

district court must make an individualized assessment based on


the facts presented, United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted),
and must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for
meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of
fair

sentencing,

Gall,

552

U.S.

at

50.

When

imposing

sentence within the Guidelines, however, the [district courts]


explanation

need

not

be

elaborate

or

lengthy

because

[G]uidelines sentences themselves are in many ways tailored to


the individual and reflect approximately two decades of close
attention

to

federal

sentencing
3

policy.

United

States

v.

Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Once we have determined that the sentence is free of
procedural

error,

reasonableness

of

we
the

must

consider

sentence,

the

tak[ing]

substantive

into

account

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

totality of the circumstances.

the

If the

sentence is within the appropriate Guidelines range, we apply a


presumption on appeal that the sentence is reasonable.

United

States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008).
Lord

challenges

the

district

courts

calculation

of

the base offense level on the basis that the presentence report
(PSR), which the district court adopted, improperly found him
to be a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors, see
USSG 4B1.5.

Lord, however, has not offered any evidence to

the contrary or specifically explained why the PSR is inaccurate


or unreliable.

His mere disagreement with the PSRs assessment

of his behavior, particularly on appeal for the first time, is,


without

more,

insufficient

dispute.

See

(4th Cir.

1990).

United

to

States

Because

put
v.

Lord

the

PSRs

Terry,

916

failed

to

findings
F.2d

make

the

157,

into
162

required

affirmative showing that the PSR was inaccurate or unreliable,


the

district

court

findings . . . without

more

was

free

specific

to

inquiry

adopt
or

[its]

explanation.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We accordingly affirm

the district courts calculation of Lords base offense level.


Additionally, we conclude that the district court did
not

otherwise

sentence.

commit

The

reversible

court

procedural

correctly

error

calculated

in

imposing

the

advisory

Guidelines range and heard argument from counsel and allocution


from

Lord.

The

court

considered

the

3553(a)

factors

and

explained that the within-Guidelines sentence was warranted in


light of the nature and circumstances of the offense, Lords
history and characteristics, and the need to protect the public
from further crimes by Lord.

Further, neither counsel nor Lord

offers any grounds to rebut the presumption on appeal that the


within-Guidelines

sentence

of

235

months

imprisonment

is

substantively reasonable.
Next,

counsel

questions

whether

the

district

court

erred in not ordering the 235-month imprisonment term to run


concurrently to the prison term Lord was then serving for a
violation of his state probation.

However, as the prison term

Lord

sentencing

was

serving

at

the

time

of

for

the

subject

federal conviction pertained to an unrelated state conviction,


the district court was free to impose a concurrent, partially
concurrent,

or

consecutive

sentence

5G1.3(c), p.s.

on

Lord.

See

USSG

In his pro se brief, Lord contends that the district


court erred by failing to consider USSG 5G1.3(c), p.s., when
it

ordered

the

235-month

prison

term

to

run

consecutive

to,

rather than concurrent with, his undischarged state prison term.


Although

we

ordinarily

review

legal

questions

concerning

the

application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, see United


States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010), where a
defendant argues on appeal that the district court erred in its
consideration

of

USSG

5G1.3

p.s.,

but

did

not

invoke

the

Guideline or argue that he was entitled to a concurrent sentence


in the district court, we review only for plain error, United
States v. Rouse, 362 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2004).
not

demonstrated

error

under

either

standard

Lord has

of

review.

Although the district court did not specifically mention USSG


5G1.3(c), p.s., at the sentencing hearing, the provision was
cited in the PSR, and it is clear from the record that the
district court considered the PSR as well as the arguments by
counsel for and against a concurrent sentence.
can

fairly

infer

that

the

district

court

Accordingly, we
considered

5G1.3(c), p.s., and Lord has not shown any error.

USSG

See United

States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995) (A [district]


court need not engage in ritualistic incantation in order to
establish its consideration of a legal issue.

It is sufficient

if . . . the district court rules on issues that have been fully


6

presented for determination.

Consideration is implicit in the

court's ultimate ruling.).


Lord also raises a pro se challenge to the courts
imposition

of

special

release

providing

control

any

that

sexually

condition
he

not

of

his

view,

explicit

term

of

purchase,

materials

supervised

possess,

including,

but

or
not

limited to[,] pictures, magazines, video tapes, movies, or any


material obtained through access to any computer or any material
linked to computer access or use.

Because Lord did not object

to the special condition at the time of sentencing, we review


See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez,

only for plain error.

441 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2006).


we

conclude

that

the

condition

After review of the record,


is

reasonable,

given

Lords

background and the need for the district court to protect the
public.

Lord thus fails to show plain error.


Turning to Lords conviction, because he did not move

in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, the Fed. R.


Crim. P. 11 hearing is reviewed for plain error.

See United

States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002).


review

of

the

transcript

of

the

plea

hearing

leads

Our
us

to

conclude that the district court substantially complied with the


mandates

of

Critically,

Rule
the

11

in

transcript

accepting
reveals

Lords

that

the

guilty

plea.

district

court

ensured the plea was supported by an independent factual basis


7

and that Lord entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily with an
understanding
DeFusco,

of

949

the

F.2d

consequences.
114,

116,

See

United

119-20

(4th

States

Cir.

v.

1991).

Accordingly, no plain error occurred in the conduct of the plea


proceeding.

Finally, we reject as unsupported by the record

Lords claim that he is actually innocent of the offense to


which he pled guilty because the Government failed to show that
the activity he attempted to induce was sexual activity.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
review.

We

therefore

affirm

the

district

courts

judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Lord, in writing, of the


right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review.

If Lord requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then


counsel

may

move

representation.

in

and

materials

legal
before

court

for

leave

to

withdraw

from

Counsels motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Lord.


facts

this

We dispense with oral argument because the

contentions
the

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in

the

aid

the

decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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