Unpublished

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4123
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MORRIS EDWARD BRIDGERS, a/k/a Muzak,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:13-cr-00183-BO-3)
Submitted:
January 29, 2015
Decided:
February 23, 2015
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion.
Jenna Turner Blue, BLUE STEPHENS & FELLERS LLP, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Morris Edward Bridgers appeals his conviction and 200month sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 (2012).
On
appeal,
Bridgers
challenges
the
adequacy
of
the
district
courts Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and argues that the district

courts
explanation
of
its
sentence
was
insufficient. *
The
Government contends that the district courts errors during the

plea colloquy were harmless and that Bridgers waived his right
to
appeal
his
sentence.
We
affirm
Bridgers
conviction
and
dismiss the appeal of his sentence.

Bridgers first challenges the district courts Rule 11
colloquy.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court
must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant

of, and determines he understands, the nature of the charge to
which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);
Bridgers counsel originally filed a brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
However, after our
independent review of the record, we ordered counsel to file a
merits brief.
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
In
reviewing
the
adequacy
of
compliance
with
Rule
11,
this
Court should accord deference to the trial courts decision as

to
how
best
defendant.
move
to
to
conduct
the
mandated
DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116.
withdraw
his
guilty
plea
colloquy
with
the
Because Bridgers did not
in
the
district
court
or
otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, we review

the plea colloquy for plain error.
278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 2002).
United States v. General,

In the guilty plea context,
a defendant demonstrates plain error by show[ing] a reasonable

probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered
the plea.
United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that the district courts omissions did
not affect Bridgers substantial rights.
Some of the omitted
information was contained in the written plea agreement, which

Bridgers signed.
failure
to
Next, we conclude that the district courts
advise
Bridgers
of
its
obligations
to
order
restitution and any applicable forfeitures were harmless because

neither were ordered in this case and Bridgers was informed he
faced
maximum
fine
of
$10,000,000.
Cf.
United
States
v.
Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 465-66 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that
district courts failure to inform defendant of authority to
order restitution was harmless where court informed defendant he
3
faced maximum fine in excess of restitution eventually ordered).

Finally, the courts failure to explain the nature of supervised
release
was
supervised
harmless
release
because
that
the
Bridgers
than his potential maximum.
term
of
actually
incarceration
received
were
and
less
See United States v. Good, 25 F.3d
218, 220 (4th Cir. 1994) ([F]ailure to discuss the nature of

supervised release is harmless error if the combined sentence of
incarceration and supervised release actually received by the
defendant is less than the maximum term he was told he could
receive.).
We therefore affirm the judgment with respect to
Bridgers conviction.
Bridgers also argues that the district court failed to
adequately explain its chosen sentence.
The Government responds
that Bridgers waived his right to appeal his sentence.
When the
Government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and did not breach

its obligations under the plea agreement, we enforce the waiver
if
it
was
knowing
and
intelligent
appeal fall within its scope.
and
the
issues
raised
on
United States v. Copeland, 707
F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013).
We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo.
United
States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010).

To determine whether an appeal waiver is knowingly and
intelligently
entered,
we
examine
circumstances,
including
the
defendants
4
the
totality
experience,
of
the
conduct,
educational
terms.
background,
General,
278
and
familiarity
F.3d
at
400.
with
the
Other
agreements
factors
to
be
considered are whether the waiver language in the plea agreement

was
unambiguous
whether
the
regarding
the
waiver of his right to appeal during the Rule 11 colloquy.
Id.
district
court
and
fully
plainly
embodied,
questioned
the
and
defendant
at 400-401; see United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th
Cir. 1991).
We
voluntary.
conclude
that
Bridgers
waiver
was
knowing
and
Although the district court did not specifically
question Bridgers as to whether he specifically understood the

appellate
waiver
provision
of
the
agreement,
the
court
did
specifically discuss the waiver when describing the terms of the

agreement, and Bridgers affirmed that he had agreed to the terms
described by the court.
Bridgers also confirmed that he was
thirty years old, had a ninth-grade education, could read and

understand English, and that he had had sufficient opportunity
to consult with his attorney.
Moreover, the language of the
plea waiver is clear and unambiguous, waiving Bridgers right to

appeal whatever sentence was imposed, excluding only a sentence
in
excess
sentencing.
of
the
advisory
Guidelines
range
determined
at
Because Bridgers sentence is below that range, the
issue he seeks to appeal falls directly within the scope of his

waiver.
We therefore dismiss the appeal of his sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
We
dispense
with
oral
argument
because
the
facts
and
legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this

court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

January 29, 2015

February 23, 2015

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

courts Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and argues that the district

Government contends that the district courts errors during the

dismiss the appeal of his sentence.

Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court

must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);

Bridgers counsel originally filed a brief pursuant to

Court should accord deference to the trial courts decision as

DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116.

Because Bridgers did not

otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, we review

United States v. General,

a defendant demonstrates plain error by show[ing] a reasonable

United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Some of the omitted

information was contained in the written plea agreement, which

Next, we conclude that the district courts

restitution and any applicable forfeitures were harmless because

faced maximum fine in excess of restitution eventually ordered).

than his potential maximum.

See United States v. Good, 25 F.3d

218, 220 (4th Cir. 1994) ([F]ailure to discuss the nature of

We therefore affirm the judgment with respect to

The Government responds

that Bridgers waived his right to appeal his sentence.

Government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and did not breach

appeal fall within its scope.

United States v. Copeland, 707

States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010).

considered are whether the waiver language in the plea agreement

waiver of his right to appeal during the Rule 11 colloquy.

Although the district court did not specifically

question Bridgers as to whether he specifically understood the

specifically discuss the waiver when describing the terms of the

Bridgers also confirmed that he was

thirty years old, had a ninth-grade education, could read and

Moreover, the language of the

plea waiver is clear and unambiguous, waiving Bridgers right to

Because Bridgers sentence is below that range, the

issue he seeks to appeal falls directly within the scope of his

We therefore dismiss the appeal of his sentence.

contentions are adequately presented in the material before this

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