In Re: Civil Rights V., 4th Cir. (1998)
In Re: Civil Rights V., 4th Cir. (1998)
In Re: Civil Rights V., 4th Cir. (1998)
No. 96-7318
No. 96-7402
David Clifford Eckstrom, NEXSEN, PRUET, JACOBS & POLLARD, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: Thomas C.R. Legare, Jr., NEXSEN, PRUET, JACOBS &
POLLARD, L.L.P., Columbia, South Carolina; Andrew F. Lindemann, ELLIS, LAWHORNE, DAVIDSON & SIMS, P.A., Columbia,
South Carolina; James M. Brailsford, III, ROBINSON, MCFADDEN
& MOORE, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
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OPINION
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from complaints filed by approximately 100
inmates confined by the State of South Carolina (the Inmates) against
the South Carolina Department of Corrections (the Department) and
various state officers and prison officials (collectively, the Defendants). The Inmates are Muslims, Rastafarians, Native Americans,
and other individuals who are challenging a grooming policy that
requires all male inmates to keep their hair short and their faces
shaven (the Grooming Policy). The Inmates claim that the Grooming
Policy forces them to compromise their religious beliefs and practices, and therefore violates their rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I. Because
we conclude that the Grooming Policy does not violate the Inmates'
free exercise rights, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Defendants.
I
Soon after his appointment in 1995 as Director of the Department
of Corrections, Michael Moore instituted a prison reform program
that included the Grooming Policy at issue in this case. The Grooming
Policy requires, inter alia, that all male inmates keep their hair short
and their faces shaven. Braids, plaits, mohawks and other "extreme"
hair styles are prohibited. Neatly-groomed mustaches are permitted,
but beards are forbidden unless the inmate has a medical condition
that would be aggravated by shaving.
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Moore implemented the Grooming Policy in order to address concerns about gang activity, prison security, and prisoner discipline.
Moore believed that prisoners used extreme hairstyles and a lack of
grooming to symbolize their defiance to prison authority. This, in
turn, made it more difficult to maintain order and discipline. Similarly, prison gangs tried to intimidate correctional officers and victimize other inmates, and officials were aware that prison gangs used
hairstyle to maintain group identity. In addition, long hair, extreme
hairstyles and beards allowed inmates to change their appearance
quickly. A pictorial demonstration in the district court illustrated just
how quick and drastic the change in appearance could be. Prison officials were concerned that inmates could use this technique to avoid
capture in the event of escape, or avoid detection or identification if
they committed a crime in prison. Finally, prison officials were aware
of numerous incidents where inmates had hidden drugs, weapons and
other dangerous contraband in their long hair or dreadlocks.
No prisoners are forcibly shaved or shorn. Instead, those inmates
who refuse to comply with the Grooming Policy are reclassified to a
more restrictive security level and moved to a higher security cell.
The Inmates each filed separate pro se complaints in the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina under 42
U.S.C. 1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42
U.S.C. 2000bb to 2000bb-4, and the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, alleging that the Grooming Policy violated
their right to free exercise of religion. The district court consolidated
the cases to allow the challenges to be heard in one proceeding. The
Defendants, on the other hand, challenged the constitutionality of
RFRA, and the United States intervened to argue for RFRA's constitutionality.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 17,
1996, the district court entered an order granting the Defendants'
motion, upholding the Grooming Policy under both RFRA and the
First Amendment.* After the Inmates filed their notice of appeal, the
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*The district court also granted summary judgment to the defendants
sued in their official capacities because they were entitled to immunity
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governmental and penological interests of maintaining order, discipline and safety in prisons, we uphold the Grooming Policy under
O'Lone.
3
Our decision in Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir.
1982), does not require a different result. In Gallahan, we struck
down a Virginia prison regulation which required all inmates to cut
their hair so that it did not extend below the top of the collar. Id. at
1346-47. In reaching this decision, we held that a prison regulation
which infringes upon a prisoner's free exercise rights must be "substantially justified" by considerations of prison safety, discipline, and
order. Id. at 1346. Furthermore, we found the asserted justifications
for the Virginia prison regulation--that long hair could be used to
shroud an inmate's features and prevent quick identification; could
provide a hiding place for contraband; and is unsanitary--to be
"overly broad" or "lacking in substance." Id. at 1346.
As the Inmates tacitly concede, the test developed in Gallahan is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's tests set forth in O'Lone and
Smith. Accordingly, the Gallahan test is no longer good law in this
circuit. Nonetheless, the Inmates claim that the asserted justifications
in this case, which are similar to the asserted justifications in
Gallahan, are "overly broad" or "lacking in substance." We disagree.
The evidence in this case is overwhelming that the Defendants were
addressing actual dangerous situations that had arisen in South Carolina prisons, situations that would be addressed effectively through
the Grooming Policy. Accordingly, Gallahan is also distinguishable
on its facts.
III
For the reasons stated above, the district court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is hereby
AFFIRMED.
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