United States v. Parker Coleman, 4th Cir. (2014)

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4117

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PARKER ANTRON COLEMAN, a/k/a KP,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:10-cr-00238-RJC-DSC-1)

Submitted:

November 25, 2014

Decided:

November 26, 2014

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior


Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian M. Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.


Anne M.
Tompkins, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
Parker Antron Coleman appeals from the denial of his
motion to suppress evidence and his conviction following a jury
trial

on

drug-trafficking,

offenses.

firearm,

and

money-laundering

Coleman contends that the district court erred by

allowing the use of evidence seized during the search of his


residence and by allowing the admission of evidence of his prior
marijuana-trafficking conviction and the fact that he began a
romantic

relationship

with

his

probation

officer,

Stephanie

Peppers, who later provided money to enable him to start the


marijuana trafficking underlying these convictions.
Coleman

contends

that

the

district

We affirm.

court

erred

by

failing to suppress evidence seized from his residence because


the search warrant was not issued pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
41.

Because

Coleman

failed

to

raise

this

argument

district court, we review this issue for plain error.

in

the

United

States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 383 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993)).
41(b)

provides

that

[a]t

the

request

of

Rule

federal

law

enforcement officer . . . a magistrate judge with authority in


the district . . . has authority to issue a warrant to search
for and seize a person or property located within the district.
As

we

have

previously

determined,

when

an

investigation

is

conducted by both federal and state agencies, the investigators


2

can use either federal or state investigatory tools.

United

States v. Claridy, 601 F.3d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 2010).

The

warrant at issue in this case was issued by a state judicial


officer

to

state

law

enforcement

officer

and

directed

the

officer to file a return with the state judge who issued the
warrant.

Because the warrant was appropriately authorized under

state law, we find no error, much less plain error, by the


district court not sua sponte suppressing evidence discovered
pursuant to the state search warrant.
Coleman also contends that the district court erred by
allowing the admission of evidence of his prior conviction, that
Peppers was his probation officer, and that he and Peppers were
in

romantic

relationship.

Peppers

testified

that

she

met

Coleman in the summer of 2007, when she was assigned to be his


probation officer following his conviction in Mississippi for
trafficking marijuana.

In January 2008, the relationship became

personal and she resigned from her job.

In early 2009, Peppers

loaned Coleman $5000 so he could buy marijuana to start a drug


trafficking

business.

She

testified

that

she

knew

he

would

repay her based on his determination to be successful and the


fact that he had previously been involved in drug trafficking.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling Colemans objections to the challenged
evidence.

The

evidence

was
3

intrinsic

to

the

marijuana

trafficking charges Coleman faced in the underlying trial.


United

States

v.

Otuya,

720

F.3d

183,

188

(4th

Cir.

See
2013)

(allowing admission of evidence of acts intrinsic to the charged


crime),

cert.

denied,

134

S.

Ct.

1279

(2014).

The

prior

conviction led to Coleman meeting Peppers, developing a personal


relationship with her, borrowing money from her, and ultimately
making the purchases of marijuana.

The prior conviction and the

fact that Peppers was his probation officer were relevant facts
that helped to complete the story of the crime.

See United

States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 316 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

Additionally, Peppers

testified that it was because of Colemans prior conviction that


she

agreed

to

loan

him

the

money

underlying marijuana business.


in

the

admission

Williams,

740

of

F.3d

this
308,

he

needed

to

start

the

We find no abuse of discretion

evidence.
314

See

United

(4th

Cir.

2014)

the

district

States v.
(providing

standard).
Accordingly,
and

affirm

Colemans

we

affirm

convictions.

We

courts

dispense

rulings

with

oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately


presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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