G.R. No.

115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises issues
centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended
information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder for the killing
of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City(CDO) of
which petitioner was the mayor at the time.
One Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. As herein petitioner
was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the
former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the
preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit,
implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre
of the Bucag family.
Before a warrant of arrest could be served on him, petitioner through
counsel, filed a motion for admission to bail with the trial court.
Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor,
Atty. Benjamin Guimong.
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College
General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel
manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of
their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of
the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law.
The trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The
following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well
enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of
court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was
thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared
and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case.

Prosecutor Gingoyon filed a subsequent motion for reconsideration but was denied
by the trial court . It was elevated to the Court of Appeals through a special civil
action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court
granting bail to petitioner annulled on the ground that they were tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's
application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently
because he filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually
arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from the
circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the
fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it
held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution,
according to respondent court, was not afforded an opportunity to oppose
petitioner's application for bail contrary to the requirements of due process.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner, for all intents and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In
petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction
by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over
the person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the
existence of such strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on
bail.
On the undisputed facts, the legal principles applicable and the
equities involved in this case, the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for
the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required
under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to
relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 10 As bail is
intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be
posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities,
either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has put it
in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the
former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his

stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either
been arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will
ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the
right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices
of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed
against him as it is available to "all persons" 15 where the offense is bailable.
The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant
is in the custody of the law. 16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a)
when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in
relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or
(b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
by surrendering to the proper authorities.
Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,
Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from
serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap.
Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having
placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of
the required trial and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte
motion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the
Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her
provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of her
physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.
In the case of herein petitioner, he may, however, at that point and in the factual
ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under
custody. He should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which
thereafter granted bail as prayed for.
In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in
the manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory
of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened
in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in
absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the application therefore be
denied.

2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction,
all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance
thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in
custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as
a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in
the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence
accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration
at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.

Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court
having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a
hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance
with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail
becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions
to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, 24 is required with the participation of both
the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to
ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of
the applicant. 25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that
the evidence meets the required quantum. 26
Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at
all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the application
for bail and to submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In
addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to
oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor acted as the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor
Gingoyon. Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its receipt of the notice of
the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor
Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing.
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of
Regional State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion
for bail and this should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither
supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation

that the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court."
It reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. The lower court exhausted all
means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the
prosecution.

COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO.

93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the
AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers
for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989.
Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their
motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal
charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their
arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held:

NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities

to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing
of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of

February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their
counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had
been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits
on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit
controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge.
(Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and
on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one
year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved
in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article
18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also
granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
People vs. Gako [GR 135045, 15 December 2000]
Facts: Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead on 25 June 1991. On 3 July 1991, Leopoldo de
la Pea executed an Extra-judicial Confession implicating therein Sonny Herodias
and Vicente Go in the conspiracy to kill and murder Galan. On 9 July 1991, an
Information was filed against the three accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and
Go, charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr. (Criminal Case CBU-22474). Judge

Godardo Jacinto, then the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
issued a Warrant of Arrest against the accused. On 22 July 1991 an Urgent Motion to
Confine Go in a hospital was filed. On 2 August 1991, the hearing on said motion
was conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to cross-examine Dr.
Gonzales. On 6 August 1991 an Order was issued to confine Go in a hospital without
the prosecution having cross examined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report. On 15
July 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Pea was presented as a witness
for the prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections of the defense
counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to
kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge Agana, which motion
was denied. On 20 November 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was
dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their right to a speedy trial had been
violated, leaving de la Pea to face trial. The prosecution then challenged the Order
of Dismissal with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 32954). In its
Decision dated 18 April 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order
of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the
case to another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of Go and Herodias by the
Supreme Court in a Minute Resolution dated 26 June 1995, the criminal case was set
anew The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on 28 October 1996, an Alias Warrant of
Arrest was issued against Go and Herodias. On 2 February 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the
physician of Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and, on 13 February
1997, Go filed a Petition for Bail. On 7 March 1997 and 10 March 1997, the
prosecution presented de la Pea who was acquitted in 1993. De la Pea testified on
matters which he was not allowed by then presiding Judge Agana to testify on. On
21 March 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of Go was filed urging his arrest
because he was out of the intensive care unit. The motion of the prosecution to
transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was denied by then
presiding Judge Jesus de la Pea. The case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with
Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge. Hearing resumed. On 26 September 1997, an
Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the arrest
of Go first before his Clinical Summary Report could be heard. On 10 November
1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of Go. On 11
November 1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr.
due to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the arrest of
Go. On 12 November 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the
Order of the court dated 10 November 1997, the order which granted bail to Go. On
14 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the
counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-judged the
evidence of the prosecution without carefully evaluating why it is short of the
requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment. On 15 November 1997, a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated 10
November 1997 because the transcripts were allegedly not read. On 1 December
1997, a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of
Dr. Matig-a was filed to determine if the medical findings on Go were not

exaggerated to prevent his arrest. On 11 December 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an
Order in which he denied the prosecutions Manifestation dated 21 March 1997 on
the confinement of Go, and the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest
dated 26 September 1997 against Go. On 20 January 1998, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an
Order denying the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 10 November
1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to Inhibit the Presiding
Judge. The prosecution received this order on 10 February 1998. On 20 March 1998,
Guadalupe Galan, the widow of the victim, filed a petition for certiorari (CA-GR SP
471460) before the Court of Appeals. The petition sought to annul or set aside the
orders of Judge Gako, Jr. and then acting Presiding Judge de la Pea. The petition
was signed by the counsel of private complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the
conformity of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu
City. On 26 March 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division) issued a
Resolution dismissing the said petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition was
not filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the People of the Philippines; and (2)
that the certification on non-forum shopping was signed by counsel for Galan, not
by Galan herself. On 14 April 1998, Galan, through counsel, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said Resolution indicating that the OSG was going to adopt her
petition. On the same date, the OSG manifested before the Court of Appeals that it
was joining Galan in her petition and was adopting her petition as its own. On 18
June 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution that denied said motion for
reconsideration of Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping
was not signed by Galan. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the fact that the
OSG joined Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency. The OSG
received copy of the resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998, the OSG filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 47142). On 12 August
1998, said petition of the OSG was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on the
ground that the petition was practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by
Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on 26 March 1998. Hence, the appeal by
certiorari.

Issue: Whether the appreciation of the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt
may be based on the voluminous records of the case, without necessarily hearing
the prosecution.

Held: The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for
failing to conform with the requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not
a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be conducted. Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or
discretionary, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates
that "no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be

admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Based on the
foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime
the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the
evidence of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with
murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death
penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused
Gos right to bail is merely discretionary. When bail is discretionary, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be
conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the
accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have
appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when
he did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on
the voluminous records of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was
mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew
that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in
that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing
that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another compelling reason
why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail
based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P
50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis. Further, the order granting
bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion without a summary of the
evidence, a substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. Well settled is
the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the presiding
judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The
irregularity in the grant of bail, however, is not attenuated since the judges findings
were based on the summary clinical report of Dr. Matiga dated 4 February 1997
while the order granting bail was issued on 10 November 1997. It could not
therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of health of Go could still be
accurately reflected by the said medical report when 9 had already passed from the
time that said medical report was prepared. It was therefore clear error for Judge
Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in granting bail when the
defense failed to present a more recent one that would convincingly raise strong
grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused would endanger his
life.
G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest Corono, J.:

FACTS:

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide
and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed
an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only
for strong reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than
six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending
appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and
substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with
grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals
should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.

Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not

punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law,
is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied. (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means
that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a
more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option
except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination
of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the
first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may
consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on
the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result
in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs
where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),
there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to

the decision maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule
of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate
courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in
applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by
the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners
theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of
the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well
as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following
policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information,
the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as
follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates

and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail
is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must
be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.