Arigo v Swift

In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near
the Tubbataha Reefs, a marine habitat of which entry and certain
human activities are prevented and afforded protection by a Philippine
law. The grounding incident prompted the petitioners to seek for
issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC.
Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they were
impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity from suit between
US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.
Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian violated their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology since these events caused and continue
to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect other
provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from damages, they
sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil, administrative
and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws
and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. They also
prayed for the annulment of some VFA provisions for being
unconstitutional.
Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued
through the VFA
No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case.
First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners claim,
the US government could not be deemed to have waived its immunity
from suit.
Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who have control and supervision
over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any
judgment against these officials would require remedial actions and the
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity from
suit bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.
Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages
caused to the Tubbataha Reefs
Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the
grounding incident under the customary laws of navigation.

The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a

restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP
reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from
suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules
and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the
latters internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy, the US considers itself bound by customary
international rules on the traditional uses of the oceans, which is
codified in UNCLOS.
As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US
refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with
UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind. Such has
nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary international
rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)
Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear
international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. ##
Other Issues
Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must be
Filed Separately
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is improper
considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US
military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the
objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions. Since jurisdiction
cannot be had over the respondents for being immuned from suit, there
is no way damages which resulted from violation of environmental laws
could be awarded to petitioners.
In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal
case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law
is to be filed separately. Hence, a ruling on the application or nonapplication of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to a US
personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS

Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for

a writ of Kalikasan.
Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the
Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan is Not Proper
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the US government. The VFA being a valid
and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions. A petition under
the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions.

diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to

acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle
on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the
execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it
increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we
adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area
that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But
under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the
extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image
below for comparison)
MAGALONA v ERMITA
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of
baselines of the Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which
Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified
Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and
by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as Bonifacio S. Tumbokon vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity
they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national as Mayor of Manila
territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila
their particular arguments are as follows:
enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December
other ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and
over Sabah;
Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area
(innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex,
sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear- Petron and Shell.
free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of
constitutional provisions;
Energy entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the companies in which they agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the
to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the Department
prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, from the joint operations and the scale down program.
itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the
baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of

understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian
declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective only for
a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January
30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the
validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor
Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the
ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of
understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.
Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty,
as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to
the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance
No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
negated by the courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of
understanding were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City
of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,

Petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS:
APO Fruits Corporation, Inc. (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc.
(HPI) were owners of 5 parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in
San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October 1995, the two
voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered
P86.9 million for AFCs land and P164.40 million for HPIs land
(total of about P251.3 million). AFC, HPI and DAR cannot agree

on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just

Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board on 14
February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the
valuation of the land for three years. But nevertheless, the
government, through the Land Bank of the Philippines, deposited
P26M into AFCs account and P45M into HPIs account as down
payment in 1996. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1996.
Later, titles were given to farmers under the CARP
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program).
Due to DARABs failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a
complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC
of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The
RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that
the purchase price should be higher than what was offered by
DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that
DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38 billion. DAR appealed
to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was just compensation.
FACTS:
No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996 without just
compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was
commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the
cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI
filed the cases before the RTC. The RTCs finding is to be
sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was given
chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be
at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such evidence. To
allow the taking of landowners properties, and to leave them
empty-handed while government withholds compensation is
undoubtedly oppressive.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of

the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered just inasmuch as the property owner is
being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with
his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has
been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not
the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to
intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as
indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation and in the abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this
principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
power are:
(1) public use and
(2) just compensation.
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before
the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.

Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly

relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination
of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use
and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors
shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to
the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall
be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent
improvements on AFCs and HPIs lands have been introduced
and found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier,
irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein
substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in
putting them up.
The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a
stones throw from the residential and/or industrial sections of
Tagum City, a fact DAR should never ignore. The market value of
the property (plus the consequential damages less consequential
benefits) is determined by such factors as the value of like
properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and location.
Therefore, AFC and HPI is entitled to the amount of just
compensation (Php 1.38 billion) as computed with 12% interest
per annum plus attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the just
compensation or P138 million.