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    United States v. Harold Sapperstein and Anne Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 694, 4th Cir. (1963)

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    This document is a court opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit regarding the appeal of Harold and Anne Sapperstein's convictions for violating the White Slave Traffic Act. The court upheld their convictions based on two key findings: 1) Their extrajudicial confessions to the FBI were sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence showing their intent was for the girls to engage in prostitution. 2) Statements made by their co-conspirator to the girls upon arrival were admissible against the Sappersteins as statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

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    United States v. Harold Sapperstein and Anne Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 694, 4th Cir. (1963)

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    This document is a court opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit regarding the appeal of Harold and Anne Sapperstein's convictions for violating the White Slave Traffic Act. The court upheld their convictions based on two key findings: 1) Their extrajudicial confessions to the FBI were sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence showing their intent was for the girls to engage in prostitution. 2) Statements made by their co-conspirator to the girls upon arrival were admissible against the Sappersteins as statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

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    Filed: 1963-01-08 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 312 F.2d 694 Docket: 8477_1

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    This document is a court opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit regarding the appeal of Harold and Anne Sapperstein's convictions for violating the White Slave Traffic Act. The court upheld their convictions based on two key findings: 1) Their extrajudicial confessions to the FBI were sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence showing their intent was for the girls to engage in prostitution. 2) Statements made by their co-conspirator to the girls upon arrival were admissible against the Sappersteins as statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

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    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    55 views6 pages

    United States v. Harold Sapperstein and Anne Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 694, 4th Cir. (1963)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    This document is a court opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit regarding the appeal of Harold and Anne Sapperstein's convictions for violating the White Slave Traffic Act. The court upheld their convictions based on two key findings: 1) Their extrajudicial confessions to the FBI were sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence showing their intent was for the girls to engage in prostitution. 2) Statements made by their co-conspirator to the girls upon arrival were admissible against the Sappersteins as statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

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    of 6

    312 F.

    2d 694

    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,


    v.
    Harold SAPPERSTEIN and Anne Sapperstein, Appellants.
    No. 8477.

    United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.


    Argued November 5, 1962.
    Decided January 8, 1963.

    Norman N. Yankellow, Baltimore, Md. (Joseph Rosenthal, Baltimore,


    Md., on brief), for appellants.
    Robert J. Carson, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Joseph D. Tydings, U. S. Atty., and
    Carl J. Lorenz, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.
    Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and SOPER and J. SPENCER BELL,
    Circuit Judges.
    SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.

    The conviction of Harold and Anne Sapperstein in the United States District
    Court for the District of Maryland for violations of the White Slave Traffic Act
    (18 U.S.C.A. 2421, 2422, 2423) rests chiefly upon their own statements to
    the F.B.I., the voluntariness and accuracy of which they do not contest. On this
    appeal they raise two points: first, that their extrajudicial statements were not
    sufficiently corroborated by independent proof of the corpus delicti, and
    second, that the trial judge erred in admitting testimony as to a co-defendant's
    statements made out of the defendants' presence. We find no merit in either
    contention.

    The Derby Club in the Chicago suburb of Calumet City, Illinois, is a "night
    spot" catering to its customers' tastes in wine, women and song. Under the
    ownership of Amos Amadio, the Club has achieved a certain notoriety as a
    center for lewd entertainment and prostitution. See United States v. Amadio,
    215 F.2d 605 (7th Cir., 1954), reversed per curiam 348 U.S. 892, 75 S.Ct. 218,
    99 L.Ed. 701 (1955). Especially familiar with its operations was Anne

    Sapperstein, known in trade parlance as a "B-girl," who went to work at the


    Derby Club in 1957. Although she personally refrained from prostitution, her
    assigned duty admittedly was to serve drinks to other girls and male patrons so
    engaged in a back room, to "roll" customers who had become intoxicated, to
    sell prophylactics, and to pick the pockets of men indulging in sexual
    intercourse. Meanwhile, her husband, Harold Sapperstein, stayed home and
    lived off her earnings.
    3

    This sordid existence continued until Sapperstein was assaulted by Amadio one
    day. Thereupon he and his wife sought revenge by disclosing in separate
    written statements to the F.B.I. that in July, 1957, as they were about to leave
    for a vacation and family reunion in Baltimore, Maryland, Amadio and William
    Austrew, his manager, suggested that they keep their eyes open in Baltimore for
    fresh talent for the Club. In language vile and explicit, Amadio specified the
    qualities desired in the new recruits. He made it clear that prostitution was to be
    within the scope of their employment and, indeed, expressed his preference for
    girls with past experience in brothels. As a profit incentive, Austrew promised
    the Sappersteins commissions based on the earnings of each girl sent. The
    confessions also related how the Sappersteins procured three teen-aged girls
    (one of whom was only 14) in Baltimore and arranged their air transportation to
    Calumet City.

    Acting upon this information, the Grand Jury for the District of Maryland
    handed up a four-count indictment charging the Sappersteins as well as
    Austrew with violations of the White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 2421,
    2422, 2423. Each count cited the three named defendants as principals and as
    aiders and abettors, 18 U.S.C.A. 2. 1 When the case came to trial in the
    District Court, the confessions of the Sappersteins were introduced in evidence
    against them. Among the Government's witnesses were two of the girls who
    had been enticed into making the interstate journey to Calumet City. After
    unsuccessful motions for judgment of acquittal, the Sappersteins were found
    guilty, United States v. Sapperstein, 198 F.Supp. 147 (D.Md. 1961),2 and they
    have appealed.

    Of course, in order to be admissible, an extrajudicial confession must be


    corroborated as to the corpus delicti. Masse v. United States, 210 F.2d 418 (5th
    Cir.), cert. denied 347 U.S. 962, 74 S.Ct. 711, 98 L.Ed. 1105 (1954).
    Appellants concede the adequacy of proof that they arranged the interstate
    transportation, but argue that the Government failed to lay a sufficient
    foundation for the confessions by extrinsic evidence of an intention on their
    part that the girls so transported should engage in prostitution. Harms v. United
    States, 272 F.2d 478 (4th Cir., 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 961, 80 S.Ct. 590, 4

    L.Ed.2d 543 (1960). While that intention must be shown to have existed prior
    to or concurrently with the interstate transportation, it may be inferred from
    evidence of the nature of the destined environment and the subsequent conduct
    of the parties. Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326, 33 S.Ct. 285, 57
    L.Ed. 528 (1913); Van Pelt v. United States, 240 F. 346 (4th Cir., 1917);
    United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir., 1962); United States v.
    Austrew, 202 F.Supp. 816 (D. Md.1962).3
    6

    Such an inference was drawn here by the District Court and, we think, with
    sound justification. Wholly apart from the confessions, and prior to their
    introduction, two of the victims gave testimony pertaining to their
    conversations in Baltimore with the Sappersteins, the degenerate nature of the
    Derby Club with its back-room brothel, the Sappersteins' close association with
    the management, the Club's policy of encouraging its "B-girls" and "stripdancers" to prostitute themselves there on a profit-sharing basis, its substantial
    financial investment in the transportation of the Baltimore recruits, and the
    actual performance by the latter of obscene dances and acts of sexual
    intercourse with male employees and patrons shortly after arrival in Calumet
    City. This testimony, coupled with documentary proof that the Sappersteins
    purchased the airplane tickets in Baltimore with money wired to them for that
    purchase by Austrew, far exceeds the minimal corroboration of guilty
    knowledge required to support the extrajudicial confessions.

    It is no answer that only one girl in fact became a Derby Club prostitute, see
    United States v. Marks, 274 F.2d 15, 18-19 (7th Cir., 1959), and authorities
    cited therein, for it was enough to show that the environment into which the
    victims were brought "would necessarily and naturally lead to a life of
    debauchery of a carnal nature * * *." Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S.
    326, 33 S.Ct. 285, 57 L.Ed. 528 (1913): cf., Cleveland v. United States, 329
    U.S. 14, 67 S.Ct. 13, 91 L.Ed. 12 (1946); United States v. Lewis, 110 F.2d 460
    (7th Cir.), cert. denied 310 U.S. 634, 60 S.Ct. 1077, 84 L.Ed. 1404 (1940).

    The second contention relates to the victims' testimony concerning statements


    made to them by Austrew upon their arrival in Illinois that their jobs entailed
    prostitution. As further indication that the enterprise was conceived for an
    illegal purpose, the testimony was introduced over appellants' vigorous
    objections that such statements were made in their absence and constituted
    hearsay. But such a theory disregards the prima facie proof that Austrew acted
    in concert with the Sappersteins in charting every detail of the proscribed
    transportation. When the challenged declarations came to light at the trial,
    Austrew had already been identified as the one who wired the money to the
    defendants for the tickets, who spoke to them on the telephone just before the

    flights, and who appeared in accordance with their arrangements to meet the
    girls at the airport.
    9

    Since Austrew's utterances were made while driving from the airport with the
    new arrivals to the Derby Club, obviously the contemplated final step in
    furtherance of the common objective, what he then said may be considered part
    of the res gestae and a circumstantial link evidencing appellants' state of mind
    in arranging the transportation. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647,
    66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354,
    360-361 (2d Cir., 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 909, 75 S.Ct. 295, 99 L.Ed. 713
    (1955); United States v. Copeland, 295 F.2d 635, 637 (4th Cir., 1961), cert.
    denied 368 U.S. 955, 82 S.Ct. 398, 7 L.Ed.2d 388 (1962); Washington v.
    United States, 275 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir., 1960); Garber v. United States, 145
    F.2d 966, 969 (6th Cir., 1944); Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888, 893
    (8th Cir., 1945). See Wigmore, Evidence, 1789 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick,
    Evidence, 228, pp. 463 et seq. (1954). As such, they were admissible under
    the time-honored exception to the hearsay rule "that a declaration made by one
    conspirator, in furtherance of a conspiracy and prior to its termination, may be
    used against the other conspirators." Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232,
    236-239, 77 S.Ct. 294, 297-298, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957); Lutwak v. United
    States, 344 U.S. 604, 617-619, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953); Blumenthal
    v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559-560, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1948);
    Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62
    L.Ed. 260 (1917).4 Since one member of a conspiracy is in law an agent of the
    others, Lutwak v. United States, supra, his declarations as related by a thirdparty witness are binding even upon those co-defendants who were not present
    during the conversations. Lutwak v. United States, supra; Clune v. United
    States, 159 U.S. 590, 16 S.Ct. 125, 40 L.Ed. 269 (1895).5

    10

    It is true that the co-conspirators' exception cannot be invoked without a


    showing that the declarant was presently engaged in promoting the joint
    criminal enterprise. But where, as here, such a showing has been made, the
    principle is not rendered inapplicable merely because the accused has not been
    formally indicted for conspiracy. Sprinkle v. United States, 141 F. 811, 815818 (4th Cir., 1905); Hilliard v. United States, 121 F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir.),
    cert. denied 314 U.S. 627, 62 S.Ct. 111, 86 L.Ed. 503 (1941); Carpenter v.
    United States, 264 F.2d 565, 572 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 360 U.S. 936, 79 S.Ct.
    1459, 3 L.Ed.2d 1548 (1959). This much was made clear by Judge Learned
    Hand in United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798, 799 (2d Cir., 1943), cert.
    denied 321 U.S. 744, 64 S.Ct. 483, 88 L.Ed. 1047 (1944), where he said: "The
    notion that the competency of the declarations of a confederate is confined to
    prosecutions for conspiracy has not the slightest basis; their admission does not

    depend upon the indictment, but is merely an incident of the general principle
    of agency that the acts of any agent, within the scope of his authority, are
    competent against his principal." See also Garber v. United States, supra; Lee
    Dip v. United States, 92 F.2d 802, 803 (9th Cir., 1937), cert. denied 303 U.S.
    638, 58 S.Ct. 526, 82 L.Ed. 1099 (1938), and authorities cited therein.
    11

    There being no error, the judgment below is

    12

    Affirmed.

    Notes:
    1

    Preliminary motions to dismiss the indictment were denied, United States v.


    Austrew, 190 F.Supp. 632 (D.Md.1961)

    Austrew was also convicted in a separate trial conducted by Judge Northrop.


    United States v. Austrew, 202 F.Supp. 816 (D.Md.1962)

    See also Jorado v. United States, 158 F. 2d 509 (1st Cir., 1946); United States
    v. Reginelli, 133 F.2d 595 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied 318 U.S. 783, 63 S.Ct. 856,
    87 L.Ed. 1150 (1943); Pine v. United States, 135 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.), cert.
    denied 320 U.S. 740, 64 S.Ct. 40, 88 L.Ed. 439 (1943); United States v. Marks,
    274 F. 2d 15 (7th Cir., 1959). Cf., United States v. Amadio, 215 F.2d 605 (7th
    Cir., 1954), reversed per curiam on other grounds, 348 U.S. 892, 75 S.Ct. 218,
    99 L.Ed. 701 (1955)

    The co-conspirators' exception has been applied in this circuit in Sprinkle v.


    United States, 141 F. 811 (4th Cir., 1905); Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d
    635 (4th Cir., 1940); Hilliard v. United States, 121 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.), cert.
    denied 314 U.S. 627, 62 S.Ct. 111, 86 L.Ed. 503 (1941); Carpenter v. United
    States, 264 F.2d 565 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 360 U.S. 936, 79 S.Ct. 1459, 3
    L.Ed.2d 1548 (1959); United States v. Copeland, 295 F.2d 635 (4th Cir., 1961),
    cert. denied 368 U.S. 955, 82 S.Ct. 398, 7 L.Ed.2d 388 (1962). Of special
    interest are the White Slave cases of Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,
    69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949); Hilliard v. United States, supra; United
    States v. Sorrentino, 78 F.Supp. 425 (M.D.Pa. 1948), affirmed 175 F.2d 721
    (3d Cir., 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 868, 70 S.Ct. 143, 94 L.Ed. 532 (1949)

    See also Fowler v. United States, 242 F.2d 860 (5th Cir., 1957); United States
    v. Bucur, 194 F.2d 297 (6th Cir., 1952); United States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788
    (7th Cir., 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 966, 76 S.Ct. 435, 100 L.Ed. 839 (1956);

    Cwach v. United States, 212 F.2d 520 (8th Cir., 1954); Ebeling v. United
    States, 248 F.2d 429 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 355 U.S. 907, 78 S.Ct. 334, 2 L.
    Ed.2d 261 (1957); Shibley v. United States, 237 F.2d 327 (9th Cir., 1956), cert.
    denied 352 U.S. 873, 77 S.Ct. 94, 1 L.Ed.2d 77 (1957); Briggs v. United States,
    176 F.2d 317 (10th Cir., 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 861, 70 S.Ct. 103, 94
    L.Ed. 528 (1950)

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