UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1

RANDY LYNN ATKINS,

Petitioner Appellant,
v.
KENNETH E. LASSITER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North
Carolina,
Respondent Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:06-cv-00372-MR)

Argued:

September 19, 2012

Decided:

November 7, 2012

Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Timothy M. CAIN,

United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Jonathan Lee Megerian, Asheboro, North Carolina, for

Appellant.
Sandra Wallace-Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul
M. Green, OFFICE OF THE APPELLATE DEFENDER OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Roy Cooper, Attorney
General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:
On November 18, 1993, in the Superior Court of Buncombe
County, North Carolina, Randy Lynn Atkins pled guilty to firstdegree
James

murder

in

Atkins.

the
On

death

of

December

his
8,

eight-month-old

1993,

following

son,
a

Lyle

capital

sentencing hearing, a jury unanimously recommended that Atkins

be

sentenced

to

death.

The

presiding

judge

imposed

the

recommended sentence.
On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
Atkinss sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied
Atkinss

petition

unsuccessfully

for

sought

writ

state

of

certiorari.

post-conviction

Thereafter,

relief.

He

he

then

filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

2254, in the Western District of North Carolina.

On August

16, 2011, the district court denied Atkinss petition, and we

subsequently granted a certificate of appealability.

We now

address Atkinss claims that he received ineffective assistance

of

counsel

and

that

the

State

failed

to

disclose

materially

favorable evidence.

I.
A.
The facts underlying Atkinss conviction are as follows:
The State presented evidence at the sentencing
proceeding tending to show that, on 16 March 1993,
3

defendant inflicted fatal injuries to his son, Lyle.

Defendant,
Lyle,
and
Lyles
mother
were
living
together at the time at the Lazywood Mobile Home Park
in Buncombe County.
Lyles mother, Ms. Colleen Shank, testified that
on the morning of 16 March 1993, she asked defendant
to watch Lyle while she washed some clothes.
Ms.
Shank stated that she heard a bang.
Following the
bang, Ms. Shank heard Lyle begin to cry, and she
rushed to the living room.
Ms. Shank testified that
she then observed defendant hitting Lyles head
against the trailer wall a few times. She testified
further that she saw defendant swing him [Lyle] very
strong and that Lyle hit the wall very hard.
Ms.
Shank tried to comfort Lyle and attempted to lay the
child down to rest. However, Lyle soon began to cry,
and Ms. Shank noted that he was turning blue.
The
mother administered CPR and requested that defendant
go to a neighbors home to call 911 for emergency
assistance.
Defendant then went to the home of a neighbor and
called 911. The 911 operator testified that defendant
responded to her questions concerning medical history
related
to
Lyles
emergency
by
replying[,]
it . . . may have been sick two or three days, but no
other.
Lyles mother testified that while waiting
for emergency personnel to arrive, defendant told her,
Dont say anything, because I will hurt you too.
Following
the
arrival
of
emergency
medical
personnel, Lyle was transported by helicopter to
Mission
Memorial
Hospital
in
Asheville.
Upon
admission to the hospital, Lyle was noted to be limp,
not moving, and exhibiting a slow heart rate.
The
admitting physician noted numerous injuries to the
small child, including bruising on both sides of his
head, an older bruise on his left elbow, bruising on
his right wrist and right hand, a deformation of his
pelvis, and an improperly healed fracture of his right
lower leg.
A detective from the Woodfin Police Department
questioned defendant and Ms. Shank in the waiting room
of the hospital. Defendant initially told the officer
that Lyle had stopped breathing because of the KerO
Sun heater.
Defendant responded to the officers
further inquiry by adding that a couple of days ago I
was holding him, and he slipped and fell, and he hurt
his arm.
The officer subsequently arrested both
4

defendant and Ms. Shank and transported them to the

Buncombe County jail. Later that day, while in police
custody, defendant issued a written statement in which
he admitted the following:
Today Lyle was crying as I was holding
him, and my temper and patience snapped
again, as he was crying and crying no matter
how soothing and gentle I was. He just kept
crying, and I couldnt handle him any more,
and I started hitting him on the side of his
head and trying to get him to stop crying,
and he wouldnt. I kept telling him to stop
it, and he wouldnt, and I kept on hitting
him with my hand on his head.
Despite aggressive medical efforts to save Lyles
life, he died at Ashevilles Mission Memorial Hospital
on 18 March 1993.
State v. Atkins, 505 S.E.2d 97, 105 (N.C. 1998).

B.
The State indicted Atkins for first-degree murder and for
first-degree sexual assault.

As a condition of his guilty plea

for murder, the State dismissed the sexual assault charge and
agreed

not

to

reference

that

charge

or

other

alleged

sexual

assaults during the sentencing hearing.

At

the

sentencing

hearing,

the

State

presented

evidence

supporting one statutory aggravating circumstancenamely, that

the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Gen.

Stat.

15A2000(e)(9).

radiologist testified that

An

experienced

N.C.

pediatric

the eight-month-old infant exhibited the following

injuries upon admission to Mission Memorial Hospital
on 16 March 1993: healing fracture of the right
clavicle, healing bone along the midshaft of the right
upper arm, extensive injury of the left upper arm,
dislocation of the left elbow, healing bone indicative
of a fracture of the right hip, skull fractures and
bruising on both the left and right sides, and a
compression fracture of the spine.
Further testimony
indicated that the injuries occurred in at least two
episodes of injury to Lyle. The pediatric radiologist
estimated that the time of the origin of injuries
ranged from four weeks prior to the hospital admission
up to within a day of the admission. Several treating
physicians also testified at the sentencing proceeding
that Lyle exhibited symptoms of battered child
syndrome.
. . . Dr. Cynthia Brown, a pediatrician,
. . . defined a battered child as a child that
presents with multiple purposely inflicted injuries
that are of varying ages.
Atkins, 505 S.E.2d at 106.
Atkins

responded

circumstances

and

circumstance,
presented

with

see

a
N.C.

mitigating

twenty-five
statutory

Gen.

evidence

Stat.
via

potential

mitigating

catchall

mitigating

15A2000(f)(9).

testimony

from

He

psychologist

Dr. Joseph Horacek, social worker Audrey Bryant, former employer

Jesse

Carr,

and

an

investigator

from

the

public

defenders

office, David Waites.

After weighing the mitigation against the aggravation, the
jury

found

heinous,

as

aggravation

atrocious

or

that

cruel,

the
see

murder
N.C.

was

Gen.

especially

Stat.

15A-

2000(e)(9), and as mitigation that (1) Atkins qualifie[d] as

having a learning disability due to his IQ variations, and (2)
6

Atkins

was

diagnosed . . . in

personality

disorder

disturbance

of

and

emotions

April

adjustment

and

of

1993

disorder

conduct.

as

having

with

Ultimately,

mixed

the

jury

unanimously recommended a death sentence, and the court followed

the jurys recommendation.

II.
A.
On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
Atkinss capital sentence, Atkins, 505 S.E.2d at 131, and the
United States Supreme Court denied Atkinss petition for a writ
of certiorari, Atkins v. North Carolina, 526 U.S. 1147 (1999).

B.
Atkins next filed several motions for appropriate relief
(MAR) in the Superior Court of Buncombe County.

After summary

denial of many of Atkinss claims, Judge Winner of the Superior

Court granted an evidentiary hearing on two issues:
Atkins

was

denied

his

right

to

the

effective

(1) whether

assistance

of

counsel by counsels failure to adequately investigate or to

present sentencing phase [mitigating] testimony regarding [his]
childhood

history

of

neglect,

abuse[,]

and

trauma,

and

(2)

whether the prosecution withheld materially favorable evidence

in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7

On January 12, 2001, the State moved for summary denial of

Atkinss ineffectiveness claim.

On April 2, 2001, Judge Guice

of the Superior Court conducted a motions hearing, ultimately

denying

Atkins

an

evidentiary

hearing

on

his

ineffectiveness

claim and granting the States motion for summary denial.

denying
Judge

an

evidentiary

Guice

noted

hearing

that,

at

on

the

the

time

ineffectiveness
Judge

Winner

In

claim,

initially

granted such a hearing, the State had not yet filed a response
to the claim.
On December 1, 2005, Judge Winner conducted an evidentiary
hearing on Atkinss Brady claim and denied relief.

The North

Carolina Supreme Court then denied Atkinss petition for a writ

of certiorari to appeal the denial of his MAR claims.

State v.

Atkins, 636 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. 2006).

C.
Atkins next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 2254(d) in the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina.

Atkins sought relief on

the following grounds:

(1) that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in the capital sentencing proceeding (Claim
I); (2) that the [S]tate failed to disclose evidence
materially favorable to him with respect to capital
sentencing (Claim II); (3) that he was denied a full
and fair opportunity to impeach his co-defendants
testimony by the [S]tates failure to disclose its
8

deal with her and by the trial courts limitation of

counsels cross-examination of her (Claim III); (4)
that he was shackled without cause during the capital
sentencing hearing (Claim IV); and (5) that he was
tried at the capital sentencing hearing without
adequate measures to compensate for his hearing
impairment (Claim V).
Atkins v. Polk, No. 1:06cv372, 2011 WL 3608234, at *6 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 16, 2011).

On August 16, 2011, the district court denied

Atkinss request for an evidentiary hearing, granted the States

motion for summary judgment, and declined to issue a certificate
of appealability.

Id. at *38.

Atkins then filed a motion to

alter or amend the judgment purusant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 59(c).

On January 17, 2012, the district court denied

Atkinss motion to alter or amend the judgment.

Atkins filed a

notice of appeal on February 12, 2012, and on May 31, 2012, we

granted a certificate of appealability.

III.
Atkins
received

raises

two

ineffective

issues

on

assistance

of

appeal:
counsel

(1)
in

whether
his

he

capital

sentencing hearing and (2) whether the State failed to disclose

materially
sentencing.

favorable

evidence

with

respect

to

his

capital

We review de novo a district courts denial of

habeas corpus relief.

Deyton v. Keller, 682 F.3d 340, 343 (4th

Cir. 2012).

A.
We

analyze

Atkinss

ineffectiveness

claim

under

the

framework outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). 1

To succeed under Strickland, Atkins must demonstrate

(1) that his counsel rendered deficient performance and (2) that
such deficiency was prejudicial.
We

adopt

deferential

Id. at 687.
posture

defense counsels performance.

Ct.

770,

788

(2011)

(An

in

our

examination

of

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.

ineffective-assistance

claim

can

function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and

raise

issues

not

presented

at

trial,

and

so

the

Strickland

standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest intrusive

1

We acknowledge that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified at 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)), limits the federal review of
habeas claims adjudicated on the merits in state court,
Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012).
Moreover, we are aware of this Courts recent discussion of
whether
a
state
court
proceeding
constituted
a
merits
adjudication.
See Winston v. Pearson (Winston II), 683 F.3d
489, 49697 (4th Cir. 2012); Winston v. Kelly (Winston I), 592
F.3d 535, 55556 (4th Cir. 2010).
Here, the parties offer conflicting views regarding whether
the state court conducted a merits adjudication of Atkinss
ineffectiveness claim.
If it did, then we would give AEDPA
deference to the state courts application of Strickland.
See
28 U.S.C. 2254(d). But, if not, then we are to conduct a de
novo review of the claim under Strickland.
See Cone v. Bell,
556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).
We need not make a determination on
this point, however.
As discussed below, even under a de novo
review, which here is more advantageous to Atkins, Strickland
does not accord Atkins relief.

10

post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very adversary

process

the

Strickland,

right
466

to

counsel

U.S.

at

is

meant

to

689-90)).

serve.

Indeed,

we

(quoting
consider

representation effective unless it fall[s] below an objective

standard of reasonableness, id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking simply
whether an attorneys representation amounted to incompetence
under prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated
from best practices or most common custom, id. at 788 (quoting
Strickland,

466

U.S.

at

690).

In

sum,

we

are

concerned

primarily with whether counsel made errors so serious that [it]

was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.

Id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A

defendant

is

prejudiced

by

ineffective

representation

when a reasonable probability [exists] that, but for counsels

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.
694)

(internal

Id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

quotation

marks

omitted).

reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome.

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, merely identifying

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding is

insufficient.

Id.

(quoting

Strickland,
11

466

U.S.

at

693)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Simply put, a defendant

must

show

that

[t]he

likelihood

of

substantial, not just conceivable.

different

result

[is]

Id. at 792.

Notably, when applying Strickland, we need not determine

whether counsels performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies.
[t]he

object

counsels

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

of

an

ineffectiveness

performance[,]

ineffectiveness

claim

[i]f

on

prejudice, we should do so.

it

the

is

ground

Rather, because

claim

is

easier

to

of

lack

not

to

dispose
of

grade
of

an

sufficient

Id.

1.
Here, Atkins alleges that his defense counsel failed to
adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding
his background and that such failure resulted in his counsels
reliance on an alternate, futile defense.

Before examining the

evidence Atkins maintains his counsel should have investigated

and presented, we chronicle the mitigating evidence that his
counsel did present.

a.
Dr. David Horacek

12

Psychologist Dr. David Horacek testified that he evaluated

Atkins for approximately twenty-two hours between July 1993 and
November 1993 and that he gave Atkins a primary diagnosis of
disassociative

identity

personality disorder.

disorder,

also

known

as

multiple

Horacek indicated that Atkins may also

suffer from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.

Horacek

explained

that

the

main

feature

of

multiple

personality disorder is an impairment in the normal ability to

integrate

memory,

personality.

identity

Individuals

and

perceptions

suffering

from

this

into

disorder

one
have

several personalities that endure over time, and at various

points of time the alter[nate] personality will assume control
of

the

avowed

[individuals]
that

during

consciousness

his

evaluation

and
of

behavior.

Atkins,

Horacek

two

alternate

personalities were evident.

Horacek

further

stated

that

development

of

multiple

personality disorder can arise from severe physical or sexual

abuse that occurs for a length of time or from painful trauma
that

occurs

develops

when

alternate

an

individual

personalities

is

as

child.

creating distance from the experiences.

means

An
of

individual
coping

and

Horacek attested that,

while evaluating Atkins, he learned that Atkins was sexually

abused at least three times as a child by his older half-brother

13

Butch and other boys in the neighborhood.

He briefly testified

that victims of child abuse often become abusers themselves.

Horacek also averred that he believed Atkins had killed his
son while one of Atkinss alternate personalities was in control
and that Atkins was mentally or emotionally disturbed during the
crimes commission.
both

Atkinss

Such disturbance, Horacek opined, impaired

ability

to

conform

his

conduct

to

the

laws

requirements and his ability to appreciate the criminal nature

of his conduct.

Audrey Bryant
Social worker Audrey Bryant interviewed Atkins in jail and
affirmed that (1) Atkins admitted he had inflicted the bruises
his son received, (2) Atkins had his head in his hands during
most of the interview, and (3) Atkins wished he could tell the
mother of the child that he was sorry.

Jesse Carr
Atkins worked full-time for Jesse Carr at Minico Cleaners
and Laundry for approximately a year and worked intermittently
on

part-time

basis

for

an

additional

six

months.

Carr

indicated that Atkins was a good worker and that he left the
cleaners to find employment with higher pay.

14

David Waites
David

Waites,

an

investigator

for

the

public

defenders

office, testified regarding Atkinss childhood, parents, and Air

Force service.

He stated that, although Atkinss parents were

in fragile heath and unable to attend the sentencing hearing,

they had provided two letters for presentation at the hearing.
The

letters

indicated

that

Atkins

suffered

from

childhood

illnesses that caused a loss of hearing in his right ear.

letters

also

indicated

that

Atkins

joined

the

Air

The

Force

at

seventeen.
Additionally,

Waites

newspaper clippings:
Atkins,

(2)

received

an

several

photographs

and

(1) a high school graduation photograph of

newspaper

Air

presented

Force

clipping

recruiting

indicating

that

award,

(3)

Atkins

had

photograph

of

Atkins in his Air Force uniform, (4) three newspaper clippings

noting that Atkins provided music for a veterans party, (5) a
newspaper

clipping

signifying

that

Atkins

was

Military

Security Specialist in an Air Force squadron serving in England,

and (6) a newspaper clipping showing that Atkins was the winner
of a Cub Scout Pack derby.
Finally, Waites averred that Atkins was involved in three
alcohol-related incidents during his time in the Air Force, that
he received an honorable discharge from the Air Force due to his
apparent

inability

to

comprehend
15

his

misconduct,

and

that

twelve days prior to Lyles admission to the hospital due to

Atkinss abuse, Atkins had been the victim of an armed robbery.
As

noted

above,

the

jury

ultimately

mitigating circumstances to Atkins:

credited

only

two

(1) that he suffered from a

learning disability and (2) that he suffered from a personality

and adjustment disorder with a mixed disturbance of emotions and
conduct.

b.
Atkins contends that he received ineffective representation
because

his

counsel

focused

on

Dr.

Horaceks

testimony

and

belief that Atkins committed the murder while under the control
of

another

personality.

Atkins

argues

that

the

multiple

personality sentencing defense was a disaster [because] [i]t

was based on inaccurate, unreliable statements made by Atkins
while he was under the influence of sodium amytal, and was not
backed

up

with

any

independent

documentary

or

testimonial

evidence.
Further, Atkins maintains that by focusing on Dr. Horaceks
opinions regarding the reasons he murdered his son, his counsel
failed to adequately investigate his childhood.
an

adequate

investigation

would

have

He argues that

revealed

the

abject

circumstances of [his] childhood and would have resulted in a

decision

to

present

credible

expert
16

mental

health

testimony

explaining the relationship between such a personal history and

[Atkinss] capital offense.
Specifically, Atkins asserts in his opening brief to this
Court

that

his

counsel

could

have

investigated

and

possibly

half-brother

Butch,

presented the following evidence:

Testimony

from

corroborating
affidavit
parents.

Atkinss

and

that

elaborating

indicated

on

severe

details
abuse

by

from

an

Atkinss

The affidavit notes that, when the defendant

was born, he became the favored child and his parents

began

to

physically

and

another brother, Ronald.

mentally

abuse

Butch

and

Such abuse included beatings

and the requirement that they live in an outhouse and

eat outside.

Butch and Ronald also suffered sexual

abuse

hands

at

the

of

another

half-brother,

Floyd.

The abuse eventually led to the removal of Butch and

Ronald from the Atkins home.

Testimony
Deane

from

Passmore

Atkinss

school

that

physical

the

guidance

counselor

circumstances

he

observed when he visited Atkinss home in 1968 were

among the very worst that [he] ha[d] seen in [his] 35
years

as

[g]uidance

circumstances

must

[c]ounselor

have

[Atkins].
17

[had]

and
severe

that

such

impact

on

Pennsylvania
severe

abuse

family

court

occurring

in

records
the

documenting

home

of

the

the

Atkins

family and the permanent removal of Ronald and Butch

from the home due to such abuse.

Pennsylvania

criminal

court

records

showing

that

Atkinss mother was arrested for forging prescriptions

for a type of methamphetamine.

Proffered

witness

statements

showing

that

Atkinss

mother was addicted to prescription medication.

Testimony

from

Atkinss

schoolmates

that

he

was

social outcast and was subjected to regular emotional

and physical abuse.

Testimony from Atkinss shop teacher Bob Carlson that

Atkins

suffered

extraordinary

cruelty

and

humiliation at school.

Testimony
Senior

from

Center

Ann
in

Blair,

Sheffield,

former

director

Pennsylvania,

of

the

that

she

witnessed Atkinss father using [Atkins] as bait to

elicit

sympathy

and

handouts

from

the

elderly

residents at the Senior Center and that she believed

Atkinss father used him to help con other vulnerable
people and shoplift from stores.

18

Testimony from social worker Joan Podkul, who could

have conducted an adequate sentencing investigation,
provided its results to trial counsel, and testified
to Atkins[s] social history, drawing together all of
the available information for a coherent presentation
to the jury.

Testimony

from

forensic

Halleck

that

between

Atkins[s]

psychiatrist

significant
dismal

Dr.

relationship

social

history

Seymour
[existed]
and

his

mental state and behavior at the time of the offense,

that

Atkinss

multiple

mental

state

personality

was

not

disorder,

attributable

and

that

to

multiple

personality disorder is viewed with skepticism and not

supported by the evidence in this case.

2.
Nevertheless,
rendered

deficient

regardless

of

performance,

we

whether
are

Atkinss

unconvinced

counsel
that

his

counsels failure to uncover or present the evidence outlined

above prejudiced him.
evidence
mitigating

in

In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the

aggravation

evidence,

against

Wiggins

v.

the

totality

Smith,

539

of
U.S.

available
510,

534

(2003), asking whether there is a reasonable probability that,

19

but for counsels unprofessional errors, the jury would have

recommended a different sentence, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

a.
First, we are unconvinced that the evidence Atkins offers
would have provided further mitigation.

Testimony from Atkinss

half-brother Butch and from his guidance counselor would have

detailed the horrific physical conditions of the home of the
Atkins family.

Nevertheless, contrary to the implications that

Atkins makes in his brief, these sources focus on the conditions

and

abuse

that

treatment

that

indicates

that

Ronald
Ronald.

did

Butch

and

Atkins
Atkins

because

Ronald

received.
did

his

not

suffered,
Indeed,

suffer

parents

the

favored

not

on

Butchs
abuse

Atkins

damaging
affidavit

that
over

he

and

him

and

Further, although the additional testimony indicates

that Atkins was sexually abused, the jury was already aware, via
Dr. Horaceks testimony, that Atkins had been sexually abused by
his half-brother and neighborhood boys.
Atkinss contention that the investigation and presentation
of details of his childhood would have allowed for credible
expert

mental

health

testimony

explaining

the

relationship

between such a personal history and [Atkinss] capital offense

also lacks merit.
and

affidavits,

We have reviewed Hallecks actual testimony

noting

that

he
20

testified

that

Atkins

was

severely neglected and abused as a child and that children who

have experienced such treatment often suffer from depression and
personality
intermittent
otherwise

disorders.

Moreover,

explosive

specified;

disorder;

antisocial,

he

diagnosed

personality
borderline,

traits; and a substance abuse disorder.

significant

relationship

[existed]

and

Atkins

with

disorder

not

narcissistic

He declared that a

between

Atkins[s]

dismal

social history and his mental state and behavior at the time of
the offense but that his mental state was not attributable to
multiple personality disorder.
Most notably, however, Halleck did not explain how Atkinss
childhood circumstances would have caused him to abuse his own
son.

Consequently,

enlightened

the

jury
are

although
regarding

unconvinced

his

testimony

Atkinss
that

it

might

have

background

would

have

and

tendencies,

we

proved

mitigating.

Indeed, as the district court recognized, Hallecks

lack of explanation regarding the connection between Atkinss

exposure to abuse and the murder of his son may have actually
proved detrimental-At best, [Dr. Halleck] would have left the impression
that [Atkinss] mental state was impaired because he
was abused as a child, which would have invited
obvious, but not necessarily beneficial, comparisons
to the level of abuse that Butch had suffered and to
the relatively positive course that Butchs life
ultimately had taken.
Atkins, 2011 WL 3608234, at *17.
21

b.
Second,
additional

there

is

mitigation

no

reasonable

provided

by

the

probability
evidence

that

Atkins

any
cites

would have overcome the aggravating circumstances of the murder

and altered the jurys recommended sentence.

The jury found

that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.

Indeed, evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing revealed that
Atkins

hit

Lyles

multiple times.

head

against

the

wall

of

his

mobile

home

Medical exams revealed that Atkins physically

abused Lyle so severely that nearly every extremity of his body

evidenced

either

fracture

or

other

notable

injury.

Lyle

exhibited
[a] healing fracture [on] the right clavicle, [a]
healing bone along the midshaft of the right upper
arm,
extensive
injury
of
the
left
upper
arm,
dislocation of the left elbow, [a] healing bone
indicative of a fracture of the right hip, skull
fractures and bruising on both the left and right
sides [of the skull], and a compression fracture of
the spine.
The

pediatric

radiologist

that

examined

Lyle

testified

that

[i]n the twenty-two years that [he] ha[d] been doing pediatric
radiology and in the nine years that [he] practiced pediatrics
before becoming a pediatric radiologist, [he] ha[d] never seen
as

extensive

bone

injuries

as

[Lyle]

had.

Furthermore,

testimony from several witnesses indicated that Lyle did not

22

immediately lose consciousness and that he would have felt and

suffered from the pain associated with his injuries.
Given these atrocities, we cannot conclude that there is
any

reasonable

probability

jury

would

have

recommended

different sentence if presented with the additional mitigating

evidence Atkins offers.
failure

to

Accordingly, we hold that his counsels

investigate

and

present

such

evidence

did

not

prejudice him, and thus, we affirm the district courts award of

summary judgment on this claim.

B.
Atkins

also

alleges

that

the

State

violated

Brady

by

withholding a statement that his former sister-in-law made to

law

enforcement

childhood
brothers.

home

regarding
and

the

the

abuse

physical
his

conditions

mother

inflicted

of

his

on

his

Because the state court adjudicated Atkins's Brady

claim on the merits, we review his allegations through the dual

lens of the AEDPA standard and the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in Brady.
144

(4th

Cir.

2012).

Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128,

Per

AEDPA,

once

state

court

has

adjudicated the merits of a claim, a federal court may not grant

a writ of habeas corpus on that claim unless the state courts
adjudication:

23

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the
evidence
presented
in
the
[s]tate
court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. 2254(d).
Under Brady, the prosecution deprives a criminal defendant
of

due

process

when

it

suppresses

evidence

that

is

both

favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of whether it suppressed the evidence
in good faith.

373 U.S. at 87.

Evidence qualifies as material

if there is a reasonable probability that the proceeding would

have

resulted

in

different

disclosed to the defense.

outcome

had

the

evidence

been

Richardson, 668 F.3d at 145; see

also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).

Thus, the

key question is whether the favorable evidence could reasonably

be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.

Kyles v. Whitley, 514

U.S. 419, 435 (1995).

1.
Here,
failing

to

Atkins

contends

disclose

the

that

the

following

State

violated

statement

that

Brady

his

sister-in-law, Katherine Whipple, made to law enforcement:

24

by

former

She stated that [Atkins] appeared to be a nice kid but

had a lot of family problems.
Two other brothers[,]
Butch and another brother[,] ran away from home when
they were teenagers.
She believes that this was due
to Floyds mother having Floyd beat them and then
making them sleep in the outside to[ilet].
To her
knowledge the [Atkins] still dont have a[n] indoor
to[ilet].
Atkins avers that, had Whipples statement been disclosed, it
would have alerted defense counsel to the critical importance of
thoroughly

investigating

Atkins[s]

childhood

family

circumstances and provided contact information for two witnesses

with useful information and further investigative leads.

2.
Employing

AEDPA,

we

consider

whether

the

state

court

unreasonabl[y] applied clearly established federal law when it

concluded that Atkins failed to prove that any of the evidence
[he]

might

have

developed

if

[he]

had

known

of

[Katherine

Whipples statement] would have with any reasonable probability

resulted in a different sentence.

We conclude that the state

courts determination was both reasonable and correct.

Simply
statement
induced

put,

is

Atkins

material.

defense

counsel

childhood,

such

additional

mitigating

has

failed

Even

if

to

investigation
evidence

to

its

further
would
that
25

show

disclosure

Whipples
would

investigate

have
we

that

disclosed

have

already

have

Atkinss
only

the

examined

under Atkinss ineffectiveness claim.

reasonable
evidence

probability

would

have

exists

altered

that
the

As we concluded above, no
the

jurys

presentation
recommended

of

such

sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district courts grant of summary

judgment to the State on this claim.

IV.
We

have

reviewed

the

district

court

proceedings

on

the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo and concluded

that Atkins has failed to prove that he suffered prejudice from
that

alleged

ineffective

assistance.

Upon

our

review

of

Atkinss Brady claim under the standard imposed by AEDPA, we

conclude

that

Atkinss

claim

is

meritless.

Accordingly,

we

affirm the district courts denial of his 2254 petition.

AFFIRMED

26