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    United States v. Ronald Smith, 46 F.3d 1129, 4th Cir. (1995)

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    Ronald Smith appealed his conviction for distribution of cocaine base, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that expert testimony was improperly admitted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found Smith guilty of distribution or aiding and abetting distribution based on the officer's testimony. The court also found that the district court properly allowed expert testimony on drug dealing practices to assist the jury. Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that it could not review the sentence imposed within the applicable guideline range or the court's refusal to depart from those guidelines.

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    United States v. Ronald Smith, 46 F.3d 1129, 4th Cir. (1995)

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    Ronald Smith appealed his conviction for distribution of cocaine base, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that expert testimony was improperly admitted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found Smith guilty of distribution or aiding and abetting distribution based on the officer's testimony. The court also found that the district court properly allowed expert testimony on drug dealing practices to assist the jury. Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that it could not review the sentence imposed within the applicable guideline range or the court's refusal to depart from those guidelines.

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    Filed: 1995-02-08 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Citations: 46 F.3d 1129 Docket: 93-5783

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    Ronald Smith appealed his conviction for distribution of cocaine base, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that expert testimony was improperly admitted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found Smith guilty of distribution or aiding and abetting distribution based on the officer's testimony. The court also found that the district court properly allowed expert testimony on drug dealing practices to assist the jury. Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that it could not review the sentence imposed within the applicable guideline range or the court's refusal to depart from those guidelines.

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    14 views3 pages

    United States v. Ronald Smith, 46 F.3d 1129, 4th Cir. (1995)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    Ronald Smith appealed his conviction for distribution of cocaine base, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that expert testimony was improperly admitted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found Smith guilty of distribution or aiding and abetting distribution based on the officer's testimony. The court also found that the district court properly allowed expert testimony on drug dealing practices to assist the jury. Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that it could not review the sentence imposed within the applicable guideline range or the court's refusal to depart from those guidelines.

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    of 3

    46 F.

    3d 1129

    NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of


    unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
    res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
    service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
    Circuit.
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Ronald SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 93-5783.

    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.


    Submitted Sept. 20, 1994.
    Decided Feb. 8, 1995.

    Denise Y. Lunsford, MICHIE, HAMLETT, LOWRY, RASMUSSEN &


    TWEEL, P.C., Charlottesville, VA, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr.,
    United States Attorney, Donald Ray Wolthuis, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Roanoke, VA, for Appellee.
    Before WILKINSON, WILKINS, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:

    Ronald Smith argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his
    conviction of distribution or aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine base
    ("crack"), that the district court improperly admitted expert testimony, and that
    the sentencing court erroneously failed to provide a statement of reasons for the
    sentence imposed. We affirm.

    I.
    2

    Officer Green testified that he first saw Smith when, in response to Green's
    request for cocaine, Smith started toward the unmarked police car. Smith

    backed away after someone warned, "Hey, man, you better leave that damn car
    alone." Green circled the block and encountered an individual, later identified
    as Fernando Gaston, who, in response to Green's request for cocaine, told him
    to wait and walked up the street toward the place where Green first encountered
    Smith. Through his rear view mirror, Green watched an exchange of some sort
    between Gaston and Smith--whom he recognized from the earlier encounter.
    Gaston immediately returned to the vehicle and sold Green a quantity of crack
    cocaine.
    3

    Gaston partially corroborated this testimony, stating that after Green requested
    cocaine base, he went up the street to obtain the cocaine. He met someone,
    obtained the crack, and returned to the vehicle. After the transaction, he
    returned to about the same place and gave the money to someone waiting there.
    He believed, but was not sure, that he returned the money to the same person
    from whom he obtained the crack cocaine.

    When arrested, Smith did not have any cocaine or money in his possession, and
    his hands did not reveal any traces of the powder with which the buy-money
    had been treated. One of the officers participating in the arrest testified that
    Smith made a throwing motion when the arresting officers approached.

    Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we


    must under Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), we find that a
    rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith
    was guilty of distribution or aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine
    base.

    II.
    6

    The district court has broad discretion in determining whether to allow expert
    testimony to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
    fact in issue." Fed.R.Evid. 702; United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589
    (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 102 (1994); United States v. Barsanti, 943
    F.2d 428, 432 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S.1992); see
    Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974). This is especially true in
    the context of drug cases with regard to testimony about the methods of drug
    dealers. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d at 589; United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 895
    (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 945 (1988); United States v. Monu, 782 F.2d
    1209, 1210-11 (4th Cir.1986).

    Because " '[i]t is a reasonable assumption that a jury is not well versed in the

    behavior and average consumption of drug users,' " Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d at 589
    (quoting United States v. Wilson, 964 F.2d 807, 810 (8th Cir.1992)), we find
    that the district court was well within its discretion in allowing the expert
    testimony of Sergeant Campbell regarding the marketing, packaging, sales, and
    distribution of crack cocaine.
    III.
    8

    The determination of the appropriate sentence within the applicable guideline


    range is within the discretion of the sentencing judge, and this Court has no
    authority to review such a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794-95 (4th Cir.1990). Moreover, based on our review of
    the sentencing colloquy, we reject Smith's argument that the district court failed
    to comply with 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3553(c)(1) (West Supp.1994).

    Additionally, the district court's refusal to grant a departure from the guideline
    range is an unappealable exercise of the sentencing court's discretion. United
    States v. Meitinger, 901 F.2d 27, 29 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 985
    (1990); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
    498 U.S. 819 (1990). We therefore do not review the district court's refusal to
    sua sponte grant a downward departure from Smith's sentencing range. See
    United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir.1992).

    10

    We therefore affirm Smith's conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral


    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
    the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional
    process.

    11

    AFFIRMED.

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