United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

32 F.
3d 563
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of

unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Timothy STRINGFIELD, a/k/a Little Joe, DefendantAppellant.
v.
Russell DABNEY, Sr., a/k/a Shorty, Defendant-Appellant.
v.
Lionela. STITH, a/k/a Nooney Baby, a/k/a Buck, DefendantAppellant.
v.
Eric STITH, a/k/a Snake, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 92-5822, 92-5844, 92-5835, 92-5836.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 12, 1994.
Decided Aug. 8, 1994.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CR-92-79).
ARGUED: Joseph W. Kaestner, Kaestner & Associates, Richmond, VA,
for appellant Dabney.
Charles David Whaley, Morchower, Luxton & Whaley, Richmond, VA,
for appellant Stringfield.
Peter Dean Eliades, Eliades & Eliades, Hopewell, VA, for appellant Eric
Stith.
John C. Jones, Jr., Hydrick Law Offices, Richmond, VA, for appellant
Lionel Stith.
Stephen Wiley Miller, Asst. U.S. Atty., Richmond, VA, for appellee.
ON BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, U.S. Atty., Carl Muzi, Third Year Law
Student, Richmond, VA, for appellee.
E.D.Va.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge, and
DUPREE, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, sitting by designation.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Lionel Stith, Eric Stith, Russell Dabney, Sr., and Timothy Stringfield were
convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec.
846.1 Lionel Stith and Dabney, Sr. appeal their convictions and sentences. Eric
Stith and Stringfield contest only their sentences. We affirm all of the
defendants' convictions but vacate the sentences of Eric Stith, Russell Dabney,
Sr., and Timothy Stringfield under the principles of United States v. Irvin, 2
F.3d 72, 76-77 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied sub nom. Gonzales v. United States,
114 S.Ct. 1086 (1994), and remand to the district court for resentencing.
* From January 1989 to November 1990, Lionel Stith directed a cocaine

distribution operation in an area known as "the Corner," in Wakefield, Virginia.
Eric Stith was involved in selling cocaine for Lionel Stith early on. Russell
Dabney, Sr. and Timothy Stringfield began selling for Lionel Stith in late 1989
or early 1990. According to the trial testimony of two other members of the
conspiracy, Lonnie Gray and Leslie Gay,2 Lionel Stith obtained multi-ounce
quantities of cocaine from New York and Newport News, Virginia. Lionel Stith
and other members of the conspiracy repackaged the cocaine into 1/4-gram
quantities, which were distributed to members of the conspiracy in lots of
twenty-eight, to sell for $25 each. From the $700 generated from the sales, each
vendor kept $200 and gave $500 to Lionel Stith. Lionel Stith permitted only
one member of the conspiracy to sell at a time.
3
Several witnesses testified about their purchases of cocaine from the four
appellants and other members of the conspiracy. In addition, from July 6, 1989,
to August 10, 1990, undercover agents made twelve cocaine purchases at the
Corner from these same individuals. At trial, Russell Dabney, Sr. admitted that
he had sold cocaine at the Corner for some time. He claimed, however, that he
had stopped selling in July 1990, a few months before the cocaine operation
ceased as a result of the participants' arrests. A Special Agent of the Internal
Revenue Service testified regarding an oral statement he had received from
Russell Dabney, Jr.,3 which identified Lionel Stith as the principal operator of
the conspiracy and described details of the cocaine distribution process. The
agent redacted any reference to Lionel Stith and instead testified that Dabney,
Jr. stated that he had paid drug proceeds to Lonnie Gray, who was collecting on
behalf of "another individual."4
In September 1992, after a jury trial, each appellant was convicted of

conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 (Count 1).
Lionel Stith was also convicted of two counts of money laundering in violation
of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Counts 3 and 5), and Eric Stith was
convicted of one count of money laundering (Count 3).5 At the sentencing
hearing, held on November 25, 1992, the district court determined that it must
apply the five-year mandatory minimum sentence, set forth in 21 U.S.C. Sec.
841(b), to each defendant on the conspiracy convictions because each was
convicted of participation in a conspiracy that distributed in excess of 500
grams of cocaine. The court did not calculate the amount of cocaine that was
reasonably foreseeable to each defendant within the scope of his agreement.
Lionel Stith was ultimately sentenced to 100 months imprisonment on the
conspiracy conviction and 57 months on each of the money laundering
convictions, all sentences to run concurrently. Eric Stith was sentenced to 60
months on his conspiracy conviction and 46 months on his money laundering
conviction, to run concurrently. Timothy Stringfield and Russell Dabney, Sr.
were sentenced to 60 months and 36 months, respectively, on their conspiracy
convictions.6
Lionel Stith and Dabney, Sr. appeal their conspiracy convictions on various
grounds. Dabney, Sr., Eric Stith, and Stringfield appeal their sentences on the
ground that the district court failed to calculate the amount of cocaine
reasonably foreseeable to each of them as required by Irvin, supra. Lionel Stith
also appeals his sentence, contending that the district court erred by not
granting him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm all of the
convictions but vacate the sentences of Russell Dabney, Sr., Eric Stith, and
Timothy Stringfield and remand for resentencing according to the rule we
announced in Irvin, 2 F.3d at 76-77.
II
6
We review Lionel Stith's challenge regarding the sufficiency of the evidence

under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), and
inquire whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime [charged] beyond a reasonable doubt...." Applying this
standard, we reject Lionel Stith's argument that there was insufficient evidence
to sustain his conspiracy conviction. He argues that the evidence showed only
that he was an individual distributor of cocaine. However, trial testimony
established not only that Lionel Stith sold cocaine, but also that his activities
were part of a conspiracy, and that he was the principal architect of the
conspiracy. He directed the cocaine distribution operation. He supplied the
dealers at the Corner, packaged the cocaine in saleable quantities, set the prices,
and directed that only one of his dealers would sell at a time. Leslie Gay
testified that Lionel Stith promised he would see to getting his dealers out of jail
if they were caught selling cocaine on the Corner. An undercover agent
testified that after he requested cocaine from Lionel Stith, a different vendor
was sent to fill his order. This evidence was more than sufficient to support the
conspiracy conviction. United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232, 236 (4th Cir.1992);
United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 101 (4th Cir.1989).
Lionel Stith also contends that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
was violated by the special agent's testimony detailing the confession of Russell
Dabney, Jr., a non-testifying codefendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123 (1968). We review de novo, United States v. Williams, 977 F.2d 866, 869
(4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1342 (1993), and agree with the
government that Bruton is not implicated here. As the Supreme Court has
stated, when the admission of a non-testifying codefendant is redacted to
eliminate all references to the defendant, the Confrontation Clause is not
violated. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1986); see also United
States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1191-92 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1083 (1991) (co-defendant's confession is admissible when it is redacted to
replace the defendant's name with a symbol or a neutral pronoun). Here, the
special agent redacted Lionel Stith's name from Dabney, Jr.'s statement, and
standing alone, the statement did not incriminate Lionel Stith. It was the trial
testimony of coconspirators that linked Lionel Stith to the incident described in
the statement, and they were subject to cross-examination. See United States v.
Campbell, 935 F.2d 39, 43 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 348 (1991).
We also find no merit to Lionel Stith's contention that the district court erred in
sentencing him by not granting him a two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. U.S.S.G.Sec. 3E1.1. Prior to his sentencing, Lionel Stith denied
being involved in a conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine,
and he denied committing any money laundering offenses. The district court
found that this behavior was inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility.
We cannot say that this was clearly erroneous. See United States v. Greenwood,
928 F.2d 645, 646 (4th Cir.1991).
III
9
Russell Dabney, Sr. argues that the district court erred by refusing to give a
requested jury instruction concerning his withdrawal from the conspiracy. We
are not persuaded. In making the determination of whether a defendant is
entitled to an instruction, we inquire whether, taken as a whole, the instructions
fairly stated the controlling law, Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/Y, 576 F.2d 1072,
1076 (4th Cir.1978). "In order to be found to have withdrawn from a
conspiracy, a defendant must show that he or she acted affirmatively to defeat
or disavow the purpose of the conspiracy." United States v. Wentland, 582 F.2d
1022, 1025-26 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979). Dabney, Sr.
simply has not met that requirement. See United States v. Heathington, 545
F.2d 972, 973 (5th Cir.1977). He argues, nevertheless, that evidence showing
that he had stopped selling cocaine prior to the termination of the conspiracy
should have been considered by the jury in making its determination of whether
he was responsible for the entire amount of cocaine involved. The principal
flaw in this argument is that the district court, not the jury, makes this
determination at sentencing. Irvin, 2 F.3d at 75.
IV
10
Dabney, Sr., Eric Stith, and Stringfield correctly contend, however, that the
district court erred by failing to calculate the quantity of cocaine attributable to
each of them before it applied the mandatory minimum sentence provision of
21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b).7 In Irvin, 2 F.3d at 78, decided after these defendants
were convicted and sentenced, we held that "in order to apply Sec. 841(b)
properly, a district court must first ... determine the quantity of narcotics
reasonably foreseeable to each coconspirator within the scope of his
agreement," rather than automatically rely on the quantity attributed to the
conspiracy as a whole. In light of this, we must vacate their conspiracy
convictions and remand with instructions that the district court resentence after
calculating the quantity of cocaine attributable to each defendant according to
the Irvin rule.
11
In view of the above, the convictions of all the defendants are affirmed, but the
sentencing of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded for resentencing of all the appellants except Lionel Stith.
12
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.
Five other defendants were indicted with the appellants for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine. These individuals either pled guilty or have not appealed
their convictions
Gray and Gay pled guilty to conspiracy, and their convictions are not part of
this appeal
Russell Dabney, Jr. was found guilty of participating in the conspiracy and has
not appealed
Earlier in the trial, Lonnie Gray and Leslie Gay had testified to turning a portion
of their cocaine proceeds over to Lionel Stith
Neither Lionel Stith nor Eric Stith appeal their money laundering convictions
The district court found that the five-year mandatory minimum applied to
Russell Dabney, Sr., but since he had already served 24 months on a state
charge for the same conduct, it reduced his sentence to 36 months pursuant to
U.S.S.G. Sec. 5G1.3, comment n. 2
Lionel Stith does not raise this issue

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32 F.

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

* From January 1989 to November 1990, Lionel Stith directed a cocaine

In September 1992, after a jury trial, each appellant was convicted of

We review Lionel Stith's challenge regarding the sufficiency of the evidence

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH

Lionel Stith does not raise this issue

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