United States v. Willie Tyler, A/K/A "Little Man" Willie Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 3rd Cir. (2002)
United States v. Willie Tyler, A/K/A "Little Man" Willie Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 3rd Cir. (2002)
United States v. Willie Tyler, A/K/A "Little Man" Willie Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 3rd Cir. (2002)
3d 84
I.
2
Evidence at trial demonstrated that on April 20, 1992, the day of Proctor's
murder, David Tyler told his brother Willie, "The bitch is going to die tonight,"
referring to Doreen Proctor. Later the same evening, an eyewitness saw Willie
Tyler showing David how to cock a sawed-off shotgun. Another eyewitness
said the Tyler brothers tried to abduct Doreen Proctor earlier that day but failed
because too many cars were in the vicinity. On the night of April 20, Roberta
Ronique Bell, David Tyler's girlfriend, asked Laura Mae Barrett to babysit her
children while she and David Tyler left for the evening. The next morning,
while Barrett was doing laundry at Bell's house, Bell brought in an armful of
bloody clothing, telling Barrett that she was to say Bell had been home all
evening.
On April 21, 1992, Willie Tyler appeared at the home of Mary Jane Hodge,
where he announced, "It's over. She's gone." David Tyler then arrived, stating, "
[S]he's dead, and I'll be at court, I'll be in court but that bitch won't." Shortly
after the murder, Barrett returned to Bell's apartment, where she observed a
fervent argument between Bell, Willie Tyler, and David Tyler. During the
argument, Bell told Willie Tyler, "I shot Doreen, but you killed her." Willie
Tyler became angry, telling Bell to be quiet because someone could be
listening.
II.
5
On July 9, 1992, David Tyler, Willie Tyler, and Ronique Bell were arrested by
state authorities for the murder of Doreen Proctor. On May 18, 1993, after a
jury trial, Willie Tyler was acquitted of the murder but convicted of
intimidating a witness.1 The state court ordered a postconviction presentence
investigation. Following an invitation from the Adams County Probation
Office, Tyler voluntarily submitted a six-page handwritten letter to the court.
Tyler's first four pages described his childhood, education, and work
experiences. In the final two pages, Tyler acknowledged he had driven his
brother to the murder scene but denied any intent on his part to kill Proctor. On
July 6, 1993, Tyler was sentenced to two to four years in state prison.
Federal authorities launched their own investigation into the death of Doreen
Proctor. After his release from state prison, Tyler was indicted by a federal
grand jury on April 16, 1996. In his federal trial, the government introduced
two inculpatory statements by Tyler, one from July 9, 1992 and one from July
20, 1992.2 Tyler was convicted of conspiracy to tamper with a witness (18
U.S.C. 371), tampering with a witness by murder (18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)
(A)), tampering with a witness by intimidation and threats (18 U.S.C. 1512(b)
(1)-(3)), and a related firearms offense (18 U.S.C. 924), and was sentenced to
life imprisonment.
Before Tyler's second federal trial, an Adams County probation officer released
Tyler's letter written to the state trial judge to the Pennsylvania State Police,
who forwarded it to the United States Attorney. After the government gave
notice it would introduce the letter during its case-in-chief, Tyler moved to
suppress it on Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment grounds. Denying Tyler's
motion, the District Court allowed the prosecution to introduce the letter.
Tyler was acquitted of conspiracy but found guilty of tampering with a witness
by murder (18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(A)), tampering with a witness by
intimidation and threats (18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1)-(3)), and using a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). On January
5, 2001, Tyler was sentenced to life imprisonment.4 This appeal followed.
III.
10
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3231. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
IV.
11
Necessary and Proper Clause, and violates due process by eliminating the
prosecutor's burden of proving scienter. Exercising plenary review, United
States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576 (3d Cir.1995), we find these arguments
unconvincing.
A.
12
13
14
15
16
17
...
18
19
20
21
22
23
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the
object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding;
24
25
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been
summoned by legal process; or
26
27
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
...
28
29
30
...
31
32
(f) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be
proved with respect to the circumstance
33
(1) that the official proceeding before a judge, court, magistrate, grand jury, or
government agency is before a judge or court of the United States, a United
States magistrate, a bankruptcy judge, a Federal grand jury, or a Federal
Government agency; or
34
(2) that the judge is a judge of the United States or that the law enforcement
officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person
authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal Government or serving the
Federal Government as an advisor or consultant.
35
Sections (a) and (b) of 1512 each contain state-of-mind requirements on the
defendant's intent to obstruct justice. But under the statute, the prosecution need
not prove a defendant's state of mind about the federal nature of the proceeding
( 1512(f)(1)) or that the law enforcement officer is acting on behalf of the
federal government ( 1512(f)(2)). Tyler contends the failure to include mens
rea requirements for those elements provides no guidance for conviction,
violating his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and rendering the
statute void for vagueness. In his briefs and at oral argument, Tyler supports
this argument with little more than a citation to Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).5
36
37
38
B.
39
40
41
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997),
on which Tyler relies, does not support the argument that 1512 is
unconstitutional. In Printz, the Supreme Court declared that portions of the
Brady Handgun Law requiring state officers to conduct federally mandated
background checks violated principles of state sovereignty. Id. at 923-24, 117
S.Ct. 2365. In contrast, 1512 implicates no principles of state sovereignty,
focusing instead on private conduct substantially affecting federal law
enforcement. The statute, like other federal criminal statutes found
constitutional, "involve[s] an assertion of authority, duly guarded, auxiliary to
incontestable national power." Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375,
76 S.Ct. 410, 100 L.Ed. 412 (1956).10
C.
42
Citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130
L.Ed.2d 372 (1994), Tyler contends 1512 violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment by relieving the government's burden of proving scienter.
Sections 1512(e)(1), 1512(f)(1), and 1512(f)(2), according to Tyler,
V.
44
Tyler contends the District Court violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights by admitting into evidence a letter written to his state court
judge in anticipation of sentencing. Before resting its case, the government read
parts of it into the record. Thereafter, Tyler's attorney read different portions of
his letter into the record those describing Tyler's personal background. Both
counsel referred to the letter in closing arguments.
45
A.
46
Tyler contends the government obtained his letter in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Tyler claims he had a "legitimate expectation of privacy," violated
by the government's "seizing" the presentence letter without a warrant or court
order. But Tyler had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a letter he
voluntarily drafted for his state court judge.
47
After a request from the federal prosecutor, Tyler's state sentencing judge
turned over the letter on March 22, 2000. The court order states the letter is to
be delivered "for purposes of a handwriting analysis." No further explanation
was given. But the Assistant United States Attorney testified he "requested and
received permission" from the judge "to take possession of the original letter
for fingerprinting, handwriting analysis, and use at the retrial of Willie Tyler."
A letter bearing Tyler's signature would require authentication before use at
trial.
48
Tyler could not reasonably expect a cloak of confidentiality. He knew the letter
would be considered by the state court judge in sentencing, an open proceeding.
Nothing prevented the sentencing judge from referring to the letter's contents
from the bench. Furthermore, Tyler desired its consideration. He had no
reasonable expectation that the letter would not become public. Therefore, we
find no search or seizure by the government in requesting and receiving the
letter.12 Regardless, Tyler consented to any "search" or "seizure." We reject
Tyler's Fourth Amendment claim.
B.
49
Tyler contends he wrote the letter without knowing it could be used against him
in future proceedings, violating his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-71, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68
L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), Tyler contends at least he should have been advised of his
Miranda rights before writing his letter.
50
The District Court found that Tyler knew of his Fifth Amendment rights before
voluntarily writing his state sentencing judge. The Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination must be claimed when self-incrimination is
threatened. Ordinarily, it cannot be reserved for future constitutional battles.
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-28, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409
(1984) (observing an individual may lose the benefit of the privilege even
absent a knowing waiver). As the Supreme Court noted in Murphy, "a witness
confronted with questions that the government should reasonably expect to
elicit incriminating evidence ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than
answer if he desires not to incriminate himself." Id. at 429, 104 S.Ct. 1136.
Tyler voluntarily chose to provide information he believed would benefit him at
sentencing. Therefore, assuming a Fifth Amendment privilege existed, Tyler
waived and forfeited its benefits.
51
Of course, the general rule prohibiting Tyler from reserving his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination would not apply to statements
obtained through "inherently coercive custodial interrogations," if there was
"some identifiable factor [denying] the individual a free choice to admit, to
deny, or to refuse to answer." Id. at 429, 104 S.Ct. 1136. Although Tyler
First ... Tyler knew about his Fifth Amendment rights before the interview.
Second, he does not assert that he was compelled to participate. Indeed, he was
advised that the letter was voluntary and could focus on anything he wanted to
say, not necessarily the crime. Third, the probation officer is not a police
officer. He does not interrogate; he gathers information for the court's
sentencing decision. Additionally, Tyler does not aver that he would have been
penalized if he did not write the letter.
53
Tyler, No. 96-106, at 16-17. Nor was the letter a response to interrogation. Put
simply, there was no interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. We have never
held a probation officer must administer Miranda warnings before conducting
presentence interviews. See United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 660 n. 5
(3d Cir. 1991) (observing this position is consistent with those in other circuits).
54
Tyler also contends the probation office's disclosure of his letter to federal
prosecutors violated the Fifth Amendment. Claiming the nature of his
presentence "interview" had changed, exposing him to future federal
prosecution, Tyler maintains he should have been warned his letter could be
used against him. But there is no evidence the probation officer believed the
letter might some day be used in a future federal proceeding. The probation
officer had no obligation to provide Miranda warnings to Tyler solely because
of the possibility of federal prosecution. See Frierson, 945 F.2d at 662
(contrasting cases in which defendants voluntarily respond to questions,
"deny[ing] a portion of criminal conduct that the court found to have taken
place," with those in which defendants "consistently rel[y] on [their]
privilege[s] when questioned about related conduct beyond the offense of
conviction").13 Moreover, as previously stated, the Fifth Amendment does not
apply to the facts here, where Tyler voluntarily submitted a letter as part of a
presentence interview by a probation officer. We reject both of Tyler's
contentions based on alleged Fifth Amendment violations.
C.
55
Tyler suggests the probation officer violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel by failing to notify his state court attorney when it invited him to write
his sentencing judge. As noted, Tyler voluntarily wrote his state court judge,
hoping to reduce his impending sentence.14 Tyler's decision to contact his judge
was entirely elective, and for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the probation
office did not need to inform Tyler's state court counsel.
56
Though not dispositive, we also observe no court has found the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies to routine presentence interviews. E.g.,
Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 821-22 (10th Cir.1998) (no Sixth Amendment
violation where a convicted murderer voluntarily offered an inculpatory
statement after receiving his Miranda rights); United States v. Washington, 11
F.3d 1510, 1517 (10th Cir.1993) ("Routine presentence interviews generally do
not require Miranda warnings, even if the defendant is in custody facing
serious punishment."); United States v. Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 939-40 (6th
Cir.1992) ("Because the probation officer does not act on behalf of the
prosecution ... a presentence interview in a non-capital case is not a `critical
stage' ...."); United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1991)
(sentencing judges exercise "independent discretion and judgment in
determining a defendant's sentence" and the denial of counsel in this context is
"constitutionally insignificant"); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578
(9th Cir. 1982) (presentence interview not a "critical stage" given the
sentencing judge's "wide discretion" in sentencing);15 United States v. Woods,
907 F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d
838, 844-45 (7th Cir.1989) (same).
57
The Sixth Amendment does not apply in this case. Tyler voluntarily
participated in the presentence investigation. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that Tyler's counsel was excluded from the presentence process or that Tyler
was forced to proceed without assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit's rationale in United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 588 (2d
Cir.1990), is instructive:
58
Counsel was surely aware that [the defendant] had to be interviewed before
sentencing, and counsel made no objection. He was also aware at sentencing of
the damaging admissions made by [the defendant] in the interview and still
raised no [Sixth Amendment] objection. Even if we assume that it was error for
the court to receive the statements, the error was not so "plain" that the trial
judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the
defendant's timely assistance in detecting it.16
59
We also reject Tyler's analogy between his letter and a pretrial psychiatric
interview. The Supreme Court declared the latter a "critical stage" of criminal
proceedings, directly implicating the accused's Sixth Amendment rights.
Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-71, 101 S.Ct. 1866. But as the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held, Estelle's holding is properly limited to its facts, where the
state neither informs defense counsel of its mental examination of the defendant
during capital murder proceedings nor allows the defendant assistance of
counsel. Baumann, 692 F.2d at 577-78 (contrasting "critical" determinations in
Nor did federal prosecutors obtain the letter in violation of Tyler's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment is ordinarily "offense
specific." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d
158 (1991). Although Sixth Amendment guarantees may apply to uncharged
crimes factually related to charged offenses, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 121
S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)),18 we do not find the Sixth
Amendment barred use of Tyler's letter at his later federal trial.
61
As noted, Tyler's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by the probation
officer's solicitation or receipt of the letter. Had the events giving rise to Tyler's
state and federal trials met the Blockburger test,19 Tyler's Sixth Amendment
rights never attached in the first instance. We also find unpersuasive Tyler's
suggestion that the presentence investigation was the "halfway point" between
successive state and federal prosecutions. As the District Court found, the
government had not initiated its prosecution of Tyler when he wrote the letter.
Tyler, No. 96-106, at 13. Almost three years passed between Tyler's drafting
his presentence letter and his first federal indictment. This interlude
demonstrates the probation office acted as a neutral factfinder for Tyler's state
sentencing judge, not as an agent for federal prosecutors. Accord Jackson, 886
F.2d at 844 ("The probation officer does not have an adversarial role in the
sentencing proceedings.... [T]he probation officer serves as a neutral
information gatherer for the sentencing judge.").20 We reject both of Tyler's
Sixth Amendment claims.
D.
62
Tyler contends the presentence statement was provided by the probation office
to the Pennsylvania State Police in violation of his rights to confidentiality and
privacy. We have already rejected Tyler's constitutional claims in this context.
We will not consider the application of state law specifically 9733 of the
Pennsylvania Judicial Code21 where no federal constitutional principles are
implicated. Having rejected Tyler's constitutional arguments regarding the use
of his letter in the federal proceeding, no further federal issues relating to the
letter remain. On the facts here, we will not supervise the state courts'
application of state law.
VI.
63
A.
64
65
The statements were offered only to demonstrate that federal officials had
jurisdiction to initiate a federal drug investigation. The hearsay rule excludes
"verbal acts," statements which themselves "affect[] the legal rights of the
parties or [are] circumstance[s] bearing on conduct affecting their rights." FED.
R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note. In this sense, the veracity of
Proctor's statement to Fones was irrelevant. Even if David Tyler did not
actually operate his drug business outside of Pennsylvania, as Proctor indicated,
Proctor's statement provided a jurisdictional basis for initiating a federal
investigation into Tyler's activities. As such, the statements were not hearsay.
Cf. Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 897 n. 3 (3d
Cir.1987) (testimony of track president's statement not hearsay where not
offered to prove truth of its assertions but simply to demonstrate state action).
The District Court properly allowed the testimony.
B.
66
67
What may have been said or happened in other cases is not evidence that you
can consider against Mr. Tyler. You must rely on the evidence and only the
evidence that you heard in this courtroom in determining the guilt or innocence
of Mr. Tyler, and you should not be you should not credit or use as a factual
as a basis for finding any facts what might have occurred in another case
involving other parties.
68
69
70
First of all, I want to emphasize that this case is not about selling narcotics, and
there has been no contention and there is no evidence that Mr. Tyler was
engaged in the sale of narcotics. So if that got into this case in any way, the
government is not arguing that that occurred at all....
71
C.
72
Tyler contends the evidence was insufficient to prove Doreen Proctor would
communicate with a federal law enforcement officer. Reviewing a claim of
insufficiency, we "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government and must sustain a jury's verdict if `a reasonable jury believing the
government's evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
government proved all the elements of the offenses.'" United States v. Rosario,
118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d
1106, 1113 (3d Cir.1991)). Tyler cannot meet this "heavy burden." Id.
73
The evidence showed Ronald Diller, who coordinated the Tri County Drug
Force, served the federal government as a "law enforcement officer" under 18
U.S.C. 1515(a)(4). 23 Diller "would advise and consult" with the federal Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) "on a regular basis," and he had authority to
develop cases. Indeed, Diller intended to refer Doreen Proctor to the DEA as a
potential federal witness. The government need not have demonstrated Tyler
believed Proctor would communicate with persons whom Tyler "knew or
believed to be federal officers." Bell, 113 F.3d at 1349. Section 1512 requires
"proof that the officers with whom the defendant believed the victim might
communicate would in fact be federal officers." Id. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, we reject Tyler's contention.
D.
74
Tyler suggests the District Court violated his constitutional right to confront
witnesses by admitting testimony from Laura May Barrett that she heard
Ronique Bell say to Tyler, "I shot Doreen, but you killed her." At trial, Tyler's
counsel objected to this statement on reliability grounds but conceded it was
otherwise admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.24
On appeal, Tyler raises Confrontation Clause concerns about the statement for
the first time. The failure to object on those grounds at trial means the
Confrontation Clause issue was not preserved for appeal. United States v.
Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 847-50 (3d Cir.1984) (en banc) (rejecting analogous
arguments that the government failed to demonstrate the reliability of a coconspirator's statement or the unavailability of the declarant where no
objection was made at trial). As in Gibbs, the absence of evidence to show
Bell's "unavailability" to testify is attributable to Tyler's failure to put the
government on notice of its necessity. Id.
75
Given Tyler's failure to object, we review only for plain error. See United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)
(plain error must be "obvious" and have "affected the outcome of the district
court proceedings"). We do not find the statement resulted in a "miscarriage of
justice" or was otherwise "highly prejudicial." Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 24
F.3d 571, 576 (3d Cir.1994). Provided an out-of-court statement qualifies under
Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the Confrontation Clause does not require the proponent of
the statement to prove the declarant is unavailable. United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387, 399-400, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986).25 And in Bourjaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), the
Supreme Court held the co-conspirator exception is "firmly rooted in our
jurisprudence" so that a court "need not independently inquire into the
reliability of such statements." Id. at 483, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Therefore, the
District Court need not have independently analyzed the reliability of Barrett's
statement. We see no plain error.
E.
76
objections outside the jury's hearing. The Court gave additional instructions
requested by counsel. Tyler's counsel expressed satisfaction with the final
instructions to the jury. We see no error.
77
The government did not misstate the law in closing argument by using the
phrase "potential federal witness," which was consistent with the District
Court's instructions and was clarified in response to a jury inquiry. Nor did the
prosecutor's comment regarding Tyler's response to the Bell accusation
constitute reversible error, as the evidence showed Tyler responded with an
admonition to remain silent.26
VII.
78
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of conviction and
sentence.
Notes:
1
David Tyler was convicted of murder. Bell was acquitted of all charges, but
was later convicted for murder in a federal trial. We affirmed Bell's federal
convictionUnited States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345 (3d Cir.1997).
On July 9, 1992, the night of his arrest, Tyler made an inculpatory statement
while in police custody and after being warned of hisMiranda rights. On July
20, 1992, Tyler made another inculpatory statement to police.
S.Ct. 1855 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court also indicated the
second element was more "important," because without "minimal guidelines, a
criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Id. at 358, 103
S.Ct. 1855 (quotations and citations omitted).
6
The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I,
8, cl. 18
The parties did not address whether the Clause itself, or some other
constitutional provision undergirding the Clause, is the constitutional
justification for 18 U.S.C. 1512. But on either basis the statute is
constitutional. The Necessary and Proper Clause has served as the textual
source for criminal laws dating to the time ofM'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). In that case, Chief Justice Marshall declared
constitutional "the punishment of the crimes of stealing or falsifying a record or
process of a court of the United States, or of perjury in such court," laws the
Court found "certainly conducive to the due administration of justice." Id. at
417, 4 L.Ed. 579. Alternatively, the Witness Tampering Act could be seen as a
manifestation of Congress's constitutional authority to carry out its enumerated
powers, including the creation of "[t]ribunals inferior to the [S]upreme Court."
U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 9. Congress began legislating in this area with the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, and its authority
has not been called into doubt. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472, 85
S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (Congress has "power to make rules governing
the practice and pleading" in federal courts); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1, 9, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to
regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts."); see also Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1824) ("Congress is not a local
legislature.... The American people thought it a necessary power.... Being so
conferred, it carries with it all those incidental powers which are necessary to
its complete and effectual execution.").
9
10
11
"Criminal intent serves to separate those who understand the wrongful nature of
their act from those who do not, but does not require knowledge of the precise
consequences that may flow from that act once aware that the act is
wrongful."Id. at 73 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 464.
12
13
We also reject Tyler's argument that afterMitchell v. United States, 526 U.S.
314, 328-29, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999), decisions refusing to
find the Fifth Amendment applies in the context of presentence interviews
"should be reconsidered." Mitchell held a sentencing court could not draw
adverse inferences from a convict's silence in determining facts related to the
crime. Id. That situation is quite removed from one in which a convict
voluntarily provides the sentencing judge with information. The Fifth
Amendment provides "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Even the most generous
interpretation of "compelled" testimony would not include Tyler's presentence
letter.
14
The record does not indicate Tyler requested and was denied the assistance of
counsel in drafting the letter
15
InUnited States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir.1990), the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reserved the question of whether after
Though this case concerns Tyler's letter, not his presentence interview, the
rationale inColon remains persuasive. Because a sentencing judge may
constitutionally question a convicted defendant appearing without counsel
before sentencing, so can the judge consider a letter submitted voluntarily by
the convicted defendant without violating the Sixth Amendment, even if the
letter is sent without counsel's knowledge.
17
For the reasons stated, we also reject Tyler's passing argument, presented in a
footnote, that the United States violated his "additional" right to counsel found
in the Fifth Amendment and based on the right against self-incrimination
18
On April 2, 2001, three days after Tyler submitted his briefs, the Supreme
Court issued theCobb opinion, which abrogated our holding in United States v.
Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir.1997). Arnold had established a limited exception
to the offense-specific rule where two prosecutions are "closely related." We
will employ the "factually related" language and analysis from Cobb in our
resolution of Tyler's appeal.
19
InBlockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306
(1932), the Supreme Court explained that "where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied
to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct.
180. At least arguably, the same standards that would have convicted Tyler in
state court would result in a federal court conviction.
20
21
22
instruction, we will review statements made by the prosecutor for error, not
plain error
23
That statute provides, "[T]he term `law enforcement officer' means an officer or
employee of the Federal Government, or a person authorized to act for or on
behalf of the Federal Government or serving the Federal Government as an
adviser or consultant...."
24
Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) provides in part, "A statement is not hearsay if ... [it]
is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a co-conspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
25
InOhio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the
Supreme Court said the "general approach" required the government to
demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement the government
wished to use against the defendant. Id. at 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531. Six years later,
Inadi clarified that Roberts does not stand for a blanket proposition that "no
out-of-court statement can be introduced ... without a showing that the
declarant is unavailable." 475 U.S. at 394, 106 S.Ct. 1121. Specifically, the
Inadi Court found the Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of
unavailability as a prerequisite to the admission of a co-conspirator's statement
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Id. at 399-400, 106 S.Ct. 1121. Tyler contends Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), reestablished that the government must demonstrate unavailability in such
circumstances. But Idaho did not explicitly overrule Inadi; indeed, Idaho cited
Inadi's holding. Id. at 815, 110 S.Ct. 3139.
Moreover, Idaho did not concern the statement of a co-conspirator, but the
statement of a three-year-old. Id. at 810-12, 110 S.Ct. 3139. Under the current
formulation of the Rules of Evidence, "unavailability" is only required if the
particular hearsay exception requires it. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57,
112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992); see also 2 McCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE 246, at 124 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.1999). Rule 801(d)(2)
(E) contains no such requirement.
26
ground supported by the record, Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d
Cir.2000) (en banc). The testimonial evidence against Tyler was sufficient to
convict him of intimidating and killing Doreen Proctor, conspiring to tamper
with a witness, and using a firearm during the commission of a crime of
violence.