John J. Boulter v. United States District Court, District of New Jersey, City of Newark, 350 F.2d 860, 3rd Cir. (1965)
John J. Boulter v. United States District Court, District of New Jersey, City of Newark, 350 F.2d 860, 3rd Cir. (1965)
John J. Boulter v. United States District Court, District of New Jersey, City of Newark, 350 F.2d 860, 3rd Cir. (1965)
2d 860
On September 19, 1962, appellant was indicted on three counts charging him
with possession of and passing counterfeit twenty dollar Federal Reserve notes.
He was promptly assigned counsel. On October 5, 1962 he appeared before the
court with his attorney. The latter advised the court that appellant desired to
plead guilty to the first count of the indictment and not guilty to the second and
third counts. The judge carefully explained to Boulter the seriousness of the
offense, nature of the plea and the possible penalty. Boulter told the court he
understood and then pleaded guilty to the first count and not guilty to the other
two. The court accepted those pleas. At the hearing as to sentence Boulter's
attorney, addressing the court for leniency on Boulter's behalf, said that Boulter
"* * * of his own free will and volition asked for the Secret Service men to
come over and they came to Hudson County jail and he cooperated with them.
To what extent I don't know, but I do know that he in fact did ask for them to
come and see him to unburden himself." The court asked appellant if he had
anything to say and he answered, "Just that I am sorry."
Before the district court, appellant made no allegation that he had received
either inadequate or incompetent representation. And, as the district court
opinion held: "Furthermore, the record reveals that the utmost caution was used
to insure the petitioner's right to due process and that his attorney acted to
protect his interests." The opinion also holds that "* * * the transcript amply
demonstrates that the petitioner was well aware of the nature and effect of his
guilty plea * * *."
The vague charge is made in this action that appellant was threatened with
maximum sentences on all three counts if he were found guilty on them. Those
maximum sentences would have totaled forty-five years. The district court
opinion notes that no mention of this was made at the time of sentencing, in the
later letter to the judge above quoted or indeed, until more than eighteen
months after sentencing. The court further pointed out "* * * that while
petitioner is of youthful age his dealings with the law have been considerable
and he cannot be termed a complete novice to criminal proceedings."
From our own study of the entire record in this case we are satisfied that the
district court was completely justified in its denial of appellant's petition to
vacate sentence.
It is only fitting that we commend the zealous, most competent efforts of Neil
Leibman, Esq., court appointed counsel on behalf of appellant in this appeal.
The order of the district court denying petition to vacate sentence will be
affirmed.