Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 16 views

    United States v. Tino Fiumara, Michael Copolla, Jerry Copolla and Larry Ricci. Appeal of Tino Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 3rd Cir. (1979)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The defendant requested that his sentencing hearing be closed to the public and press due to concerns that prejudicial information disclosed at the hearing could jeopardize his right to a fair trial in an upcoming case in a neighboring district court. The district court denied this request. In this opinion, the Circuit Court denies the defendant's motion for a stay of the sentencing proceedings pending appeal. The Court finds that the defendant does not have a constitutional right to a closed sentencing hearing under these circumstances. Additionally, the Court's order is likely not immediately appealable, and the defendant's right to a fair trial in the other case would not be irreparably harmed, as remedies could be sought in that court.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd

    United States v. Tino Fiumara, Michael Copolla, Jerry Copolla and Larry Ricci. Appeal of Tino Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 3rd Cir. (1979)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    16 views6 pages
    The defendant requested that his sentencing hearing be closed to the public and press due to concerns that prejudicial information disclosed at the hearing could jeopardize his right to a fair trial in an upcoming case in a neighboring district court. The district court denied this request. In this opinion, the Circuit Court denies the defendant's motion for a stay of the sentencing proceedings pending appeal. The Court finds that the defendant does not have a constitutional right to a closed sentencing hearing under these circumstances. Additionally, the Court's order is likely not immediately appealable, and the defendant's right to a fair trial in the other case would not be irreparably harmed, as remedies could be sought in that court.

    Original Description:

    Filed: 1979-09-05 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 605 F.2d 116 Docket: 79-1937

    Copyright

    © Public Domain

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    The defendant requested that his sentencing hearing be closed to the public and press due to concerns that prejudicial information disclosed at the hearing could jeopardize his right to a fair trial in an upcoming case in a neighboring district court. The district court denied this request. In this opinion, the Circuit Court denies the defendant's motion for a stay of the sentencing proceedings pending appeal. The Court finds that the defendant does not have a constitutional right to a closed sentencing hearing under these circumstances. Additionally, the Court's order is likely not immediately appealable, and the defendant's right to a fair trial in the other case would not be irreparably harmed, as remedies could be sought in that court.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    16 views6 pages

    United States v. Tino Fiumara, Michael Copolla, Jerry Copolla and Larry Ricci. Appeal of Tino Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 3rd Cir. (1979)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The defendant requested that his sentencing hearing be closed to the public and press due to concerns that prejudicial information disclosed at the hearing could jeopardize his right to a fair trial in an upcoming case in a neighboring district court. The district court denied this request. In this opinion, the Circuit Court denies the defendant's motion for a stay of the sentencing proceedings pending appeal. The Court finds that the defendant does not have a constitutional right to a closed sentencing hearing under these circumstances. Additionally, the Court's order is likely not immediately appealable, and the defendant's right to a fair trial in the other case would not be irreparably harmed, as remedies could be sought in that court.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    of 6

    605 F.

    2d 116
    5 Media L. Rep. 2168

    UNITED STATES of America


    v.
    Tino FIUMARA, Michael Copolla, Jerry Copolla and Larry
    Ricci.
    Appeal of Tino FIUMARA.
    No. 79-1937.

    United States Court of Appeals,


    Third Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 6, 1979.
    Decided Sept. 5, 1979.

    Matthew P. Boylan, Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Lowenstein, Sandler,


    Brochin, Kohl, Fisher & Boylan, A Professional Corporation, Newark, N.
    J., Dennis D. S. McAlevy, Hoboken, N. J., for appellant.
    Robert J. Del Tufo, U. S. Atty., Newark, N. J., for appellee; Maryanne T.
    Desmond, Chief, Appeals Div., Mark J. Malone, Asst. U. S. Attys.,
    Newark, N. J., on brief.
    Before ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    WEIS, Circuit Judge.

    The defendant in this criminal proceeding has asked that we enter a stay or
    enjoin his sentencing proceedings in the district court pending appeal or
    consideration of a petition for mandamus. He contends that the district court's
    refusal to exclude the public and press from his sentencing hearing will result
    in publicity jeopardizing his right to a fair trial in a case pending in a
    neighboring district. We do not read Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, --- U.S. ----, 99
    S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), to grant the defendant a constitutional right
    to a private hearing in the circumstances of this case. Entertaining substantial

    doubts as to the likelihood of his success, both on the merits and on


    jurisdictional grounds, we deny defendant's motion.
    2

    The defendant was convicted on June 20, 1979, of violations of the Hobbs Act,
    18 U.S.C. 1951-1952 (1976), and a presentence report was prepared at the
    direction of the trial judge. After reviewing the report, which contained
    references to other criminal activity, the defense requested a hearing at which it
    proposed to refute some of those allegations.

    The trial and conviction were in the United States District Court for New Jersey
    sitting in Newark, New Jersey, and it was there that the sentencing hearing was
    scheduled for July 17, 1979. At that time, the defendant was under indictment
    for numerous other offenses, and was scheduled for trial in the Southern
    District of New York in October 1979. Many of the same newspapers and
    television stations that cover the district court in Newark also service New
    York City where the court for the Southern District of New York conducts its
    trials. The defendant timely asked that the public and press be excluded from
    the evidentiary hearing on the ground that prejudicial matters inadmissible in
    the New York trial would be divulged.1 The United States Attorney objected to
    closing the hearing, and the trial judge denied the defendant's request. A single
    judge of this court granted interim relief, pending submission of defendant's
    request for a stay to a motions panel.

    In passing upon a motion for a stay, we consider the following factors:

    1. the likelihood that the petitioner will prevail on the merits of the appeal;

    2. whether there will be irreparable injury to the petitioner unless a stay is


    granted;

    3. whether there will be substantial harm to other interested parties; and

    4. the public interest.

    See Croskey Street Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 459 F.2d 109, 111-12 (3d
    Cir. 1972) (Aldisert, J., concurring); 9 Moore's Federal Practice P 62.05, at 6225 (2d ed. 1975). Addressing the first of these factors we must weigh not only
    the likelihood of success on the merits but also whether the defendant will be
    able to satisfy the threshold requirements of jurisdiction. Defendant asserts in
    his brief that the order of the district court is reviewable at this stage and that as

    an alternative, jurisdiction exists for mandamus. Both the appeal and the
    proposed petition for mandamus, however, pose problems in the circumstances
    present here.
    10

    First, it is doubtful that the district court's order is immediately appealable.


    Defendant concedes that the order is not final within the usual meaning of 28
    U.S.C. 1291, but argues that it comes within the exception to the rule of
    finality described in Cohen v. Beneficial Finance Industrial Loan Corp., 337
    U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), and applied to
    interlocutory orders within

    11 small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and
    "that
    collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
    independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
    until the whole case is adjudicated." Id. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225-1226.
    12

    The collateral order doctrine has been applied, though sparingly, in the criminal
    context. As the Court observed in United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850,
    854, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978): "the rule of finality has particular
    force in criminal prosecutions because 'encouragement of delay is fatal to the
    vindication of the criminal law.' Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. (323,
    325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 81 L.Ed. 783 (1940))." In Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
    651, 656-63, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977), the Court set out
    three requirements for immediate appeal of a collateral order:

    13

    1. the district court's order must have finally disposed of the question and did
    not leave the matter open, unfinished, or inconclusive;

    14

    2. the decision is not simply a step toward final disposition of the case on the
    merits;

    15

    3. the decision involves an important right which would be lost, probably


    irreparably, if review had to await final judgment.

    16

    Assuming, Arguendo, that the first two requirements pose no barrier, we are
    not persuaded that the third has been hurdled in the case Sub judice.

    17

    The defendant argues that he has a right to have the public excluded from the
    evidentiary hearing based on the holding in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra.
    But in Gannett, the Court stated explicitly that a defendant has no constitutional
    right to compel a secret trial, --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. 2898. Moreover, it is

    significant that there the prosecutor agreed to bar the press, and the trial judge
    believed that an open hearing would pose a reasonable probability of prejudice
    to the defendant.
    18

    Another distinguishing feature is that the hearing at issue here is posttrial,


    rather than pretrial as in Gannett. The plurality opinion in that case formulated
    the question to be whether the public had "an independent constitutional right
    to insist upon access to a pretrial judicial proceeding," Id. ---- U.S. at ----, 99
    S.Ct. at 2901, and the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice emphasized that
    the proceeding under scrutiny was not a trial, but a pretrial hearing, Id. ---- U.S.
    at ----, 99 S.Ct. 2898. Here, by contrast, since defendant has already been
    convicted, the concern of the Gannett Court that the trial not be prejudiced by
    pretrial disclosures is not a consideration. Accordingly, we do not agree that the
    Gannett case supports the premise that the defendant acting alone has a
    constitutional right to exclude the public from a sentencing hearing.

    19

    Of course, defendant does have a right to a fair trial in the Southern District of
    New York. However, if publicity generated by the trial or evidentiary hearing
    in Newark affects the New York trial, he may then take appropriate steps there,
    the usual remedies of voir dire, change of venue, continuance, and the like
    being available in that forum. To that extent, therefore, the right to a fair trial in
    New York would not be irreparably lost by denying immediate review here.

    20

    We are mindful that the final judgment rule is to be broadly construed and that
    the Cohen exception must be kept within narrow bounds if the rule is to retain
    its vitality. Although this case may at best be in the "twilight zone of finality,"
    that there is available a remedy in another forum weighs against use of the
    collateral order exception here. See In re 1975-2 Grand Jury Investigation of
    Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 566 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied,
    437 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 3092, 57 L.Ed.2d 1135 (1978). We conclude that the
    defendant has failed to make a strong showing that he is likely to prevail on his
    contention that the order is appealable, that he will be successful on the merits,
    or that without the stay he will be irreparably injured.

    21

    We do not overlook the strong statement of the court in the Gannett case that

    22 safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative
    "(t)o
    constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Sheppard
    v. Maxwell (384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600), Supra. And because of
    the Constitution's pervasive concern for these due process rights, a trial judge may
    surely take protective measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably
    necessary." --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. at 2904.

    23

    The trial judge's responsibility is not limited solely to the case on his docket
    and in a situation like the one at bar he may not ignore the consequences in a
    nearby jurisdiction. But here it appears that preclusion of the public and press
    from the sentencing hearing is not the only way to protect the defendant's
    rights. The same result may be accomplished by simply postponing the
    sentencing until after the pending trial in New York is concluded. The
    defendant has already offered to remain in custody and waive any right he may
    have to prompt sentencing. Although there is some indication in the record that
    continuance of the hearing may be a hardship for one or more witnesses, it
    would seem that taking depositions, either in conventional form or by
    videotape, would satisfactorily resolve that problem.

    24

    Defendant also asserts that the publicity generated might be harmful should a
    retrial be ordered in the New Jersey case. He will have the opportunity to raise
    that contention in a direct appeal from the convictions already entered. The
    collateral order doctrine, therefore, is not applicable to that argument since no
    right will be lost by awaiting final judgment. In the posture of the case at bar,
    we need not comment upon the validity of the defendant's contention in this
    respect.

    25

    What we have said with regard to our doubts that the defendant can prevail on
    the merits of his request that the public be excluded similarly applies to the
    assertion that the order is reviewable under the court's mandamus power. As
    the Supreme Court noted in its discussion of the subject in Will v. Calvert Fire
    Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 655, 98 S.Ct. 2552, 57 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978), the
    moving party must show a "clear and indisputable" right to the writ. Id. at 662,
    98 S.Ct. 2552. Courts of appeals have broad authority on direct appeal but a
    writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), may issue only
    when "necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions." 437
    U.S. at 661, 98 S.Ct. at 2557. Thus, although a simple showing of error may
    suffice to obtain a reversal on direct appeal, to issue a writ of mandamus under
    such circumstances "would undermine the settled limitations upon the power of
    an appellate court to review interlocutory orders." Will v. United States, 389
    U.S. 90, 98 n.6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 275, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967).

    26

    We perceive no strong likelihood that the defendant would be successful in


    receiving a writ of mandamus directing the district judge to order a closed
    hearing in the circumstances of this case. Because we conclude that the
    defendant has failed to make the necessary showing to justify either the
    issuance of a stay or an injunction pending appeal, his motion will be denied.

    Under 18 U.S.C. 3577 matters inadmissible as evidence at trial are not barred
    from disclosure to the court after a defendant's conviction. That section
    provides:
    "No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
    character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
    United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
    appropriate sentence."

    You might also like