11 F.

3d 1163
62 USLW 2368, 1993-2 Trade Cases P 70,442,
28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881

Sara G. SERBIN and George Baker, individually, and on behalf

of all others similarly situated, Appellants,
v.
ZIEBART INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, INC. and
Ziebart
Corporation, Appellees.
Sheilah GUARINO, Appellant,
v.
SUN COMPANY, INC., Sun Refining & Marketing Company,
Robert
McClements, Jr., David Zebley and Wells, Rich, and
Greene, Inc., Appellees.
Nos. 92-3689, 93-5321.

United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.
Argued May 20, 1993.
Consolidated for purpose of disposition
by Court Order dated June 24, 1993
with Appeal at No. 93-5321.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Oct. 29, 1993.
Decided Nov. 30, 1993.
Sur Petition for Rehearing in No. 93-5321 Dec. 29, 1993.
1

Samuel J. Cordes, Andrew G. Sykes, Nancy A. Walker (argued), Ogg, Jones,

DeSimone & Ignelzi, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellants in No. 92-3689.

Gary P. Hunt, Richard B. Tucker, III (argued), Tucker Arensberg, P.C.,

Pittsburgh, PA, for appellees in No. 92-3689.

John F. Innelli, Rudolph, Seidner, Goldstein, Rochestie, Salmon & Dorian,

Philadelphia, PA, Joseph J. Baldassari, Heaney, Kilcoyne & Furey,

Pennsauken, NJ, for appellant in No. 93-5321.

4

James M. Beck, Jon A. Baughman, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia,

PA, for appellees in No. 93-5321.

Before: STAPLETON and ALITO, Circuit Judges and POLLAK, District

Judge* .OPINION OF THE COURT
POLLAK, District Judge:

These two cases have been consolidated on appeal because, in challenging

dismissal of their respective claims, plaintiff-appellants present the same
question of law. The question of law is whether consumers of goods or services
in interstate commerce who allege that, to their detriment, they purchased such
goods or services in reliance on the advertising claims of the vendor, have a
federal cause of action under subsection 1 of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a)(1), against the vendor.

Taken as a whole, the Lanham Act, enacted in 1946 and overhauled in 1988, is
primarily intended to provide a statutory framework for the registration and
protection of trademarks for goods and services, and, to that end, "to regulate
commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive
and misleading use of marks in such commerce." 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1127. But
trademarks are not the Lanham Act's only concern. An important cognate
statutory purpose is "to protect persons engaged in such commerce against
unfair competition." Ibid.

With a view to aiding in the achievement of these statutory goals, Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act as enacted in 1946 provided as follows:

Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation
of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with
knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or
representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce
or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a
civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that
of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person
who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false

description or representation.
10

15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1125(a) (1982) (emphasis added). Section 39 of the Lanham

Act vested subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal courts over causes of action
created by the Lanham Act: "The district and territorial courts of the United
States shall have original jurisdiction and the courts of appeal of the United
States shall have appellate jurisdiction, of all actions arising under this chapter,
without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity
of the citizenship of the parties." 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1121 (1982).

11

As recast in 1988, Section 43(a) was broken down into two subsections:
subsection 1 authorizes "any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such acts" to bring a civil action against anyone who:

12on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
...
commerce any term, name, symbol or device, or any combination thereof, or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of facts, which
13

(1) is likely to cause confusion ... as to the affiliation ... of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or

14

(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,

characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities....

15

15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a) (emphasis added). Section 39--the jurisdictional

provision--remained essentially unchanged.

16

In dismissing plaintiff-appellants' claims, the two district courts did not

challenge the submission--which seems, indeed, indisputable--that the
underscored portion of the quoted language of the current version of Section
43(a) is, as a matter of syntax, sufficiently broad to accommodate consumer
claims. Rather, the district courts concluded, on the basis of case law with
which the meager legislative history was not in disaccord, that the false
advertising aspects of Section 43(a)--as originally framed in 1946 and as revised
in 1988--were calculated to protect competitors or others with a comparably
integral commercial interest but did not include ultimate consumers within the
scope of protected interest. Since we agree with the holdings of the district
courts, we will affirm their judgments.

17

In part I of this opinion, we describe in somewhat more detail the claims made
and proceedings had in the district courts. In part II of this opinion we identify
and discuss the relevant precedents. In part III we explain why, in our
judgment, the rulings of the two district courts were correct.

I.
Serbin v. Ziebart, No. 92-3689
18

Plaintiffs Sara G. Serbin and George Baker brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Ziebart
International Corporation and Ziebart Corporation. Ms. Serbin and Mr. Baker
alleged in their joint complaint that, each of them, in 1990, contemporaneously
with buying a new automobile, bought from the defendants (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Ziebart") Ziebart's so-called "Super Rust Protection"
policy which insured against the rusting of newly purchased automobiles. The
plaintiffs further alleged that Ziebart's advertisements of the "Super Rust
Protection" policy contained representations that the Ziebart policy provided
lifelong protection substantially more comprehensive than that contained in
standard new-automobile manufacturers' warranties. These representations,
according to the complaint, were false and known by Ziebart to be so. Plaintiffs
alleged that, at least since 1988, standard warranties covering automobiles of
the type purchased by the plaintiffs and similar warranties covering other
brands of automobiles, American and foreign, sold in the United States, have
provided multi-year, or 100,000 mile, protection against rusting fully as
comprehensive as that provided by the lifelong Ziebart policy. Also, plaintiffs
alleged that the Ziebart advertisements described the Ziebart policy in more
expansive terms than the actual recitals of coverage set forth in the text of the
policy.

19

Contending that they had been misled by Ziebart's advertisements into

spending money on a policy "duplicative" of the protection afforded at no
additional cost by automobile manufacturers during the life of the factory
warranties, plaintiffs pleaded two causes of action--a federal claim under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and a pendent state claim under the
Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Act, 73 P.S. Secs. 201-2(4)(v-vii). Plaintiffs
also sought class certification on behalf of "all persons ... who purchased
Ziebart 'Super Rust Protection' in connection with the purchase of a new motor
vehicle...."

20

Ziebart moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Judge Bloch granted the motion. In a thoughtful opinion

which reviewed the case law of Section 43(a) in some detail, Judge Bloch held
that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the Lanham Act. Moreover, since
the complaint did not state a valid federal claim, Judge Bloch concluded that
the proper course was to dismiss the state claim as well, without prejudice to its
reassertion in a state court.
21

Judge Bloch's dismissal of the Lanham Act claim rested on his conclusion that
the injuries complained of by plaintiffs were not within the zone of interests
sought to be protected by Section 43(a)'s ban on false advertising:

22
Although
a consumer may bring an action under Sec. 43(a) of the Lanham Act, that
consumer must show a commercial interest which is subject to an injury because of
the Lanham Act violation. See Ditri v. Coldwell Banker, 954 F.2d 860 872 (3d
Cir.1992) ("In an action under Sec. 43(a), plaintiffs must allege in their complaint ...
that there is a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in terms of declining sales, loss of
goodwill, etc."). That commercial interest which is subject to injury need not be in
direct competition with the alleged perpetrator's commercial interest, [Thorn v.
Reliance Van Co., Inc., 736 F.2d 929, 933 (3d Cir.1984) ], but there must be some
reasonable and cognizable commercial interest which has been or potentially will be
injured by the Lanham Act violation, Ditri, 954 F.2d at 872 (footnote omitted).
Guarino v. Sun Company, Inc., No. 93-5321
23

Plaintiff Sheilah Guarino brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey against defendants Sun Company, Inc., Sun Refining &
Marketing Company, and Wells, Rich, and Greene Inc. The gravamen of the
complaint was that plaintiff had purchased Sun Company's highest octane
gasoline, Sunoco Ultra, in reliance on defendants' advertising claims that Ultra
provided more power and quicker acceleration than gasolines of lower octane
and lesser cost--claims known by defendants to be false--and had thus been
induced to spend money on a gasoline of premium price that did not enhance
performance. The suit, which plaintiff sought to frame as a class action on
behalf of "[a]ll persons in the United States who purchased Ultra gasoline from
April 1, 1990 through the date of class certification," invoked federal
jurisdiction on the basis of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; the complaint also
alleged certain pendent state law claims.

24

Defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56(c). Judge Irenas granted the motion, 819 F.Supp. 405. Judge
Irenas carefully reexamined the materials canvassed by Judge Bloch in Serbin
and reached the same result: "... [W]e agree with the court's conclusion in
Serbin ... that plaintiffs solely as consumers are 'devoid of any existing or

potential commercial interest,' and do not have standing under Sec. 43(a)."
Judge Irenas added that "[t]o accept plaintiff's argument would be to convert
the Lanham Act from a regulation of commercial interests and unfair
competition to a catchall consumer protection statute that could apparently be
used to challenge any allegedly misleading advertising. While such an
expansion of the Act's coverage may be desirable,1 that is for Congress, not this
court, to decide."
II.
25

The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946, recast and codified in a single piece of
legislation the various antecedent federal statutes dealing with trademarks and
related matters. Section 43(a) of the 1946 Act (from which the 1988 version of
Section 43(a), the provision at issue in these two consolidated appeals, derives)
was an enlargement of Section 3 of the Trademark Act of 1920.

26

Section 3 of the 1920 Act provided "[t]hat any person who shall willfully and
with intent to deceive ... use in connection with any ... articles of merchandise ...
a false designation of origin ... and shall then cause such merchandise to enter
into interstate or foreign commerce ... shall be liable to an action at law ... and
... in equity ... at the suit of any person, firm, or corporation doing business in
the locality falsely indicated as that of origin...."2 Section 3 "was ... deemed to
be a 'dead letter,' due principally to the requirement of proof of wilfulness or
intent to deceive, a defect corrected by successor draft bills and ultimately by
Sec. 43(a)." Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, 442 F.2d 686, 690 n. 14
(2d Cir.1971). Section 43(a) of the 1946 Act not only discarded the
wilfulness/intent-to-deceive ingredients, it also occupied territory broader than
false designations of origin. The new statute provided that "[a]ny person who
shall ... use in connection with any goods or services ... a false designation of
origin, or any false description or representation ... and shall cause such goods
or services to enter into commerce ... shall be liable to a civil action by any
person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin ... or by
any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation." 60 Stat. 427, 441.

27

When enacted Section 43(a) appears to have made little impress on the bar; in
the years immediately following its adoption, the new provision seldom went to
court. The first significant appellate construction of Section 43(a) was this
court's 1954 decision in L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649
(3d Cir.1957).3 There, a dress manufacturer sued a dress retailer, alleging that
the retailer had, in advertisements of a dress the retailer was selling for $6.95,
used a photograph of a dress plaintiff was marketing for $17.95. Invoking the

Lanham Act, plaintiff alleged that defendant's use of the photograph of

plaintiff's dress resulted in potential purchasers of plaintiff's more expensive
dress (1) buying defendant's dress instead, or (2) not purchasing plaintiff's dress
in the belief that it was only worth $6.95, not $17.95. The district court
dismissed on dual grounds: lack of jurisdiction, since diversity of citizenship
was not alleged; and failure to state a cause of action.
28

This court, speaking through Judge Hastie, reversed.

29

With respect to jurisdiction, Judge Hastie pointed out that Section 43(a) defined
a relevant cause of action and that Section 39 vested jurisdiction in the federal
courts over all causes of action arising under the Lanham Act. Turning to the
question whether the complaint stated a cause of action, Judge Hastie
acknowledged that two federal courts had read Section 43(a) as merely a
statutory codification of the federal common law unfair competition doctrine
first enunciated in American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281
(6th Cir.1900), that limited false representation claims to those that
demonstrably involved " '[p]alming off' "--i.e., "confusion of plaintiff's and
defendant's goods." 214 F.2d at 651.4 Judge Hastie rejected this narrow reading
of Section 43(a):

30 find nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view that
We
this section is merely declarative of existing law. Indeed, because we find no
ambiguity in the relevant language in the statute we would doubt the propriety of
resort to legislative history even if that history suggested that Congress intended less
than it said. It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false
representation of goods in commerce and has given a broad class of suitors injured
or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in the federal courts. This
statutory tort is defined in language which differentiates it in some particulars from
similar wrongs which have developed and have become defined in the judge made
law of unfair competition. Perhaps this statutory tort bears closest resemblance to the
already noted tort of false advertising to the detriment of a competitor, as formulated
by the American Law Institute out of materials of the evolving common law of
unfair competition. See Torts Restatement, Section 761, supra. But however similar
to or different from pre-existing law, here is a provision of a federal statute which,
with clarity and precision adequate for judicial administration, creates and defines
rights and duties and provides for their vindication in the federal courts. For
illuminating discussions of Section 43(a) and its relation to precedent law, see
Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 1948, 48 Col.L.Rev. 876, 877886; Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 1949, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 987,
998-1000.

214 F.2d at 651.

31
32

The two articles referred to by Judge Hastie as "illuminating discussions of

Section 43(a)" are noteworthy.

33

The first article, published in 1948, was by Rudolph Callmann, the author of
the treatise whose three-volume first edition--Unfair Competition and TradeMarks--had appeared in 1945, a year before the enactment of the Lanham Act.
Mr. Callmann's article, entitled False Advertising as a Competitive Tort,5
deplored American Washboard, acknowledged that its "doctrine ... appears to
be too deeply embedded in the law to expect that it will be judicially
reexamined,"6 and then expressed disappointment that the Second Circuit's first
attempt to probe the very recently enacted Section 43(a) had linked it to the
prior case law rather than "welcoming the new law and using its language and
sweep as a basis for by-passing an unhappy precedent...." Mr. Callmann went
on to observe:

34 present writer has previously stated that "Unlawful competition is a tort sui
The
generis, a violation of the order of struggle, an injury to the right of every competitor
to require that his competitors act in conformity with the rules of competition.
Competition is a relationship with mutual rights and liabilities and the duty to act in
harmony with the rules of competition is an affirmative obligation." This means
literally that "every competitor" is injured and therefore, that every competitor has a
cause of action. The language of the Lanham Act is in complete harmony with this
position, for it states that the wrongdoer in cases of false advertising is "liable to a
civil action ... by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of any such false description or representation."7
35

The second article, entitled The National Law of Unfair Competition, was by
Professor Charles Bunn.8 A principal theme of the article was that, if only
federal courts had in years past been pressed to read the Federal Trade
Commission Act a little more empathetically, that statute would have turned out
to be a charter of national unfair competition law and there would have been no
need to enact Section 43(a). As it was, Section 43(a) was "a marked
enlargement" 9 of Section 3 of the Trade Mark Act of 1920.10 "Quite clearly the
Congressional intention was to allow a private suit by a competitor to stop the
kind of unfair competition that consists of lying about goods or services, when
it occurs in interstate commerce."11 Professor Bunn concluded his discussion of
Section 43(a) in the following words:

36

Let us say that a concern makes lumber from ponderosa pine and sells it

interstate as "white pine lumber." It is engaging in an unfair method of

competition in commerce which damages the public, and the FTC has authority
to stop it. But if the Commission failed to act, the sellers of genuine white pine
lumber were formerly held to have no remedy in court, even under the pre-Erie
law. Under the Lanham Act they have an action, since, clearly, they are likely
to be damaged by the illegal competition. If they can show that the illegal
competition is continuing, they should have an injunction. For the defendant's
conduct is illegal by force of federal law, and damages are inadequate because
no particular competitor can prove particular lost sales. There is no real reason
to require the FTC to spend public money to proceed against trade liars if
private competitors are willing to take on the job.12
37

In 1971, a quarter-century after the enactment of the Lanham Act, the Second
Circuit, in Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004, 92 S.Ct. 559, 30 L.Ed.2d 557 (1971), addressed the
question whether a customer who alleged damages flowing from the false
advertising of a purveyor of goods or services has stated a viable cause of action
under Section 43(a). The issue posed in Colligan was, said Judge Moore, "one
of first impression for this and apparently any federal court." Id. at 688. The
arguments in favor of such a claim were advanced in a sympathetic setting: The
plaintiffs were two Long Island high school students. The defendants had,
according to the complaint, advertised a ski-weekend in Massachusetts; proper
equipment, qualified instruction, safe and certified transportation, and all
meals--a package tour for $44.75 a head--were to be supplied. One-hundredfifty-three students at Hempstead's Sacred Heart Academy signed up. The
weekend was a fiasco--there weren't enough skis, only one member of the staff
was a qualified ski instructor, buses broke down and were unsafe, etc. The two
plaintiffs sued not only on their own behalf but as representatives of (a) their
151 fellow students and (b) all other New York-area high school students who
might be similarly deceived. The complaint invoked Section 43(a) and Section
39's grant of federal question jurisdiction with respect to Lanham Act claims.
The district court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

38

On appeal, relying on the language of Section 43(a) creating a cause of action

in favor of "any person who believes that he is or is likely to be injured by use
of any such false representation or description," appellants' counsel presented
the case for reversal in what Judge Moore described as "an able brief, which
sets forth the issues with beguiling simplicity...." 442 F.2d at 687.13
"Appellants' principal contention [was] that the language of Sec. 43(a),
specifically the term 'any person,' is so unambiguous as to admit of no other
construction than that of permitting consumers the right to sue under its aegis."
Id. at 689. "It is further suggested that if Congress had desired, it could and

would have limited or narrowed the class of protected plaintiffs to commercial

parties merely by saying so. We reject this line of maxims of statutory
construction in favor of Judge Learned Hand's more practical instruction that
'[w]ords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition,' and therefore turn first to Sec.
43(a)'s legislative history." Ibid. (footnote omitted).
39

Judge Moore's assessment of the legislative history--much of it "ancient

history," id. at 690--is set forth in the margin.14 Suffice it to say, Judge Moore
and his colleagues were not persuaded that the legislative history supported
what appellants insisted was the unambiguous meaning of Section 43(a):

40

The congressional statement of purpose of the Act is contained in Sec. 45,

which in pertinent part states: "The intent of this chapter * * * is to protect
persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition." In this, the only
phrase referring to the class of persons to be protected by the Act, as defined by
their conduct and the source of the injuries sought to be protected against, no
mention at all is made of the "public" or of "consumers." The legislative history
of the Act, such as it is, add nothing. We do know to a reasonable certainty,
however, that the consumer protection explosion and the wholesale
displacement (though not preemption) of traditional state statutory and common
law remedies--matters pregnant with manifold consequences of great
importance--were never considered or foreseen by Congress prior to the
enactment of Sec. 43(a). We conclude, therefore, that Congress' purpose in
enacting Sec. 43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair competition
remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers generally and
almost certainly without any consideration of consumer rights of action in
particular. The Act's purpose, as defined in Sec. 45, is exclusively to protect the
interests of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous commercial
conduct.15

41

Judge Moore found confirmation for the foregoing analysis in Judge Hastie's
opinion for this court in L'Aiglon. "As the [L'Aiglon ] court noted, although
Sec. 43(a) was intended to create a federal unfair competition count, since 'the
Lanham Act was not intended to bring all unfair competition within federal
jurisdiction,' it was intended to be a special, limited one covering all those cases
in which false description and/or false designation of origin was alleged. Since
Congress deliberately excluded from coverage virtually all categories of unfair
competition but for false advertising, it could not have intended to create a
whole new body of substantive law completely outside the substantive scope of
unfair competition." Id. at 692-93 (footnotes omitted).16Colligan in the Law
Reviews and Treatises

42

The decision in Colligan quickly became a focus for debate among the
academic commentators. Law review note and comment writers were divided.
Compare 46 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 807 (1971) ("The decision of the court in Colligan
appears to present a perfect illustration of judicial conservatism," Id. at 811) and
72 Colum.L.Rev. 182 (1972) ("[S]tanding issue [resolved] in a manner ...
arguably ... not dictated by the language, legislative history or underlying
policy of the statute, and that may have been at variance with the best interests
of the general public." Id. at 191), with 3 Rutgers-Camden L.J. 583, 590 (1972)
("In light of the legislative history, together with subsequent judicial
interpretation, it was not unwarranted for the court to hold as it did." Id. at 590.
However, "[i]t is strongly urged ... that Congress in amending Section 43(a)
provide consumers with a comprehensive remedy against false advertising." Id.
at 591). More senior scholars also had discrepant assessments of Colligan.
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy felt that the Second Circuit's "restrictive reading
of Sec. 43(a) is both bad policy and improper judicial interpretation of clear
statutory language." 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair
Competition Sec. 27.5 (1973). But Professor Walter J. Derenberg praised Judge
Moore's "well-reasoned opinion," Derenberg, The Twenty-fifth Year of
Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 62 Trade-Mark Rep.
393, 495 (1972) which "limit[ed] Section 43(a), quite properly, to commercial
competitors rather than to 'any person'..." Id. at 494.17

The Case Law After Colligan

43

Over the past two decades Colligan has been an important focus for the
developing case law of Section 43(a). See, e.g., Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d
602, 608 (9th Cir.1981); Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mort'g. Midwest Corp., 871
F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir.1989); Sandoz Pharmaceuticals v. Richardson-Vicks,
Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230 (3d Cir.1990).

Ninth Circuit Case Law:

44

Colligan served as a point of departure for a particularly interesting series of

Ninth Circuit Section 43(a) cases. The first of these cases was Smith v.
Montoro, a suit alleging that (1) the plaintiff, Paul Smith, had acted in a movie
under a production contract guaranteeing Smith star billing in the screen credits
and advertising, (2) the producer licensed defendants to distribute the movie in
the United States, and (3) the defendants then substituted the name of another
actor for the plaintiff's name in the screen credits and in the advertising. Smith's
invocation of federal question jurisdiction was predicated on Section 43(a). The
district court dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim. According to the
district court, Section 43(a) was "limited in its scope and intent to

merchandising practices in the nature of, or economically equivalent to,

palming off one's goods as those of a competitor, and/or misuse of trademarks
and trade names." Smith's suit, the district court ruled, did not fall within the
statute: "There is certainly in this case no intent to divert a competitor's business
by misleading consumers. Plaintiff's claim is not that his name was misused,
but that it wasn't used at all." 648 F.2d at 603. The district court also expressed
doubt that Smith had standing to sue under Section 43(a) since he "was not in
any sort of competition with the defendants." Id. at 607. The appellate court
reversed, holding that (1) Section 43(a) covered what the court characterized as
"express reverse passing off," Ibid. (emphasis in original), and (2) Smith was an
injured "person" within the meaning of Section 43(a) and hence had standing.
The court explicated its ruling on standing as follows:
45

The Second Circuit has ruled that section 43(a) does not give standing to
consumers. Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004, 92 S.Ct. 559, 30 L.Ed.2d 557 (1971). This
reading of section 43(a) has been sharply criticized. See, e.g., 2 J. McCarthy,
supra, Sec. 27:5. At any rate, however, it is clear that appellant, as one in the
business of providing his talents for use in the creation of an entertainment
product, is uniquely situated to complain of injury resulting from a film
distributor's misidentification of appellant's contribution to the product.
According to one commentator, the "dispositive question" as to a party's
standing to maintain an action under section 43(a) is whether the party "has a
reasonable interest to be protected against false advertising." 1 R. Callmann,
supra, Sec. 18.2(b), at 625 (3d ed. 1967). See also New West Corp. v. NYM
Co. of Calif., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.1979). The vital interest of
actors in receiving accurate credit for their work has already been described.
Accordingly, we hold that appellant has standing to sue in federal court based
on defendants' alleged violation of section 43(a).

46

Id. at 608.

47

Smith was followed by Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812

F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.1987). Halicki was a suit under Section 43(a) brought by a
movie producer against a distributor and certain theaters alleging that the
defendants, contrary to their agreement to advertise the movie under the "PG"
rating assigned by the Motion Picture Association, advertised the movie-falsely--under the more restrictive "R" rating, with the result that audiences
were smaller than they would have been had the advertising rating been
accurate. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court acknowledged that, if Smith v. Montoro and
an analogous Second Circuit case, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,18

"are extended, Halicki has made out a plausible case." 812 F.2d at 1214. This
would be especially true "if we should read 'competition' in the Lanham Act in
the Pickwickian way it is suggested that the term has already been read in
relation to trademarks. See McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition,
1984 ed. Sec. 24.4B." However, said the court:
48

The statute does not permit us to accept Halicki's invitation.... The statute is
directed against unfair competition. To be actionable, conduct must not only be
unfair but must in some discernible way be competitive....

49

If Section 43(a) is not confined to injury to a competitor in the case of a false

designation, it becomes a federal statute creating the tort of misrepresentation,
actionable as to any goods or services in commerce affected by the
misrepresentation. As one treatise suggests, the Lanham Act then would be
similar to French, German and Swiss law where, by virtue of a general code
clause, in any suit in tort or contract the violation of good morals may become
an issue. Broadening the Act from unfair competition to unfair trade "is
equivalent" to the complete dilution of the concept of unfair competition.
Callmann, Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, (1981 ed., 1986
supp.) Sec. 209.

50

Adhering to the statutory language, we do not find conduct actionable under

Section 43(a).

51

812 F.2d at 1214.

52

The apparent tension between Smith v. Montoro and Halicki v. United Artists
Communications, Inc. was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Waits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1992). Tom Waits, a singer of some celebrity,
brought suit under Section 43(a) against an advertising agency and its client,
Frito-Lay, for having created and arranged to broadcast a radio commercial for
Salsa Rio Doritos "which featured a vocal performance imitating Waits' raspy
singing voice." Id. at 1096. The case went to trial and the jury returned a
substantial verdict for plaintiff. The appellate court affirmed. In its opinion, the
court recognized that Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc. and Smith
v. Montoro seemed to point in opposite directions--Halicki towards, and Smith
away from, a requirement of competition between plaintiff and defendant as a
defining ingredient of a Section 43(a) claim. The Waits court resolved the
difficulty as follows:

53

We find that Smith and Halicki may be reconciled, and we begin with the basic

principle embody; that standing under section 43(a) exists where the interest
asserted by the plaintiff is a commercial interest protected by the Lanham Act.

54

55

Its drafters wrote the purposes of the Lanham Act, two of which are relevant
here, into the statute itself: to make "actionable the deceptive and misleading
use of marks in ... commerce" and "to protect persons engaged in ... commerce
against unfair competition." 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1127 (1988). Section 43(a) reflects
both of these purposes, providing two bases of liability: (1) false
representations concerning the origin, association, or endorsement of goods or
services through the wrongful use of another's distinctive mark, name, trade
dress, or other device ("false association"), and (2) false representations in
advertising concerning the qualities of goods or services ("false advertising").
See, e.g., 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition Secs.
27:2-27:4, at 344-68 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing two prongs of section 43(a)); UHaul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir.1982) (discussing
trademark infringement and false comparative advertising as two distinct
causes of action under Sec. 43(a)); Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House,
Ltd., 532 F.Supp. 1203, 1220 (S.D.N.Y.) (discussing false association and false
advertising), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir.1982). Halicki and
Smith are distinguishable, because they involve different prongs of section
43(a) liability and implicate distinct interests. Cf. Halicki, 812 F.2d at 1214
(distinguishing Smith on the basis of type of claim asserted).
We have recognized that simple claims of false representations in advertising
are actionable under section 43(a) when brought by competitors of the
wrongdoer, even though they do not involve misuse of a trademark. See UHaul, 681 F.2d at 1160-61. The plaintiff's claim in Halicki was exclusively
such a "false advertising" claim, for it sought redress for a simple
misrepresentation as to a product's quality, the content of a movie. We were at
pains to point out that the plaintiff's injury was not related to the Lanham Act's
purpose of preventing the "deceptive and misleading use of marks," 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 1127, declaring that the statute's purposes with regard to the use of
trademarks were irrelevant to his claim. See Halicki, 812 F.2d at 1214. Rather,
where the misrepresentation simply concerns a product's qualities, it is
actionable under section 43(a) only insofar the Lanham Act's other purpose of
preventing "unfair competition" is served.

....
56
57

The plaintiff's claim in Smith, on the other hand, was a type of false association
claim stemming from the misuse of a mark, for it alleged the wrongful removal
of the plaintiff's name and the wrongful substitution of another's name. Smith

teaches that where such a claim is presented, the plaintiff need not be a
competitor, for the Lanham Act also grants a cause of action to certain
noncompetitors who have been injured commercially by the "deceptive and
misleading use of marks." ... Those with standing to bring such a claim include
parties with a commercial interest in the product wrongfully identified with
another's mark, as in Smith, or with a commercial interest in the misused mark.
58

978 F.2d at 1108-09 (footnotes omitted).

Third Circuit Case Law:

59

This court has voiced what is perhaps the sharpest judicial criticism of
Colligan. In Thorn v. Reliance Van Company, Inc., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir.1984),
plaintiff Philip Thorn owned forty-five per cent of the stock of Florida-Eastern
U.S. Van Lines, an interstate trucking company specializing in the transport of
household goods that went bankrupt. Alleging that Florida-Eastern's financial
difficulties were precipitated by false advertising in the yellow pages placed by
Reliance Van, a competitor trucking company controlled by certain of
plaintiff's own fellow directors, Thorn sued in a federal district court, relying on
a claim under Section 43(a) as the basis for federal jurisdiction and also
pleading various state law claims. The district court, noting that the trustee in
bankruptcy had declined to bring suit, dismissed Thorn's Section 43(a) suit for
lack of standing. This court reversed:

60

The traditional plaintiff under section 43(a) has been a competitor who was
injured in his line of business as a result of the false advertising.... Thorn,
however, in his capacity as an officer, director and shareholder of FloridaEastern was not a competitor of Reliance. The question then is whether Thorn
as an investor falls within the class of non-competitors entitled to bring an
action....

61

Under a plain meaning interpretation of section 43(a) it is this court's function

to grant standing to Thorn if he is a person who believes that he has been
damaged by Reliance's use of false representations ... In Colligan, the Second
Circuit held that consumers could not maintain a class action under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. 442 F.2d at 689. Although the court acknowledged
that a plain meaning interpretation of that section would permit consumers to
sue under the statute, the court reasoned that congressional intent, as evidenced
in section 45 of the Act, limited protection to interests of "a purely commercial
class against unscrupulous commercial conduct." Id. at 692. The primary reason
articulated for denying consumer standing was that an expansive reading would
further flood the already overcrowded federal courts. Id. at 693.

62

We reject the Colligan decision to the extent that it is contrary to the plain
meaning rule as set out by the Supreme Court in Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. at 485, 37 S.Ct. at 194 [61 L.Ed. 442 (1917) ] and Aloha Airlines, Inc.
v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, U.S. at [11-12], 104 S.Ct. at 294 [78 L.Ed.2d
10 (1983) ].

63

736 F.2d at 931-32 (footnotes omitted).

64

Having "reject[ed] the Colligan decision to the extent that it is contrary to the
plain meaning rule," this court went on to point out that, on its facts, Thorn lay
outside the purview of Colligan:

65

In any event, the instant case is readily distinguishable from Colligan since
Thorn seeks standing not as a consumer, but instead as an investor in a bankrupt
corporation controlled by individuals who allegedly conspired to injure that
corporation through false advertising.

66

736 F.2d at 933.

67

Finally, this court addressed the question "whether there are any prudential
reasons," ibid., for denying standing to Thorn:

68

Having concluded that the plain language of the statute gives Thorn, a noncompetitor, the right to sue for harm caused by the false representation of
services in commerce, we believe that "the 'dispositive question' as to a party's
standing to maintain an action under section 43(a) turns on whether the party
'has a reasonable interest to be protected against false advertising.' " Smith v.
Montoro, 648 F.2d at 608, quoting 1 R. Callmann, Unfair Competition
Trademarks and Monopolies, Sec. 18.2(b) at 625 (3d ed. 1967). The Ninth
Circuit adopted a prudential requirement that the party seeking standing under
section 43(a) must demonstrate a "reasonable interest" to be protected under the
statute. This requirement would eliminate frivolous claims and prevent flooding
the federal courts with Lanham Act claims contrary to the type envisioned by
Congress.

69

In this case, we find that Thorn in his capacity as an investor has alleged
sufficient direct injury resulting from the false advertisements of the defendants
and through these allegations has demonstrated a reasonable interest to be
protected under section 43(a).

70

Ibid.

70

Ibid.

71

The "sufficient direct injury" alleged by Thorn was that his investment in
Florida-Eastern was destroyed by the misconduct of one of Florida-Eastern's
chief competitors. Thus, this court's determination that the plaintiff in Thorn
had "a reasonable interest to be protected under section 43(a)" permitted a false
advertising suit by one who, while not in his own person a competitor of the
alleged rogue enterprise, was, nonetheless, so situated that he could quite
reasonably be regarded as a surrogate for such competitor.19

72

No decision of this court since Thorn has broadened the class of false
advertising claims cognizable under Section 43(a).20 One case--Ditri v.
Coldwell Banker, 954 F.2d 869 (3d Cir.1992)--appeared to present the question
whether a purchaser of professional services could sue under section 43(a). "...
[P]laintiffs contend[ed] that they [had] standing, as non-competitors, to assert a
claim under section 43(a) based on the plain meaning analysis of that section
expounded in Thorn ..." Id. at 872. However, concluding that the
representations complained of did not constitute false advertising within the
meaning of the statute, the court in Ditri found it "unnecessary to decide the socalled standing issue which would, at best, only involve prudential standing."
Ibid. Our two other recent section 43(a) cases--Sandoz Pharmaceuticals v.
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir.1990), and U.S. Healthcare v.
Blue Cross of Gr. Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.1990)--involved litigants
who were direct competitors. In Sandoz, we observed:

73

The Lanham Act is primarily intended to protect commercial interests. See

Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004, 92 S.Ct. 559, 30 L.Ed.2d 557 (1971). A competitor
in a Lanham Act suit does not act as a " 'vicarious avenger' of the public's right
to be protected against false advertising." American Home Prods. Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 672 F.Supp. 135, 145 (S.D.N.Y.1987). Instead, the statute
provides a private remedy to a commercial plaintiff who meets the burden of
proving that its commercial interests have been harmed by a competitor's false
advertising.

74

902 F.2d at 230.

III.
A.
75

In arguing that Section 43(a) should be read as protecting consumers against

false advertising, appellants invoke the "plain meaning" canon of statutory

construction. See Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 90910 (3d Cir.1990). Appellants argue that the statutory description of those
entitled to sue--"any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged"-is sufficiently capacious to include consumers. And appellants stress that
"plain meaning" informed this court's opinion in Thorn.
76

It is the case that in Thorn we said: "Under a plain meaning interpretation of

section 43(a), it is this court's function to grant standing to Thorn if he is a
person who believes that he has been damaged by Reliance's use of false
representations." 736 F.2d at 932. But our analysis did not stop there:

77
Having
concluded that the plain language of the statute gives Thorn, a noncompetitor, the right to sue for harm caused by the false representation of services in
commerce, we believe that "the 'dispositive question' as to a party's standing under
section 43(a) turns on whether the party 'has a reasonable interest to be protected
against false advertising.' " Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 609, quoting R.
Callmann, Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, Sec. 18.2(b) at 625 (3d
ed. 1967).... In this case, we find that Thorn in his capacity as an investor has alleged
sufficient direct injury resulting from the false advertisements of the defendants and
through these allegations has demonstrated a reasonable interest to be protected
against under section 43(a).
78

736 F.2d at 933.

79

In Thorn, in short, we expressly subscribed to the Ninth Circuit's Smith v.

Montoro pronouncement that the " 'dispositive question,' " in determining who
may bring a false advertising claim under Section 43(a), is whether a putative
plaintiff " 'has a reasonable interest to be protected against false advertising.' "
More to the point, we noted that in framing the " 'dispositive question' " the
opinion in Smith v. Montoro was quoting Section 18.2(b) of the third edition of
the Callmann treatise. What the Callmann treatise said, in the sentence
excerpted in Smith v. Montoro and in turn excerpted in Thorn, was as follows:

80 dispositive question should be whether plaintiff has a reasonable interest to be

The
protected against false advertising.
81

1 R. Callmann, Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, Sec. 18.2(b)

at p. 625 (3d ed. 1967) (footnote omitted).21 A reading of the entire paragraph
in which the quoted sentence appears sheds strong light on what Callmann
meant by "a reasonable interest to be protected against false advertising." The
strong light shed by that paragraph appears "dispositive" with respect to the
issue posed by the cases at bar:

82false description of goods refers to any untrue statement referring to the nature of
A
the goods as the consumer would understand it.... Initially, the comments of the
courts with respect to the right to sue under section 43(a) were difficult to
understand. In California Sportswear [California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of
California, 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.1947) ] the court quite properly insists upon proof
that the buying public accepted the label as an index of the original of the goods; but
it doubted whether the statute creates a liability "in favor of a quite indefinite
number of volunteer plaintiffs." This, indeed, is the only practical explanation for
the judicial reluctance to recognize false advertising as a competitive tort--the
"indefinite number of volunteer plaintiffs." It has been stated above that "unlawful
competition is a tort sui generis, a violation of the order of struggle, an injury to the
right of every competitor to require that his competitors act in conformity with the
rules of competition. Competition is a relationship with mutual rights and liabilities
and the duty to act in harmony with the rules of competition is an affirmative
obligation." This means that virtually "every competitor" is injured and, therefore,
that every competitor has a cause of action. The language of the Lanham Act is in
complete harmony with this position, for it states that the wrongdoer in cases of
false advertising is "liable to a civil action ... by any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation."
Indeed the statute goes further in recognizing that the plaintiff need not even be "in
the same line of business and in competition with defendant"; it will be sufficient, in
the case of a false designation of origin, that the plaintiff is "doing business in the
locality falsely indicated" and, in the case of a false description of goods or services,
that he believes he is or is likely to be damaged, because, for instance, the parties are
doing business on different economic levels. The dispositive question should be
whether plaintiff has a reasonable interest to be protected against false advertising. If
he has, his right to maintain an action should be determined by the federal law of
unfair competition and the federal court will have jurisdiction over any action under
section 43(a), regardless of diversity of citizenship or joinder with any related claim
under copyright, patent or trademark laws. It has been said that the complaint must
be framed in terms of section 43(a) to warrant removal to a federal court. This is not
so. It should be sufficient that the allegations of the complaint reveal the false
advertising. The public as such, i.e., the individual consumer, will have no right of
action under section 43(a) and there is no need of such right. Its interest can be
protected by the Federal Trade Commission, which has been authorized by section 5
of its Enabling Act to take action on its behalf.
Id. at pp. 623-26 (footnotes omitted).22
83

We said in Sandoz that "[t]he Lanham Act is primarily intended to protect

commercial interests," and that "[section 43(a) of] the statute provides a private
remedy to a commercial plaintiff who meets the burden of proving that its

commercial interests have been harmed by a competitor's false advertising."

902 F.2d at 230. As our holding in Thorn demonstrates, we do not construe
Section 43(a) as limiting the class of false advertising plaintiffs to those in
direct competition. But the Thorn plaintiff, as the major shareholder in a firm
allegedly driven into bankruptcy by a principal competitor's false advertising,
was a particularly appropriate standard bearer for the "commercial interests" of
the bankrupt firm. "The absence of a less remote party with an interest in
challenging the false representation may account for the Third Circuit's
decision...." Restatement of the Law: Unfair Competition, Tentative Draft No.
1 (April 12, 1988) 59, reprinted in Restatement of the Law: Unfair
Competition, Tentative Draft Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (1992). We conclude, as
Callmann did, that consumers fall outside the range of "reasonable interests"
contemplated as protected by the false advertising prong of Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act as enacted in 1946.
B.
84

The final question to be addressed is whether the 1988 revision of the Lanham
Act enlarged the scope of Section 43(a) so as to authorize consumer suits for
false advertising. As we have noted, the false advertising language of Section
43(a), as enacted in 1946,23 provided that "[a]ny person who shall ... use in
connection with any goods or services ... any false description or representation
... and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce ... shall be
liable to a civil action ... by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation." 60 Stat.
441. In contrast, the 1988 revision, now in force, authorizes "any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such acts to sue anyone
who in connection with any goods or services ... uses in commerce ... any ...
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
facts, which ... in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities ... of his or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities...." 15 U.S.C. Sec. 43(a). The revision makes explicit that
culpability attaches not only to a defendant's false advertising with respect to the
defendant's goods or services but also to false advertising relating to the goods
or services of others. That apart, the earlier and later versions of the false
advertising aspects of Section 43(a) have generally been treated as equivalent.
Thus, in Ditri, supra, a section 43(a) false advertising case, we noted that "we
find that the language of the Lanham Act is substantially the same under both
versions as it relates to the allegations in this case ..." 954 F.2d at 872 n. 1.
However, since appellants in the cases at bar place some reliance on portions of
the legislative history of the 1988 revision, we think it appropriate to consider
directly the question whether Congress in 1988 changed the law so as to

authorize consumer suits for false advertising.

85

In her brief on appeal, appellant Guarino quotes from a 1988 report of the
House Judiciary Committee which discussed Colligan with disapproval,
opining that the Second Circuit's "analysis not only is unsupported, but also
appears outdated." H.R.Rep. No. 100-1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 13. The
Judiciary Committee not only criticized Colligan, it reported favorably a bill
that would have amended Section 43(a) to authorize "any person, including a
consumer, who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation." Id. at 32 (emphasis in original).
However, "the provision was deleted in a House-Senate Conference
Committee." 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition Sec. 27.04 at p. 27-55 (3d ed. 1992).

86

Appellants Serbin and Baker note that Congressman Kastenmeier, manager of

the 1988 revision of the Lanham Act on the floor of the House, made plain his
strong conviction that consumers ought to be able to sue under Sec. 43(a) and
indeed were already entitled to sue under the statute as originally enacted in
1946. On October 19, 1988, in the course of debate on the day of final House
action, Congressman Kastenmeier said:

87

Consumer interests have also been the subject of compromise in this legislation.
As reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary, the bill would have
explicitly acknowledged that consumers have standing to sue for violations of
section 43(a), which provides a cause of action for unfair competitive acts such
as false and misleading advertising. The agreement, however, deleted this
provision from the bill. While I support the deletion as part of the necessary
compromise on this bill, it is unfortunate in the long run. I continue to believe
that consumers already have standing to sue under current law, and that the
provision that was deleted only clarified that law.

88

134 Cong.Rec. 31850 (Oct. 19, 1988).

89

But against Congressman Kastenmeier's words must be measured the

subsequent words of Congressman Fish:

90

I would like to comment on one provision which was taken out of H.R. 5372
which was reported by the Judiciary Committee and which is not found in this
compromise, it would have provided consumers with standing to sue under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. This provision, which had not been studied or
evaluated by anyone for its long-term effects on Federal unfair competition law,

would have radically altered the nature of the Lanham Act and would have had
the likely effect of turning the Federal courts into a small claims court.
91

134 Cong.Rec. 31854 (Oct. 19, 1988).

92

With matters in this posture, the verdict must be that rendered by Professor
McCarthy, who characterizes Congressman Kastenmeier's statement as "only
an optimistic opinion by a representative whose proposal was defeated in a
House-Senate compromise." 2 McCarthy, supra, Sec. 27.04 at p. 27-55 (3d ed.
1992).

Conclusion
93

The question of policy that underlies these appeals is not whether false
advertising is a bad thing. It is, and consumers are victimized by it. The
question of policy is what institution, or set of institutions, should be charged
with identifying false advertising, ameliorating its malign consequences, and, in
the long run, shrinking its dominion. State courts have substantial authority in
this field by virtue of judge-made misrepresentation law, and some state
legislatures have, through such legislation as the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, undertaken to widen that authority. Congress conferred a
measure of public enforcement authority on the Federal Trade Commission
and, through section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, has vested in the federal courts
jurisdiction to entertain certain categories of private law suits predicated on
claims of false advertising. Given this commitment of institutional resources to
the cause of consumers injured by false advertising, if Congress had intended to
make the additional commitment involved in recognizing a federal tort of
misrepresentation and in bestowing access to federal fora without regard to the
amount in issue, we are confident that the legislative history of the Lanham Act
would have borne clear witness to that commitment. Because we find no clear
indication of such an unusual commitment and because we are satisfied that
section 43(a) had an important, though narrower and quite distinct purpose, we
join the Second Circuit in holding that Congress, when authorizing federal
courts to deal with claims of false advertising, did not contemplate that federal
courts should entertain claims brought by consumers. 24

94

Some have suggested that the Federal Trade Commission has not been a
sufficiently effective watch-dog of consumer interests,25 and that the
protections afforded consumers in state courts are inadequate.26 Such seemed to
be the view of the House Judiciary Committee in 1988, when it proposed
amending section 43(a) expressly to include consumers among those entitled to
sue. H.R.Rep. 100-1028 (100th Cong.2d Sess., 1988) 13-14. However, that

view did not prevail in Congress at that time.

95

In determining whether Section 43(a) should be enlarged in the manner

proposed, Congress needs to consider what other tasks the federal courts now
perform and whether some of those tasks--tasks that would otherwise compete
with Section 43(a) claims for federal judicial attention--should be withdrawn
from the cognizance of federal courts. There is plainly a national consensus that
federal courts should be prepared to devote as much time as is necessary to the
careful adjudication of cases involving claims of employment and housing
discrimination, of dilution of voting rights, of fraudulent marketing of
securities, of differential treatment of persons with disabilities, or of injury to
the environment. Is there the same consensus with respect to diversity cases
involving alleged negligence in the driving of an automobile, or alleged
physician or lawyer malpractice, or the filing of allegedly fraudulent insurance
claims? The responsibility for answering these questions lies, in the first
instance, with Congress. It is Congress that determines the agenda of federal
trial courts. In making that determination, Congress establishes priorities about
the proper utilization of the energies of an institution of limited size and
resources--the federal judicial system.27

96

The judgments below are affirmed.

97

Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN,

GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO,
ROTH, and LEWIS, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge.*

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Dec. 29, 1993.
98
99

The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the above-entitled case having
been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and
to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service,
and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a
majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not having
voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.

Honorable Louis H. Pollak, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation

In a footnote, Judge Irenas observed:

The court is aware that some commentators have argued in favor of consumer
standing either as a matter of judicial interpretation or legislative clarification.
See, e.g., Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of
Public Regulation, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 Ga.L.Rev.
1, 66-68 (Fall 1985); See also False Advertising Claims and the Revision of the
Lanham Act: A Step in Which Direction?, 59 U.Cin.L.Rev. 957, 960-67
(Winter 1991).

The full text of Section 3 was:

That any person who shall willfully and with intent to deceive, affix, apply, or
annex, or use in connection with any article or articles of merchandise, or any
container or containers of the same, a false designation of origin, including
words or other symbols, tending to falsely identify the origin of the
merchandise, and shall then cause such merchandise to enter into interstate or
foreign commerce, and any person who shall knowingly cause or procure the
same to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or commerce with
Indian tribes, or shall knowingly deliver the same to any carrier to be so
transported, shall be liable to an action at law for damages and to an action in
equity for an injunction, at the suit of any person, firm, or corporation doing
business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin, or in the region in
which said locality is situated, or at the suit of any association of such persons,
firms, or corporations.

41

Stat. 533, 534

In 1956, Chief Judge Clark of the Second Circuit pointed to L'Aiglon, with
approval, as the principal judicial discussion of Section 43(a), and observed
that "the bar has not yet realized the potential impact of this statutory
provision." Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d
Cir.1956) (Clark, C.J. concurring)

Of course, the American Washboard jurisprudence originated and flourished

decades before the court's pronouncements in Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) that "there is no general federal common
law."

48 Colum.L.Rev. 876 (1948)

Id. at 885

Id. at 886

Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 987 (1949)

Id. at 998

10

See supra note 2

11

62 Harv.L.Rev. at 999

12

Id. at 1000

13

Appellees filed no brief on appeal

14

Judge Moore's opinion states in part:

We agree with appellants that "[t]he Lanham Act of 1946 has a very long and
convoluted legislative history," which with respect to Sec. 43(a) we find to be
inconclusive and therefore of little or no help in resolving the issue decided
today. We are cited by counsel to certain statements, actions and inactions and
are asked to make certain causal connections among them and then to draw a
set of preferred inferences therefrom. Counsel lay stress, for example, on the
following statement made before a joint congressional committee in 1925 by a
representative of the U.S. Trademark Association with respect to the language
of a bill's provision, which, in substantially modified form, became Sec. 43(a):
"It provides that any person who is damaged by the false description may start
the suit. Obviously the purchaser might claim that he has been misled and
damaged and start suit. At any rate, if it is intended to limit the right to start
such a suit, that limitation should be stated."
None of the committee members or draftsmen of Sec. 30 of the 1925 bill
expressed any disagreement with this statement, and the provision remained
unchanged, containing no express limitation barring consumer suits.
We are asked to conclude from this ancient history that the committee's silence,
followed by its inaction with respect to amending this portion of the bill, must
mean that Congress clearly intended to create standing for consumers under the
1946 Act. On this flimsy record, it would be self-serving for us to invoke the
doctrine of "silence as acceptance" as a basis upon which to draw any
consequential inference with respect to Sec. 43(a)'s legislative history. We
believe it more likely that the committee members evidenced no disagreement
or agreement with the interpretation given Sec. 30 by the above-quoted
statement because neither was necessary; the committee members probably
were sufficiently confident of their own interpretation that they felt that no
clarification by way of reply and/or amendment was needed to implement their

intention to confer standing solely upon commercial plaintiffs.

It is also suggested that since the statutory predecessor of Sec. 43(a), Sec. 3 of
the Trademark Act of 1920, was addressed solely to the prohibition of false
designations of origin and authorized suit only by persons, corporations, etc.,
"doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin" and since this
type of language was preserved in several early drafts of what became Sec.
43(a) but was ultimately dropped by the A.B.A. Trade-Mark Committee in
favor of a provision permitting suit by "any person, firm or corporation who is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any false description or representation,"
we should conclude that the A.B.A. rejection of the earlier colorably broader
A.B.A. language "clearly indicates an intent [attributable to Congress] not to
restrict the provision to actions by businessmen and tradesmen," and "a
[congressional] concern to expand the class and type of person authorized to
sue." We, on the other hand, construe the deletion of the phrase "in his trade or
business" from the earlier A.B.A. drafts to be equally consistent with a clearly
expressed congressional purpose to create a federal statutory tort of unfair
competition sui generis, thus rendering the subject phrase to the status of mere
surplusage.
442 F.2d at 689-691 (footnotes omitted).
15

442 F.2d at 691-92 (footnotes omitted)

16

The Second Circuit decided Colligan on May 6, 1971. On October 6, 1971, a

district court in California, in denying a motion to dismiss, held in Arnesen v.
Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 333 F.Supp. 116 (C.D.Cal.1971), that a
consumer who alleged damages flowing from false advertising had stated a
claim under Section 43(a). The court in Arnesen rejected the contention that the
statute "confers no private right of action on a defrauded customer but only on
competitors...." Id. at 119. "The liability clause of Section 43(a) is clear on its
face; it applies to any person who is or is likely to be damaged. Defendant
would have us construe against the plain language of the statute." Id. at 120.
The court did not discuss--indeed, it did not cite--Colligan
The Arnesen complaint included counts other than the Section 43(a) count;
accordingly, the Arnesen opinion, in addition to parsing Section 43(a),
addressed other issues not pertinent to our present inquiry. Several years after
the denial of the motion to dismiss the Section 43(a) claim, the court entered a
default judgment against defendants on that claim. Jones v. The Raymond Lee
Organization, Inc., 209 USPQ 209, 212 (C.D.Cal.1949).

17

And see, Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby--Too Far Maybe?, 49 Ind.L.J. 84, 106-08

(1973):
In the recent Colligan case, the Second Circuit construed Sec. 43(a) in light of
the legislative intent that could be gleaned from the language of the Act itself
and inferred from the common law underlying the Act, rather than relying on
legislative history that is "very long and convoluted." It is submitted that this
approach and the resulting conclusions were correct, even though the effect
may have been to deny an aggrieved party a feasible route to relief." Id. at 106
(footnote omitted)....
"The upshot of the court's analysis is that Sec. 43(a) was intended by Congress
primarily to ameliorate competitive abuses and only incidentally to benefit
broader public or "consumer" interests. This view is buttressed by the fact that
the law of unfair competition and trademarks in general actually functions in
this manner. Notwithstanding the oft-expressed concern for public interest, the
law's evolution has been restricted almost entirely to commercial plaintiffs." Id.
at 108-09 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
18

538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1976) (claim by "Monty Python" group that broadcast by
American Broadcasting Company excised much of Monty Python's "rare brand
of humor," to detriment of group's reputation, cognizable under Section 43(a)
notwithstanding no competitive relationship between Monty Python and ABC)

19

There would appear to be a question whether the false advertising claim found
cognizable by this court in Thorn would pass muster in the Ninth Circuit which,
under Waits (drawing in turn on Halicki ), "counsels that a discernibly
competitive injury must be alleged." 978 F.2d at 1109

20

A district court in this Circuit, in granting a motion for class certification, did
rule, in reliance on Thorn, that consumers may bring a false advertising claim
under Section 43(a). Maguire v. Sandy Mac, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 444, 448
(D.N.J.1991). The class certification order was subsequently vacated. Maguire
v. Sandy Mac, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 50, 53-4 (D.N.J.1992)

21

In assessing the weight attached by this court and by the Ninth Circuit to the
Callmann treatise, it bears recollection that a major portion of Rudolph
Callmann's article on False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48
Colum.L.Rev. 876, 877-886 (1948) was one of two "illuminating discussions of
Section 43(a)" particularly relied on by Judge Hastie in L'Aiglon, 214 F.2d at
651. See supra p. 1167. The nexus between the treatise and the False
Advertising article is a close one: when Callmann, in the paragraph quoted
from the third edition of his treatise, stated, in quotation marks, that " 'unlawful
competition is a tort sui generis ...,' " he was perpetuating a pronouncement of
his own that he incanted in the False Advertising article, quoting from the first

edition of his treatise. See 48 Colum.L.Rev. at 886 n. 48

22

It should be noted that the third edition of the Callmann treatise was published
in 1967, four years before the Second Circuit's decision in Colligan

23

See supra p. 1164

24

In construing statutes we do well to bear in mind the precepts laid down by

Professor David Shapiro:
... [T]he tilt towards continuity is in fact a useful guideline in discerning
legislative purpose, and ... it is consistent with values that lie at the heart of our
constitutional system and the role of courts. Courts push beyond their proper
limits when they interpret statutes to yield results that, for political or other
reasons, may well have lain beyond the legislature's intended reach. On the
other hand, courts have a unique responsibility to accommodate change to a
complex and relatively stable structure of rules and principles.
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
921, 960 (1992).

25

See, e.g., the September 8, 1988 testimony of Bruce Silverglade, Legal Director
of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary
Committee, excerpted at H.R.Rep. 100-1028 (100th Cong.2d Sess., 1988) 14.
See also, Note, False Advertising Claims and the Revision of the Lanham Act:
A Step In Which Direction?, 59 U.Cin.L.Rev. 957, 965 (1991)
Shortly before Guarino was filed, Sun Company, Inc. and Sun Refining and
Marketing Company entered into a consent agreement with the Federal Trade
Commission under which the respondents agreed to cease and desist from, inter
alia, "making any representation ... about the superiority of ULTRA 93.5 and
94 in providing engine power or acceleration" unless respondents were
prepared to back up the representations with "competent and reliable scientific
evidence." In the Matter of Sun Company, Inc., FTC 902 3268 Order, Part I
(June 11, 1991). Commissioner Owen dissented, arguing that "the public
interest would have been better served if the remedy in this matter had provided
stronger incentives to insure compliance with the FTC Act, or had provided
other relief that would truly benefit consumers." Dissenting Statement of
Commissioner Deborah K. Owen, p. 2.

26

See Note 59 U.Cin.L.Rev. at 965-55, and testimony of Bruce Silverglade, both

cited supra, note 25. See also Thompson, Consumer Standing Under Section
43(a): More Legislative History, More Confusion, 79 Trademark Rep. 341, 353

(1989), noting that a number of states, including some that have adopted the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, do not authorize consumer class
actions, and "[s]ince ... an individual's damages may be too insignificant to
warrant bringing a suit, the federal provisions for class actions would be
particularly suitable for use in consumer deception cases." But, as pointed out in
Callagy and Lusins, Private Consumer Remedies for False Advertising, in
False Advertising and Commercial Speech (Practicing Law Institute Course
Handbook 1992) 336, some states, including some large ones, do authorize
consumer class actions, citing Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill.2d 7, 56 Ill.Dec. 886,
428 N.E.2d 478 (1981) (authorizing class action under Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act on behalf of national class of 180,000
would-be acquirers of "accent" butane lighters defendant undertook to
distribute free as part of promotion of "cricket" lighters but was unable to
deliver in sufficient quantities due to over-demand); and Committee on
Children's T.V. v. Gen. Foods, 35 Cal.3d 197, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660
(1983) (authorizing classes of parents and children to sue breakfast cereal
manufacturers for allegedly fraudulent broadcast advertising). As to the
possibilities of bringing private consumer false advertising claims under the
Federal Trade Commission Act or under RICO, see Callagy and Lusins, Private
Consumer Remedies, supra, at 329-33
27

At its September 1993 session the Judicial Conference of the United States
voted to:
Reaffirm the federal judiciary's historical commitment to the principle that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts should be limited, complementing and not
supplanting the jurisdiction of the state courts.
Endorse the principle that the size of the Article III Judiciary should be limited
to the number necessary to exercise such jurisdiction, thus allowing a policy of
carefully controlled growth.

10

The Third Branch No. 10 (Oct. 1993) 1

Honorable Louis H. Pollak, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation