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    United States v. D. R. MacLean A/K/A Daniel Martorella A/K/A John D. Humphreys, 578 F.2d 64, 3rd Cir. (1978)

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    The document is a court opinion regarding whether it is permissible for jurors to take notes during a trial. The court held that: 1) The decision to allow juror note-taking is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 2) The trial judge in this case properly instructed the jurors on the appropriate use of notes, such as not giving notes greater weight than a juror's own memory. 3) It was not reversible error if only one juror took notes or later became the foreman, since the jury had been properly instructed.

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    United States v. D. R. MacLean A/K/A Daniel Martorella A/K/A John D. Humphreys, 578 F.2d 64, 3rd Cir. (1978)

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    The document is a court opinion regarding whether it is permissible for jurors to take notes during a trial. The court held that: 1) The decision to allow juror note-taking is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 2) The trial judge in this case properly instructed the jurors on the appropriate use of notes, such as not giving notes greater weight than a juror's own memory. 3) It was not reversible error if only one juror took notes or later became the foreman, since the jury had been properly instructed.

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    Filed: 1978-06-30 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 578 F.2d 64 Docket: 77-2187

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    The document is a court opinion regarding whether it is permissible for jurors to take notes during a trial. The court held that: 1) The decision to allow juror note-taking is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 2) The trial judge in this case properly instructed the jurors on the appropriate use of notes, such as not giving notes greater weight than a juror's own memory. 3) It was not reversible error if only one juror took notes or later became the foreman, since the jury had been properly instructed.

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    72 views5 pages

    United States v. D. R. MacLean A/K/A Daniel Martorella A/K/A John D. Humphreys, 578 F.2d 64, 3rd Cir. (1978)

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    The document is a court opinion regarding whether it is permissible for jurors to take notes during a trial. The court held that: 1) The decision to allow juror note-taking is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 2) The trial judge in this case properly instructed the jurors on the appropriate use of notes, such as not giving notes greater weight than a juror's own memory. 3) It was not reversible error if only one juror took notes or later became the foreman, since the jury had been properly instructed.

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    of 5

    578 F.

    2d 64

    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,


    v.
    D. R. MACLEAN, a/k/a Daniel Martorella a/k/a John D.
    Humphreys, Appellant.
    No. 77-2187.

    United States Court of Appeals,


    Third Circuit.
    Argued March 28, 1978.
    Decided June 30, 1978.

    Blair A. Griffith, U.S. Atty., Thomas A. Crawford, Asst. U.S. Atty.,


    Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
    Charles F. Scarlata, Scarlata & DeRiso, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
    Before ALDISERT, GIBBONS and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit
    Judges.OPINION OF THE COURT
    HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge.

    The propriety of note-taking by jurors is a matter of first impression for this


    court. The subject has already been addressed, however, by most circuits, many
    state courts, legislatures and scholars. We join in the unanimous view of federal
    appellate courts that have decided the issue: Whether or not to allow notetaking by jurors is a matter committed to the sound discretion of trial judges.
    That discretion was not abused here and, therefore, the judgment of conviction
    will be affirmed.

    A jury found the defendant D. R. Maclean guilty on all nineteen counts of an


    indictment alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud), 18 U.S.C.
    1342 (use of a fictitious name to defraud) and 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy).
    The substance of the charges is that the defendant fraudulently induced owners
    of undeveloped property in Florida to attempt to sell their properties through his
    company. The defendant profited from the resulting advertising fees.

    Defendant argues that the district court committed reversible error by allowing
    jurors to take notes and in failing to make those notes part of the record.
    Although the exact sequence of events is not completely clear, it was
    apparently brought to the court's attention that one of the jurors had a writing
    pad, and after a side bar conference, the jurors were told that they could take
    notes and they were cautioned as to the proper use of the notes. After this initial
    instruction, no other instruction was given prior to the jury's deliberation or at
    any other time. Only one juror actually took notes. This juror became foreman
    of the jury.

    The Supreme Court has never addressed the note-taking issue. 1 The following
    circuits have held that it is within a trial judge's discretion to allow note-taking:
    Second (U. S. v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975)); Fifth (U. S. v.
    Pollack, 433 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1970)); Seventh (U. S. v. Braverman, 522 F.2d
    218 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985, 96 S.Ct. 392, 46 L.Ed.2d 302
    (1975)); Eighth (Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Kelly, 84 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1936));
    Ninth (Toles v. U. S., 308 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836,
    84 S.Ct. 79, 11 L.Ed.2d 66 (1963)); Tenth (U. S. v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697
    (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860, 98 S.Ct. 186, 54 L.Ed.2d 133
    (1977)); and the District of Columbia (Goodloe v. U. S., 88 U.S.App.D.C. 102,
    188 F.2d 621 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819, 72 S.Ct. 35, 96 L.Ed. 619
    (1951)).

    On the state level, a number of legislatures have enacted statutes permitting


    jurors to take notes.2 At least one state has a rule prohibiting note-taking.3 Most
    states, however, leave the question to the discretion of the trial judge.4
    Reactions to note-taking in the legal literature have been mixed with majority
    sentiment probably leaning towards at least leaving the matter to the trial
    judge's discretion.5

    The Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury
    System, 26 F.R.D. 411, 424 (1960), made the following recommendation:

    7 Trial jurors should, in the discretion of the trial judge, be permitted to take
    XX.
    notes for use in their deliberations regarding the evidence presented to them and to
    take these notes with them when they retire for their deliberations. When permitted
    to be taken, they should be treated as confidential between the juror making them
    and his fellow jurors.
    8

    Standard 4.2 of the Standards Relating to Trial by Jury published under the
    auspices of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for
    Criminal Justice (Approved Draft 1968) provides:

    94.2. Note taking by jurors.


    10
    Jurors
    may take notes regarding the evidence presented to them and keep these notes
    with them when they retire for their deliberations. Such notes should be treated as
    confidential between the juror making them and his fellow jurors.
    11

    The obvious and strongest argument in favor of allowing note-taking is that,


    when done properly, it is a valuable method of refreshing memory. In addition,
    note-taking may help focus jurors' concentration on the proceedings and help
    prevent their attention from wandering.

    12

    The arguments against note-taking are more numerous if not more weighty.
    Probably the gravest concern is that the best note takers (or the only note taker)
    may dominate jury deliberations. It has been asserted that a dishonest juror
    could sway the verdict by falsifying notes. Others fear that jurors will attach too
    much significance to their notes merely because they are in writing, and attach
    too little significance to their own independent memory. Another concern is that
    jurors, busily taking notes, may miss important testimony. Jurors, who are not
    trained or experienced in note-taking, may accentuate irrelevancies in their
    notes and ignore the more substantial issues and evidence. Also, note-taking
    jurors may not pay sufficient attention to witnesses' behavior which is so
    important in assessing credibility.6

    13

    We need not conclude whether the dangers of note-taking outweigh its benefits.
    We do conclude, however, that the benefits are substantial enough to allow trial
    judges to decide, in each case, whether note-taking should be permitted. Since
    the value of note-taking will vary according to the complexity and quantitative
    nature of each trial as well as according to the abilities and desires of the jurors,
    the decision on whether to permit note- taking is best left to the trial judge to
    make based on the circumstances of each case. "It is the (trial) judge . . . who
    has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial."
    Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 1096, 55 L.Ed.2d 319
    (1978).

    14

    We are confident that the dangers of note-taking can be substantially avoided


    by proper instruction to the jury. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, "
    (W)e have not yet attained that certitude about the human mind which would
    justify us in . . . a dogmatic assumption that jurors, if properly admonished,
    neither could nor would heed the instruction of the trial court . . . ." Lakeside v.
    Oregon, supra, at 340 n.11, 98 S.Ct. at 1095 quoting Bruno v. United States,
    308 U.S. 287, 294, 60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257 (1939).

    15

    Jurors should be instructed that their notes are only aids to memory and that
    they are not conclusive and should not be given precedence over their
    independent recollection of the facts. See U. S. v. Bertolotti, supra, 529 F.2d at
    160; Toles v. U. S., supra, 308 F.2d at 594, and that a juror who does not take
    notes should rely on his or her independent recollection of the evidence and not
    be influenced by the fact that another juror has taken notes. Jurors should also
    be told that they must not allow their note-taking to distract them from the
    ongoing proceedings. See U. S. v. Riebold, supra, 557 F.2d at 706; Devitt and
    Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 10.06. That the contents of
    the notes must not be disclosed except to other jurors should also be made
    clear. See Devitt and Blackmar, supra, 10.06.

    16

    In the instant case, the jurors were instructed as follows:A second matter that I
    think we can process is a request that was made by one of the jurors having to
    do with taking notes. The taking of notes by jurors has been frowned upon by
    many courts because of the danger that in the course of the jury's deliberations
    such notes may be given more significance than they may deserve. Also, it's
    feared that while a juror may be taking notes on a particular point, some very
    important items of testimony that follow may be overlooked, the juror being
    preoccupied in recording impressions on a particular point. It's my view,
    however, that if a juror wishes to take notes which may help to refresh his or
    her own memory, particularly when an indictment contains a number of counts
    and the testimony of the witnesses is prolonged and it takes over an unusual
    period of time, that the juror should be permitted to take such notes. I
    emphasize, however, that such notes are not entitled to any greater weight than
    the recollection or the impression of any other juror as to what the testimony
    may have been or what the conclusions should be arrived at and with that
    understanding the taking of notes by jurors will be permitted. It is hoped that
    you will fully understand that they are not official transcripts and may not
    cover points that are significant to another juror, but if a juror wishes to keep
    his or her mind refreshed as to the testimony in the case as it goes along, the
    Court will not prohibit the taking of notes.

    17

    This instruction fully informed the jurors of the proper use of notes and the
    pitfalls to be avoided. Although it is perhaps advisable to repeat instructions on
    note-taking immediately prior to the jury's deliberation, the failure to do so is
    not reversible error particularly where, as here, no such instruction was
    requested. Once the jury is properly instructed, it is not significant that only one
    juror decided to take notes. See Goodloe v. U. S., supra. That the sole notetaking juror here became foreman of the jury does not alter this conclusion.
    There is no need, absent some specific indication of prejudice, for the court to
    examine the notes or to make them part of the record. See U. S. v. Bertolotti,

    supra.
    18

    Because we hold that the district court did not err in its handling of the notetaking issue and because we hold that defendant's other contentions are without
    merit,7 the judgment of conviction as to all counts will be affirmed.

    In Agnew v. U. S., 165 U.S. 36, 17 S.Ct. 235, 41 L.Ed. 624 (1897), exception
    was taken to the trial judge's permitting note taking, but the court did not
    discuss the issue because the record did not show that any notes were taken

    These statutes are collected in Parry, Taking Note of Note-Taking, 10 Columbia


    Journal of Law and Social Problems 565, 585 n.102 (1973-74)

    See Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1113

    See Parry, supra note 2, at 587; 37 Temple L.Q. 332 (1964)

    See, e. g., Bomberger and McNagny, Should Jurors be Allowed to Take Notes?,
    32 J. Am.Jud. Soc'y 57 (1948) (Bomberger argues for and McNagny against
    note-taking); 18 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 800 (1957) (favoring note-taking). Other
    discussions of the issue include: 14 A.L.R.3d 831; Wright, Federal Practice and
    Procedure Criminal 382, 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial 934

    For a study of the reactions of federal, Pennsylvania and California trial judges
    to the arguments pro and con, see Parry, supra note 2 at 605-606

    Defendant also contended on appeal that:


    1) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial;
    2) he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct; and
    3) the admission of a mail survey conducted by Postal Inspector Trainor was
    reversible error.

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