Konstantinos Moutevelis v. United States, 727 F.2d 313, 3rd Cir. (1984)
Konstantinos Moutevelis v. United States, 727 F.2d 313, 3rd Cir. (1984)
Konstantinos Moutevelis v. United States, 727 F.2d 313, 3rd Cir. (1984)
2d 313
84-1 USTC P 9220
I.
4 The purpose of the investigation is, for the years under investigation, to determine
3.
the taxpayer's correct tax liabilities and to determine whether the taxpayer has
violated any of the criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26
U.S.C.).
5 As of the date of this affidavit, no recommendation has been made to the
4.
Department of Justice for a grand jury investigation of, or the criminal prosecution
of, the taxpayer. Moreover, the Department of Justice has not made any request
under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 6103(h)(3)(B) (26 U.S.C.) for the
disclosure of any return or return information (as such terms are defined in Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, Section 6103(b) (26 U.S.C.)) relating to the taxpayers.
6
App. at F-2. The quoted allegations are tailored to the terms of sections 333(b)
and (c) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),
Pub.L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 622-23 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. Sec.
7602(b), (c)). Those provisions establish that an investigation by the Internal
Revenue Service "into any offense connected with the administration or
enforcement of the internal revenue laws" is a valid purpose for use of a
summons. However, no summons may issue to any person with respect to
whom a Justice Department referral is in effect. The statute establishes that a
Justice Department referral is in effect if the Secretary of the Treasury has
recommended to the Attorney General a grand jury investigation or a criminal
prosecution, or if the Justice Department has sought disclosure within the
meaning of section 6103(b). These amendments codify the position of the
dissenting justice in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 320321, 98 S.Ct. 2357, 2369-2370, 57 L.Ed.2d 221 (1978), that there should be a
"bright line" test for the validity of Internal Revenue Service summonses. The
bright line which the LaSalle dissenters urged, and which Congress adopted,
was that such a summons should not trench upon the power of the grand jury or
broaden the Justice Department's right to discovery in criminal cases. Congress
thereby eliminated from consideration the question whether the Internal
Revenue Service was motivated by a criminal investigative purpose, so long as
no Justice Department referral has occurred.
7
Mr. Moutevelis, relying on United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146, 152 (3d
Cir.1979), and United States v. Garden State National Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 71
(3d Cir.1979), contends that he was entitled to some discovery before his
motion to quash was dismissed. The only challenge he makes to the summons,
however, is that it is issued for a criminal rather than a civil purpose. The
district court was not required to permit discovery for the establishment of a
fact which, since the enactment of Section 333(b) of TEFRA is simply
irrelevant. He makes no allegations which would otherwise bear upon the
enforceability of the summons.
Hon. C. Clyde Atkins, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Florida, sitting by designation