Not Precedential
Not Precedential
Not Precedential
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OPINION
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
previous action and the Hamilton suit in August of 2005. On October 15, 2007, the
District Court lifted the stay on the federal action and ordered that a single amended
complaint be filed, containing all of the parties allegations. The case was then stayed
again pending the outcome of the Pennsylvania adjudication of the takings.
On December 22, 2008, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, sitting en banc,
concluded that the RALC improperly condemned the property at issue. The District
Court reopened the case, and a renewed motion to dismiss was filed. The District Court
granted the motion on December 7, 2009, concluding that the Property Owners had failed
to state a claim on any of their federal causes of action, and declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The instant appeal
followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331
and 1367, and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We exercise de novo
review of a District Courts dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).
III.
The majority of the Property Owners argument focuses on their contention that
the District Court erred in reading Kelo as providing a national standard for what
constitutes a public use for purposes of the Fifth Amendments takings clause. The
Fifth Amendments takings clause provides nor shall property be taken for public use,
without just compensation, and the Property Owners argue that in determining whether
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something constitutes a public use, we must look to state law on the subject. They rely
heavily on the fact that the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, in In re Condemnation
by Redevelopment Authority of Lawrence County, 962 A.2d 1257 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2008), held that Pennsylvania law does not permit eminent domain to be used to foster
economic development. According to the Property Owners reading of Kelo, the Fifth
Amendment permits economic development to constitute a public use, but courts should
look to state law to determine whether that state has made such a use a public use. We
disagree.
The question facing the Supreme Court in Kelo was whether the Fifth
Amendments takings clause permitted economic development to constitute a public use.
The Court concluded that economic development could constitute a public use, stating
that [p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of
government. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). The Court went
on to emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power, and noted that [t]his Courts authority .
. . extends only to determining whether the Citys proposed condemnations are for a
public use within the meaning of the Fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution. Id.
at 489-90.
We do not believe that this language requires that we look to what limitations
various states impose on their own eminent domain powers to determine whether the
taking at issue violates the Fifth Amendment. Instead, we find the Courts statement in
Kelo to be clear: a taking for purposes of economic development satisfies the Fifth
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law. Appendix (App.) 51 (quoting United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2003)). We agree with the policy embodied in
that statement, even if the District Court slightly overstated the principal. First, an
underlying constitutional violation is not required to state a substantive due process
claim, and some violations of state law may shock the conscience. This, however, does
not mean that every violation of state law is constitutionalized through the application
of the substantive due process clause, and the District Court was properly concerned with
preventing this provision from turning into a broad authorization to review state actors
compliance with state law. On several occasions, this Court has implied that a violation
of state law will constitute conscience shocking behavior when it contains allegations of
corruption, self-dealing, bias against an ethnic group, or additional facts that suggest[]
conscience-shocking behavior. Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 220 (3d Cir. 2008); see
also Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004). In other
words, a state officials failure to follow state law does not, by itself, shock the
conscience in the absence of additional facts. No such additional facts are presented in
this case; instead, the Property Owners simply allege that the defendants did not follow
state law in taking their property. While this certainly is not conduct without a remedy,
the remedy is not provided by the Federal Constitutions substantive due process clause.
For this reason, we will affirm the District Courts dismissal of the substantive due
process claim.
The Property Owners also allege that the District Court erred in dismissing their
equal protection claims. In bringing this claim, they proceeded as a class of one,
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arguing that the action in this case amounted to intentional and arbitrary discrimination
without a rational basis. Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). The Property
Owners assert that because the property was not blighted, there was no legitimate
government interest in exercising eminent domain over the property and that the
defendants acted irrationally in condemning it.
We again disagree with the Property Owners argument. Much as the Federal
Constitutions definition of public use does not depend on state law, we do not refer to
state law in establishing whether the government has a legitimate interest in taking the
property. States have a legitimate government interest in exercising their eminent
domain power for the public use, which, for purposes of the Federal Constitution,
includes economic development, as discussed above. The Property Owners argument
that there was no legitimate government interest in this case, therefore, is without merit.
Further, there was no arbitrary singling out of the properties in question in the present
case. Instead, the properties were chosen because they were the only properties not
purchased within the Millennium Park area, meaning that all similarly situated
individuals were treated similarly in this case. In sum, the state action both advanced a
legitimate government interest and was not discriminatory. That state law may place
further limitations on the use of eminent domain power does not cause a federal equal
protection problem, and we will affirm the District Courts dismissal.
The Property Owners also find error in the District Courts treatment of their
conspiracy claims, its discussion of qualified immunity, and its dismissal of their state
law claims. Because we have not found any underlying error in the District Courts
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treatment of the substantive claims, however, we need not address any of the Property
Owners arguments on these issues. A conspiracy to engage in conduct that does not
amount to a constitutional violation is not a violation of 1983, and no immunity is
necessary if there was no unconstitutional act. Further, as we agree that all of the federal
claims were properly dismissed, the District Court did not err in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). We
will, therefore, affirm the District Courts treatment of all of these issues as well.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.