United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
2d 62
PER CURIAM:
In this case the National Labor Relations Board has found that, in the course of
a labor dispute about employment policies and practices of a principal
contractor and some of the subcontractors involved in a large construction
project, the Building and Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia and
Vicinity, AFL-CIO, and its President, James O'Neill, engaged in unfair labor
practices, among them unlawful secondary boycotting and unduly protracted
picketing to force union recognition without filing a petition for certification.
On this review of the order entered pursuant to the Board's findings, one
principal contention of the Trades Council is that the protracted strike and
attendant picketing were unobjectionable because they were for the purpose of
compelling employers to observe regional standards of wages and working
conditions, rather than to compel unionization. This was a disputed question of
fact. The Board has found on ample evidence that the picketing had a primary
recognitional and organizational objective, whatever additional objective it may
or may not have had. We are obligated to respect that finding.
The Trades Council also contends that its relation to employees and to their
grievances is not such as to make it a 'labor organization' as defined in section
2(5) of the Act. However, we are satisfied that the record shows that the Trades
Council is, within the meaning of the statute, an organization 'in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes * * * or
conditions of work.'
Finally, the individual respondent, James O'Neill, contends that relief cannot be
given against both the Council and him, its president, because section 8(b) of
the Act provides that 'it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents' to engage in certain proscribed conduct. The contention is that the
disjunctive 'labor organization or its agents' precludes imposing responsibility
on both. This is simply a non sequitur. A provision that certain conduct by
either of two parties is wrongful in no way implies that both cannot join in and
be responsible for such wrongdoing.
After considering all points raised by the several parties we are satisfied that
the Board's petition for enforcement of its order should be granted and that the
cross-petitions of the respondents to set aside the order should be denied.