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    United States v. Charles v. Labovitz and Martin Abrams Martin Abrams, 251 F.2d 393, 3rd Cir. (1958)

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    The document is a court case from 1958 regarding an appeal of a conviction of bribery and conspiracy to bribe a federal employee. The only issue on appeal was whether the defendant possessed the necessary criminal intent. The court held that under the federal bribery statute, criminal intent is established by either an intention to influence an official's decision or action, or to induce them to violate their lawful duty. It is not required to show the action sought was itself unlawful. The conviction was affirmed.

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    United States v. Charles v. Labovitz and Martin Abrams Martin Abrams, 251 F.2d 393, 3rd Cir. (1958)

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    Scribd Government Docs
    84 views3 pages
    The document is a court case from 1958 regarding an appeal of a conviction of bribery and conspiracy to bribe a federal employee. The only issue on appeal was whether the defendant possessed the necessary criminal intent. The court held that under the federal bribery statute, criminal intent is established by either an intention to influence an official's decision or action, or to induce them to violate their lawful duty. It is not required to show the action sought was itself unlawful. The conviction was affirmed.

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    Filed: 1958-01-13 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 251 F.2d 393 Docket: 12306_1

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    The document is a court case from 1958 regarding an appeal of a conviction of bribery and conspiracy to bribe a federal employee. The only issue on appeal was whether the defendant possessed the necessary criminal intent. The court held that under the federal bribery statute, criminal intent is established by either an intention to influence an official's decision or action, or to induce them to violate their lawful duty. It is not required to show the action sought was itself unlawful. The conviction was affirmed.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    84 views3 pages

    United States v. Charles v. Labovitz and Martin Abrams Martin Abrams, 251 F.2d 393, 3rd Cir. (1958)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The document is a court case from 1958 regarding an appeal of a conviction of bribery and conspiracy to bribe a federal employee. The only issue on appeal was whether the defendant possessed the necessary criminal intent. The court held that under the federal bribery statute, criminal intent is established by either an intention to influence an official's decision or action, or to induce them to violate their lawful duty. It is not required to show the action sought was itself unlawful. The conviction was affirmed.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf
    of 3

    251 F.

    2d 393

    UNITED STATES of America


    v.
    Charles V. LABOVITZ and Martin Abrams; Martin Abrams,
    Appellant.
    No. 12306.

    United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.


    Argued November 19, 1957.
    Decided January 13, 1958.

    Edwin P. Rome, Philadelphia, Pa. (Morris L. Weisberg, Blank, Rudenko


    & Klaus, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
    Joseph L. McGlynn, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa. (Harold K. Wood,
    U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
    Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and GOODRICH and HASTIE, Circuit
    Judges.
    HASTIE, Circuit Judge.

    On this appeal from a conviction of bribery and conspiracy to bribe a federal


    employee the only question which requires discussion is one raised concerning
    the criminal intent which is an essential element of the crime of bribery as
    defined in Section 201 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

    The following factual picture was disclosed by the evidence for the
    prosecution. Under an Army supply contract the government had paid the
    contracting corporation an estimated price for certain articles of its
    manufacture, subject to a price redetermination on the basis of the contractor's
    cost experience. In due course of renegotiation proceedings the contracting
    officer reached a tentative conclusion that the contractor should refund about
    $16,000 to the government. However, the contractor, advised of this, proposed
    and was authorized to make a further showing as to its costs. At this stage,
    according to the government's case, appellant Abrams, acting in concert with
    co-conspirator Labovitz, the president of the contracting corporation, offered

    money to a government accountant assigned to this case for the purpose of


    inducing him to recommend to the contracting officer a reduction of the refund
    claim.
    3

    It did not appear whether or not the contractor's proposed supplementary


    submission did or could afford any factual or legal justification for a reduction
    of the refund claim. The government did not negative the possibility that, had
    there been no bribe, the accountant might, on the available data, lawfully and
    properly have made the very recommendation that Abrams wanted him to
    make. Moreover, in charging the jury the trial judge spoke of the intention to
    influence an official decision as the gravamen of the offense. He said nothing
    about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the result sought. It is in this context
    that the question of requisite criminal intent arises.

    The bribery statute itself deals explicitly with the element of criminal intent,
    making it a crime to offer money to any person acting for the United States
    "with intent to influence his decision or action on any * * * matter * * * before
    him in his official capacity * * * or to induce him to do or omit to do any act in
    violation of his lawful duty * * *" 18 U.S.C. 201. For present purposes the
    important point is that the statute states the essential criminal intent in
    alternatives. On the face of the statute, either an intention to influence official
    behavior or an intention to induce unlawful action will supply the culpability
    which the statute requires. The reason for this is obvious. It is a major concern
    of organized society that the community have the benefit of objective
    evaluation and unbiased judgment on the part of those who participate in the
    making of official decisions. Therefore, society deals sternly with bribery
    which would substitute the will of an interested person for the judgment of a
    public official as the controlling factor in official decision. The statute plainly
    proscribes such corrupt interference with the normal and proper functioning of
    government.

    In support of his position that bribery under 201 must be directed at the
    accomplishment of unlawful action, the appellant cites United States v. Glazer,
    D. C.Del.1955, 129 F.Supp. 285. We are not sure that the language used in that
    decision was so intended. In any event, a correct judicial statement of the matter
    appears in Daniels v. United States, 9 Cir., 1927, 17 F.2d 339, 343, certiorari
    denied Appell v. U. S., 274 U.S. 744, 47 S.Ct. 591, 71 L.Ed. 1325, where the
    court said "that to constitute the offense of attempted bribery it is immaterial
    whether the official action sought to be influenced be right or wrong." And in
    United States v. Schanerman, 3 Cir., 1945, 150 F.2d 941, 943, this court,
    quoting the language of Kemler v. United States, 1 Cir., 1942, 133 F.2d 235,
    238, stated the controlling rationale as follows:

    "* * * Obviously no one would give or offer a bribe unless he expected to gain
    some advantage thereby, and since attempting to gain an advantage by this
    means is the evil which the statute is designed to prevent, it can make no
    difference if after the act is done the doer discovers that for some reason or
    another, be it a mistake on his part or a mistake on the part of some officer or
    agency of the United States, there was actually no occasion for him to have
    done it. The statute is violated when a bribe is given or an offer to bribe is
    made regardless of the occasion therefor, provided it is done with the requisite
    intent and provided the acceptor or the offeree of the bribe is a person of the
    sort described in the statute."

    There was no trial error in the treatment of the matter of criminal intent. The
    other points urged by appellant are decided against him without discussion.

    The judgment will be affirmed.

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