United States v. J. Paul Joines and John Robert Joines. Appeal of John Robert Joines, 258 F.2d 471, 3rd Cir. (1958)
United States v. J. Paul Joines and John Robert Joines. Appeal of John Robert Joines, 258 F.2d 471, 3rd Cir. (1958)
United States v. J. Paul Joines and John Robert Joines. Appeal of John Robert Joines, 258 F.2d 471, 3rd Cir. (1958)
2d 471
Thereafter the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment
of affirmance and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in
the light of Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1256, 2
L.Ed.2d 1514, decided by the Supreme Court on the same day. 357 U.S. 573,
78 S.Ct. 1380, 2 L.Ed.2d 1547.
3
We have given the most careful consideration to the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the Jones case but are unable to discover that it controls the case
before us. In its opinion in that case the Supreme Court said that the search and
seizure there involved "were considered to have been justified because the
officers had probable cause to believe that petitioner's house contained
contraband materials which were being utilized in the commission of a crime,
and not because the search and seizure were incident to petitioner's arrest."
Viewing the case in this light the court reversed the judgment of conviction
based on the seized evidence, pointing out the settled doctrine that probable
cause for belief that certain articles subject to seizure are in a dwelling cannot
of itself justify a search without a warrant.
In the case before us, however, the facts as found by the trial judge, with which
finding we agree, are that the officers searched the defendant's dwelling house
in a bona fide attempt to find and arrest him and that they did not know of, or
even suspect, the existence of the still, mash and liquor in the dwelling house
until they came upon it in the course of their search for the defendant. This,
then, is the case which the Supreme Court took pains to point out that the Jones
case was not, and it falls within the exception to the rule requiring a search
warrant which the court in that case expressly pointed out, namely, a "search
incident to a valid arrest."
The fact that the defendant could not be found in his dwelling house did not
render the presence of the officers there unlawful since they entered armed with
a warrant which they were endeavoring in good faith to execute. And being
lawfully in the house they were entitled to seize the illicit articles which met
their eyes. Accordingly, the fact that no arrest actually then took place is
immaterial. Indeed, if that were the decisive factor there would have been no
purpose in remanding the case to us for further consideration. On the contrary,
the Supreme Court, had it thought this undeniable fact controlling, would
certainly have reversed the defendant's conviction.
Moreover, the failure of the officers to execute the warrant for 21 days even
though they may have had opportunities during that time to do so did not render
the warrant invalid, as the defendant urges. For ordinarily there is no legal
requirement that a warrant of arrest must be executed immediately or at the first
opportunity. Kent v. Miles, 1897, 69 Vt. 379, 37 A. 1115; State v. Nadeau,
1903, 97 Me. 275, 54 A. 725; State v. Kopelow, 1927, 126 Me. 384, 138 A.
625. While its execution should not be unreasonably delayed there may be
perfectly valid reasons why further investigation should be made before the
drastic step is taken of arresting a citizen on a criminal charge. Certainly there
is no constitutional right to be arrested promptly or otherwise.
7
It is true that the warrant directed the officer executing it to bring the body of
the defendant "forthwith" before the commissioner. In this respect it was drawn
in compliance with Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18
U.S.C.A., which requires that an arrested person be taken before the nearest
available commissioner "without unnecessary delay". This refers, however, to
delay between arrest and production before a commissioner. It has nothing
whatever to do with the time when the arrest is to be made.