United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

592 F.
2d 188
Claude O. MARKOE, Leroy S. Arnold, John A. Bell, Britain H.

Bryant, Hector Cintron, Sidney Lee, and Frits E.
Lawaetz, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Appellants,
v.
LEGISLATURE OF the VIRGIN ISLANDS and Henrita
Todman,
Supervisor of Elections of the Virgin Islands, Appellees.
No. 78-1733.
United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.
Argued Dec. 14, 1978.
Decided Jan. 31, 1979.
Charles Bidelspacher, Bidelspacher & Bidelspacher, Williamsport, Pa.,

James H. Isherwood, Isherwood, Colianni, Alkon & Barnard,
Christiansted, St. Croix, V. I., John F. James, James & Resnick,
Christiansted, St. Croix, V. I., for appellants.
Ronald T. Mitchell, Pallme, Anduze, Mitchell & Dow, Ive Arlington
Swan, Atty. Gen., Daniel A. Isaacson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charlotte Amalie,
St. Thomas, V. I., for appellees.
Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit
Judges.OPINION OF THE COURT
SEITZ, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the district court refusing to reapportion

the Virgin Islands' fifteen-member legislature. In this appeal, as in the district
court, they assert that the district of St. Croix should be entitled to elect a
majority of the territorial representatives.
* On May 18, 1972, the Virgin Islands Senate, the territory's unicameral
legislature, enacted an apportionment plan, Act No. 3221, 2 V.I.C. 101-03.

That act, presently in force, divides the territory's three islands into two
legislative districts, one consisting of St. Croix and the other consisting of St.
Thomas and St. John. Fourteen senators are divided equally between the two
districts while the fifteenth, known as the senator at large, is elected by the
territory's entire population. The senator at large, however, must be a resident of
St. John. 1
In enacting this plan, the Senate relied upon gross population figures drawn
from the 1970 Census. These figures credited St. Croix with a population of
31,779, St. Thomas with a population of 28,960, and St. John with a population
of 1,729. The district of St. Thomas-St. John thus included 30,689 persons, or
1090 persons less than the district of St. Croix.
Plaintiffs, a resident of St. Croix and six of St. Croix's seven senators, brought
this class action seeking legislative reapportionment. They assert that St.
Croix's status as the more populous of the two legislative districts entitles it to
majority representation in the Virgin Islands Senate. Plaintiffs base their claim
on the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and on 48
U.S.C. 1561, which guarantees equal protection of the laws to citizens of the
Virgin Islands. After receiving the parties' evidence, the district court found that
St. Thomas-St.John, although perhaps less populous than St. Croix, included
more citizens and more registered voters than the latter district. Furthermore,
the district court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the present apportionment
gave a majority of the representatives to St. Thomas-St. John. Instead, the
district court found that the senator at large represented the entire territory and
not just St. Thomas-St. John. On the basis of these findings the district court
entered judgment in favor of defendants.
II
5
On appeal, plaintiffs allege that the district court erred (1) in approving the plan
on the basis of data other than that considered by the Senate in 1972; (2) in
concluding that the senator at large represents the entire territory rather than
just the district of his or her residence; (3) in refusing to give the residents of St.
Croix a full eight votes in the Senate rather than seven votes and one senator at
large; and (4) in admitting various evidence at the trial. Plaintiffs do not seek to
alter either the districting of the Virgin Islands or the number of seats in the
Senate. We must consider this appeal, therefore, within the framework of a
two-district, fifteen-member plan. Cf. Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v.
Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 197, 92 S.Ct. 1477, 32 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (whenever
possible courts must defer to a legislature's choice as to its own size).
A.
6
The legislative journal for May 18, 1972, clearly shows that in apportioning the
territory the Senate considered only gross population figures from the 1970
Census: St. Croix, 31,779, St. Thomas, 28,960, and St. John, 1,729. Plaintiffs
place exclusive reliance on these figures to demonstrate malapportionment. For
the purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the 1972 plan must stand or
fall on the basis of these figures.
B.
7
Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in concluding that the Senate is
evenly apportioned 7-7-1 rather than 8-7 in favor of St. Thomas-St. John. They
point out that the senator at large must reside in St. John, which is included in
the smaller of the two legislative districts.
In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438, 85 S.Ct. 498, 501, 13 L.Ed.2d 401
(1965), an early reapportionment case, the Supreme Court held that "(i)t is not
accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of
only that district . . . wherein he resides." In that case the plan of apportionment
required various state senators to reside in particular subdivisions of the voting
unit. Nevertheless, each senator's tenure depended "upon the county-wide
electorate (and) he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the
county . . .." Id.
The Supreme Court has guarded Fortson jealously. Several lower courts have
attempted to distinguish the facts in that case from various apportionment plans
that included sub-district residency requirements. Each time, the Supreme Court
has rebuffed the challenge. See Clark v. Peters, 422 U.S. 1031, 95 S.Ct. 2647,
45 L.Ed.2d 687 Vacating mem., 508 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1975); Dallas County v.
Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 1706, 44 L.Ed.2d 312 (1975) (per curiam);
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 87 S.Ct. 1554, 18 L.Ed.2d 656 (1967). In Dallas
County v. Reese, supra, at 481, 95 S.Ct. at 1708, the Court completely
discredited the "theoretical presumption . . . that elected officials will represent
the districts in which they reside rather than the electorate which chooses
them."
10
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has never faced a plan of apportionment like
that under scrutiny here. The Virgin Islands have only two legislative districts;
the single senator at large may act decisively when the other senators split
seven to seven along district lines. Nevertheless, none of the cited cases
indicates that such a configuration would defeat Fortson's general rule. We

believe that the senator at large must be counted as a representative of the entire
territory and not as a representative of St. Thomas-St. John alone.
11
We are not called upon to decide whether a different result would be dictated
had plaintiffs proven that the senator at large was, in fact, a "front" for the
interests of only one district. See Dallas County v. Reese, supra, at 480, 95
S.Ct. 1706; Dusch v. Davis, supra, at 116, 87 S.Ct. 1554. The district court
found the record "totally devoid" of evidence that might suggest such a charade.
Plaintiffs do not challenge this finding on appeal.
12
We conclude that the present plan of apportionment must be characterized

exactly as the statute itself would suggest: seven senators representing St.
Croix, seven senators representing St. Thomas-St. John, and one senator
representing the entire territory.
C.
13
Our conclusion that representation in the Virgin Islands is divided evenly

between the two districts does not dispose of this appeal. Plaintiffs argue that,
even given such a characterization, the district of St. Croix remains
unconstitutionally underrepresented. The majority of the population, they
assert, is entitled to control the majority of the legislature.
14
Initially, we note that traditional measures of underrepresentation do not

mandate reapportionment in this case. Assuming, as we must, that the
representational scheme is 7-7-1, the district of St. Croix, when compared with
St. Thomas-St. John, is underrepresented in the Senate by no more than 3.5 per
cent.2 The Supreme Court has recognized an informal cut-off point of 10 per
cent for challenges to apportionment of legislative bodies other than the
Congress of the United States. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418, 97
S.Ct. 1828, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977). See also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). The deviation in this case falls
comfortably below that threshold.
15
Plaintiffs' argument, however, transcends mathematics. They flatly assert that

any majority, no matter how small, entitles them to control a majority of the
Senate. They purport to draw this rule directly from the seminal case of
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). There,
the Supreme Court held that state legislatures must be apportioned on the basis
of population. In considering Alabama's plan of apportionment, which allowed

25 per cent of that state's population to elect majorities in both houses of the
legislature, the Supreme Court decried governance by a minority of the
electors:
16
Logically,
in a society ostensibly grounded on representative government, it would
seem reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that
State's legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority control of state
legislative bodies, would appear to deny majority rights in a way that far surpasses
any possible denial of minority rights that might otherwise be thought to result.
17
Id. at 565, 84 S.Ct. at 1383. Later in the same opinion, the Court returned to
this theme.
18 constitutional system amply provides for the protection of minorities by means

Our
other than giving them majority control of state legislatures. And the democratic
ideals of equality and majority rule, which have served this Nation so well in the
past, are hardly of any less significance for the present and the future.
19
Id. at 566, 84 S.Ct. at 1384.
20
Plaintiffs cite these expansive passages and suggest that this court must
vindicate the "democratic ideal" of majority rule by providing St. Croix with a
majority of the fifteen votes in the Virgin Islands Senate. In another passage,
however, Reynolds sets forth the "overriding objective" of legislative
apportionment: "substantial equality of population among the various districts,
so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any
other citizen . . .." Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 579, 84 S.Ct. at 1390. In many
cases, as in Reynolds, pursuit of this polestar will allow districts containing a
majority of the population to elect a majority of the representatives. But where
two evenly balanced districts choose a small number of representatives, we
perceive a tension between "substantial equality" of voters and "majority rule"
as defined by plaintiffs.
21
The data in this case illustrate the tension. In 1970, St. Croix claimed 50.9 per
cent of the territorial population; St. Thomas-St. John claimed the remaining
49.1 per cent. As already noted, this small disparity results, under the 7-7-1
plan of apportionment, in 3.5 per cent underrepresentation of St. Croix. If
plaintiffs enjoyed an eight-to-seven majority in the Senate, however, St.
Thomas-St. John would be underrepresented by approximately 9.9 per cent.3
By granting plaintiffs' requested relief we would create a greater disparity in
representation than already exists.
22
Forced to choose between the "overriding objective" of equality of franchise

and plaintiffs' notion of majority rule, we believe that the present plan of
apportionment is more consistent with the requirements of Reynolds v. Sims.
Given our reliance on plaintiffs' gross population figures, we need not decide
whether the distribution of citizens or of registered voters offers a permissible
basis for apportionment. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-95, 86 S.Ct.
1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966).
D.
23
Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of
Kenneth Callwood, defendants' demographic expert, and in soliciting an
affidavit from the Virgin Islands' Supervisor of Elections, a defendant in this
action. Because neither we nor the district court relied upon Callwood's
testimony in reaching our conclusions, plaintiffs were not prejudiced by its
admission. Similarly, we have not relied upon the Supervisor's affidavit, which
dealt with voter registration in the two districts. The district court's solicitation
and use of that affidavit, although inconsistent with the Code of Judicial
Conduct's prohibition against Ex parte contacts, does not constitute reversible
error.
III
24
The order of the district court entering judgment in favor of defendants will be
affirmed.
2 V.I.C. 102 (Cum.Supp.1976) provides:

There shall be fifteen members of the Legislature, to be known as senators.
Seven (7) senators shall be elected by the qualified electors of the District of St.
Croix and seven (7) senators shall be elected by the qualified electors of the
district of St. Thomas-St. John. One (1) senator shall be elected at large by the
qualified electors of the Virgin Islands from the Virgin Islands as a whole;
provided, however, that such senator shall be a person who is a bona fide
resident of St. John.
Under a 7-7-1 plan, the ideal elector/senator ratio would be 62,468 (total
population) divided by 14 (number of partisan senators), or 4462 persons per
senator. St. Croix, which has a population of 31,779 and has seven senators,
exceeds this target by 1.75%. St. Thomas-St. John, population 30,689, falls
short of this target by 1.75%. The total deviation is thus 3.5%
Under a plan giving St. Croix an 8-to-7 majority, the ideal elector/senator ratio
would be 62,468 divided by 15, or 4165 persons per senator. St. Croix
(population 31,779), which would be entitled to 8 senators, would fall 4.6%
Below this target. St. Thomas-St. John (population 30,689) would exceed this
target by 5.3%. The total disparity would thus be 9.9%

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592 F.

Claude O. MARKOE, Leroy S. Arnold, John A. Bell, Britain H.

United States Court of Appeals,

Charles Bidelspacher, Bidelspacher & Bidelspacher, Williamsport, Pa.,

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the district court refusing to reapportion

legislature, enacted an apportionment plan, Act No. 3221, 2 V.I.C. 101-03.

indicates that such a configuration would defeat Fortson's general rule. We

We conclude that the present plan of apportionment must be characterized

Our conclusion that representation in the Virgin Islands is divided evenly

Initially, we note that traditional measures of underrepresentation do not

Plaintiffs' argument, however, transcends mathematics. They flatly assert that

of population. In considering Alabama's plan of apportionment, which allowed

18 constitutional system amply provides for the protection of minorities by means

Id. at 566, 84 S.Ct. at 1384.

Forced to choose between the "overriding objective" of equality of franchise

2 V.I.C. 102 (Cum.Supp.1976) provides:

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