United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit
2d 178
Louis R. Harolds, New York City, William L. Standard, New York City,
Advocate (Morris F. Pearlman, Proctor, Jersey City, N.J., on the brief),
for appellant.
William W. Ross, Washington D.C. (George Cochran Doub, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Chester A. Weidenburner, U.S. Atty., Newark, N.J., Paul A.
Sweeney, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for
appellees.
Before MARIS, STALEY and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.
HASTIE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant is the administratrix of Daniel Frank who was drowned in the ocean
very near the New Jersey shore under circumstances which, in appellant's view,
obligate the United States to pay damages to Frank's dependents. Claiming that
either negligence of employees of the government within the meaning of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2674, or negligence of a public
vessel covered by the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, 46 U.S.C.A. 781,
caused Frank's death, appellant filed this libel asserting that one of the above
cited statutes, supplemented, as Congress has authorized, by the New Jersey
Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, provides a legal basis for recovery
against the United States.
2
During the tow Frank attempted to walk along the deck of the cruiser to the
after cabin, holding a handrail as he proceeded. The cruiser heeled sharply, the
handrail broke and Frank fell into the sea. The lifeboat crew immediately cut
the tow line and made every effort to rescue Frank. However, he drowned
before they could be of assistance to him.
The district court found for the United States on the ground that the plaintiff
had not carried her burden of proving that the attempted rescue failed because
of any of the faults of the Coast Guard. We agree that the United States was
entitled to judgment, but place our affirmance on a different ground.
On appellant's own theory the effect of the alleged faults of the Coast Guard
was to prevent its own rescue party from reaching the drowning man soon
enough to save him. There has been no showing that any fault of the Coast
Guard contributed in any way to Frank's falling into the sea. Nor did the Coast
Guard in any way worsen his plight thereafter. In saying this we have not
overlooked a suggestion on this appeal that the Coast Guard may have
worsened Frank's position by taking the cruiser in tow. No such finding was
made below and on the evidence such a finding could not reasonably have been
made. The present claim must stand or fall on the theory that the Coast Guard
was at fault solely in failing to get help to the decedent as soon as would have
been the case had the rescue vessel been in proper condition and properly
equipped and manned.
7
If the United States is liable at all for negligence of the Coast Guard in
connection with an attempted rescue operation, the responsibility of this public
agency rises no higher than that of a private salvor. Upon that limitation the full
bench of this court was agreed in P. Dougherty Co. v. United States, 3 Cir.,
1953, 207 F.2d 626, certiorari denied 347 U.S. 912, 74 S.Ct. 476, 98 L.Ed.
1068, although on other points we were divided. We recognized that the Coast
Guard, like a private salvor, renders voluntary assistance where no duty to help
is owed the person or vessel in distress. True, it is a statutory function of the
Coast Guard to establish and operate rescue facilities. 14 U.S.C. 2. Congress
has also provided that the 'Coast Guard may render aid to persons and protect
and save property at any time and at any place at which Coast Guard facilities
and personnel are available and can be effectively utilized.' 14 U.S.C. 88(b).
But this legislation falls short of creating a governmental duty of affirmative
action owed to a person or vessel in distress. Lacey v. United States,
D.C.Mass.1951, 98 F.Supp. 219; see Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 1955,
350 U.S. 61, 69, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48; cf. Restatement, Torts, 314. An
obligation to render aid may grow out of a relationship such as master and
servant or ship and crewman. Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co., 3 Cir., 1940,
112 F.2d 163; Di Nicola v. Pennsylvania R.R., 2 Cir., 1946, 158 F.2d 856;
Sadler v. Pennsylvania R.R., 4 Cir., 1947, 159 F.2d 784. But there is no such
relational basis for a duty here.