John F. Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Company, William Platt, Howard Stuverude, Joseph Wood, Local 1069 U.A.W, 750 F.2d 13, 3rd Cir. (1984)
John F. Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Company, William Platt, Howard Stuverude, Joseph Wood, Local 1069 U.A.W, 750 F.2d 13, 3rd Cir. (1984)
John F. Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Company, William Platt, Howard Stuverude, Joseph Wood, Local 1069 U.A.W, 750 F.2d 13, 3rd Cir. (1984)
2d 13
36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 576,
36 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,951, 40 Fed.R.Serv.2d 500
This appeal is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United
States, which on July 2, 1984 vacated our prior judgment and remanded for
reconsideration in light of its decision in Cooper et al. v. Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984). See --- U.S.
----, 104 S.Ct. 3566, 82 L.Ed.2d 867. After receipt of the Supreme Court's
mandate we afforded the parties the opportunity to comment as to an
appropriate disposition. We reinstate our prior judgment.
In 1971 employees of Boeing Vertol Co. filed a class action on behalf of all
black employees of that company, alleging a company-wide pattern or practice
of racial discrimination. John F. Edwards was a witness in the trial of that
action, but not a named plaintiff. The district court held that Boeing Vertol Co.
had not engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination, and this court
affirmed. Croker v. Boeing, 437 F.Supp. 1138, 1192 (E.D.Pa.1977), aff'd, 662
F.2d 975 (3d Cir.1981) (in banc). The district court undertook to consider
claims of individuals, including Edwards, as well as pattern or practice
discrimination. The court purported to find that Edwards had failed to make out
a prima facie case of individual racial discrimination.
Our earlier opinion decided three issues: that the trial court erred in striking
Edwards' jury trial demand; that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
acts of discrimination which occurred prior to May 25, 1973; and that the
judgment in favor of Boeing Vertol Co. in the Croker class action did not bar
his action. Only the third issue is affected by the Supreme Court's action.
In the Cooper case the Supreme Court rejected the claim that a district court in
a Rule 23 class action had an obligation to adjudicate claims of all class
members. It might be inferred, from language in the Cooper opinion, that the
district court had discretion to adjudicate such claims if it so desired; a question
we need not decide.1 Were we to draw such a reverse inference from the
holding in Cooper that would suggest, perhaps, that Dickerson v. United States
Steel Corp., supra, was erroneously decided. Boeing Vertol Co. urges that we
do so. Doing so, however, in no way advances its position.
Our judgment in Croker v. Boeing Vertol Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir.1981), is
Hon. Carol Los Mansmann, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation