Scribd
Upload
190 views18 pages

An Introduction To Fault Tree Analysisi (FTA)

This document provides an introduction to fault tree analysis (FTA). It explains that FTA is a systematic method used to examine a system from the top down and identify potential faults, failure modes, and causes. The document outlines the objectives and relationship between FTA and failure mode and effects analysis. It also describes the key elements and symbols of FTA, provides examples, and explains the methodology including defining the top event, rules, gates, cut sets, Boolean algebra, and qualitative and quantitative analysis. Benefits and limitations of FTA are also discussed.

Uploaded by

erwingontek
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
190 views18 pages

An Introduction To Fault Tree Analysisi (FTA)

This document provides an introduction to fault tree analysis (FTA). It explains that FTA is a systematic method used to examine a system from the top down and identify potential faults, failure modes, and causes. The document outlines the objectives and relationship between FTA and failure mode and effects analysis. It also describes the key elements and symbols of FTA, provides examples, and explains the methodology including defining the top event, rules, gates, cut sets, Boolean algebra, and qualitative and quantitative analysis. Benefits and limitations of FTA are also discussed.

Uploaded by

erwingontek
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 18

An Introduction to Fault Tree

Analysis (FTA)
Dr Jane Marshall
Product Excellence using 6 Sigma
Module
PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 1

Objectives
Understand purpose of FTA
Understand & apply rules of FTA
Analyse a simple system using FTA
Understand & apply rules of Boolean algebra

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 2

Relationship between FMEA


& FTA
Product Failure
Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA)

Failure Mode & Effect


Analysis (FMEA)
Part Failure

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 3

Fault Tree Analysis

Is a systematic method of System Analysis


Examines System from Top Down
Provides graphical symbols for ease of understanding
Incorporates mathematical tools to focus on critical areas

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 4

Fault tree analysis (FTA)


Key elements:
Gates represent the outcome
Events represent input to the gates

FTA is used to:


investigate potential faults;
its modes and causes;
and to quantify their contribution to system unreliability in the
course of product design
.

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 5

Symbols

Basic Event

AND Gate

OR Gate

AB

AUB

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Transfer out

Transfer in

Page 6

Example Fault Tree


Top event

A developed Tree ..

A
A
1

2
1

5
4

1 2
9 10

7 8 9

.. Ready for analysis

PEUSS 2011/2012

1 2 3

4 5 6

FTA

Example: redundant fire pumps

Source: http://www.ntnu.no/ross/srt/slides/fta.pdf
PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 8

Example: redundant fire pumps

Source: http://www.ntnu.no/ross/srt/slides/fta.pdf
PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 9

Example

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 10

Example

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 11

Methodology (Preliminary
Analysis)
Set System Boundaries
Understand Chosen System
Define Top Events

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 12

Methodology (Rules)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The Immediate, Necessary & Sufficient Rule


The Clear Statement Rule
The No Miracles Rule
The Complete-the-Gate Rule
The No Gate-to-Gate Rule
The Component or System Fault? Rule

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 13

Methodology (Rules - 1)
immediate, necessary and sufficient
cause
Immediate

Closest in space, time and derivation of the event above


Necessary

There is no redundancy in the statement or gate linkage


The event above could not result from a sub set of the causal
events
Sufficient
The events will, in all circumstances and at all times, cause
the event above
PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 14

Methodology (Rules - 2) The


clear statement rule

Write event box statements clearly, stating


precisely what the event is and when it
occurs

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 15

Methodology (Rules - 3) The


component or systems fault rule
If the answer to the question:
Can this fault consist of a component failure? is Yes,

Classify the event as a State of component fault


If the answer is No,

Classify the event as a state of system fault

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 16

Methodology (Rules - 4) no
miracles rule
If the normal functioning of a component
propagates a fault sequence, then it is
assumed that the component functions
normally

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 17

Methodology (Rules - 5) the


complete gate rule

All inputs to a particular gate should be


completely defined before further
analysis of any one of them is
undertaken

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 18

Methodology (Rules - 6) no gate


to gate rule
Gate inputs should be properly defined fault
events, and gates should not be directly
connected to other gates

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 19

Fault Tree Example

Connector A

Switch
Battery

Motor

.. Motor does not


run when switch is
pressed
PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Connector B

Page 20

10

Fault Tree Example


Motor does not
run

top event ..
motor does not run
when switch is pressed

No Power
Supply

Motor
failed

Switch
malfunction

Switch
is
broken

Insufficient
force is
applied

No
connection

Connector
A
detached

Battery
is dead

Connector
B
detached

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 21

Qualitative Analysis
(Combination of Gates)
Q

Algebraic representation is:


Q=(AC)(DB)

or gate
PEUSS 2011/2012

and gate
FTA

Page 22

11

Qualitative Analysis
(Cut Sets)

A listing taken directly from the Fault Tree


of the events, ALL of which must occur to
cause the TOP Event to happen

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 23

Qualitative Analysis (Cut Sets)


Algebraic representation is:

Q=(AC)(DB)

which can be re-written as:


Q=(AD ) (AB) ( C D ) (C B)
Q= (AD ) +(A B) +( C D )+( C B)
which is a listing of Groupings ...each of
which is a Cut Set

AD AB CD BC

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 24

12

Qualitative Analysis
(Minimal Cut Sets)

A listing, derived from the Fault Tree Cut Sets and


reduced by Boolean Algebra, which is the smallest
list of events that is necessary to cause the Top
Event to happen

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 25

Qualitative Analysis
(Boolean Algebra)
Commutative laws
AB=BA
AB=BA
Associative laws
A (B C) = (A B) C
A (B C) = (A B) C
Distributive laws
A (B C) = A B A C
A (B C) = (A B) (A C)

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Commutative laws
AB=BA
A + B = B +A
Associative laws
A (B C) = (A B) C
A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C
Distributive laws
A (B + C) = A B + A C
A + (B C) = (A + B) (A + C)

Page 26

13

Qualitative Analysis
(Boolean Reduction)
Idempotent laws

Top event

AA=A
A +A = A

Absorption law
A + (A B) = A
B

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 27

Exercise in deriving Cut Sets


..
(AB)((AC)(DB))(DC)

AB
A B

PEUSS 2011/2012

(AC)(DB)
AC

DB

A C

D B
FTA

DC

D C

Page 28

14

Solution ..
( A B ) (( A C ) ( D B )) ( D C )
(A+B)(AC+DB)DC
AACDC + ADBDC + BACDC + BDBDC
ACD + ABCD + ABCD + BCD
ACD + BCD
Minimal Cut Sets ACD, BCD

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 29

Design Analysis of Minimal Cut Sets


A Cut Set comprising several components is less likely to fail than
one containing a single component
Hint .....
AND Gates at the top of the Fault Tree increase the number of
components in a Cut Set
OR Gates increase the number of Cut Sets, but often lead to single
component Sets

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 30

15

Benefits and limitations


Prepared in early stages of a design and further developed in
detail concurrently with design development.
Identifies and records systematically the logical fault paths from a
specific effect, to the prime causes
Allows easy conversion to probability measures
But may lead to very large trees if the analysis is extended in
depth.
Depends on skill of analyst
Difficult to apply to systems with partial success
Can be costly in time & effort

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 31

Software

Software packages available for reliability tools


Relex
Relia soft
others

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 32

16

Exercise 1

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 33

One
Possible
Solution

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 34

17

RBD of an engine
LV

Fuel
pump

Fuel
filter

Fuel system

Jet

Other
components

HV

Ignition system 1

Carburettor
LV

HV

Ignition system 2
PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 35

PEUSS 2011/2012

FTA

Page 36

18

You might also like