Leroy Fears v. Secretary PA Dept of Corr, 3rd Cir. (2013)

DLD-329
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-4564
___________
LEROY FEARS,
Appellant
v.
DR. JEFFREY A. BEARD, Ph. D., Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections; MR. LOUIS S. FOLINO; MR. SMITH, (First Name Unknown), Corrections
Officer; MR. GRIM (First Name Unknown), Corrections Officer; MR. VICTOR
SANTOYO, Corrections Officer, each Defendant is sued individually and within his
Official capacity
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00315)
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 11, 2013
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Leroy Fears, an inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Courts orders
granting the defendants motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. For the reasons
set forth below, we will summarily affirm.
I.
The facts being well-known to the parties, we set forth only those pertinent to this
appeal. Fears is confined in the Capital Housing Unit at SCI-Greene, due to his sexual
assault and murder of a twelve year old boy. The Capital Housing Unit is a Level 5
housing unit. All Level 5 inmates are handcuffed on their way to and from the exercise
yard for security and safety reasons. Defendant Smith, one of the yard officers,
handcuffed Fears before he returned to his cell. According to Fears, Smith made his right
handcuff so tight that he was in excruciating pain. Fears, however, did not tell Smith. He
told defendant Grim, a sergeant, that his cuffs were too tight, but did not say that he was
in pain. Grim inspected the cuffs and did not observe any injury. Fears was then
escorted to his cell by two other officers. He did not mention anything to them about
being in pain.
Fifteen minutes after Fears returned to his cell, Grim asked him if he needed
medical attention. Fears did not respond, and Grim left the area. Later, Fears started
experiencing pain in his right wrist and he was seen by two nurses. The medical report
from that visit stated that he had a superficial scratch on his right wrist, which was treated
with antibiotic ointment and a bandage.
Fears then filed a grievance pertaining to the incident. Defendant Santoyo
conducted an investigation and concluded that no excessive force was used when Fears
was handcuffed. Defendant Folino affirmed the denial of Fears grievance.
Fears filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his
rights under the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. After most of those claims were
dismissed, (Dkt. Nos. 21, 67), the defendants moved for summary judgment on Fears
remaining claims of excessive force and failure to intervene, (Dkt. Nos. 95-97). The
District Court granted their motion (Dkt. No. 117) and Fears timely appealed (Dkt. No.
119).
II.
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We may summarily affirm the
District Courts judgment if the appeal presents no substantial question. 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
We turn first to the District Courts dismissal of Fears claims.1 We exercise
plenary review over an order dismissing claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Fears originally filed his complaint in state court. Because he failed to effectuate proper
service, defendants never answered his complaint, and only learned of it after he filed a
motion for a default judgment. The case was then removed to federal court, and the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) moved for dismissal due to lack of
3
12(b)(6). Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Reviewing such an
order, we accept as true all allegations in the plaintiffs complaint as well as all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we construe them in a light most
favorable to the non-movant. Id. (citation omitted). A complaint must contain a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations,
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). [A] complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id.; see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (explaining that a plaintiff must identify[] facts that are
suggestive enough to render [his claim] plausible.) [O]nly a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The District Court properly dismissed Fears Eighth Amendment claim against
Grim based on a delay in medical care. Such a claim required a showing that Grim was
deliberately indifferent to Fears serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976). Deliberate indifference can be shown by a prison official intentionally
proper service and because it was not a person for purposes of 1983. For
substantially the same reasons given by the District Court, (Dkt. No. 21, pp. 3-4), the
claims against the DOC were properly dismissed.
4
denying or delaying access to medical care . . . . Id. at 104-05. The District Court
assumed, for the sake of argument, that Fears was suffering from a serious medical need.
(Dkt. No. 67, p. 9.) However, it determined that his factual allegations were insufficient
to state a plausible claim as to Grims deliberate indifference. We agree. Fifteen minutes
after Fears returned to his cell, Grim asked him if he needed medical attention, and Fears
did not respond. (Dkt. No. 1-2, 16.) Further, Fears admitted that he was unaware of his
injury until after Grim left his cell. (Id. 18.) Grim could not have known that Fears
needed medical attention, let alone have intentionally delayed his access to it.2
We agree with the District Courts dismissal of Fears claims arising under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Fears alleged that he was denied the right to petition
the government for redress of grievances under the First Amendment, and that he was
denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by the prison grievance procedures.
Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures. See, e.g.,
Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). Nor do they
have a liberty interest protected by the due process clause in the grievance procedures.
See Antonelli v. Sheehan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (states inmate grievance
procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause). In
We also agree that Fears failed to state a plausible claim for relief with respect to his
allegations that the administrative grievance process somehow subjected him to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 67, p. 11.)
5
any event, Fears was not deprived of any process here. He admits that he availed himself
of the prison grievance procedures. Fears may not agree with the outcome of his
grievance, but his complaints were aired and assessed by the appropriate officials.
The District Court also properly dismissed Fears claims against Folino and
Santoyo. Fears alleged that their handling and denial of his administrative grievance
violated his First Amendment rights. In order for liability to attach under 1983, a
plaintiff must show that a defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of his
federal rights. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (defendant
in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability
cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior). Fears claims
against Folino and Santoyo were based solely on their involvement in the administrative
grievance process, in which he had no constitutional rights. Therefore, his allegations
were insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.3 Finally, to the extent Fears
attempted to assert his claims as violations of substantive due process, the District Court
correctly dismissed them under the more-specific provision rule explained in United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). (Dkt. No. 67, pp. 15-16.)
We turn now to the District Courts grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. We exercise plenary review and employ the same standard as applied
The claims against Beard were also properly dismissed because Fears did not allege any
facts pertaining to him. (Dkt. No. 67, p. 13.)
6
below. DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004). That is, [t]he court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we must affirm if the record
evidence submitted by the non-movant is merely colorable or is not significantly
probative. DeHart, 390 F.3d at 267-68 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Fears
claim that Smith used excessive force against him while handcuffing him in the yard.
Specifically, the District Court determined that Fears allegations, taken as true, only
established the de minimis use of force, which is insufficient to state a claim of excessive
force under the Eighth Amendment.4 (Dkt. No. 114, p. 7.) We agree. See Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment does not protect an
inmate against an objectively de minimis use of force). The pivotal inquiry in an
excessive force claim is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain . . .
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Id. p. 649. The record does
not reflect that Fears was handcuffed for any reasons other than institutional safety and
security.
In his argument in support of his appeal, Fears does not point out any specific facts that
would create a genuine issue and cause us to find that summary judgment was
improvidently granted.
7
We also agree with the District Court that there were no genuine issues of material
fact pertaining to Fears failure to intervene claim against defendant Grim. (Dkt. No.
114, pp. 9-11.) An officers failure to intervene can be the basis of an Eighth
Amendment violation under 1983 if the officer, upon witnessing anothers use of
excessive force against a prisoner, had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply
refused to do so. Smith, 293 F.3d at 650. However, an officer is only liable if there is
a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene. Id. at 651. Given Fears failure to
show that Smith used excessive force when handcuffing him, his failure to intervene
claim must fail. Regardless, Grim inspected Fears cuffs when he complained in the yard
and did not observe any injury that would have justified removing them before Fears
returned to his cell minutes later.
III.
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily
affirm. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6

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DLD-329

DR. JEFFREY A. BEARD, Ph. D., Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of

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