Robert J. Henderson Anita E. Henderson v. Robert Gruntz v. Charlene Weir, Third-Party Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant, 947 F.2d 950, 3rd Cir. (1991)

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947 F.

2d 950

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions


other than opinions or orders designated for publication are
not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel.
Robert J. HENDERSON; Anita E. Henderson, PlaintiffsAppellees,
v.
Robert GRUNTZ, Defendant,
v.
Charlene WEIR, Third-party defendant-counter-claimantAppellant.
No. 89-55230.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.


Submitted Oct. 7, 1991.*
Decided Oct. 25, 1991.

Before SCHROEDER, LEAVY and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

1MEMORANDUM**
2

Charlene Weir Gruntz (Weir) appeals from the magistrate judge's order
denying her ex parte application to release certain property seized pursuant to a
writ of execution. The district court granted Robert and Anita Henderson (the
Hendersons) a default judgment against Robert Gruntz (Gruntz), Weir's
husband, and issued a writ of execution upon a racehorse owned by Gruntz to
satisfy the judgment. Weir asserts that she, not Gruntz, owns the racehorse and
that the magistrate judge erred in denying her application. We affirm.

The Hendersons moved this court to dismiss Weir's appeal as untimely. They
argued that Weir had failed to appeal the final judgment on her third party
claim within 30 days. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1). However, we construed Weir's ex

parte application as a motion to reconsider the judgment pursuant to


Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) and held that her appeal was timely filed. Accordingly, we
treat Weir's appeal as an appeal from a denied Rule 60(b) motion.
4

A decision regarding a motion to reconsider pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) is


reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Molloy v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 313, 315 (9th
Cir.1989).

DISCUSSION
5

Weir cannot challenge the magistrate judge's underlying decision on her third
party claim because she failed to file notice of appeal of that determination
within the 30 day limit of Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1). The appeal of a court's denial
of a Rule 60(b) motion does not bring up the underlying judgment for review;
only the decision on the 60(b) motion will be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir.1991); Cel-A-Pak v.
California Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 680 F.2d 664, 668 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 491, 74 L.Ed.2d 633 (1982).

Weir contends that the California codes pursuant to which her third party claim
was heard1 provide for a summary proceeding that did not empower the
magistrate judge to determine ownership of the seized property, and she
contends that the proceeding denied her due process. As a result, she claims,
the decision was void. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4).

The California codes governing executions of judgments enable courts to "give


a quick and effectual remedy to third parties whose property has been levied on
by mistake and to protect the officer who makes such levy." Rubin v. Barasch,
275 Cal.App.2d 835, 836-37, 80 Cal.Rptr. 337, 339 (1969). A hearing is held to
determine the validity of the third party claim. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code 720.310 et
seq. The third party claimant may present evidence and testimony to establish
ownership; the judgment creditor and judgment debtor may cross-examine the
third party claimant's witnesses and present other evidence to rebut the claim.
The court's determination of ownership at the close of the hearing is conclusive
between the parties to the proceeding. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code 720.390; Embree
Uranium Co. v. Liebel, 169 Cal.App.2d 256, 258-59, 337 P.2d 159 (1959).

The California courts have long held that the state's judgment execution law
does not deny third party claimants due process. In McCoy v. Justice's Court,
23 Cal.App.2d 99, 101-102, 71 P.2d 1115 (1937), the California Court of
Appeal held that Cal.Civ.Proc.Code 689, the predecessor statute to the current

code sections governing third party claims, satisfied due process. See also,
Fulton v. Webb, 39 Cal.App.2d 509, 512, 103 P.2d 596 (1940). Weir points to
no authority which declares that third party claimants are entitled to all of the
accounterments of full-blown litigation.2 "The third party claimant chose her
remedy and has had her day in court." Fulton, 39 Cal.App.2d at 512.
9

The magistrate judge conducted a hearing under California law and determined
that Weir did not own the horse. Weir did not appeal. That judgment is not
void.

10

AFFIRMED.

The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument
pursuant to 9th Cir.R. 34-4 and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by
the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the execution of levies to
satisfy money judgments. Therefore, state law governs the practice and
procedure to be followed in the execution of a money judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P.
69(a). In this case, California law, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code 680.010 et seq. governs

In fact, section 720.410 expressly denies third-party claimants the right to a jury
trial

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