Kathy Coraggio v. Time Inc. Magazine Company, Time Warner, Inc., Karen Magee, Lisa Pols, 108 F.3d 329, 2d Cir. (1997)
Kathy Coraggio v. Time Inc. Magazine Company, Time Warner, Inc., Karen Magee, Lisa Pols, 108 F.3d 329, 2d Cir. (1997)
Kathy Coraggio v. Time Inc. Magazine Company, Time Warner, Inc., Karen Magee, Lisa Pols, 108 F.3d 329, 2d Cir. (1997)
3d 329
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York and was argued.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff's claims of pregnancy discrimination under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), pregnancy
discrimination under New York law and marital status discrimination under
New York law. Plaintiff contends that the district court erred when in granted
summary judgment to defendants on her Title VII claim and her New York state
law claims, and that the district court further erred when it adjudicated her state
law claims after dismissal of her Title VII claim.
We affirm the judgment of the district court granting the defendants' motion for
summary judgment for substantially the reasons stated in the district court's
opinion and order dated March 27, 1996. See Coraggio v. Time Inc. Magazine
Co., No. 94 Civ. 5429, 1996 WL 139786 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1996). We write
here only to consider whether the district court erred when it adjudicated
plaintiff's state law claims after it decided to dismiss her only federal claim.
We have frequently upheld summary judgments with respect to both state and
federal claims in cases brought under Title VII and corresponding state
discrimination laws. See, e.g., Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d
708, 715 (2d Cir.1996); Stetson v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 995 F.2d 355 (2d
Cir.1993). Plaintiff relies principally on Morse v. University of Vermont, 973
F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1992), in which we held that the district court abused its
discretion by exercising pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim that
required the court to resolve an undecided question of state law. Id. at 127-28.
Here, in contrast, plaintiff's state law claims are controlled by established
precedent derived from Title VII case law. See Miller Brewery Co. v. State
Div'n of Human Rights, 498 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777-78 (N.Y.1985).
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
exercised pendent jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims and dismissed
those claims on the merits, notwithstanding its decision to dismiss plaintiff's
federal claim.
We have considered all of the plaintiff's arguments on appeal and find them to
be without merit.