EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122250 & 122258. July 21, 1997]

EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, and
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

First, we rewind the facts. The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held
on May 8, 1995. The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and
private respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got
23,038 votes. Edgardo Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.
[1]

On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He
alleged:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent was maintaining his own `private army' at his
aforesaid resident, P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine National Police assigned with the
Intelligence Command at Camp Crame, applied for and was granted search warrant no. 95-147 by
Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 5 May 1995. A copy of the said search warrant
is attached as Annex "A" hereof.
5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95-147, an elite composite team of the PNP
Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial Command,
backed up by the Philippine National Police Special Action Force, accompanied by mediamen who
witnessed and recorded the search by video and still cameras, raided the house of respondent
Florentino Blanco at his stated address at Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
6. Enclosed as Annex "A-1" is a video tape taken of the proceedings during the raid.
7. The composite team was able to enter the said premises of respondent Florentino Blanco where
they conducted a search of the subject firearms and ammunition.
8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various high powered
firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long arms. These persons
composing respondent's `private army,' and the unlicensed firearms are as follows:

A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama 1. PYTHOM (sic) Cal. 347 SN 26946 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
2. INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with Suppressor SN: 45457 with two (2) Mags and 54
Rounds of Ammo.
B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon 1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2) Mags and 47 Rounds of Ammo.
C.Roberto Santos y Sacris 1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum Sn: 522218 with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil 1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3) Rounds of Ammo.
E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion 1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
F. Francisco Libari y Calimag 1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869
Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.
9. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass window,
respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject premises.
10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the composite policemilitary team applied for the issuance of a second search warrant (Annex "B-6") so that they could
enter the said room to seize the said firearm.
11. While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent's wife and respondent's
brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to be the campaign manager of respondent in the Nationalist
People's Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the locked room so they could withdraw money
in a vault inside the locked room to pay their watchers, and the teachers of Meycauayan in the 8
May 1995 elections.
12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were allowed
to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags from the vault.
13. When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found out
that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained 200 pay
envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened contained the amount of P1,000.00. When

questioned, respondent's brother Mariano Blanco and respondent's wife, admitted to the raiding
team that the total amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00.
14. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as respondent's bribe
money to the teachers of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "C" is the cover of one of the shoe boxes
containing the inscription that it is intended to the teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-buying activity ever
in the history of Meycauayan politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the envelope where this
P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100 peso denominations totalling one thousand pesos per envelope
with the inscription `VOTE!!! TINOY.'
This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his organization
called `MTB' or `MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS.' The chairman of this
movement is respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who admitted to the police during the raid
that these money were for the teachers and watchers of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-A, Brgy.
Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is perforated in the middle. The
purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy and return it to respondent's headquarters to receive
the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money after voting for respondent during the elections. The
voter will initially be given a down-payment of P500.00.
16. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use of flying
voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a copy of the Police Blotter dated 8 May 1995 showing that
six (6) flying voters were caught in different precincts of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who admitted after
being caught and arrested that they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent and his followers,
to vote for other voters in the voter's list.
17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another scheme as
follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his target from the list of voter and will impersonate
said voter in the list and falsify his signature.
Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct No. 26,
Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Annex "G-1" is the statement of one Ma. Luisa de los Reyes
Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct to vote, her name was already voted upon by
another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T. Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, - Poll
Clerk; and Nelson John Nito - Poll Member.
18. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the good graces of
the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the petition of the people of
Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an article in the 3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled
`1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar.'
19. The second search warrant on respondent's residence yielded to more firearms and thousands of
rounds of ammunition. These guns were used by respondent to terrorize the population and make
the people afraid to complain against respondent's massive vote buying and cheating in today's

elections. Respondent's bribery of the teachers ensured the implementation of his vote-buying
ballot box switching, impersonations, and other cheating schemes.
Attached as Annexes `I-1' to I-2' are the pertinent Receipts of the guns and ammunitions seized
from respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a Certification to the same effect.
20. The above acts committed by respondent are clear grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing election functions; for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Election
Code. There are only 97,000 registered voters in Meycauayan versus respondent's expenses of at
least P10,000,000.00 as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend
Proclamation. The COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after finding that there
was a "probable commission of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification
pursuant to the provisions of section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and the
evidence in support of disqualification is strong." It directed the Municipal Board of
Canvassers "to complete the canvassing of election returns of the municipality of
Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of respondent Florentino P. Blanco should he
obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan until
such time when the petitions for disqualification against him shall have been resolved."
On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him.
On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify
Blanco. The parties thereafter submitted their position papers. Blanco even replied to the
position paper of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.
[2]

On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground
of vote-buying, viz.:
[3]

xxxxxxxxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to
DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having violated Section 261 (a) of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of herein Respondent is now
made PERMANENT. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan, Bulacan shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election returns,
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately
proclaimed.
SO ORDERED."
Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en
banc. Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. He moved for
reconsideration of that part of the resolution directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers
[4]

to "immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election
returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-mayor he should be declared mayor in the
event Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions were heard on September 7, 1995. The
parties were allowed to file their memoranda with right of reply. On October 23, 1995, the
COMELEC en banc denied the motions for reconsideration.
In this petition for certiorari, Blanco contends:
[5]

xxxxxxxxx
18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in affirming en toto and adopting as its own the majority
decision of the First Division in that:
18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of Petitioner Blanco
herein as the winning candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the benefit of any notice or
hearing in gross and palpable violation of Blanco's constitutional right to due process of law.
18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the procedure
for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this Honorable Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the case
of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC) violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the
laws by setting him apart from other respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose case
were referred by COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering
their proclamation -- an act which evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco herein.
18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in
violation of law and the precedents which consistently hold that questions of VOTE-BUYING,
terrorism and similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election protest where the issue of
vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing of the issue in a summary
proceeding;
18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage in VOTEBUYING without that minimum quantum of proof required to establish a disputable presumption
of vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;
18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down by this
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO vs. COMELEC which was reiterated only recently
in the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.
On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his petition for certiorari that he should be
declared as Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No.
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 and our decision in Labo
vs. COMELEC.
[6]

[7]

We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.

Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended
his proclamation as mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against
him. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the
COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate's proclamation. It ought to be emphasized
that the suspension order is provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so
warrants. It is akin to a temporary restraining order which a court can issue ex-parte under
exigent circumstances.
In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the
Order suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition
to disqualify him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter submitted his
position paper and reply to Alarilla's position paper. The COMELEC considered the
evidence of the parties and their arguments and thereafter affirmed his
disqualification. The hoary rule is that due process does not mean prior hearing but only
an opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC gave Blanco all the opportunity to be heard.
Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings.
[8]

Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing from the procedure laid down in
COMELEC Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification cases. The resolution
pertinently provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent
candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the
complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before
proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for
suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is
pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is
strong."
It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it deprived Blanco of equal protection of our
laws.
We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over
proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution endows
the COMELEC the all encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." We have long ruled that this broad
power includes the power to cancel proclamations. Our laws are no less explicit on the
matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides:
[9]

"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for an elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the elections laws."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides:
"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must
follow the procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot
always be straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained that the
resolution was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at that
time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial solution to
the problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit of
disqualification cases which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its decision to resolve
the disqualification case of Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law Department is
within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion. The action of the COMELEC is in
accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, viz:
"x x x.
"SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-selling. - The presentation of a complaint for
violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by
affidavits of complaining witness attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voter's acceptance of
money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be
sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly or
through its duly authorized legal officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881. (emphasis supplied)
"x x x."
Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who dissented from the majority ruling, clings
to the view that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the Commission of its duty to resolve
disqualification cases under the clear provision of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646." Clearly too,
Blanco's contention that he was denied equal protection of the law is off-line. He was not
the object of any invidious discrimination. COMELEC assumed direct jurisdiction over his
[10]

disqualification case not to favor anybody but to discharge its constitutional duty of
disposing the case in a fair and as fast a manner as possible.
Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his
disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on section 4 of its
Rules of Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be
heard summarily after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its
criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of
summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should
be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is
summary in character.
The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying
activities of Blanco. The factual findings of the COMELEC (First Division) are as follows:
[11]

"x x x
"Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying has no factual basis because the affidavits and
sworn statements admitted as evidence against him are products of hearsay; inadmissible because
of the illegal searches; they violate the Rule of Res Inter Alios Acta and the offense of vote-buying
requires consummation.
We are not impressed.
A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's affidavit is unsigned] attached to the Reply of the
Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner [Annexes 1, 2 and 3] would reveal that they are
in the nature of general denials emanating from individuals closely associated or related to
respondent Blanco.
The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent's Position Paper [Annexes 1, 2, 3
and 4]. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco's political leaders and private secretary.
On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos [Exhibit "E-1"] is rich in detail as to how the
alleged vote-buying was conducted.
Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement for Tinoy
Blanco] cards which were in the possession of the affiants and allegedly used as a means to
facilitate the vote-buying scheme.
There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for Respondent
[Annexes "E-2", "E-3", "E-4", "E-5", "E-6", "E-7", "E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].
On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote for
Respondent when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal complaint for
violation of section 261 [2] of BP 881 was filed by P/Sr. Inspector Alfred S. Corpus on May 9,
1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan. The same was docketed as Criminal Case 9516996 [Exhibit F-2].

Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of the
suspected flying voters.
The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same [Exhibit "F1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two suspected flying
voters when the latter attempted to vote despite failing to locate their names in the voter's list.
From this rich backdrop of detail, We are disappointed by the general denial offered by
Respondent. In People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993, 222 SCRA
684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is the weakest defense' [page 692].
In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso, et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993, 221
SCRA 1993, the Supreme Court observed that,
`We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive
declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former
deserves more credence." [page 754].'
However, Respondent conveniently resorts to section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states that a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included herein, may be given in evidence against him [affiants who
executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against Respondent.
There is no merit in this contention.
The affiants are not the accused. Their participation in the herein case is in the nature of witnesses
who have assumed the risk of being subsequently charged with violating Section 261 [1] of BP
881. In fact, their affidavits were sought by the Petitioner and not by any law enforcement
agency.Even Respondent admits this finding when he filed his Reply to Petitioner's Position Paper
and Motion to Refer for Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information in Court against the
Persons Who Executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election
Offense. If they were the accused, why file the motion? Would not this be redundant if not
irrelevant?
xxx
Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers. Why such a huge
amount? Why should the Respondent, a mayoralty candidate, and according to his own admission,
be giving money to teachers a day before the elections? What were the peso bills doing in pay
envelopes with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY", and kept in shoe boxes with the word
"Teachers" written on the covers thereof?
There is also something wrong with the issuance of the aforementioned MTB cards when one
considers the testimony of Burgos that more or less 50,000 of these cards, which is equivalent to
more or less 52% of the 97,000 registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan, were printed by

respondent; that there are only 443 precincts in Meycauayan; that under the law, a candidate is
allowed only one watcher per polling place and canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no
explanation at all by the respondent as to what these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00
each.
xxx
Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving must be
consummated.
Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises money x x x." Section
28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, recipient and
conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be
liable as principals: x x x.
While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising something in
consideration for someone's vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying.
In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising money in consideration for the votes of said
affiants is sufficient for a finding of the commission of the offense of vote-buying."
These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone
dissent of Commissioner Maambong.
There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the
resort to our technical rules of evidence. Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that
technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings
especially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. More
importantly, we cannot depart from the settled norm of reviewing decisions of the
COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review the factual findings of the COMELEC
absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its decision, order or
resolution."
[12]

We now come to the petition of Nolasco that he should be declared as mayor in the
event Blanco is finally disqualified. We sustain the plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus:
[13]

"x x x
"SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor.- (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor
or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members
according to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be resolved by the
drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each distribution the immediately preceding election."
In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides:
"x x x.
"ART. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials.- (a) What constitutes permanent
vacancy - A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor (1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice
mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
ipso facto become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may
be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as defined in this Article."
Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained
the second highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent
case of Reyes v. COMELEC, viz:
[14]

"x x x x x x x x x
"We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying petitioner
Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U.
Reyes.

"That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner
in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by seesawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the
results under the circumstances.
"Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes
are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not
be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot
retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him."
Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as
it failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC.
[15]

A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of
Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of
republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which our people express their sovereign judgment. Its
free exercise must be protected especially against the purchasing power of the peso. As we
succinctly held in People v. San Juan, "each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to
assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that
will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption
must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's
free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right
of suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process."
[16]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc dated

October 23, 1995 is affirmed with the modification that petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is
adjudged as Mayor of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino P.
Blanco. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46863

November 18, 1939

IRINEO MOYA, petitioner,

vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.
Elpidio Quirino for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above entitled case declaring
the respondent, Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor of the municipality of Paracale,
Province of Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general elections held
on December 14, 1937, the parties herein were contending candidates for the aforesaid office. After canvass of the
returns the municipal council of Paracale, acting as board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the elected
mayor of said municipality with a majority of 102 votes. On December 27, 1937, the respondent field a motion of
protest in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the Court of Appeals, on July 13, 1939 rendered the
judgment hereinbefore mentioned which is sought by the petitioner to be reviewed and reversed upon the errors
alleged to have been committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or contrary to the
controlling decisions of this Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."
Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the eight (8) ballots now to be
mentioned. (1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2, alleged to have been inadvertently admitted
in favor of the respondent, such inadvertence raises a question of fact which could have been corrected by the
Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a position to determine in this proceeding for review by certiorari.
Upon the other hand, if the error attributed to the Court of Appeals consisted in having admitted ballot Exhibit F-175
in precinct No. 2 instead of the ballot bearing the same number corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot
clearly appears admissible for the respondent because the name written on the space for mayor is "Primo del
Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and deserves but scanty consideration. (2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in
precinct No. 3 was erroneously admitted for the respondent by the Court of Appeals, the name written on the space
for mayor being "G.T. Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the councilor "Alcalde Pinong del Fierro":
appears; but the intention of the elector is rendered vague and incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was
improperly counted for the respondent. As to this ballot, the contention of the petitioner is sustained (3) Ballot Exhibit
F-77 in precinct No. 2 should also have been rejected by the Court of Appeals. The ballot bears the distinguishing

mark "O. K." placed after the name "M. Lopis" written on space for vice-mayor. The contention of the petitioner in
this respect is likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was properly admitted for respondent. On
this ballot the elector wrote within the space for mayor the name of Regino Guinto, a candidate for the provincial
board and wrote the respondent's name immediately below the line for mayor but immediately above the name "M.
Lopez" voted by him for vice-mayor. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of the mayor
is clear under the circumstances. (5) Ballot F-131 in precinct No. 1 was also properly counted for the respondent.
On this ballot the elector wrote the respondent's name on the space for vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his
mistake, he placed an arrow connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed on the left
side of the ballot. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor is thus evident, in the
absence of proof showing that the ballot had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for
the respondent and the Court of Appeals committed no error in so adjudicating. Although the name of the
respondent is written on the first space for member of the provincial board, said name is followed in the next line by
"Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in the next line by word "consehal" and the name of a
candidate for this position. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor being
manifest, the objection of the petitioner to the admission of this ballot is overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is
valid for the respondent. On this ballot the Christian name of the respondent was written on the second space for
member of the provincial board, but his surname was written on the proper space for mayor with no other
accompanying name or names. The intention of the elector being manifest, the same should be given effect in favor
of the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein "Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the proper
space, is valid for the respondent. In his certificate of candidacy the respondent gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del
Fierro." The conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and
"Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not without justification and, by liberal construction, the ballot in question was
properly admitted for the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in precinct No. 1 Exhibit F24 in precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots appear to be among the 75 ballots found
by the Court of Appeals as acceptable for the respondent on the ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino" in
"Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent. The petitioner
contends that the initial "R" and not "P". Even if we could reverse this finding, we do not feel justified in doing so
after examining the photostatic copies of these ballots attached to the herein petition for certiorari. The second
assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in adjudicating to the respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor. We
are of the opinion that the position taken by the Court of Appeals is correct. There was no other candidate for the
office of mayor with the name of "Rufino" or similar name and, as the respondent was districtly identified by his
surname on these ballots, the intention of the voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to vote for the
respondent of the office for which he was a candidate.
lawphi1.net

The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the office of mayor, and
it is the contention of the petitioner that said ballots should not have been counted by the Court of Appeals in favor
of the respondent. For the identical reason indicated under the discussion of petitioner's second assignment of error,
namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of
the respondent, we hold that there was no error in the action of the Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to
the respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit F-77 in precinct
No. 2, we are inclined to accept the rest of the disputed ballots for the respondent not only for the specific reasons
already given but also and principally for the more fundamental reason now to be stated. As long as popular
government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised,
must continue to be the manes by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular
agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He

has a voice in his Government and whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to
stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost,
with reasonable, liberality. Counsel for both parties have called our attention to the different and divergent rules laid
down by this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us to engage in the
task of reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases
will be found to be exactly the same in factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this
connection that whatever might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be
permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the
justification for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are now incorporated in
section 144 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been erroneously admitted by the
Court of Appeals for the respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In view whereof it becomes unnecessary to
consider the counter-assignment of errors of the respondent.
With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is hereby
dismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs.

G.R. No. L-33541 January 20, 1972

ABDULGAFAR
PUNGUTAN, petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF SULU. respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Manuel M. Gonzales for petitioner.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for respondent Benjamin Abubakar.
Teao, Garcia and Apostol for respondent COMELEC, etc.

FERNANDO, J.:p
The resolution of respondent Comelec 1 now assailed in this petition for review, was undoubtedly
motivated by the objective of insuring free, orderly and honest elections in the discharge of its
constitutional function to enforce and administer electoral laws. 2 It excluded from the canvass
for the election of delegates for the lone district of the province of Sulu the returns from 107
precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being
spurious or manufactured and therefore no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner
Abdulgafar Pungutan, who otherwise would have been entitled to the last remaining seat for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, there being no question as to the election of the
other two delegates, 3 would lose out to respondent Benjamin Abubakar. Petitioner would thus
dispute the power of respondent Commission to exclude such returns as a result of oral
testimony as well as the examination of the fingerprints and signatures of those who allegedly
voted as the basis for the holding that no election in fact did take place. This contention is,
however, unavailing, in the light of our holding last month in Usman v. Comelec. 4The other
principal question raised is whether the recognition of such prerogative on the part of respondent
Commission would contravene the constitutional provision that it cannot pass on the right to
vote. The appropriate answer as will be made clear is likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence,
respondent Commission must be sustained.
The case had its origin from a petition filed on December 16, 1970, by respondent Abubakar and
the other candidates, 5 superseding an earlier one dated December 7, 1970 alleging that in the

towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no elections were in effect held in view of massive
violence, terrorism and fraud. 6 The respondents named therein, including now petitioner
Pungutan, answered on December 18, 1970 to the effect that the elections were duly held in the
above-mentioned municipalities and denied the allegation as to the existence of massive fraud,
terrorism and serious irregularities. The case was duly heard, with oral testimony from five
chairmen of certain precincts in Tapul, five teachers from Parang, five teachers from Luuk and
three teachers from Siasi, followed by an examination of the precinct book of voters from said
towns and the fingerprints and signatures of those who voted, as shown at the back of CE Form
No. 1 and CE Form No. 39 for the 1970 elections for the Constitutional Convention.
After reciting the relevant facts, respondent Commission came to this conclusion: "In the light of
the foregoing findings of the Commission with respect to the manner in which the elections were
conducted in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, the Commission is of the opinion that the elections in
said municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the elections in Karomatan, Lanao del
Norte. Actually no elections were held in said municipalities as the voting was done by persons
other than the registered voters while armed men went from precinct to precinct, prepared the
ballots and dictated how the election returns were to be prepared. The same reasons which
compelled the Commission to reject the returns from Karomatan and to consider said returns as
no returns at all or spurious or manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared at
gunpoint (again paraphrasing in the reverse the second Pacis case) compel us with much greater
justification to find that the returns from Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or
manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the elections in said municipalities are
sham." 7 The above findings of fact found support in the light of the competent and credible
evidence sustaining that the most flagrant irregularities did attend the so-called elections in
Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk.
As to Siasi: "In Siasi where there were 21,688 registered voters it was made to appear that
20,970 had voted. However, the result of the examination of the thumbmarks and signatures of
those who voted compared with the fingerprints of the registered voters appearing in their
registration record, CE Form 1 showed that only 460 of the registered voters had been definitely
established to have actually voted, 131 identified through the thumbmarks and 329 by their
signatures. The 11,154 of those who voted were found to be substitute voters: 7,557 were
discovered to be voters voting in substitution of the registered voters through their thumbmarks
and 3,597 through their signatures. No opinion was made with respect to the rest of the votes
cast because not all of the 13,282 voters whose thumbprints could not be analyzed were referred
to the NBI for signature examination. Only 4,631 of these blurred thumbprints from 28 precincts
were referred to the NBI for signature examination. Examination of these 4,631 signatures
revealed that 3,597 were by persons other than the registered voters, only 329 were by the
register voters and no opinion could be rendered with respect to 705 for lack of sufficient basis of
comparison. In 26 precincts of Siasi there was 100% voting but not necessarily by the registered
voters. The overall average for the whole town is 96.6% voting. There were 80 persons who were
able to vote without any CE Form 1 or without voting in the name of the voters registered in the
precinct." 8
With respect to Tapul: "In Tapul where there were 12,223 registered voters it appeared that
11,575 votes were cast. 197 persons were able to vote without CE Form No. 1 without using the
names of registered voters in the precinct. When the thumbprints corresponding to the 11,575
votes cast were examined by the Fingerprint Identification Division of the Commission, only 3
were found to be identical with the thumbprints of the registered voters in their registration
record: one each in Precincts 8, 29 and 20-A. 5,300 thumbmarks were found to be not identical
with the corresponding thumbmarks of the registered voters in their registration records, CE
Form 1. 6,199 thumbmarks, however, could not be analyzed because they were blurred,
smudged or faint. Of these 6,199 blurred thumbprints from 56 precincts, 4,187 from 31 precincts

were referred to the NBI handwriting experts for signature examination. The result of said
examination by the NBI of these 4,187 signatures showed that only 13 were found to be identical
with the signatures of the registered voters in their registration record, CE Form 1, while 2,897
were those of persons other than the registered voters. No opinion could be rendered on 1,277
signatures for lack of sufficient basis of comparison." 9 Further: "It appeared, therefore, that in
the whole town of Tapul out of the 11,575 votes cast only 13 were definitely established as cast
by the registered voters. 8,197 were definitely established as cast by substitute voters. No
opinion could be rendered with respect to 1,277 for lack of sufficient basis, 2,012 were not
examined anymore since these were in precincts where the number of substitute voting had
been found to constitute a very high percentage. It has been also established that on Election
Day about one hundred men armed with long arms were seen going around from precinct to
precinct in Tapul driving away the voters and instructing the teachers-inspectors on how to
prepare the election returns. Some of the ballot boxes were seen to have been brought to the
Municipal Treasurer's office early in the afternoon of Election Day hours before the closing of
voting. Nineteen (19) precincts of Tapul reported 100% voting while the over-all percentage of
voting in the whole municipality was 94.5%." 10
Then came the recital as to Parang: "In Parang, where there were 11,761 registered voters in 67
precincts, it was made to appear that 11,083 votes were cast. 66 voters who were not registered
in the precinct were able to vote illegally without even using the names of the registered voters
therein. An examination of the thumbprints of those who voted appearing in CE Form 39 or at the
back of CE Form 1 compared with the corresponding thumbprints of the registered voters
appearing in their registration record in CE Form 1 showed that only 39 thumbprints of the
registered voters in his CE Form 1, while 4,698 were different from those of the registered voters.
6,539 thumbmarks could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or faint.
However, only 2,647 of these 6,539 smudged thumbprints were referred to the NBI for signature
examination since the rest of said blurred thumbmarks were in precincts where a high
percentage of non-identical thumbmarks was already discovered. 1,573 signatures were found to
be by persons other than the registered voters and only 83 were found to be identical with those
of the registered voters. No opinion could be rendered with respect to 991 signatures for lack of
sufficient basis. In 20 precincts it was made to appear that all the registered voters had voted.
The overall percentage for the whole town of Parang was 94%. The evidence also showed that in
a number of precincts in Parang armed men had entered the polling places and prepared the
ballots. The registered voters were not able to vote." 11 Lastly, as to Luuk: "In Luuk where there
were 13,124 registered voters, 12,263 votes were cast. 281 persons who were not registered
voters in this precinct were able to vote illegally without even using the names of the registered
voters. The thumbprints of those who voted appearing in their voting record either in CE Form 1
or in CE Form 39 compared with the thumbprints of the registered voters appearing in the voter's
registration record in CE Form 1 showed that only 22 of the thumbmarks of those who voted were
identical with the thumbmarks of the registered voters, while 6,021 were found to be different
from those of the registered voters. 6,134 thumbmarks could not, however, be analyzed because
they were found to be blurred, smudged or faint. However, the signatures of those who voted in
13 precincts were examined by the NBI and it was found that the said signatures were written by
just a few persons as explained with greater particularity in the earlier pages of this
resolution." 12
In the light of the above and finding no need to determine how the election was in fact
conducted as to Pata, Patikul, Indanan, Panamao, South Ubian, Balimbing, Bongao and Tandubas,
it was the holding of the Commission in the resolution of May 14, 1971: "1. To rule by unanimous
vote that the returns from the 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang
and 60 precincts of Luuk are spurious and/or manufactured returns or no returns at all and as
such should be excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone
congressional district of the province of Sulu; 2. To hold also by unanimous vote that further

hearings on the petition of [Benjamin Abubakar, et al] for the rejection or exclusion from the
canvass of the returns from Indanan, Panamao, Pata, Tandubas South Ubian, Patikul, Bongao and
Balimbing would no longer be necessary, it appearing that the results of the election would no
longer be affected by the returns from said municipalities after the rejection of the returns from
the four towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk and, therefore, for the purpose of the completion
of the canvass, to direct the Board of Canvassers to include the returns from said municipalities
in the canvass; 3. By majority vote of the members of the Commission to direct the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Sulu to reconvene in Jolo and complete the canvass excluding from said
canvass the returns from the towns of Siasi, Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to proclaim the 3rd
winning candidate at 5:00 P.M. on May 28, 1971, unless restrained by the Supreme Court." 13 On
May 22, 1971, this petition for the review of the above resolution of May 14, 1971 of respondent
Commission was filed. Three days later, a resolution was adopted by this Court requiring
respondents to file an answer not later than June 4, 1971. Both respondent Commission on
Elections and respondent Abubakar duly filed their answers on said date. Respondent
Commission took pains to explain with even more detail why such a resolution had to be issued
considering the "massive voting anomalies ranging from substitute voting to grabbing of ballots
to preparation of election returns and other election documents at gunpoint" thus justifying its
conclusion that the elections in the four towns amounted to a sham. The case was heard on June
8, 1971 with petitioner Pungutan represented by Attorney Jose W. Diokno. Respondent Abubakar,
represented by Attorney Jovito R. Salonga, sought permission to submit a memorandum, which
was received by this Court on June 28, 1971. Petitioner was given the opportunity to reply
thereto, and he did so in his memorandum filed with this Court on October 18, 1971. The case
was deemed submitted on December 3, 1971. It is the decision of this Court, as noted at the
outset, after a careful study of the pleadings and in the light of our decision last month in Usman
v. Commission on Elections 14 that the challenged resolution of respondent Commission of May
14, 1971 is in accordance with law. The petition must therefore fail.
1. There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of power to
disregard and annul the alleged returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67
precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured. So we have
held on facts analogous in character in the above Usman decision rendered last month. Nor is it
to be wondered at. Any other view would indict itself for lack of fealty to reason and to the
realities of the situation. It goes without saying that what is contemplated in the law is that the
electors in the exercise of their free will can go to the polls and exercise their right of suffrage,
with the boards of inspectors crediting each candidate with the votes duly obtained after an
honest count. It is on that basis that election returns are to be made. Where no such election was
in fact held as was found by respondent Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not only
justified but it is its clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as clearly spurious and
manufactured and therefore bereft of any value. The words of Justice Castro, in the Usman
decision, referring to the election returns from Karomatan, considered as likewise not entitled to
credit because of their lack of integrity and authenticity, are opposite: "These circumstances
definitely point, not merely to a few isolated instances of irregularities affecting the integrity and
authenticity of the election returns, but to an organized, well-directed large-scale operation to
make a mockery of the elections in Karomatan. We find and so hold that the election returns from
the 42 precincts in question were prepared under circumstances conclusively showing that they
are false, and are so devoid of value as to be completely unworthy of inclusion in the canvass.
We have no alternative but to affirm the Comelec's finding that they are spurious and
manufactured." 15 Nor is it to be lost sight of that the power to reject returns of such a character
has been exercised most judiciously. Even a cursory perusal of the mode and manner of inquiry
conducted by respondent Commission resulting in the challenged resolution should suffice to
remove any doubt as to the absence of any impropriety or improvidence in the exercise of such a
prerogative. Clearly, there was care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional

objective of insuring that an election be "free, orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the
circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at, then certainly there is a
frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any reluctance in yielding the
imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by respondent Commission in the discharge of its
constitutional function of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The
long line of decisions especially so since Cauton v. Commission on Elections, 16 is not susceptible
of any other interpretation. Only thus may there be an assurance that the canvassing and
proclamation reflect with fidelity and accuracy the true results of an election, in fact actually
held. We do so again. As a matter of fact, such a sympathetic approach to the results arrived at
in the discharge of its functions started with the leading case of Sumulong v. Commission on
Elections. 17 As was so well put by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission on
Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The
Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which
it was created -- free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of
means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court
should not interfere." 18 The same approach is reflected in the opinion of the Chief Justice
in Lucman v. Dimaporo when as he pointed out if "pursuant to our Administrative Law, the
findings of fact of administrative organs created by ordinary legislation will not be disturbed by
courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in
support of such findings ... there is no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution
intended to place the Commission on Elections created and explicitly made 'independent' by
the Constitution itself on a lower level than said statutory administrative organs; ... ." 19
2. The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It is a
right without which the principle of sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. 20 In
the traditional terminology, it is a political right enabling every citizen to participate in the
process of government to assure that it derives its power from the consent of the governed.
What was so eloquently expressed by Justice Laurel comes to mind: "As long as popular
government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality
and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be
emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the
adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen
as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority." 21
How such a right is to be exercised is regulated by the Election Code. 22 Its enforcement under
the Constitution is, as noted, vested in respondent Commission. Such a power, however, is purely
executive or administrative. So it was characterized by the Chief Justice in Abcede v.
Imperial: 23 "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the
President to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the
Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.' ...."
It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a denial of which should find redress in the
judiciary as the guardian of constitutional rights, is excluded from the authority vested in
respondent Commission. If the exclusion of the returns from the four towns in Sulu involved a
question as to such a right, then, clearly, what the Commission did was beyond its competence.
Such is not the case however. What is deemed outside such a sphere is the determination of
whether or not a person can exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage. Thus,
the question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is properly judicial. 24 As to whether

or not an election has been held is a question of a different type. It is properly within the
administrative jurisdiction of respondent Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting did
take place, considering the massive irregularities that attended it in the four towns, then the
exclusion of the alleged returns is not tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the second issue raised
by petitioner that in so acting the respondent Commission exceeded its constitutional power by
encroaching on terrain properly judicial, the right to vote being involved, is likewise to be
resolved against him. At any rate, what was set forth by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Diaz v.
Commission
on
25
Elections would likewise dispose of such a contention adverse to petitioner. Thus: "It is pleaded
by respondents that the rejection of the Sagada returns would result in the disfranchisement of a
large number of legitimate voters. But such disfranchisement would only be provisional, subject
to the final determination of the validity of the votes at the protest that may be filed with the
Constitutional Convention." 26
3. As to the plea in the prayer of the petition that in the event that the challenged resolution of
May 14, 1971 as to the power of respondent Commission is sustained, a special election be
called by it in all the 290 precincts in the four municipalities of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, it
suffices to refer to our ruling in Usman v. Commission on Elections, where a similar point was
raised without success. So it should be in this case. We see no reason to order such a special
election. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
May 14, 1971 is affirmed. The Commission on Elections is directed to order the board of
canvassers to convene without delay and forthwith proceed with and complete the canvass of
the election returns from all the precincts of Sulu, excluding therefrom all the election returns
from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of
Luuk, and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate for the third Constitutional Convention seat
allotted to the said province. This decision is hereby declared immediately executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29333

February 27, 1969

MARIANO LL. BADELLES, protestant-appellant,

vs.
CAMILO P. CABILI, protegee-appellee.
-------------------------G.R. No. L-29334

February 27, 1969

BONIFACIO P. LEGASPI and CECILlO T. BARAZON protestants-appellants,

vs.
FELIX Z. ACTUB, PROVIDENCIO P. ABRAGAN, MANUEL F. CELDRAN, CASIMERO P.
CABIGON and BENITO ONG, protestees-appellees.
Bonifacio P. Legaspi for and in his own behalf.
Camilo P. Cabili. Gerardo B. Padilla and Ignacio Espaol and Voltaire I. Roviro for protesteesappellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City, after the
Nov. 14, 1967 elections, based on the allegations of flagrant violations of certain mandatory
provisions of the Election Code, to be more specifically set forth hereafter, were dismissed in a
single order by the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, the Honorable Teodulo C. Tandayag
presiding. The cases are now before us on appeal.
In one of them, 1 the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of Iligan
City, was contested by protestant, now appellant, Mariano Badelles. In the other, 2 the protestants
are the now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who along with the five
protestees 3 were among those who were registered candidates voted for in such election for
councilors in the City of Iligan, with the protestees being credited with the five highest number of
votes, with protestants Legaspi and Barazon obtaining sixth and seventh places, respectively.
In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the
part of election officers were alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an absence
of an allegation that they would change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and
against the protestees, that such irregularities would destroy the secrecy and integrity of the
ballots cast, or that the protestees knew of or participated in the commission thereof. For the
lower court then, the lack of a cause of action was rather evident.
Hence the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, which was sought to be fortified by the
invocation of the doctrines that voters should not be deprived of their right to vote occasioned by
the failure of the election officials to comply with the formal prerequisites to the exercise of the
right of suffrage and that the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections while mandatory

before the voting should be considered directory thereafter. The validity of such order of
dismissal is now to be inquired into by us in this appeal.
In the petition of protestant Badelles, dated December 8, 1967, and marked as received the next
day by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, 15th Judicial District, it
was stated that both he and protestee Camilo P. Cabili were the duly registered candidates for
the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, both having filed their respective certificates of candidacy
in accordance with law and as such candidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It
was then alleged that the Board of Canvassers, on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected
protestee for having obtained 11,310 votes while protestant was credited with 8,966 votes.
Protestant would impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were "flagrant violation
of mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections ...." in that more than 200
voters were registered per precinct contrary to the provision limiting such number of 200 only
and that no publication of the list of voters for each precinct was made up to the election day
itself, enabling persons who under the law could not vote being allowed to do so. As a result of
such alleged "flagrant violations of the laws relation to or governing elections" around 8,300
individuals were allowed to vote illegally.
It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to exercise their
right of suffrage in view of their failure, without any fault on their part, to have the proper
identification cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of voters. It was stated further that
even in the case of those individuals provided with identification cards with their names included
in the list of voters, they could not avail themselves of their right of suffrage as their applications
for registration could not be found. Mention was also made of the fact that the final lists of voters
and the applications for registration were delivered to their respective precincts late on election
day itself thus preventing them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was caused
by the excessive number of voters being listed and many having been assigned to precincts
other than the correct ones.
What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do so,
numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal number, who were duly registered
with the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the above
circumstances. The proclamation then could not have reflected the true will of the electorate as
to who was the mayor elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over the protestant consisted
of only 2,344 votes.
The prayer was among others for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for
elective positions in the City of Iligan being set aside and declared null and void, protestant
pleading further that he be granted other such relief as may be warranted in law and equity.
The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon in the other case against
protestees 4 was in substance similarly worded. The prayer was for the setting aside and
declaring null and void the proclamation of protestees with protestants seeking such other relief
which should be theirs according to law and to equity.
In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: "1. That
the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period allowed by the Revised Election Code; 2.
That [the lower court] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, the
Commission on Elections being the proper body to hear the same; 3. That the complaint states
no cause of action." 5 This very same grounds were relied upon in a motion to dismiss by
protestees Actub and Cabigon, filed in the other suit.
As above noted, in a single order of March 23, 1968, the two above election protests were
dismissed, the lower court being of the opinion that neither petition alleged a cause of action "to
justify [it] to try the same." The first ground of the motion to dismiss to the effect that the

protests in both cases were filed beyond the reglementary period was rejected. The claim as to
lack of jurisdiction was likewise held to be without merit. The single order of dismissal in both
cases as indicated was based on the lack of a cause of action.
The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion that there was no
cause of action, proceeded along these lines: "Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of
election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections are not of themselves
either ground for contest or for proper matters of inquiry... There is no allegation in the protest
that the alleged irregularities committed by the election officers would tend to change the result
of the election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees. There is no allegation in the
petition that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300
illegal voters who voted were for the protestees. There is, therefore, no legal and practical
justification for the court to inquire into the irregularities committed by the election officials, as
alleged in the petition, for it would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that
they will be declared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City." 6
It was further stated in such order of dismissal: "There is no allegation in the petition that the
irregularities committed by the election officials have destroyed the secrecy and integrity of the
ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that the non-compliance of the election officials
of the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters were intentional on their
part for the purpose of committing frauds for the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation
in the petition that because of the alleged irregularities committed by the election officials in not
following the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters and the
distribution of the precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal, nor is there
an allegation in the protests that the irregularities committed by the election officials would
affect the election in favor of the protestees." 7
A greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have admonished the lower court from
asserting in an uncompromising tone the absence of an allegation that the protestants in both
cases failed to allege that if the facts pleaded by them were proved the result would not have
been different. It is true the complaints could have been more explicitly worded, but as they
stood, the absence of such a claim could not be so confidently asserted.
To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility
attaching to the line of reasoning thus pursued by the lower court. We are not unaware of the
undeniable fact that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in their drafting or precision in
their terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the
elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts,
rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be
stressed, would have to be accepted at their face value for the purpose of determining whether
there is a cause of action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts
thus pleaded. We cannot in law and in conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.
Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation of
a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of
misconduct and misdeeds of such character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Abes v. Commission on Elections 8 points the way, but the lower court was apparently impervious
to its teaching. It may not be controlling, but it furnishes more than a hint. It would seem,
though, that for the court below, its message did not ring out loud and clear.
The opinion in the Abes case, penned by Justice Sanchez, starts thus: "Petitioner's cry for relief,
so their petition avers, is planted upon the constitutional mandate of free, orderly, and honest
elections. Specifically, they list a number of repressible acts." Among those mentioned were that
blank official registration forms were taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Register

several weeks before election day, November 14, 1967; that active campaigning within the
polling places by Nacionalista leaders or sympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed;
that voters were permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista
candidates; that voters were compelled to fill their official ballots on open tables, desks and in
many precincts outside the polling places; that thousands of voters sympathetic to the
Nacionalista candidates were allowed to vote beyond the hours for voting allowed by law; that
identification cards were delivered by partisan leaders of respondents Nacionalista candidates,
and those who did not signify their preference for Nacionalista candidates were not given such
cards; that the precinct books of voters were not sealed within the deadline fixed by law; and
that the resulting effect of irregularities was to prevent full fifty-one per cent of the registered
voters from voting.
One of the issues raised on the above facts is whether or not the Commission on Elections could
annul the aforesaid election in Quezon City on the above allegations of fraud, terrorism and other
illegal practices committed before and during the election. The petition did not prosper; it was
dismissed. The remedy, we held, lay not with the Commission on Elections but with the courts of
justice in an election protest.
In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec
may not tread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek
annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle
emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
Elections, 9 assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest
manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil" did not rest with the Commission on
Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government." More specifically, with reference to
provincial and municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to the courts." Then came this
express affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily includes the power to
determine the validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the contestants." .
As so emphatically observed in the Abes opinion, "there has been neither deviation nor retreat
from the foregoing pronouncement." After which came the following: "The ratiocination advanced
that there was failure of election due to rampancy of terrorism, frauds, and other irregularities,
before and during elections, such that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters were not able
to vote, will not carry the day for petitioners. For, in the first place, this is grounded upon bare
assertions. Respondents contest the correctness thereof. And in the answer of respondents
Amoranto, Mathay and others, they aver that out of 162,457 registered voters in Quezon City,
100,382 voters actually cast their votes about 62% of the registered voters. But above all, as
pointed out in City Board of Canvassers vs. Moscoso, [the] nullity of an election for municipal
officials should be determined in a petition contesting the election of municipal officers-elect to
be filed before the Court of First Instance."
Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining whether
irregularities or serious violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections was clearly
and succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision above cited, the opinion coming from Justice
Makalintal. 10 Thus: "The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and
other irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular
election protest, pursuant to section 174 of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the
city board of canvassers from canvassing the election returns and proclaiming the winning
candidates for municipal offices."
It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the
flagrant violations of the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.

That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. Time and time again, 11 we have
stressed the importance of preserving inviolate the right of suffrage. If that right be disregarded
or frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth.
As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved
and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be
the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the
common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty
and as the ultimate source of the established authority." 12
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the
people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted.
Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It is
their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no
justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views.
It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the
electoral process.
It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure to
observe the mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless.
Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly serves that
purpose.lawphi1.nt
It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from
entirely satisfactory manner. Than itself is no reason for the courts to slam the door against any
opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order of dismissal complained of
were not set aside.
Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be misinterpreted
however. All that it directs is that the protetees in both cases be required to answer. Thereafter,
if, as is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious imputations made as to the alleged
irregularities, the lower court could properly inquire into what actually transpired. After the facts
are thus ascertained in accordance with the accepted procedural rules, then the appropriate law
could be applied.
It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or
lack of it, of either protest. That would be premature to say the least. All we do is to set aside the
order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases remanded
to the lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion and the law. Without
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 74-MJ July 30, 1976
SALVADOR LACSON, JR., complainant,
vs.
RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge, of Talisay, Negros Occidental, respondent.

ANTONIO, J:
Respondent Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas, of Talisay Negros Occidental, is charged in a
verified complaint by Salvador Lacson, Jr. with (a) ignorance of the law, (b) partiality, and (c)
violation of the Election Code of 1971.

The Executive Judge, to whom this case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, found the charges of ignorance of the law and partiality to be without factual
basis. He, however, found that respondent Judge has failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971, which provides:
Any person who has been refused registration or whose name has been stricken out from the
permanent list of voters may at any time except sixty (60) days before a regular election or
twenty-five (25) days before a special election, apply to the proper court for an order directing
the election registration board or the board of inspectors as the case may be, to include or
reinstate his name in the permanent list of voters, attaching to his application for inclusion the
certificate of the Electron registration board or the board of inspectors regarding his case and
proof of service of a copy of his application and of the notice of hearing thereof upon a member
of the said board (Emphasis supplied.)
In his report of July 17, 1972, the Investigating Judge stated:
Respondent disregarded this requirement and none of the petitions for inclusion based on lack of
forms contains the attached certificate of the Chairman or any member of the Board of
Inspectors of the precinct concerned to the effect that petitioner or petitioners applied for
registration on October 9, 1971 but were refused registration for lack of registration forms. While
it may be true that the various; petitions for inclusion contained the sworn statement of Eduardo
Belbes that a copy of the petition had been served on the members of the Board of Inspectors of
the corresponding precinct, yet this notice applied to the original dates of hearing stated in the
Petition and it is reasonable to assume that on the dates at which the petitions were ordered
reset for hearing by respondent Judge, to wit: On October 18 for the petitions filed on October
14; and on October 20 for the petitions filed on October 19, the Board of Inspectors were not
notified. This is impliedly admitted by respondent when he expressed the belief that notice to the
Election Registration Board alone was sufficient, and that the certificate of the Board of
Inspectors to the effect that the petitioners applied for registration in the corresponding precinct
on October 9, 1971, but were refused registration for lack of forms was not necessary inasmuch
as he relied on the testimonies of the petitioners themselves on that point. Also, even if
respondent was motivated by a desire to adhere strictly to the requirement of Comelec
Resolution No. RR-938 that inclusion cases be decided within two (2) days from the filing of the
petition, it would seem that respondent acted rather hastily in resetting the inclusion cases filed
in the afternoon of October 19, 1971 for hearing immediately the following morning or on
October 20, 1971. This is especially true of Election Cases Nos. 93 to 172, except Cases Nos. 162
to 172 (Exhs. 8A to 8K inasmuch as Mrs. Efren admittedly informed respondent of the filing of the
cases right the same morning of October 20. Hence it is not likely that the various members of
the Board of Inspectors could have been notified to appear and testify that petitioners in fact
appeared before their respective precincts and were denied registration for lack of forms. caution
dictated that this requirement or this procedure be followed as this was one sure way of
Identifying the petitioners and ascertaining whether in fact they applied for and were refused
registration for lack of forms. True, inclusion and exclusion cases are summary in nature but the
procedure adopted by respondent Judge provided no safeguard whatsoever against
indiscriminate inclusion. For he admitted that as long as the petitioners were present when he
called the inclusion cases for hearing and the respondent Election Registration Board or the
members of the Board of Inspectors of the precincts concerned were not present he considered
the latter in default and summarily granted the petition. This could be the only reason why
practically all the inclusion cases resulted in the issuance of orders directing the inclusion of the
petitioners now marked as Exhs 'B', 'B-l' to 'B-54' and, as it turned out, on appeal most of the
petitions were dismissed either for failure of the petitioners to appear or, as in Cases Nos. 136153, because the Court found on the basis of the testimony of the Chairman of Precinct No, 41 of
Talisay that he even had a surplus of seventeen (17) application forms. 1

In extenuation the Investigating Judge found also that respondent, in his aforesaid actuations, did
so without improper motive but in good faith.
In our republican system of government, the exercise by the people of their right of suffrage is
the expression of their sovereign will. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the free and
voluntary use of this right be effectively protected by the law and by governmental authority. As
stated in an earlier case: 2
* * * The people in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a
consistent and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the
performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a
representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed should be
exercise, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in good
faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit and welfare of the state. (U.S. vs.
Cruikshank 92 U.S. 588.) In the last analysis, therefore, the inclusion in or exclusion from the
permanent electoral list of any voter concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but
the public in general.
In the light of the statutory purpose, the seriousness of respondent's failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 136 of the electoral law becomes evident. His good faith or lack of
malice is of no avail, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibita the act alone
irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. It appears, however, that on April 8, 1974, the
President of the Philippines promulgated Presidential Decree No. 433, which grants general
amnesty under certain conditions to public school teachers, other government officials and
employees, members of the armed forces of the Philippines and other persons for violation of
election laws and other related statutes in connection with the elections of 1965, 1967, 1969,
1971, and the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
There is no question that as a consequence of the general amnesty all persons who violated the
election law on the dates and occasions therein mentioned are relieved of their criminal
liability. 3 In the case at bar, respondent is relieved of any criminal liability for his aforecited
infraction; however, in the public interest he should be admonished.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby admonished that he should exercise greater care in the
observance of the provisions of existing laws in the discharge of his judicial duty, and warned
that any subsequent misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47243

June 17, 1940

CIPRIANO ABAIL, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,

vs.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF BACOLOD, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ET AL., respondentsappellants.
Vicente J. Francisco, Ramon H. Severino, Abundio Z. Arrieta and Res. A.
Sobretodo for the appellants.
Emilio R. Severino, Amado B. Parreo, Vicente T Remetio and Carlos Hilado for the appellees.

In the year 1937 the total number of registered voters in the municipality of Talisay, Negros
Occidental, was 3,658. In 1938 the electoral census of the place, after the registration on
September 24 and October 1, 1938, showed that the number of registered voters had increased
to 18,288. A few days before the election for Assemblymen on November 8, 1938, or on October
18, 1938, 17,344 petitions were filed in the justice of the peace court of Bacolod. Negros
Occidental, for the exclusion of the names of an equal number of persons from the permanent
list of registered voters of Talisay, Negros Occidental, on the grounds that they were not
residents of Talisay n accordance with the Election Code, that they could not prepare their ballots
themselves, and that their registration as voters was not done in accordance with law. The
hearing of the petitions for exclusion was held on October 28, 1938. After attorneys Hilado,
Parreo, Remitio and Severino entered their appearance for the challenged voters, the justice of
the peace of Bacolod ascertained who of the challenged voters were present in court and who
were absent. Thereafter the said justice of the peace declared those who were absent in default.
Failing to obtain a reconsideration, the attorneys for the challenged voters moved that, since the
presentation of evidence had not yet commenced, all the petitions be forwarded to the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental which was then presided over by two Judges. The attorneys
for the petitioners in the said 17,344 exclusion cases objected on the ground that the aforesaid
attorneys had no authority to represent those who were absent. Whereupon the justice of the
peace of Bacolod ruled that said attorneys could represent only the 87 challenged voters who
were present in the court room and accordingly remanded their cases to the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. At the same time the justice of the peace dismissed 253 of the
petitions upon motion of the petition upon motion of the petitioners themselves. Although no
evidence was presented by the petitioners in support of their petition against those who, were
declared in default, the justice of the peace of Bacolod ordered their exclusion from the list of
voters on the ground that it was the duty of the challenged voters appear in court in order to be
personally examined in accordance with section 118 (f) of the Election Code, as one of the
grounds for their exclusion from the list of voters was that they could not prepare their ballots
themselves, that is, that they could not read and write. The attorneys for the challenged voters
received notice of the decision of the justice of the peace of Bacolod on November 2, 1938, when
the present petition for certiorari was instituted in the Court First Instance of Negros Occidental
by the petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of the other challenged voters for the purpose
of having the judgment of the justice of the peace of Bacolod in the aforesaid exclusion
proceedings set aside. After hearing, the Honorable Judge Sotero Rodas of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment setting aside the decision of the respondent
justice of the peace of Bacolod and ordering the restoration of the excluded voters in the
permanent electoral census of Talisay, Negros Occidental. From this judgment the instant appeal
was brought, and the respondents-appellants make an elaborate assignment of nine errors. In

view of the result hereinbelow reached, we do not consider it necessary to consider seriatim
these errors.
While the present controversy may seem academic because the 1938 election is over, we have
nevertheless assumed the task of deciding the same on its merits in view of the imperative
necessity and importance of having a correct electoral census in the municipality of Talisay,
Negros Occidental, and for that matter in any municipality or city in the Philippines, for use in
future elections. In the scheme of our present republican government, the people are allowed to
have a voice therein through the instrumentality of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing
certain prescribe qualifications (Article V, Constitution of the Philippines; sections 93 and 94,
Election Code). The people in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of
securing a consistent and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him
with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him
a representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed should
be exercised, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens professing it, but in
good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit of the state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank,
92 U. S., 588.) In the last analysis, therefore, the inclusion from the permanent electoral list of
any voter concerns not only the latter in his individual capacity but the public in general.
Section 113 of the Election Code provides that if the Judge of the Court of First Instance is in the
province, the proceedings for the inclusion from the list of voters shall, upon petition of any
interested party filed before the presentation of evidence, be remanded to the said Judge who
shall hear and decide the same in the first and last instance. When, therefore, the attorneys for
the challenged voters moved the justice of the peace of Bacolod to remand all the exclusion
cases to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, then presided over by two Judges, it
was mandatory on said justice of the peace to grant the motion. Without deciding whether the
attorneys who appeared for the challenged voters were in fact authorized by all, it is our opinion
that, in view of the extraordinary circumstance that the challenged voters were more than
seventeen thousand and a representative number thereof were present, and in view of the
nature of the proceedings which affect public interest, it was error for the aforesaid justice of the
peace not to have remanded all the petitions for exclusion to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. Thereafter, in the interest of prompt and economical administration of justice the
necessary arrangement could have been made to enable the corresponding judge of First
Instance of the province to proceed to Talisay and hear the cases there.
The judgment appealed from will accordingly be reversed and in the exercise of our discretionary
power (Casonvs. Rickards, 5 Phil., 611; Rementeria vs. Lara, 6 Phil., 532; Agonoy vs. Ruiz, 11 Phil,
204; Muerteguy & Aboitizvs. Delgado, 22 Phil., 109; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation vs. Aldanese, 46 Phil., 713; Tinsay vs. Yusay, 47 Phil., 639; Singh vs. Tan Chay, 51
Phil., 259; Province of Tayabas Perez, 56 Phil., 257), the case remanded to the Court First
Instance of Negros Occidental with instruction to hear and decide the petitions for exclusion of
the merits, in the first and last instance (section 113, Electoral Code), giving the parties every
opportunity to present their respective evidence. so that it may thereafter make such corrections
in the electoral census of Talisay, Negros Occidental, as may be proper (section 90, Electoral
Code), and to refer to the Solicitor-General such violations of the Election Law as might have
been committed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Avancea C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.