84 F.

3d 91

FULTON COGENERATION ASSOCIATES, PlaintiffAppellee,

v.
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 700, Docket 95-7540.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.
Argued Feb. 2, 1996.
Decided May 15, 1996.

Robert A. Barrer, Syracuse, NY (Hiscock & Barclay, LLP; Brian K.

Billinson, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, of counsel), for
Defendant-Appellant.
Leonard H. Singer, Albany, NY (Couch, White, Brenner, Howard &
Feigenbaum, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before OAKES, KEARSE and WINTER, Circuit Judges.
OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge:

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation ("Niagara") appeals from a summary

judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York, Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., Judge, in favor of Fulton Cogeneration
Associates ("Fulton") on its claim against Niagara for breach of contract. The
district court held that Niagara was obligated under the contract to purchase all
electricity generated by an electric generating facility operated by Fulton in the
Town of Fulton, New York, so long as such quantities were not unreasonably
disproportionate to the stated estimates within the contract, and that, as a matter
of law, Fulton never produced an amount of electricity that exceeded
commercially reasonable expectations. Niagara argues on appeal that the
district court should have dismissed or stayed the action until the New York
Public Service Commission ("PSC") ruled on the matter, that the district court
erred in granting Fulton summary judgment because several genuine issues of
material fact exist, and that the district court erred in not granting summary

judgment to Niagara because Niagara acted properly under the Agreement and
PSC rules. We find that this case presents material issues that must be
determined by a trier of fact, and we therefore reverse and vacate in part the
summary judgment in favor of Fulton and remand. In all other respects, we
affirm the district court.
BACKGROUND
2

In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act

("PURPA"), 16 U.S.C. 824, et seq., in an effort to reduce United States
dependence on foreign oil by encouraging the development of alternative
energy sources. To further this goal, PURPA requires electric utilities to
purchase all electricity produced by independent power producers operating socalled Qualifying Facilities ("QF"). See 16 U.S.C. 824a-3(b); 18 C.F.R.
292.304. State agencies such as the PSC are empowered to regulate the
facilities and approve the contracts covered by PURPA. See 16 U.S.C. 824a3; N.Y.Pub.Serv.Law 66-c(1) (McKinney Sup.1995).

In December 1987, Turner Power Group, Inc., Fulton's predecessor-in-interest

and an independent power producer operating a QF (the "Plant"), entered into a
power purchasing agreement (the "Agreement") with Niagara pursuant to the
provisions of PURPA. The first "WHEREAS" clause of the Agreement
describes the size of Fulton's Plant:

4
SELLER
will own and operate an electric generating plant ... with a capacity of
approximately 47.0 megawatts, and with expected annual production of
approximately 392,000 Megawatt-hours (individually and together referred to as
"ELECTRICITY")
5....
6

Under the terms of the Agreement, Fulton agreed to deliver and Niagara agreed
to accept all of the "electricity" produced by the Plant, net of any amounts used
by Fulton itself.1 The Agreement further provides that Niagara must pay for the
electricity "on the basis of energy, or kwh, delivered" to Niagara at the rate
established in Niagara's tariff, which is 6cents/Kwh. The PSC approved the
contract in April 1988.

The Plant is designed to deliver electricity to Niagara and steam to a Nestle

Chocolate & Confections Company factory located nearby. The Plant's gas
turbine generator set burns natural gas or # 2 distillate oil to produce electricity.
Exhaust heat from the turbine is captured and used to generate steam, some of

which can be injected back into the turbine to boost capacity levels, and
therefore ultimate energy production, after Fulton has sent the required amount
of steam to the Nestle factory.
8

The distinction between capacity and energy is crucial to an understanding of

the dispute between these two parties. As explained in affidavits submitted by
both parties, the term "capacity" refers to the amount of electric power that an
electric generator can produce, and is measured in kilowatts (Kw) or megawatts
(Mw). The term "energy" is the usage of capacity over a period of time and is
measured in kilowatthours (Kwh) or megawatthours (Mwh). Thus, the two
concepts are linked and dependent upon one another. As the contract states, the
terms are referred to individually and collectively as "ELECTRICITY."

Upon completion of the Plant in July 1991, Fulton began delivering electricity
to Niagara. From July 1991 through April 1992, Niagara bought all delivered
electricity from Fulton at the rate of 6cents/Kwh.

10

On March 13, 1992, Niagara informed Fulton that the Plant was producing
above a 47 megawatt capacity.2 Because Niagara believed it was not required to
pay for production above that level, it stated that it would use a formula called
"Demonstrated Maximum Net Capability," or "DMNC," to measure the
seasonal capacity of the Plant and prorate payments to Fulton. Under this
formula, if the capacity climbed over the 47 megawatts provided in the
contract, Niagara would calculate a seasonal capacity rate based upon the four
peak hour capacity output in the summer and winter--in other words, the
highest average consecutive four-hour output--and would pay the 6cents/Kwh
rate only for that proportion of electricity attributable to a 47 megawatt
capacity. Any excess would be paid at a market rate, which was lower than the
6cents/Kwh contract rate. The DMNC formula was mentioned nowhere within
the Agreement between Niagara and Fulton, but Niagara chose it because it had
been utilized by the PSC in connection with other PURPA contracts.

11

Niagara thus measured the seasonal capacity of the Plant in terms of the
DMNC formula at 50 megawatts. Niagara thereafter paid for 47/50ths of the
energy at the 6cents/Kwh rate and the rest at a market rate. Niagara used this
DMNC formula from May 1992 through October 1992. After October 1992, it
began paying the 6cents/Kwh rate again. The use of the formula resulted in
Niagara paying Fulton $279,691.19 less in 1992 than it would have been
obligated to do at the contract rate.3

12

Fulton commenced this breach of contract action based upon diversity of

citizenship on October 30, 1992, seeking both equitable and monetary relief.
After denying Niagara's motion to dismiss the complaint due to the doctrines of
abstention and primary jurisdiction, the district court ordered that discovery
proceed. After the close of discovery, both parties moved for summary
judgment. In an order dated October 11, 1994, the district court denied both
parties' motions.4 The case was scheduled for a final pre-trial conference and a
bench trial to commence on March 27, 1995. On the morning of the first day of
trial, the district court decided to reconsider the summary judgment motions
sua sponte, based in large part upon a recently decided case of the Appellate
Division, Third Department, Philadelphia Corp. v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 207 A.D.2d 176, 621 N.Y.S.2d 237 (3d Dept.1995). After hearing oral
argument, the district court granted summary judgment to Fulton.
13

Niagara's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, and this appeal
ensued.

DISCUSSION
14

Niagara raises three issues in its appeal. First, it claims that the district court
should have declined jurisdiction in this case based upon the doctrine of
abstention or, alternatively, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Second,
Niagara asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
Fulton because material issues of fact regarding the alleged breach of contract
remain in dispute. Finally, Niagara argues that the district court should have
entered summary judgment in favor of Niagara because Niagara acted properly
under the terms of the Agreement and PSC rules. We will address each of these
issues in turn.

I. Exercise of Jurisdiction
15

Niagara moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss

Fulton's complaint on the basis of the doctrine of abstention, or, in the
alternative, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The district court denied
Niagara's motion, finding that no state policy problems of substantial
importance were involved and that this breach of contract action did not fall
within the particular expertise and regulatory duties of the PSC. We agree with
the district court and therefore affirm its denial of Niagara's motion to dismiss.
A. Doctrine of Abstention

16

Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the

jurisdiction given them." In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos

Litigation, 78 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47
L.Ed.2d 483 (1976)). A district court's decision to abstain is appropriate only in
order:
17 to avoid a federal constitutional issue where that issue may be mooted or altered
(1)
by a state-court ruling on the state-law question; or (2) to avoid hindrance of such
state functions as criminal prosecutions or the collection of state taxes; or (3) to
conserve federal judicial resources in those "exceptional circumstances" where there
is concurrent state-court litigation whose resolution could result in "comprehensive
disposition of litigation"; or (4) to defer to state resolution of difficult state-law
questions that involve local regulation and administration or important matters of
local public policy.
18

Id. (citations omitted). A district court abuses its discretion if it abstains from
jurisdiction in a case that is not covered by one of these four narrow exceptions.
Id. at 775-76.

19

Niagara argues that the fourth category listed above applies to this case: that a
district court may decline to adjudicate difficult questions of state law bearing
on substantial public policy matters whose import extends beyond the particular
case. This exception to a district court's duty to exercise jurisdiction is
commonly referred to as Burford abstention, after Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943), where the Supreme Court
decided that abstention from jurisdiction was proper in a case in equity
involving review of a Texas Railroad Commission order regarding the
conservation of oil and gas. In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2514-15, 105 L.Ed.2d 298
(1989), the Supreme Court summarized the principles underlying Burford
abstention:

20
Where
timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court ... must
decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies:
(1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at
bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in
similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with
respect to a matter of substantial public concern."
21

(quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814, 96 S.Ct. at 1245).

22

We agree with the district court that application of Burford abstention would be

inappropriate in this case. There are no difficult questions of state law affecting
policy issues of substantial import here; the case simply involves a breach of
contract. Though the PSC approved the contract, it has not attempted to
interpret the contract or monitor the parties' performance since its initial
involvement. Therefore, there is no indication that New York considers the
issues presented by this dispute to be ones of substantial import. Neither does
exercise of jurisdiction in this case threaten to disrupt a coherent policy of New
York, because although there is a state regulatory scheme regarding contract
approval in cases such as this, there is no state regulatory scheme governing
contract interpretation or performance. Accordingly, the district court properly
refused to apply Burford abstention.
B. Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine
23

As an alternative to Niagara's argument regarding Burford abstention, it claims

that the district court should have applied the primary jurisdiction doctrine and
withheld its exercise of jurisdiction until an application was made to the PSC
seeking a clarification of the Agreement.

24

The primary jurisdiction doctrine applies "whenever enforcement of the claim

requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body." United States
v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 165, 1 L.Ed.2d 126
(1956); see also Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 964 F.2d 116, 122-23 (2d Cir.1992)
(finding the doctrine applicable to cases involving state agencies). The aim of
the doctrine, then, is to ensure that courts and agencies with concurrent
jurisdiction over a matter do not work at cross-purposes. See General Elec. Co.
v. M.V. Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022, 1026 (2d Cir.1987) (citing 3 K. Davis,
Administrative Law, 19.01 at 5 (1958)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108
S.Ct. 710, 98 L.Ed.2d 661 (1988). In deciding whether to apply the primary
jurisdiction doctrine to a given case, a court must take into account the need for
uniform decisions and the specialized knowledge of the agency involved.
Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. at 64, 77 S.Ct. at 165; see also Goya Foods, Inc. v.
Tropicana Products, Inc., 846 F.2d 848, 851 (2d Cir.1988). As a threshold
matter, of course, a court must find that the agency has jurisdiction over the
issue presented. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d
51, 59 (2d Cir.1994).

25

We agree with the district court that the primary jurisdiction doctrine cannot be
properly applied to this case. The PSC's explicit jurisdiction is limited by New
York Public Service Law 66-c (McKinney Sup.1995), which speaks only of
the PSC's power to require utilities to enter into power purchasing agreements

with alternative energy producers. The PSC has been reluctant to extend this
express jurisdiction over the formation of contracts to adjudication of breach of
contract disputes. See Northeast Cogen., Inc., NYPSC Case No. 90-E-0975,
Declaratory Ruling at 5 (Apr. 8, 1991); Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v.
Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., 908 F.Supp. 1180, 1186 (W.D.N.Y.1995).
Even if the PSC could exercise proper jurisdiction over this case, however, we
would nevertheless find the primary jurisdiction doctrine inappropriate because
the issues of contract interpretation here are neither beyond the conventional
expertise of judges nor within the special competence of the PSC. Compare
Schuylkill Energy Resources, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 1996
WL 32891, * 2-3 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 23, 1996) (finding application of primary
jurisdiction doctrine proper in a power purchasing agreement case when
disputed issue concerned technical application of Public Utility Commission's
curtailment regulations). Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of
Niagara's motion to dismiss on the basis of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
II. Grant of Summary Judgment in Favor of Fulton
26
27

We turn next to Niagara's claim that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Fulton. The district court found that the Agreement
obligated Niagara to purchase from Fulton all electricity delivered by Fulton at
the 6cents/Kwh rate, so long as such quantities were not unreasonably
disproportionate to the stated estimates within the contract. The court further
found that, as a matter of law, Fulton never produced an amount of electricity
that exceeded commercially reasonable expectations. Niagara contends that the
district court erred because the existence of genuine issues of material fact
regarding the role of capacity and commercially reasonable expectations
preclude summary judgment.

28

Summary judgment is mandated when "there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A court must determine "whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In a breach of contract action, summary
judgment is appropriate "[w]here the language of the contract is unambiguous,
and reasonable persons could not differ as to its meaning." Rothenberg v.
Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir.1985); State v. Peerless
Ins. Co., 108 A.D.2d 385, 390, 489 N.Y.S.2d 213, 218 (1st Dept.1985), aff'd,
67 N.Y.2d 845, 501 N.Y.S.2d 651, 492 N.E.2d 779 (1986).

29

30

The district court found that the Agreement between Fulton and Niagara was an
output contract, and as such was subject to good faith and commercial standards
of fair dealing. Based upon this finding and the recent case of Philadelphia
Corp. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 207 A.D.2d 176, 621 N.Y.S.2d 237
(3d Dept.1995), the district court held that the capacity and energy estimates in
the first Whereas clause of the Agreement did not create absolute maximums
limiting Niagara's obligation to purchase electricity.
We agree with the district court and reject Niagara's claim that the parties
intended "a capacity of approximately 47 megawatts, and ... annual production
of approximately 392,000 Megawatt-hours" to mean "no more than 47
megawatts of capacity and 392,000 megawatthours of energy." In Philadelphia
Corp., a breach of contract action involving power purchasing agreements
defining the electricity to be sold "in terms of approximate capacity and
approximate annual production," id. at 177, 621 N.Y.S.2d 237, the court found
that the estimates stated in the contracts were targets, not maximums or
minimums. The court held:

31
[D]efendant
is obligated to purchase and plaintiffs are obligated to sell electricity in
such quantities which are not unreasonably disproportionate to the stated estimates
within the contracts.... While the estimates are not absolute maximum quantities
beyond which the contracts do not apply, ... neither may plaintiffs modify their
outputs beyond the normal range commercially consistent with the capacity
estimates used in the contracts....
32

Id. at 177-78, 621 N.Y.S.2d 237. Philadelphia Corp. directly controls the
interpretation of the capacity and energy estimates in this case. Thus, we affirm
that portion of the district court's opinion holding that the Agreement
unambiguously obligates Niagara to purchase and Fulton to sell electricity in
quantities not unreasonably disproportionate to the stated estimates within the
Agreement.

33

The district court also found that, as a matter of law, Fulton's production never
exceeded commercially reasonable expectations. The court reasoned that the
only relevant estimate in the Agreement was the "annual production of
approximately 392,000 megawatthours of energy." The court held that since
Fulton never exceeded this yearly energy estimate, it did not breach the
Agreement, regardless of whether it exceeded the capacity estimates in the
Agreement. In finding that "approximately 392,000 megawatthours" was the
only relevant estimate in the Agreement, the district court relied on the parties'
stipulation that Niagara purchased energy, not capacity, from Fulton and upon
the fact that the Agreement called for payment on the basis of kilowatthours

rather than kilowatts. We disagree with the district court that these two facts
lead inexorably to the conclusion that the capacity estimate does not affect the
parties' obligations under the Agreement.
34

There are several reasons why we believe the level of capacity may be read as a
material term of the Agreement. As an initial matter, contracts should be
construed so as to give effect to all provisions. Cruden v. Bank of New York,
957 F.2d 961, 976 (2d Cir.1992). The district court's interpretation of the
contract leaves the capacity estimate completely ineffectual.

35

Additionally, as the parties agree, energy is the usage of capacity over time.
Therefore, one cannot speak of energy apart from capacity: energy is defined in
terms of capacity. As explained in the affidavit of Mark Barry, a manager of the
Plant, "[t]he amount of energy which a gas turbine generator set, or any electric
generator, can produce is a function of its capacity during each hour it is on line
and the total number of hours on line."

36

Indeed, it seems that a central purpose of the Agreement would be defeated if

capacity were not considered a material term. The purpose of estimates in
power purchasing agreements is to allow utilities to plan accurately for
generation and load. As the PSC explained in one ruling:

37
Electric
system reliability demands that utilities continuously match generation and
load. Planning for future electric needs thus requires firm estimates of the expected
amount and timing of on-site generation that will be sold to utilities.
38

Representations in purchase agreements as to the size and type of a facility are

a key underlying source of information regarding the amount of non-utility
generation available.

39

Indeck-Yerkes Energy Services, Inc., NYPSC Case No. 88-E-114, Declaratory

Ruling at 3 (Sept. 14, 1988) (emphasis added), aff'd, 164 A.D.2d 618, 564
N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dept.1991). If the capacity estimate were not material, Fulton
would be allowed to deliver electricity without regard to timing. For example,
Fulton could deliver all 392,000 megawatts of energy during one part of the
year (by using a higher capacity level) and deliver none during the remainder.
However, electricity amounts must be predictable over time because electricity
cannot be efficiently stored for later use. Electricity is not a commodity like
steel beams that can be stored and passed out to the ultimate consumer as need
demands. Rather, Niagara could be left with unusable energy and an inability to
meet consumers' needs efficiently if the capacity estimate were not a material

term of the Agreement subject to the standard of commercial reasonableness.

40

For these reasons, we believe that both the energy and capacity estimates in the
Agreement are material terms subject to standards of commercial
reasonableness.5

41

The district court also found that even if it were to take capacity into account,
the capacity variance never exceeded commercially reasonable expectations.
We vacate this portion of the court's opinion because we find that there remain
disputed issues of fact regarding whether the variances at issue in this case were
reasonable.

42

Although there is evidence in the record of the Plant's billing history, including
total monthly Kwh generation, we cannot discern from the evidence the
variance of the Plant's capacity over the course of the Agreement. In this
regard, evidence of the proper way to measure or analyze capacity must be
presented to illuminate the parties' reasonable expectations of the Plant
capacity. Fulton, it appears, would ask the court to look to average annual
capacity, whereas Niagara would argue for capacity on the basis of four hour
periods of time. Each of these methods produce wildly different results and
may lead to different conclusions regarding the parties' performance under the
Agreement.

43

Specific evidence regarding the cause of the capacity variance in the Plant is
also needed. The parties agree that the capacity of gas-fired plants can vary
based upon air temperature. Fulton claims that variances in this Plant are solely
the result of these ambient air temperature changes, not of any Plant design
modification, and thus are fully within the reasonable expectations of the
parties. Niagara claims to be able to prove through specific expert testimony
that the Plant's capacity level can be controlled by Fulton. Niagara's claim
seems to gain support from the Barry affidavit, submitted by Fulton, in which
Barry explains that ambient air temperature changes are but one factor affecting
capacity: fuel gas supply pressure and the amount of steam recovered and
injected back into the generator, rather than sent to the Nestle factory, may also
affect capacity levels. The degree of Fulton's control over the capacity variance
at the Plant may thus be crucial to the ultimate outcome of this case. PSC
rulings have stated that capacity variances that occur due to post-contract
changes in a plant's design or party's behavior are not covered by the contract.
See American Ref-Fuel Co., NYPSC Case No. 90-E-0238, Declaratory Ruling
at 9 (Aug. 22, 1990); Indeck-Yerkes, supra, Declaratory Ruling at 5.

44

However, Fulton may indeed prevail in this case if it can prove that the

44

However, Fulton may indeed prevail in this case if it can prove that the
capacity variance was not within its control and the variance at issue here was
within the contemplation of the parties. We hold, though, that such issues
cannot be resolved as a matter of law at this juncture. We therefore vacate the
portion of the district court's opinion finding that the capacity variance did not
exceed commercially reasonable expectations.

45

We emphasize that our decision concerns only the propriety of summary

judgment as a means of resolving the role of capacity in the Agreement. We do
not comment on the merits of Niagara's claims regarding its unilateral change in
payment methodology. We simply find that disputed issues of fact exist with
respect to the parties' commercially reasonable expectations and the capacity
variance of the Plant.

III. Denial of Summary Judgment In Favor of Niagara

46
47

Niagara asserts that summary judgment should be granted in its favor because
it acted properly under the Agreement and PSC rules. We affirm the district
court's decision denying Niagara summary judgment because, as we stated
above, there remain disputed issues of material fact that preclude a decision
regarding whether either party acted properly under the Agreement.

CONCLUSION
48

We reverse and vacate in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to
Fulton, and remand for a factual determination whether the capacity variances
of the Fulton Plant were commercially reasonable. In all other respects, we
affirm the able decision of the district court.

The Agreement states: "SELLER shall deliver to NIAGARA and NIAGARA

shall accept all of the ELECTRICITY produced at the PLANT net of parasitic
loads subject to the terms and conditions of this AGREEMENT." The term
"parasitic load[ ]" refers to the electricity used by the Fulton Plant

Niagara installed meters at the Fulton plant to measure capacity and energy.
According to an affidavit submitted by Fulton, a 47 MW gas turbine plant, if
operated continuously 24 hours a day, 365 days per year, would generate
411,720,000 Kwh per year, but because of downtime amounting to about 8 days
per year for necessary maintenance, and forced outages calculated to sacrifice
3% of the total production, the plant was estimated to produce approximately
390,600,000 Kwh annually

Niagara later conceded that Fulton was entitled to $152,264.47 of this amount
because of a July 24, 1992, amendment to Section 66-c of the New York Public
Service Law which applies to payments under PURPA contracts. There
remains, therefore, $127,426.72 plus interest in dispute between the parties

The district court also denied Fulton's motion for sanctions based upon
Niagara's belated concession that it owed Fulton $152,264.47 of the contested
amount

Though Fulton urges otherwise, the case of Energy Tactics, Inc. v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., --- A.D.2d ----, 631 N.Y.S.2d 697 (2d Dept.1995) does
not alter our decision in this case because in Energy Tactics the energy output,
not the capacity, exceeded the contract estimate, which was construed to cover
only the first year of a twenty year contract. The court there did not discuss the
materiality of capacity estimates directly, though in upholding the cogenerator's
claim to full payment on the added output after the first year (when a second
generator went into operations as contemplated in the contract), it recognized
that the 1.0 capacity of both generators enabled an output in excess of about
50% of the stated estimate