In Re Filiberto Ojeda Rios, 863 F.2d 202, 2d Cir. (1988)
In Re Filiberto Ojeda Rios, 863 F.2d 202, 2d Cir. (1988)
In Re Filiberto Ojeda Rios, 863 F.2d 202, 2d Cir. (1988)
2d 202
Petitioner was initially arrested in Puerto Rico on August 30, 1985, after a
grand jury in the District of Connecticut indicted him and others for various
offenses arising out of the 1983 armed robbery of a Wells Fargo office in West
On August 14, 1988, a grand jury in the District of Puerto Rico indicted Ojeda
Rios on assault and firearms charges arising from the shooting episode that
occurred in Puerto Rico on August 30, 1985, when he was arrested for the
Connecticut robbery. Two days later he was arrested in Connecticut on a bench
warrant issued upon the Puerto Rico indictment. The Government sought
pretrial detention without bail in connection with the Puerto Rico assault
charges, and such detention was ordered by the United States Magistrate in
Puerto Rico. Thereafter, Ojeda Rios successfully sought to have his
confinement transferred to the Southern District of New York so that he could
consult with counsel in connection with the pending Connecticut indictment.
Ojeda Rios has challenged the pretrial detention order issued by the Magistrate
in Puerto Rico by appealing to the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.
See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3145(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
In his mandamus petition, Ojeda Rios contends that this Court's mandate
determining that the length of his pretrial detention in connection with the
Connecticut indictment exceeded due process limits precludes his continued
incarceration in connection with any matters, such as the shooting in Puerto
Rico, that were urged by the Government as justification for his detention on
the Connecticut charges. Without reaching the merits of that claim or any issue
concerning the consequences of our mandate in Ojeda Rios I, we deny the
petition for mandamus.
Denial Lopez Romo, United States Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico, and
George Wigen, Warden of the MCC. To the extent that Ojeda Rios seeks
mandamus relief against judicial officers in the District of Puerto Rico, which is
within the First Circuit, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 41 (1982), we lack jurisdiction. General
Electric Co. v. Byrne, 611 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir.1979) ("We are aware of no
statute or decision which would authorize us to issue a writ of mandamus
directed to a district judge sitting in another circuit."); see In re Stone, 569 F.2d
156, 157 (D.C.Cir.1978) (court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to issue mandamus
to United States Tax Court where final judgment would be appealable to Eighth
Circuit); In re Virginia Electric Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 365 (4th Cir.1976)
("The All Writs Statute [28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a) (1982) ] authorizes this court to
issue writs of mandamus to district courts in the circuit.") (footnote omitted); 16
C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3932,
at 178 n. 13.5 (1988).
5
To the extent that petitioner seeks mandamus against prosecuting officials and
his immediate custodian, jurisdiction to issue the writ is not defeated by the rule
of General Electric Co. v. Byrne, supra, but the writ is nonetheless unavailable.
The "all writs" statute authorizes courts of appeal to issue extraordinary writs
only "in aid of their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651 (1982). The
claim that the pretrial detention order issued by the Magistrate in Puerto Rico is
unlawful because of a conflict with the ruling of this Court in Ojeda Rios I is
now pending, on an appeal from the Magistrate's order, before the District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the court with "original jurisdiction over
the offense" in connection with which the detention order was issued. See 18
U.S.C. Sec. 3145(b) (Supp. IV 1986). Appellate jurisdiction with respect to that
order lies with the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See 18 U.S.C. Sec.
3145(c) (Supp. IV 1986), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 41 (1982). We would not be acting in
aid of our jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of that order. Though
petitioner, now confined in the Southern District of New York, may petition
there for habeas corpus and thereby secure a ruling from which an appeal
would lie to this Court, his pending petition for mandamus to declare his
detention unlawful is not necessary to preserve our jurisdiction to hear such an
appeal if it transpires. Moreover, the availability of habeas corpus, though
perhaps not precluding mandamus, is itself a sufficient reason for declining to
issue the writ, since it is well settled that mandamus is not warranted where
another remedy at law is available. E.g., Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co.,
230 U.S. 35, 45, 33 S.Ct. 1007, 1010, 57 L.Ed. 1379 (1913); In re Morrison,
147 U.S. 14, 26, 13 S.Ct. 246, 250, 37 L.Ed. 60 (1893).