Ql:ourt: of Tbe Llbilippines Jfllanila
Ql:ourt: of Tbe Llbilippines Jfllanila
Ql:ourt: of Tbe Llbilippines Jfllanila
jfllanila
SECOND DIVISION
Present:
CARPIO, J, Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
MENDOZA, and
LEONEN,JJ
- versus -
Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------~----~
DECISION
.....--
BRION,J.:
.,~
. ~-
Decision
Decision
461, and placed the reserved area under the administration of the Veterans
Federation of the Philippines (VFP).
The property is within the 537,520 square-meter parcel of land
reserved in VFPs favor.
On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of
Sale
between the Republic of the Philippines, through former Land
Management Bureau (LMB) Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad)
and petitioner NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently registered
and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAIs name.
12
12
13
Decision
action had prescribed because its title to the property had already become
indefeasible.
The RTCs decision
The RTC narrowed down the issues to: (a) the character of the
property in question, i.e., whether the property in question was part of the
FBMR, and hence, inalienable; and (b) the validity of the deed of sale
conveying the property to NOVAI, i.e., whether the title over the property
was acquired by NOVAI through fraud. The RTC resolved both issues in
NOVAIs favor.
In its decision, the RTC ruled that: (a) the property is alienable and
disposable in character, as the land falls within the area segregated from the
FBMR pursuant to Proclamation No. 461; (b) the subject deed of sale should
be presumed valid on its face, as it was executed with all the formalities of a
notarial certification; (c) notwithstanding the claims of forgery, the signature
of Dir. Palad on the deed of sale appeared genuine and authentic; and (d)
NOVAIs title to the property had attained indefeasibility since the
Republics action for cancellation of title was filed close to two (2) years
from the issuance of the title.
The CAs decision
The CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision. It ruled that the
property is inalienable land of the public domain; thus, it cannot be disposed
of or be the subject of a sale. It pointed out that, since NOVAI failed to
discharge its burden of proving the existence of Proclamation No. 2487 the
positive governmental act that would have removed the property from the
public domain the property remained reserved for veterans rehabilitation
purposes under Proclamation No. 478, the latest executive issuance affecting
the property.
Since the property is inalienable, the CA held that the incontestability
and indefeasibility generally accorded to a Torrens title cannot apply
because the property, as in this case, is unregistrable land; that a title issued
by reason or on account of any sale, alienation, or transfer of an inalienable
property is void and a patent nullity; and that, consequently, the Republics
action for the cancellation of NOVAIs title cannot be barred by
prescription.
Also, the CA held that there can be no presumption of regularity in the
execution of the subject deed of sale given the questionable circumstances
that surrounded the alleged sale of the property to NOVAI,14 e.g., NOVAIs
14
See rollo, pp. 79-80, where the CA enumerated the following circumstances that cast strong doubt
on the validity of the propertys sale in favour of NOVAI: (1) the lack of record with the LMB of NOVAIs
application for sales patent; (2) the survey return shows that the subdivision survey was requested by
NOVAI itself; and (3) the technical description presented by NOVAI was prepared by the LMB for
reference purposes only, and not for registration of title.
Decision
G.R. No. 156951, September 22, 2006, cited in rollo, pp. 80-86. The CAs December 28, 2006
decision stated the name of the respondent in GR No. 156951 as Southcom Homeowners Association,
Inc. We believe the name Southcom was a clear typographical error and what the CA was obviously
referring to was Southside for other than the word Southcom, the quoted portion of the ruling, the GR
No. and the date all pertains to the case entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Southside Homeowners
Association, Inc. and the Register of Deeds, et. al.
16
Supra note 3.
Decision
public officer under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and
celebrated with all the formalities of a notarial certification;
(c) Proclamation No. 2487 is to be presumed valid until proven
otherwise; that the Republic carried the burden of proving that
Proclamation No. 2487 was a forgery, and that it failed to
discharge this burden;
(d) The CA should not have considered as evidence the testimony of
Senator Franklin Drilon on the nonexistence of Proclamation No.
2487 because such testimony was given by Senator Drilon in
another case17 and was not formally offered in evidence by the
Republic during the trial of the present case before the RTC;
(e) The action for cancellation of title filed by the Republic is
already barred by prescription because it was filed only on
December 23, 1993, or close to two (2) years from the issuance
of NOVAIs title on January 9, 1992; and
(f) The case of Southside is not a cognate or companion case to the
present case because the two cases involve completely dissimilar
factual and doctrinal bases; thus, the Courts observations and
ruling in Southside should not be applied to the present case.
The Republics Comment to the Petition
Procedurally, the Republic assails the propriety of the issues raised by
NOVAI, such as whether Proclamation No. 2487 and the signature of LMB
Director Palad on the assailed deed of sale are forged or fictitious, and
whether the Republic had presented adequate evidence to establish the
spuriousness of the subject proclamation, which are factual in nature and
not allowed in a Rule 45 petition.
On the petitions substance, the Republic counters that:
(a) The property is inalienable public land incapable of private
appropriation because, while the property formed part of the area
segregated from the FBMR under Proclamation No. 461, it was
subsequently reserved for a specific public use or purpose under
Proclamation No. 478;
(b) Proclamation No. 2487, which purportedly revoked Proclamation
No. 478, does not legally exist and thus cannot be presumed valid
and constitutional unless proven otherwise; the presumption of
validity and constitutionality of a law applies only where there is
17
People v. Eduardo Domingo, et al., Criminal Case No. 98-164382; TSN, November 17, 2003; CA
rollo, pp. 172-201.
Decision
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price or a portion of it to the LMB; and (4) the Deed of Sale was not signed
by the President of the Republic of the Philippines or by the Executive
Secretary, but was signed only by the LMB Director.
Also, the BCDA observed that NOVAI was incorporated only on
December 11, 1991, while the deed of sale was purportedly executed on
November 15, 1991, which shows that NOVAI did not yet legally exist at
the time of the propertys purported sale.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DENY NOVAIs petition for review on certiorari as
we find no reversible error committed by the CA in issuing its December
28, 2006 decision and March 28, 2007 resolution.
I. Procedural Objections
A. In the filing of the present petition before this Court
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a party desiring to
appeal from a judgment or final order of the CA shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence on a certain state of facts.21 The
issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted.22 In contrast, a
question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of facts or when the query invites the calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses; the existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation
to each other and to the whole; and the probability of the situation.23
The rule that only questions of law may be the subject of a Rule 45
Petition before this Court, however, has exceptions.24 Among these
21
See Altres, et al. v. Empleo, et al., 594 Phil. 246, 263 (2008).
Id.
23
See Altres, et al. v. Empleo, et al., supra note 21, at 263; Republic v. Medida, GR No. 195097,
August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 317, 323-324.
24
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 171982, August 18,
2010, 628 SCRA 404, the Court held:
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is
limited to reviewing errors of law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Courts function to analyze and weigh the
evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the
exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on the
Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
22
Decision
the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (emphasis supplied)
25
Rollo, pp. 783-807.
26
See GSIS v. Court of Appeals, 251 Phil. 222, 234 (1989).
27
See First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., 323 Phil. 36, 47 (1996).
28
See Garcia, et al. v. David, et al., 67 Phil. 279, 282 (1939); and Tahanan Development Corp. v.
CA, et al., 203 Phil. 652, 688-691 (1982).
29
See Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, 457 Phil. 527, 534 (2003).
30
Id.
Decision
10
intervention in one case even when the petition for review was already
submitted for decision before it.31
In the present case, the BCDA is indisputably the agency specifically
created under R.A. No. 722732 to own, hold and/or administer military
reservations including, among others, those located inside the FBMR. If we
are to affirm the CAs decision, the BCDA stands to benefit as a favorable
ruling will enable it to pursue its mandate under R.A. No. 7227. On the
other hand, if we reverse the CAs decision, it stands to suffer as the
contrary ruling will greatly affect the BCDAs performance of its legal
mandate as it will lose the property without the opportunity to defend its
right in court.
Indeed, the BCDA has such substantial and material interest both in
the outcome of the case and in the disputed property that a final adjudication
cannot be made in its absence without affecting such interest. Clearly, the
BCDAs intervention is necessary; hence, we allow the BCDAs
intervention although made beyond the period prescribed under Section 2,
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.
II. Substantive Issues
A. The property is non-disposable land of
the public domain reserved for public or
quasi-public use or purpose
We agree with the CA that the property remains a part of the public
domain that could not have been validly disposed of in NOVAIs favor.
NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving that the property was
withdrawn from the intended public or quasi-public use or purpose.
While the parties disagree on the character and nature of the property
at the time of the questioned sale, they agree, however, that the property
formed part of the FBMR a military reservation belonging to the public
domain. We note that the FBMR has been the subject of several presidential
proclamations and statues issued subsequent to Proclamation No. 423, which
either removed or reserved for specific public or quasi-public use or purpose
certain of its portions.
On the one hand, NOVAI argues that Proclamation No. 461 had
already transferred the property from the States public domain to its
private domain.
On the other hand, the respondents argue that
31
See Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 534-535 (2003), citing Director of Lands v. Court
of Appeals, 181 Phil. 432 (1979).
32
Entitled AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS
INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY FOR THIS PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES or otherwise known as the BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
1992; approved on March 13, 1992.
Decision
11
Proclamation No. 478, in relation with RA 7227 and EO No. 40, had
reverted the property to the inalienable property of the public domain.
The classification and disposition of lands of the public domain are
governed by Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, the
countrys primary law on the matter.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, may, from time to time, classify lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands, and transfer
these lands from one class to another for purposes of their administration
and disposition.
Under Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, the President may, from time to
time, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and for purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable and disposable public lands, declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under the Acts provisions.33
Section 8 of C.A. No. 141 sets out the public lands open to disposition
or concession and the requirement that they have been officially delimited
and classified, and when practicable, surveyed. Section 8 excludes (by
implication) from disposition or concession, public lands which have been
reserved for public or quasi-public uses; appropriated by the Government; or
in any manner have become private property, or those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by the Act or any other valid law may be
claimed. Further, Section 8 authorizes the President to suspend the
concession or disposition of lands previously declared open to disposition,
until again declared open to disposition by his proclamation or by act of
Congress.
Lands of the public domain classified as alienable and disposable are
further classified, under Section 9 of C.A. No. 141, according to their use or
purpose into: (1) agricultural; (2) residential, commercial, industrial, or for
similar productive purposes; (3) educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes; and (4) reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public
uses. Section 9 also authorizes the President to make the classifications and,
at any time, transfer lands from one class to another.
Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as
reservations for public and quasi-public uses as any tract or tracts of
land of the public domain which the President, by proclamation and upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may
designate as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or
any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof or for quasi-public uses or
33
Decision
12
purposes when the public interest requires it.34 Under Section 88 of the
same Act, these reserved tract or tracts of lands shall be non-alienable
and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other
disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of [CA
No. 141] or by proclamation of the President.35
As these provisions operate, the President may classify lands of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, mineral or timber land, and
transfer such lands from one class to another at any time.
Within the class of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, the President may further classify public domain lands, according to
the use or purpose to which they are destined, as agricultural: residential,
commercial, industrial, etc.; educational, charitable, etc.; and reservations
for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses; and, he may transfer such
lands from one class to the other at any time.
Thus, the President may, for example, transfer a certain parcel of land
from its classification as agricultural (under Section 9 [a]), to residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar purposes (under Section 9 [b]) and
declare it available for disposition under any of the modes of disposition of
alienable and disposable public lands available under C.A. No. 141, as
amended.
The modes of disposition of alienable and disposable lands available
under C.A. No. 141 include: (1) by homestead settlement (Chapter IV), by
sale (Chapter V), by lease (Chapter VI) and by confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles (Chapters VII and VIII) for agricultural lands under Title II
of C.A. No. 141 as amended; (2) by sale or by lease for residential,
commercial, or industrial lands under Title III of C.A. No. 141, as amended;
(3) by donation, sale, lease, exchange or any other form for educational and
charitable lands under Title IV of C.A. No. 141, as amended; and (4) by sale
by public auction for townsite reservations under Chapter XI, Title V of
C.A. No. 141, as amended.
34
35
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13
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14
interpretation as lands are property, whether they are public lands or private
lands.36
In this regard, Article 419 of the Civil Code classifies property as
either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 42037 defines
property of the public dominion as those which are intended for public use
or, while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are intended for
some public service. Article 421, on the other hand, defines patrimonial
property as all other property of the State which is not of the character stated
in Article 420. While Article 422 states that public dominion property
which is no longer intended for public use or service shall form part of the
States patrimonial property.
Thus, from the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on
Property, lands which are intended for public use or public service such as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses are property of the public
dominion and remain to be so as long as they remain reserved.
As property of the public dominion, public lands reserved for public
or quasi-public uses are outside the commerce of man.38 They cannot be
subject to sale, disposition or encumbrance; any sale, disposition or
encumbrance of such property of the public dominion is void for being
contrary to law and public policy.39
To be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of the
public domain designated as reservations must first be withdrawn, by act of
Congress or by proclamation of the President, from the public or quasipublic use for which it has been reserved or otherwise positively declared to
have been converted to patrimonial property, pursuant to Sections 8 and 88
of C.A. No. 141 and Article 422 of the Civil Code.40 Without such express
declaration or positive governmental act, the reserved public domain lands
remain to be public dominion property of the State.41
To summarize our discussion:
(1) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for public
or quasi-public uses are non-alienable and shall not be subject to disposition,
although they are, by the general classification under Section 6 of C.A. No.
36
37
38
39
40
41
See J. Brion Dissent in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines, 605 Phil. 244 (2009).
Article 420 of the Civil Code reads in full:
Art. 420.The following things are the property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
(emphasis supplied)
See Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 528 Phil. 181, 218-221 (2006).
Id. at at 219.
Id. at 219-220.
Id. at 220-221.
Decision
15
141, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, until declared open
for disposition by proclamation of the President; and
(2) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations are
property of the public dominion; they remain to be property of the public
dominion until withdrawn from the public or quasi-public use for which they
have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President,
or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial
property.
Based on these principles, we now examine the various issuances
affecting the property in order to determine the propertys character and
nature, i.e., whether the property remains public domain property of the
State or has become its private property.
For easier reference, we reiterate the
proclamations and statutes affecting the property:
various
presidential
Decision
16
Clearly, the legal basis of the propertys sale could not have been
Proclamation No. 461.
2. Proclamation No. 2487 which purportedly
revoked Proclamation No. 478 does not
legally exist; hence, it did not withdraw
the property from the reservation or from
the public dominion
Neither can Proclamation No. 2487 serve as legal basis for the
propertys sale in NOVAIs favor. Proclamation No. 2487 purportedly
revoked Proclamation No. 478 and declared the property open for
disposition in favor of NOVAI.
The Republic and the BCDA (now respondents) argue that
Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist; it could not have served to
release the property from the mass of the non-alienable property of the State.
Decision
17
The October 26, 1999 letter of then Solicitor General Raul I. Goco to Director Aurora T. Aquino
of the Office of the President inquiring about the existence of Proclamation No. 2487, records, Vol. II, pp.
205-206. It pertinently reads :
Dear Director Aquino,
The President, in Memorandum Order No. 173, directed the Solicitor General, in
coordination with the Administrator of the Land Authority, to file an action for the
cancellation of x x x (ii) TCT No. 15387 in the name of Navy Officers Village
Association, covering Lot 3, SWO-13-000183 with an area of 47.5009 hectares,
otherwise known as the NOVA area.
Also, please furnish us with a copy of Proclamation No. 2487 which purportedly
excluded from Proclamation No. 478 {reservation for the Veterans Rehabilitation,
Medicare and Training Center} that portion known as NOVA area for disposition.
43
The November 12, 1993 reply-letter of Director Aurora T. Aquino to Solicitor General Drilon,
records, Vol. II, pp. 208-206. It reads in part:
This has reference to your letter dated October 20, 1993 x x x
It is further informed that the alleged Proclamation No. 2487 excluding from the
Proclamation No. 478 dated October 25, 1965, {reservation for the Veterans
Rehabilitation, Medicare and Training Center site purposes} the NOVA AREA for
disposition, is not among the signed documents on file with this Office x x x.
Decision
18
A final point, we did not fail to notice the all too obvious and
significant difference between the proclamation number of Proclamation No.
2487 and the numbers of the proclamations actually issued by then President
Corazon C. Aquino on or about that time.
We take judicial notice that on September 25, 1991 the very day
when Proclamation No. 2487 was supposedly issued former Pres. Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 80048 and Proclamation No. 801.49 Previously, on
44
Decision
19
September 20, 1991, Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 799;50 and
thereafter, on September 27, 1991, she issued Proclamation No. 802.51
Other proclamations issued around or close to September 25, 1991,
included the following:
1. Proclamation No. 750 issued on July 1, 1991;52
2. Proclamation No. 760 issued on July 18, 1991;53
3. Proclamation No. 770 issued on August 12, 1991;54
4. Proclamation No. 780 issued on August 26, 1991;55
5. Proclamation No. 790 issued on September 3, 1991;56
6. Proclamation No. 792 issued on September 5, 1991;57
7. Proclamation No. 797 issued on September 11, 1991;58
8. Proclamation No. 798 issued on September 12, 1991;59
9. Proclamation No. 804 issued on September 30, 1991;60
10. Proclamation No. 805 issued on September 30, 1991;61
11. Proclamation No. 806 issued on October 2, 1991;62
12. Proclamation No. 810 issued on October 7, 1991;63
50
Decision
20
This list shows that the proclamations issued by former Pres. Aquino
followed a series or sequential pattern with each succeeding issuance
bearing a proclamation number one count higher than the proclamation
number of the preceding Presidential Proclamation. It also shows that on or
about the time Proclamation No. 2487 was purportedly issued, the
proclamation numbers of the proclamations issued by President Aquino did
not go beyond the hundreds series.
It is highly implausible that Proclamation No. 2487 was issued on
September 25, 1991, or on any day close to September 25, 1991, when the
proclamations issued for the same period were sequentially numbered and
bore three-digit proclamation numbers.
As Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist and therefore could
not have validly revoked Proclamation No. 478, we find, as the CA also
correctly did, that Proclamation No. 478 stands as the most recent
manifestation of the States intention to reserve the property anew for some
public or quasi-public use or purpose. Thus, consistent with Sections 88, in
relation with Section 8, of C.A. No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code,
as discussed above, the property which was classified again as reservation
for public or quasi-public use or purpose is non-alienable and not subject to
disposition; it also remains property of the public dominion; hence, nonalienable and non-disposable land of the public domain.
As a consequence, when R.A. No. 7227 took effect in 1992, the
property subject of this case, which does not fall among the areas
specifically designated as exempt from the laws operation67 was, by legal
fiat, transferred to the BCDAs authority.
63
Decision
21
Decision
22
(2006).
75
Approved on March 9, 1922, entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain of the Government of the Philippine
Islands.
76
Section 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby authorized to sell or
lease land of the private domain of the Government of the Philippines Islands, or any part thereof, to such
persons, corporations or associations as are, under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred
and seventy-four, known as the Public Land Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease of agricultural
public land.
77
Sec. 2. The sale or lease of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if such land is
agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and six,
respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if it be classified differently in conformity with the provisions of
Decision
23
land necessary for the public service. As the sale was executed by the
LMB Director covering the property that was reserved for the use of the
VRMTC, it, therefore, clearly violated the provisions of Act No. 3038.
2. The area subject of the sale far exceeded the area that the Director of
Lands is authorized to convey.
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 87878 which, per the Deed of Sale,
purportedly authorized the Director of Lands, representing the Republic, to
sell the property in favor of NOVAI, limits the authority of the Director of
Lands to sign patents or certificates covering lands to ten (10) hectares.
In this case, the subject deed of sale covers a total area of 475,009
square meters or 47.5009 hectares. Obviously, the area covered by the deed
of sale and which NOVAI purportedly purchased, far exceeds the area that
the Director of Lands is authorized to convey under B.P. Blg. 878.
3. The evidence on record and the highly suspect circumstances
surrounding the sale fully supports the conclusion that the propertys
sale to NOVAI is fictitious, thus, void.
We note the following irregularities that attended the sale of the
property to NOVAI:
a.
The absence, on file with the LMB, of any request for approval
of any survey plan or of an approved survey plan in NOVAIs
name covering the property.79 The approved survey plan relating
to Lot 3, SWO-13-000183 subject of NOVAIs TCT No. 15387
pertains to the AFPOVAI under Proclamation No. 461;80
b.
c.
chapter nine of said Act: Provided, however, That the land necessary for the public service shall be exempt
from the provision of this Act.
78
Entitled AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING SECTION ONE HUNDRED SEVEN OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBER ONE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS AMENDED. It was enacted on July 9, 1985.
79
See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division of the National Capital Region,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-NCR), TSN, September 16, 1996, pp. 18-25.
80
See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division, DENR-NCR, TSN, pp. April 22,
1996, pp. 2-24.
81
See testimony of Ernesto Erive, then Chief of Surveys Division, DENR-NCR, TSN, August 26,
1996, pp. 2-3.
82
Certification of Jose Mariano, Chief of the LMB Records Management Division, dated September
24, 1993, records, Vol. II, p. 347.
Decision
d.
24
Lastly, the LMB Cashier's Office did not receive 'the amount of
P14,250,270.00 allegedly paid by NOVAI as consideration for
the property. The receipts 87 - O.R. No. 8282851 dated November
28, 1991, for P160,000.00 and O.R. No. 317024 dated December
23, 1992, for P200,000.00 - which NOVAI presented as evidence
of its alleged payment bore official receipt numbers which were
not among the series of official receipts issued by the National
Printing Office to the LMB, and in fact, were not among the
series used by the LMB on the pertinent dates. 88
In sum, we find - based on the facts, the law, and jurisprudence - that
the property, at the time of the sale, was a reserved public domain land. Its
sale, therefore, and the corresponding title issued in favor of petitioner
NOVAI, is void.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the present petition for review on
certiorari. No reversible error attended the decision dated December 28,
2006, and the resolution dated March 28, 2007, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85179.
SO ORDERED.
<);~~~
Associate Justice
See also TSN of the testimonies of Armando B. Bangayan, then Chief of the LMB Records
Management Division, January 10, 1996; Jose Parayno, Records Officer I of the DENR-NCR South
CENRO, September 16, 1996, pp. 3-7; and of Ernesto Erive, Chiefof Surveys Division, DENR-NCR, July
13, 1996, pp. 3-10.
83
See October 4, 1993 letter of LMB Director Palad to Captain Nilo Rosario Villarta, Office of the
Naval Judge Advocate, records, Vol. II, pp. 343-344; and TSN, February 12, 1997.
84
Submitted by Eliodoro M. Constantino NBI Document Examiner III, Records, Vol. II, pp. 433436. See also TSNs dated July 25, 1997 and December 2, 1997 where NBI Document Examiner
Constantino confirmed his findings in the October 29, 1993 Questioned Documents Report.
85
Records, Vol. II, p. 436.
86
Id
87
Records, Vol. I, p. 163.
88
See November 22, 1994 Certification issued by the LMB Cash Section, signed by Cash Section
OIC Lilibeth Sloan, records, Vo. II, p. 348.
LMB Cashier Lilibeth Sloan testified that the official receipts which the LMB used on November
28, 1991, started from No. 4195501 Sup to 4195550 S; while those which it used on December 23, 1992,
started with 4195699 Sup to 4195709 S, TSN, September 3, 2002, pp. 7-9.
25
Decision
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
,.#~~
JOSEC
ENDOZA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.