United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.: No. 952, Docket 90-6257
927 F.
2d 85
UNITED STATES of America; Yonkers Branch-National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
YONKERS BOARD OF EDUCATION, Yonkers Community
Development
Agency, Defendants,
City of Yonkers, New York, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 952, Docket 90-6257.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued Jan. 17, 1991.
Decided March 4, 1991.
Raymond P. Fitzpatrick, Jr., Birmingham, Ala. (J. Michael Cooper,
Mason & Fitzpatrick, P.C., of counsel); Jamie A. Hastings, Corp. Counsel,
City of Yonkers, N.Y. (Eugene J. Fox, Sp. Counsel, of counsel), for
defendant-appellant.
Linda F. Thome, Washington D.C. (John R. Dunne, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
David K. Flynn, Brian Hefferman, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee U.S.
Michael H. Sussman, Goshen, N.Y., for plaintiff-appellee Yonkers
Branch, NAACP.
Before OAKES, Chief Judge, CARDAMONE and WALKER, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is yet another appeal by the City of Yonkers (the "City") from orders
seeking to implement the housing remedy in a civil rights action initiated in
1980 by the United States against the City and the Yonkers Board of
Education.
BACKGROUND
2
After more than 90 days of trial in 1983 and 1984, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Leonard B. Sand, Judge, issued a
decision establishing the City's liability for a pattern of intentional racial
segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624
F.Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y.1985). On May 26, 1986, the district court entered its
Housing Remedy Order ("HRO"), obligating the City inter alia to provide
acceptable sites for 200 units of public housing. See United States v. Yonkers
Bd. of Educ., 635 F.Supp. 1577, 1580-81 (S.D.N.Y.1986). This court affirmed
the district court's liability and remedial rulings "in all respects." United States
v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1055, 108 S.Ct. 2821, 100 L.Ed.2d 922 (1988).
Shortly after this court's affirmance of the liability decision and HRO, the
parties negotiated an agreement setting forth certain actions that the City would
take to implement the HRO. This agreement was entered by the district court
on January 28, 1988 as the First Remedial Consent Decree in Equity ("Consent
Decree"). The Consent Decree identifies seven sites for the construction of
public housing, obligates the City to acquire title by purchase or condemnation
to those sites that were privately owned, sets a timetable for the project up to
the commencement of construction, and commits the City to adopt, within
ninety days, a legislative package of incentives for local developers. We
discussed the City's contumacious delay in implementing the incentive
legislation in United States v. Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir.1988), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 110 S.Ct. 625,
107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990).
In December 1988, the Yonkers Municipal Housing Authority ("MHA") issued
a Request for Proposals ("RFP") from developers for the construction of public
housing on five of the seven sites identified in the Consent Decree. As
contemplated by the Consent Decree, the RFP provides for "turnkey"
development of the sites: the City would convey title to the developer, the
developer would obtain construction financing and build the housing, and, upon
completion of the housing, the MHA would purchase the project from the
developer. Deluxe Development of New York, Inc. ("Deluxe") was selected as
the developer for the first RFP.
The present dispute arises out of three orders, entered on July 24, 1990, July 31,
1990, and August 2, 1990, relating to the five sites named in the RFP. The July
24 order requires the City to transfer the sites to Deluxe prior to the signing of
the turnkey contract of sale, and further requires that title to those sites be free
and clear of any defects. The July 31 order rejects the City's request for certain
protection against the possibility that the sites someday cease to be used for
public housing. The order also notes that the City is under an ongoing
obligation to take corrective action with respect to any clouds on title. The
August 2 order, among other things, requires the City to clear certain title
defects prior to conveyance. The City argues that these orders impermissibly
expand the scope of the City's obligations under the HRO and Consent Decree,
and therefore constitute an abuse of the district court's discretion. Because we
believe that the City has waived its right to raise these arguments on appeal,
and because we find the arguments to be without merit, we affirm.
DISCUSSION
Section 10 of the Consent Decree provides:
6 City agrees that, to the extent it relates to the City's obligation to provide sites
The
for the placement of 200 units of public housing, it will seek no further appellate
review of the decision ... entitled United States of America et al. v. Yonkers Board
of Education et al., 624 F.Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y.1985) or of any subsequently
entered decree.
7
According to the City, section 10 bars only those appeals that challenge the
City's basic obligation to provide sites. However, by its terms, section 10 also
bars appeals from decrees that "relate[ ] to" the City's obligation. Requests to
modify the City's obligation are, we believe, "related" to that obligation within
the meaning of the provision. Accordingly, because this appeal challenges
district court rulings insofar as they deny the City's requests to modify its
existing obligations,1 it is barred by section 10 and must be dismissed.
Even if section 10 did not bar this appeal, the district court orders would still
have to be affirmed, because none of the challenged provisions constituted an
abuse of the district court's discretion. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1236 (2d Cir.1987) (discussing deference owed to
district court's choice of remedy in racial discrimination cases), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1055, 108 S.Ct. 2821, 100 L.Ed.2d 922 (1988).
The City first challenges the district court's denial of the City's request for a
possibility of reverter in the sites.2 The City argues that it is entitled to this
future interest in the sites as protection against certain contingencies--e.g.,
Deluxe fails to build public housing on the sites or the MHA terminates the
sites for public housing. However, while in the normal case it might well be
appropriate to determine the issue of future interests before execution of a
turnkey contract of sale, we do not believe that the district court's refusal to
grant a possibility of reverter amounts to an abuse of discretion in this case.
First, Judge Sand may, before the HRO is dissolved and the case dismissed,
provide that any buildings constructed pursuant to the HRO be used only for
public housing. Second, in the unlikely event that the City's fears are realized,
the federal courts have adequate equitable powers to remedy the situation.
Finally, Judge Sand had good reason to believe that granting the City's request
would delay and/or jeopardize implementation of the HRO, which the court
properly considered of paramount importance.
10
The next alleged abuse of discretion occurred when the district court refused to
rule that, upon conveyance of title to the first five sites, the City was entitled to
a pro rata release from its obligation to provide sites. Again, we believe the
district court exercised its discretion prudently. There are numerous ways in
which the City may still impede the construction of public housing. For
example, the City could refuse to clear title defects, refuse to provide normal
city services at the sites during and after construction, or refuse to issue
occupancy permits when the housing is complete. Given the City's past record
for obstruction, the district court was wise not to release it prematurely from its
ongoing obligation under section 9 of the Consent Decree to "fully and in good
faith cooperate with all persons, parties, and organizations the involvement of
which is necessary or desirable for the completion of the process" of
constructing the housing.
11
Finally, the City argues that the August 2 order modifies the City's existing
obligations by requiring the City to convey the sites free and clear of all
encumbrances and clouds on title. However, to the extent that the City appeals
the requirement that it identify and clear all encumbrances prospectively, prior
to conveyance, the appeal is moot in light of the district court's order of
November 29, 1990, which vacated that requirement. To the extent that the
City challenges, as a modification of its obligations, the requirement that it
defend against any suits arising from defects in the titles it conveys, such
challenge is frivolous. The City is obligated under the HRO "to provide
acceptable sites for ... public housing"3 (emphasis added). Sites that cannot be
used for public housing because of title defects are, quite simply, not
"acceptable."
12
Accordingly, the district court orders are affirmed.
As discussed infra, we reject the City's attempts to characterize the orders as
"expansions" of the City's existing obligations
A possibility of reverter is the future estate left in the creator or in his
successors in interest upon the simultaneous creation of an estate that will
terminate automatically within a period of time defined by the occurrence of a
specified event
N.Y.Est.Powers & Trusts Law Sec. 6-4.5 (McKinney 1967).
Similarly the Consent Decree requires the City "to provide the [identified] sites
... for the location of ... public housing."
