United States v. Joseph Harley, 682 F.2d 398, 2d Cir. (1982)
682 F.
2d 398
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Joseph HARLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 450, Docket 81-1290.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued Dec. 10, 1981.
Decided June 29, 1982.
Edward Chikofsky, New York City (David Breitbart, New York City, on
the brief), for defendant-appellant.
James B. Rather, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City (John S. Martin, Jr., U.
S. Atty., and Robert S. Litt, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, on the
brief), for appellee.
Before MOORE, TIMBERS and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges.
VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge:
Joseph Harley appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York convicting him of the possession of cocaine,
21 U.S.C. 812, 844, and the receipt of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18
U.S.C. 922(h). Harley contends that he was arrested without probable cause
and that therefore District Judge Goettel erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence of the cocaine and firearm seized in the arrest. Finding no
error, we affirm.
* The events leading to defendant's arrest on January 11, 1981, occurred during
an investigation by agents of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration. For several weeks prior to January 11, DEA agents had
maintained periodic surveillance of a building located at 356 West 145th Street
in Manhattan, where, they had been informed, narcotics transactions were
taking place. On several occasions, agents observed suspicious behavior. There
was an unusual amount of pedestrian traffic in and out of the building. Those
who entered generally remained inside for only a few minutes, then came out
and left the area. Sometimes, when two people arrived together, one would wait
outside while the other went in. When the latter emerged, he would exchange
something with the person who had remained outside, following which they
would go their separate ways. This suspicious activity in a known high-crime
area, coupled with informant information that narcotics were being sold in the
building, gave the agents reason to believe that narcotics transactions were, in
fact, taking place.
3
On the night of January 11, the agents decided to question some of the people
seen leaving the building, hoping thereby to obtain additional information and
to uncover an informant who would be willing to take an agent inside. They
decided to approach persons leaving the area by car rather than on foot, so that
the contact would not be seen by persons inside the building. Around 8:30 p.
m., a man arrived in a cab, which waited for him while he went into the
building, and he then left in the same cab. The agents followed the cab until it
stopped and discharged its passenger. Upon inquiry by the agents, the
passenger confirmed the agents' belief that narcotics were being distributed in
the building which, the passenger stated, was being used as a form of social
club. Armed with this additional information, the agents resumed their
surveillance.
At about 10:40 p. m., they saw the defendant drive up in a car bearing Georgia
license plates. He double-parked, turned on the car's flashers and entered the
building. A few minutes later, he emerged, reentered his car, and drove off. The
agents followed. After proceeding several blocks, the defendant stopped for a
red light near an entrance to the Harlem River Drive. The agents stopped
alongside and slightly ahead of defendant's car, so that the right rear window of
their car was even with the driver's window of defendant's car. Agent William
Snipes, seated in the front passenger seat, motioned to the defendant to pull
over, as Agent Gerald Franciosa, the driver, blew the horn. Agent Thomas
Chamberlin, seated in the rear of the car, held up his badge to the window and
also motioned Harley to pull over. Harley reacted by running the red light and
racing up Harlem River Drive at speeds of up to ninety miles per hour.
The agents chased Harley for more than three miles, catching up with him only
when he became boxed in behind two cars that were stopped at a red signal
light. The agents then positioned their car so as to prevent Harley from again
speeding away and got out of their car. As they did so, they observed Harley
reach back into the floor area behind his seat. Agents Chamberlin and
Franciosa drew their guns, but remained in the background while Agent Snipes,
whose gun remained holstered, approached Harley, opened his door and
directed him to get out of the car. As Harley got out, Agent Chamberlin
reholstered his gun and took Harley around to the rear of the car. At the same
time, Agent Snipes observed a handgun on the floor of Harley's car behind the
front seat. He picked it up and told Chamberlin that he had recovered a
weapon, whereupon Chamberlin placed Harley under arrest. Following the
arrest, Chamberlin searched Harley and recovered a packet of cocaine from the
front pocket of Harley's jacket.
6
In denying Harley's suppression motion, Judge Goettel held that Harley was not
arrested until after Agent Snipes recovered the handgun and that the events
which preceded the arrest were reasonable under the circumstances.
II
7
In recent years, following the leadership of the Supreme Court, we have
explored at some length the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places
upon the warrantless accosting of individuals by law enforcement officers. See,
e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340
(1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981); United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed.2d 594 (1981);
United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
970, 101 S.Ct. 1490, 67 L.Ed.2d 620 (1981). The pertinent holding of these
cases, as summarized by Judge Kearse in United States v. Streifel, supra, 665
F.2d at 422, is that an officer having a reasonable suspicion, based on
articulable, objective facts, that criminal activity is afoot may make an
investigatory stop that is reasonable in both its duration and its intrusiveness.
We agree with the district court that the stop in the instant case did not exceed
these bounds.
By the time defendant visited 356 West 145th Street, the DEA agents were
pretty well convinced that narcotics were being sold on the premises. The
characteristics of Harley's brief stop were typical of the activities which the
agents had been observing. Although Judge Goettel did not base his holding
upon a finding of probable cause, he suggested the possibility that the DEA
agents had probable cause to arrest Harley when they first accosted him.
Whether or not the facts then in the agents' possession were adequate to
constitute probable cause, they clearly were sufficient, when coupled with
Harley's precipitous and reckless flight, to justify an investigatory stop.
From the very infancy of criminal litigation, juries have been permitted to
consider flight as "evidence of consciousness of guilt and thus of guilt itself." 2
Wigmore, Evidence, 276(4), at 122 (Chadbourn rev. 1979); Harrington v.
Sharff, 305 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1962). Such evidence surely may be
considered as meaningful by police officers contemplating only a stop or an
arrest, where the controlling standard is something less than "beyond a
reasonable doubt". People v. Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 699, 376 N.Y.S.2d
497, 339 N.E.2d 182 (1975). "(D)eliberately furtive actions and flight at the
approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when
coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect
to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the
decision to make an arrest." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S.Ct.
1889, 1904, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); see Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694,
700-01, 51 S.Ct. 240, 241, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931); United States v. Gomez, 633
F.2d 999, 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1695, 68
L.Ed.2d 194 (1981); United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208, 212-13 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912, 95 S.Ct. 1567, 43 L.Ed.2d 777 (1975);
People v. Kreichman, supra, 37 N.Y.2d at 698-99, 376 N.Y.S.2d 497, 339
N.E.2d 182.
10
Relying principally upon this Court's decision in United States v. Ceballos,
supra, 654 F.2d 177, defendant argues that his detention by the agents was not
an investigatory stop but that, instead, he was under arrest from the time he
made the second stop. We think that defendant extracts more from the Ceballos
opinion than Judge Sand put into it.1 In Ceballos, at least three vehicles manned
by officers were used to effect the stop of defendant's vehicle, one blocking the
front and two blocking the rear. At least some of the officers in these vehicles
then approached defendant's car with weapons drawn. Id. at 180. The Court
held that this use of force was not precipitated by any actions of the defendant
who, the Court said, drove in a normal manner and gave the officers no reason
to suspect that he was armed. Id. at 183-84. The Court did not hold that a law
enforcement officer is precluded from displaying a weapon unless he has
probable cause to make an arrest. Indeed, Judge Sand cited numerous cases in
which the display of weapons was held not to transform a stop into an arrest. Id.
at 183 n.10. It would be a sad day for law enforcement officers if a per se rule
to the contrary were now adopted.
11
During 1980, one hundred four police officers were killed in the line of duty,
ninety-five of them by means of a gun. Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, 1980, at 338-39 (1981). Thirty
were killed while investigating robberies and burglaries in progress or while
pursuing the perpetrators. Id. Eighteen were killed while attempting arrests for
other crimes. Id. Seventeen were killed while investigating suspicious persons
or circumstances. Id. Seventeen were killed during traffic pursuit or stops. Id.
Unless we wish these already tragic figures to escalate, we must give law
enforcement officers a reasonable opportunity to protect themselves. Nothing in
the Constitution requires that we do otherwise. United States v. Jackson, supra,
652 F.2d at 248-50; United States v. Maslanka, supra, 501 F.2d at 213 n.10.
12
In short, there is no hard and fast rule concerning the display of weapons.
Terry 2 stops are narrow but fluid exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. What might be unreasonable when an
officer merely suspects that a minor offense has been committed is not
unreasonable when, as here, officers have reason to fear that a suspected
criminal is armed. The nature of the crime under investigation, the degree of
suspicion, the location of the stop, the time of day, the reaction of the suspect to
the approach of police are all facts which bear on the issue of reasonableness.
See, e.g., United States v. Bull, 565 F.2d 869, 870 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 946, 98 S.Ct. 1531, 55 L.Ed.2d 545 (1978).
13
If there is sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop,
reasonable force may be used to effect that stop. United States v. Streifel, supra,
665 F.2d at 422. In weighing the conduct of the officers involved, we must
give due consideration to their experienced judgment. United States v. White,
648 F.2d 29, 36 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 424, 70 L.Ed.
233 (1981). We would be heartless if we did not share the officers' concern for
their own safety. As Judge Meskill aptly stated, we cannot impose on law
enforcement personnel the hobson's choice of keeping their guns holstered
when to do so "increases the risk that (they) will be shot." United States v.
Jackson, supra, 652 F.2d at 249.
14
The testimony in the instant case shows that Agents Chamberlin and Franciosa,
who drew their weapons, remained in the background, and there is no proof
that the defendant even saw the unholstered weapons. In view of the nature of
the criminal activity under investigation, the likelihood of defendant's
involvement, his precipitous and dangerous flight, and his unusual conduct in
reaching into the back seat of his car as the agents approached, the district court
did not err in refusing to elevate defendant's preliminary investigatory detention
into an arrest. United States v. White, supra, 648 F.2d at 39-46.
15
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
United States v. Ceballos was written by District Judge Sand, sitting by
designation, with the concurrence of Judge Oakes and over a strong dissent by
Judge Meskill
2
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
