Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,841 Aubrey B. Lank, As Receiver of Pickard & Company, Incorporated v. The New York Stock Exchange, 548 F.2d 61, 2d Cir. (1977)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,841 Aubrey B. Lank, As Receiver of Pickard & Company, Incorporated v. The New York Stock Exchange, 548 F.2d 61, 2d Cir. (1977)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,841 Aubrey B. Lank, As Receiver of Pickard & Company, Incorporated v. The New York Stock Exchange, 548 F.2d 61, 2d Cir. (1977)
2d 61
The New York Stock Exchange appeals from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, on questions certified by
Judge Morris E. Lasker, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b). The opinion
below is reported, 405 F.Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y.1975). The principal issue
before us is whether a member of a national securities exchange has a cause of
action against the exchange for damages suffered as a result of the exchange's
failure to force the member to comply with the exchange's rules. We hold that it
does not.
* In December 1971 appellee Aubrey Lank commenced this suit against the
New York Stock Exchange for violations of Section 6 of the Securities
Lank was appointed receiver in April 1969, and commenced this action on
December 17, 1971. With the permission of the Delaware Chancery Court, he
had earlier sought to present the same claims as a counterclaim against the
Exchange in the Delaware receivership proceeding in 1971, but the Delaware
court, upon the Exchange's motion, dismissed the counterclaim on the ground
that exclusive jurisdiction for a claim under the Exchange Act lay in the federal
courts. New York Stock Exchange v. Pickard & Co., Inc., 282 A.2d 651, 652
(Del.Ch.1971). In the District Court the Exchange counterclaimed against Lank
for the same amount it had sought in the receivership proceeding. This
counterclaim is not before us.
The Exchange sought dismissal of the complaint and summary judgment, both
for "lack of capacity" of the receiver to raise these claims on behalf of Pickard
against the Exchange, and because the action was barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss "for lack
of capacity" only those claims Lank sought to assert on behalf of third parties
Pickard's creditors, subordinated lenders and stockholders. In all other respects
the motion was denied.
Recognizing that the questions of whether Lank could sue the Exchange and of
the time within which such a suit could be commenced were novel and "involve
* * * controlling question(s) of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion," Judge Lasker, upon the Exchange's motion, certified two
questions for immediate review by this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1292(b):3
9 Whether the receiver of a former member corporation of the (New York Stock)
(1)
Exchange has standing (or alternatively capacity) to assert a claim against the
Exchange under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of the
member corporation, and
10 Whether a three-year or six-year statute of limitations is applicable to the
(2)
receiver's claim under Section 6.
11
The District Court held that the receiver "has standing" to assert a Section 6
claim against the Exchange both because the corporation itself could have done
so and because "the ultimate beneficiaries of any recovery by (him) are third
parties who share no culpability for Pickard's wrongdoing and ultimate demise"
(id. at 1039). It further held that New York's six-year statute of limitations for
actions upon a contract applies in a suit for violations of Section 6, since the
plaintiff sues as a third party beneficiary of the agreement the Exchange was
required to file when it registered with the SEC.
12
We note that in the hurly-burly and rush of litigants to make their way into the
already overcrowded courts it is not surprising that not only the niceties but also
the very fundamentals of rules of practice and procedure are pushed aside.
Indeed, there are many who consider these rules to be "technicalities" to be
disregarded whenever possible in the interest of speedy and inexpensive justice.
We protest against this trend and would remind those who choose to listen that
without rules of procedure all litigation degenerates into chaos. Rules of
procedure are intended: to give orderliness and stability to court proceedings; to
achieve certainty and to prevent confused reasoning, that great enemy of justice
everywhere. At the heart of this case is Section 6 of the Exchange Act. We
must decide whether or not appellee has stated a cause of action or "claim for
relief" against the Stock Exchange, and this depends upon the way we interpret
Section 6. Capacity to sue has nothing to do with this problem. Moreover, we
are at a loss to understand what is meant here by the reference to appellee's
"standing." Fuzzy thinking is apt to follow the inaccurate use of procedural
phrases with clear and precise historical meanings. These phrases are part and
parcel of procedure itself. But there is plenty of precedent for the somewhat
indiscriminate use of these words in various contexts in recent years and they
cause no confusion in this case.
II
13
The primary purpose of the Exchange Act was to protect customers of the stock
exchanges that is, public investors. One method of effectuating this was to
impose on the exchanges a statutory duty "to protect investors by regulating
(the exchanges') members." Note, Exchange Liability for Net Capital
Enforcement, 73 Col.L.Rev. 1262, 1264 (1973).
14
At all times relevant to this action, Section 6(a) of the Exchange Act required
an exchange to agree, as a prerequisite to its registration with the SEC as a
national securities exchange, "to comply, and to enforce so far as within its
powers compliance by its members, with the provisions of" the Exchange Act
and SEC and exchange rules and regulations;4 Section 6(b) requires an
exchange to formulate and enforce rules for disciplining and suspending
members; and Section 6(d) states in terms that the purpose of these
requirements is "to insure fair dealing and to protect investors." In Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737, 65 S.Ct. 38, 89
L.Ed. 591 (1944), this court held that when an exchange breaches the duty
prescribed by Section 6 to enforce its rules, a private right of action arises in
favor of public investors. Judge Clark, whose opinion, though dissenting on the
element of burden of proof, set forth the rationale of the court, characterized the
implication of such a private right of action as necessary to effectuate the
Congressional purpose of protecting public investors, the class Congress
17
Judge Clark recognized, however, that not every person who might be injured
by an exchange's dereliction would have a cause of action.
18is well established that members of a class for whose protection a statutory duty is
It
created may sue for injuries resulting from its breach * * *.
19
Id. at 245. This long established rule is: that before a private right of action may
be inferred the would-be plaintiff must show that he is within the class the
statute is intended to protect, and that it is not sufficient merely to show that the
defendant is within the class the statute is designed to regulate. This rule has
been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See, e. g., Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975).
20
Even were we to agree with appellee that granting him a right of action against
the Exchange would "accord" with the purpose of the Exchange Act, our
function here is to discern the intent of Congress, not to legislate in its place.
Thus, while Lank demonstrates that the Exchange Act was designed to regulate
the securities exchanges, this obviously correct proposition has little to do with
the threshold question in this case: for the benefit of whom was such regulation
intended?
21
The beneficiary of the 1934 legislation was intended to be the public investor.
One finds in the Act and its legislative history no indication of intention to
benefit members of the exchanges at the expense of the exchange itself. The
statement presented by Senator Fletcher, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, in introducing S. 2693, an earlier version of the bill
which became the Exchange Act, said:
22 bill just introduced for the regulation of securities exchanges is one of the series
The
of steps taken and to be taken for the purpose of bringing safety to the general public
in the field of investment and finance. * * *
It is in the light of the interests of the general public that the bill was drawn. * * *
23
24 purpose of the bill is to insure to the public that the securities exchanges will be
The
fair and open markets. The bill seeks to protect the American people by requiring
brokers on these exchanges, members of these exchanges, to be wholly disinterested
in performing their services * * *.
25
26 bill proceeds on the theory that the exchanges are public institutions which the
The
public is invited to use * * *, and are not private clubs to be conducted only in
accordance with the interests of their members. The great exchanges of this country
upon which millions of dollars of securities are sold are affected with a public
interest in the same degree as any other great utility.
27
28
29
Since Baird v. Franklin, supra, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737, 65 S.Ct. 38, 89 L.Ed. 591 (1944), the scope of "investors" has been slowly
expanded through judicial construction to include even limited partners and
subordinated lenders of member organizations of an exchange, as in New York
Stock Exchange v. Sloan, 394 F.Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y.1975). The Ninth Circuit
has agreed with the view expressed in Sloan that subordinated lenders and
limited partners of brokerage firms "have standing" to bring private actions for
violations of Section 6. Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., 534 F.2d 156,
165 n. 4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 259 (1976). Hughes, however, did not
make an independent analysis of the legislative history or purpose behind the
regulation of stock exchanges, nor did it seek to determine whether
subordinated lenders and limited partners were within the class in whose behalf
a cause of action could be inferred, and that specific issue is not before us in
this case.
30
The court in Hughes found nothing to "mandate a reversal of the long standing
rule that a private right of action is available under Section 6." 534 F.2d at 166
n. 5. Nor do we. The issue in this case, however, is not whether the rule
allowing a private right of action should be reversed, but whether it should be
extended.
31
32 limited partners and subordinated lenders) clearly have a large stake in the
(The
enforcement of the rules. Because their status requires them to rely on the general
partners both to manage the enterprise and to comply with the * * * rules, they are
entitled to the Exchange's diligent enforcement of them.
33
394 F.Supp. at 1310-1311. In the instant case, after quoting this passage, Judge
Lasker went on to say:
405 F.Supp. at 1037. Belying this rationale, however, is the fact that there is
nothing in the language or legislative history of the Exchange Act to indicate
that Congress intended the protection of Section 6 to reach everyone who might
rely on the Exchange's enforcement or suffer injury due to lack of it.
36
37
Thus we conclude that it was the intention of Congress to draw a clear line of
demarcation between public investors, on the one hand, who may assert claims
against a stock exchange for damages arising out of violations of Section 6,
and, on the other hand, members of those exchanges, who may not. The
Congress did not enact Section 6 for the purpose of affording protection to the
very members of the stock exchanges whose conduct was being regulated at
As to whether the receiver may sue, we are of the opinion that if the member
has no cause of action, its receiver also has none.5 In the order appointing him,
Lank was given only those powers contained in the Delaware receivership
statute, 8 Del.Code Annot. Section 291. In particular, he was authorized to:
39 charge of the estate and effects, business and offices of said corporation, and to
take
collect the outstanding debts, claims, and property due and belonging to the said
corporation, with power to prosecute and defend, in the name of the corporation, or
otherwise, all claims or suits * * * and to do all other acts which might be done by
the corporation, if in being, that may be necessary and proper(.)
40
New York Stock Exchange v. Pickard & Company, Inc., Civil Action No. 2997
(Del.Ct.Ch., April 22, 1969).
41
A receiver stands in the shoes of the corporation and can assert only those
claims which the corporation could have asserted. While it is true that where he
represents the creditors as well as the estate, he may sometimes sue in that right
where the estate could not, 75 C.J.S. Receivers 325 (1952); 16 Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of Corporations Section 7847 (1962), on this appeal Lank makes no
claim to assert as receiver a right not belonging as well to a corporate member
of the Exchange. Indeed the court below recognized that the issue in this case is
"whether Pickard has a cause of action against the Exchange under 6 of the
Securities Exchange Act on which the receiver may sue." 405 F.Supp. at 1036.
42
Nonetheless, the court then rejected the Exchange's argument that the receiver
could not sue because Pickard was the primary wrongdoer a contention we
need not consider on the ground that where the receiver sues to maximize the
pool of corporate assets out of which creditors can be satisfied, he may sue
where the corporation could not. However, the fact that a receiver could sue a
transferee to recover a fraudulent transfer made by the corporation, even though
the corporation itself could not, is of no moment here. Since the member
corporation may not sue the exchange, neither may its receiver or its creditors,
for the latter cannot bring themselves within the protected class. To the extent
that a receiver's recovery in a Section 6 suit would benefit public investors, as
was suggested in the opinion below, 405 F.Supp. at 1037, those investors
already have a cause of action in their own right under Baird v. Franklin, supra,
141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737, 65 S.Ct. 38, 89 L.Ed. 591
(1944), and the receiver's suit would add nothing to their rights. To allow the
In view of our holding that Lank has stated no claim for relief against the
Exchange for violations of Section 6 of the Exchange Act, we do not reach the
question of whether the three-year or the six-year statute of limitations applies.
44
45
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion, with costs.
At all times relevant to this action, Section 6, 15 U.S.C. Section 78f, read, in
pertinent part:
(a) Any exchange may be registered with the Commission as a national
securities exchange under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in this
section, by filing a registration statement in such form as the Commission may
prescribe, containing the agreements, setting forth the information, and
accompanied by the documents, below specified:
(1) An agreement (which shall not be construed as a waiver of any
constitutional right or any right to contest the validity of any rule or regulation)
to comply, and to enforce so far as is within its powers compliance by its
members, with the provisions of this chapter, and any amendment thereto and
any rule or regulation made or to be made thereunder;
(b) No registration shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules of the
exchange include provision for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a
member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade, and declare that the willful violation of any provisions of
this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder shall be considered conduct or
proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.
(d) If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying for registration
Lank asserts that the inability to put Pickard in order resulted from the
Exchange's refusal to enforce its rules against Pickard at a time when
enforcement could have saved the firm. Because of our view of the case as
expressed in this opinion it is not necessary to consider the merits of this claim
It should be noted that no member firm of the Exchange was a corporation until
1953 when Exchange Rules were revised to permit corporations to become
members. Until then the question of Section 6 liability to a corporate member's
receiver could not have arisen