230 F.

2d 416

Joe W. COLLINS, as Committee for Travious Riddle Collins,

Incompetent, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
ST. LOUIS,
MISSOURI, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 141, Docket 23658.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Dec. 12, 1955.
Decided Feb. 14, 1956.

Edward J. Behrens, New York City (Gay & Behrens, New York City, on
the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
C.J. Pernicone, New York City (Richard E. Joyce and John F. X. Finn,
New York City, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and MEDINA and WATERMAN, Circuit
Judges.
CLARK, Chief Judge.

This is an action by the plaintiff, Collins, as a committee for Travious Riddle

Collins, an incompetent, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by
his ward when struck on a street in New Orleans, La., by an automobile owned
and operated by one Edward Duffy. The complaint further alleges that at the
time of the accident Duffy was insured by a policy of liability insurance issued
by the defendant and that this direct action against the insurer (to which Duffy
is not a party) is based upon La.Rev.Stat. 22:655 (1950).1

This action was instituted in the court below on June 9, 1954. On October 4,
1954, the plaintiff brought suit against both Duffy and the insurer on the same
claim in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
New Orleans, La., Division, for the purpose, as he now asserts, of preserving

the claim against the bar of the statute of limitations in case of dismissal of the
action in New York. This suit is still pending.
3

Both the incompetent and his committee are citizens of Virginia. Defendant is a
citizen of Missouri, but is doing business in New York as well as Louisiana.
The insurance policy was delivered to Duffy in Louisiana, of which state he is a
resident and apparently a citizen.

Defendant insurer pleaded a number of affirmative defenses and later moved

for dismissal on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim on which
relief could be granted and that there was no jurisdiction of the subject matter.
Hearings on the motions were adjourned pending decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 75
S.Ct. 151, 99 L.Ed. 59, and Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 348
U.S. 66, 75 S.Ct. 166, 99 L.Ed. 74, both of which cases involved important
questions of application of the Louisiana direct action statute. After these
decisions were rendered defendant filed a supplemental affidavit dealing
principally with the second action brought by plaintiff in Louisiana.

Judge Palmieri subsequently dismissed the complaint on grounds of forum non

conveniens, buttressing his decision with the conclusions that the forum was
remote from the place of the accident and from the witnesses and that the local
trial calendar was crowded, and with several other considerations of policy
based on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055.
He further stressed that plaintiff could not be injured by the dismissal because
he was still able to pursue his remedy in Louisiana. D.C.S.D.N.Y., 128 F.Supp.
228.

The application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens by Judge Palmieri to

dismiss the case was erroneous. The field of that doctrine is entirely occupied
by 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), enacted in 1948 subsequent to the decision of Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839--the case relied upon by the
judge. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32, 75 S.Ct. 544, 99 L.Ed.
789 (a case decided after the decision herein); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69
S.Ct. 944, 959, 93 L.Ed. 1207, 10 A.L.R.2d 921. If the forum is found to be
inconvenient, the remedy now is transfer, not dismissal as formerly. The
validity of this conclusion is, in effect, admitted by defendant, who now seeks
to have us regard the action of the district court not as a dismissal, but as in
substantive effect a transfer to Louisiana, where the second similar action is
pending. We cannot, however, so view the order below. We think a litigant is
entitled to have his duly brought case remain alive, avoiding new problems of
jurisdiction, limitations, laches, and the like, whatever vicissitudes of transfer

or consolidation thereafter with other actions may occur. Moreover, he should

be confronted with a direct presentation of the statutory issue and the
supporting material, rather than be faced with conjecture and supposition. On a
remand this issue may be faced thus directly upon defendant's properly
supported motion. We express no opinion on the merits of such an issue, if
arising hereafter, except to note that we have often questioned reliance upon
the fact of locally congested dockets as a proper ground for an order of transfer.
Court congestion is not local, and conditions below may be no worse than
elsewhere, particularly in the light of the recent heroic and highly successful
efforts of our district judges to meet their calendar problems. But beyond all
this, we think it dangerous to suggest that a judge may deny entrance to his
court to a litigant on the ground of his serious burdens; his understandable
complaints should be directed elsewhere, as to executive and legislature.
7

But though we hold dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens to be

improper, we must also consider the more complex question whether the
dismissal is to be sustained because no suit on the Louisiana direct action
statute may be maintained in a federal district court sitting in New York.2 Here
our first problem is to determine whether, within the meaning of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, and
cases following it,3 this in current semantics is a matter of "substance," to which
state law applies, or a matter of "procedure," to which federal law is applicable.
And decision must rest upon application of the test stated in Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1470, 89 L.Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R.
1231: "The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and
the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced,
or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that
alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result
of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be
controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State
court?"

We think the problem has been settled by Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Elbert, supra, 348 U.S. 48, 75 S.Ct. 151. In that case the Supreme Court
sustained the jurisdiction of a United States District Court sitting in Louisiana
in a case brought under the direct action statute here involved. One of the
principal objections to jurisdiction raised there was the lack of diversity of
citizenship between the plaintiff and the tort-feasor. But the Supreme Court
followed the characterization of the Louisiana courts that the statute created a
separate and distinct right of action against the insurer, and hence held that lack
of diversity between tort-feasor and plaintiff was not material. Apart from the
language of the opinion it is implicit in the result that the right created by the

statute was regarded as substantial, for, were the matter only procedural, it
would have been improper for the federal court to conform its practice thereto.
To like effect is Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., supra, 348 U.S.
66, 75 S.Ct. 166. And see also New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soileau, 5 Cir.,
167 F.2d 767, 6 A.L.R.2d 128, certiorari denied 335 U.S. 822, 69 S.Ct. 45, 93
L.Ed. 376; and Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Green, 5 Cir., 181 F.2d 1.4
9

But this does not complete our inquiry; for, under prevailing precedents in
diversity cases, we are admonished to find and apply the New York view of the
foreign law. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct.
1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S.Ct. 1023, 85
L.Ed. 1481, 134 A.L.R. 1462; Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514,
73 S.Ct. 856, 97 L.Ed. 1211. This was not the original principle as exemplified
in the Erie case itself; for there, as often pointed out, Justice Brandeis accepted
the Pennsylvania law, as there found by the Court, and not the New York view
of it, for application in the court below. And this further gloss has presented
perhaps the most criticized feature of the developing Erie-Tompkins principle.
For not only does it frustrate what those severe critics of the pre-Erie rule,
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, thought a creative activity in the federal courts
to make a proper choice among competing state laws, but it also leads to just
that forum-shopping which was Erie's target and may yield to a litigant whose
only merit is suing first the peculiar advantage of so wholly unique a law as
was actually applied in the Griffin case.5 Our present situation is illustrative.
New York State's interest is obviously minimal. Yet the idea is that New York
doctrines aimed to protect its local interests and advance its public policy shall
be extended to prevent a court of the United States from according substantive
justice as between a Virginia citizen and a Missouri corporation. We are not
sure that a developing Erie doctrine, which properly aims to avoid
discrimination in New York litigation by the accident of the federal forum, does
now require us to deny justice to these suitors according to the prevailing
substantive law if by chance it appears that the New York state courts would
refuse a remedy.6 So before turning directly to the New York precedents we
shall note the fast growing general law of conflicts as to the enforceability of
such direct action statutes as the one before us.

10

This question has, it is true, produced some divergence of judicial view. Thus in
Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. of Glens Falls, New York, 316 Mich.
37, 24 N.W.2d 547, the Supreme Court of Michigan declined to give effect in
that state to a Wisconsin direct action statute7 similar to the Louisiana statute
here at issue. The Michigan court declined to characterize the Wisconsin statute
as substantive or procedural, but grounded its decision upon the alleged affront
to Michigan public policy as expressed in a statute specifically forbidding direct

action against the insurer. But Chief Justice Butzel, for himself and two
colleagues, filed a very persuasive dissent setting forth his contrary views as to
public policy and further arguing that the direct action provision created a
substantive vested right, transitory in nature and enforceable in Michigan.
11

Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329, 85 A.L.R. 1, similarly
holds that the Wisconsin statute creates a substantive right for purposes of the
conflict of laws. The Kertson case is cited with approval in Burkett v. Globe
Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316, where the Supreme Court of
Mississippi, employing its own analysis, held that the Louisiana statute here at
issue created a substantive right enforceable in Mississippi. Later, the
Mississippi court overruled this decision, McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305, 120 A.L.R. 846, in an opinion from which the
Chief Justice vigorously dissented. In the McArthur case the court, abandoning
its own characterization of the Louisiana statute, rested its decision upon the
characterization allegedly given the statute by the Louisiana courts. But
Louisiana in differing contexts has denominated the statute both "procedural"
and "substantive" (the latter characterization having been made principally in
decisions subsequent to the McArthur case).8 In any event, it is the general rule
that the forum will make its own characterization of foreign law.9 It is no doubt
true that respect should be accorded the construction of a statute by the courts
of the state whose legislature enacted it; this is a valuable device for avoiding
the constitutional difficulties which might result from refusing to enforce as
"procedural" a right regarded as "substantive" in another state.10 But that is not
the problem here, and we think we should rely for conflict of law purposes
upon the characterization (purporting to conform to Louisiana decisions) given
the statute by the Supreme Court. See Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Elbert, supra, 348 U.S. 48, 51, 75 S.Ct. 151, 154, wherein appears the
following: "The Louisiana courts have characterized the statute as creating a
separate and distinct cause of action against the insurer which an injured party
may elect in lieu of his action against the tortfeasor. West v. Monroe Bakery,
217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122; Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.
[211 La. 19, 29 So.2d 177]." Cf. Wells v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 5 Cir.,
132 F.2d 316.

12

This is not a mere matter of determination of proper parties to the action;11 it is,
as noted by the Supreme Court in the Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. case,
a matter of enforcement of a right of action against a designated defendant
where no such right previously existed. Of course, more obfuscation than
clarification is achieved through the undiscriminating use of the labels
"procedural" and "substantive." The realities of the individual situation must
govern. The purpose of the conflict of laws doctrine is to prevent substantial

variation as a result of choice of forum in the rights and duties arising from a
given legal situation. But some limitations must be placed upon the reference to
foreign law in the interest of orderly administration of justice by the courts of
the forum. In the instances where these limitations are imposed to promote
practicality, convenience, and the integrity of local practice, local rules at the
forum are applied and denominated "procedure."12 The Louisiana courts have
made significant distinctions as to the defenses which may be raised between
suits brought directly against the insurer and those brought against the tortfeasor. See Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, supra, 348 U.S. 48, 51,
75 S.Ct. 151, and cases cited therein. It therefore appears that the direct action
statute does more than merely shorten the legal process; it creates what is
substantially a new right of action, and failure to apply it in the Southern
District of New York will defeat that uniform enforcement of vested rights
which is the purpose of the law of conflicts.13 On the other hand, we can
perceive no reason why the application of the statute in the district court here
should result in any interference with the orderly administration of justice.
13

But if we are firmly bound to apply the conflict of laws doctrines of New York
to this case, we reach the same conclusion as that already indicated by our own
analysis. New York follows the usual rule that the law of the forum determines
what is a matter of procedure and what of substance. Murray v. New York, O.
& W.R. Co., 242 App.Div. 374, 275 N.Y.S. 10. Although no New York case
has yet had occasion to characterize the direct action statute of a sister state,
there is every reason to believe that such a statute would be denominated
"substantive" and enforced. New York has permitted the law of a foreign state
to determine the proper party to bring an action for wrongful death, even
though the law of the forum prescribed different plaintiffs. See Wooden v.
Western N.Y. & P.R. Co., 126 N.Y. 10, 16, 26 N.E. 1050, 1051, 13 L.R.A. 458,
wherein the court said: "But it must not be forgotten that the cause of action
sued upon is the cause of action given by the lex loci, and vindicated here and
in our tribunals upon principles of comity. [Leonard v. Columbia Steam
Navigation Company] 84 N.Y. 53 [38 Am.Rep. 491], supra. That cause of
action is given to the widow in her own right and as trustee for the children,
and we open our courts to enforce it in favor of the party who has it, and not to
establish a cause of action under our statute which never in fact arose."

14

See also Wikoff v. Hirschel, 258 N.Y. 28, 179 N.E. 249; Baldwin v. Powell,
294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E.2d 412.

15

Of course New York adheres to the general rule that the law of the forum
determines the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued. Mertz v. Mertz, 271
N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597, 108 A.L.R. 1120. In the Mertz case the court refused

to allow a wife to bring an action against her husband for negligently inflicted
personal injuries suffered in Connecticut, both parties being residents of New
York. Connecticut law permitted such a suit, but New York law did not. This
decision, however, was strongly influenced by the asserted New York policy of
preserving domestic tranquillity by barring this kind of litigation. And New
York had a strong interest in the well-being of the marriage of these two of its
own residents.
16

In any event, although the proper parties and the capacity of parties to sue and
be sued may in general be deemed a procedural matter, the designation of the
party defendant in the direct action statute, by analogy to the death action cases,
must be regarded as part and parcel of the new substantive right created
thereby. Cf. W.B. Dunn Co. v. Corwin, 258 App.Div. 609, 17 N.Y.S.2d 577;
National City Bank of New York v. Beebe, Sup., 131 N.Y.S.2d 67, affirmed
without opinion 285 App.Div. 874, 139 N.Y.S.2d 238, dismissed 308 N.Y. 960,
127 N.E.2d 100.

17

It is further contended that, even though the right may be substantive, it would
be violative of New York policy to enforce it. This contention is based upon the
state policy which forbids knowledge of a tort-feasor's liability insurance from
being brought to the attention of the jury. Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y.
479, 95 N.E. 10; Hopper v. Comfort Coal-Lumber Co., 276 App.Div. 1014, 95
N.Y.S.2d 318; Brown v. Walter, 2 Cir., 62 F.2d 798, 800. Based on the liberal
view usually taken by the courts of New York in not declining to enforce
foreign rights because of their alleged variation from their New York
analogues, we cannot say that a state court would refuse to entertain a direct
action against an insurer merely because this would bring the existence of
insurance to the attention of the jury in a case apparently unconnected with
New York or its citizens. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224
N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 201, for the classic statement of New York's
attitude in this regard, where Cardozo, J., said: "We are not so provincial as to
say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise
at home. * * * [The courts] do not close their doors, unless help would violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."

18

Furthermore, in several recent cases New York in its own courts has permitted
defendant tort-feasors to bring in their insurers as third-party defendants
pursuant to 193-a of the N.Y. Civil Practice Act. See Brooklyn Yarn Dye Co.
v. Empire State Warehouses Corp., 276 App.Div. 611, 96 N.Y.S.2d 738;
Adelman Mfg. Corp. v. New York Wood Finisher's Supply Co., 277 App.Div.
1117, 100 N.Y.S.2d 867; Rosenberg v. Cassidy, Sup., 135 N.Y.S.2d 87. Cf.

Gleason v. Sailer, 203 Misc. 227, 116 N.Y.S.2d 409. See also N.Y. Workmen's
Compensation Law, McK.Consol.Laws, c. 67, 54, which allows the
compensation insurer to be made a party to the original application for
compensation.
19

Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. of Glens Falls, New York, supra, 316
Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547, decided on public policy grounds similar to those
urged here, is quite distinguishable, since the majority opinion there turned
primarily upon a Michigan statute which specifically forbade direct action
against the insurer. In view of New York's enlightened attitude toward the
employment of local policy as a bar to foreign claims and the unsettled state of
New York law with regard to insurance companies as third-party defendants,
the application of the Louisiana statute is not prohibited by New York public
policy. If it were so barred in fact, a real problem of Full Faith and Credit might
be raised. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980, 95 L.Ed. 1212;
First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 72 S.Ct.
421, 96 L.Ed. 441.

20

We come now at length to the ultimate point raised by defendant, namely, as to

the venue of the action and whether the statute by virtue of its provision for
direct action "in the parish where the accident or injury occurred or in the parish
where the insured has his domicile * * * " is not by its own terms applicable
only to actions brought within the state of Louisiana. The more reasonable
view, however, appears to be that these are but requirements of place of suit
which do not carry beyond the limits of a Louisiana forum. This is the logical
outcome of Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, supra, 348 U.S. 48, 75
S.Ct. 151, giving substantive value to the statute to permit suit in the federal
court, and thus overriding the local venue requirements. See also New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soileau, supra, 5 Cir., 167 F.2d 767, 6 A.L.R.2d
128, certiorari denied 335 U.S. 822, 69 S.Ct. 45, 93 L.Ed. 376; Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 34 S.Ct. 587, 58 L.Ed. 997,
L.R.A.1916D, 685. In effect each argument deduced above for the substantive
value given this statute by the Supreme Court, and by us following its lead, is
an argument against according a controlling and prohibiting effect to these
directions as to the place of enforcement of the remedy. Hence our conclusion
must be that the dismissal was improper.

21

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this

opinion.

The section in pertinent part reads as follows: " * * * The injured person or his

The section in pertinent part reads as follows: " * * * The injured person or his
or her heirs, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer
within the terms and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or
injury occurred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said
action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and
the insurer, jointly and in solido. This right of direct action shall exist whether
the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of
Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding
such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the State of
Louisiana. Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to affect the
provisions of the policy or contract if the same are not in violation of the laws
of this state. It is the intent of this Section that any action brought hereunder
shall be subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy or contract and the
defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the
insured, provided the terms and conditions of such policy or contract are not in
violation of the laws of this state. As amended Acts 1950, No. 541, 1."

See, in general, Note, 31 Ind.L.J. 75

See West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223, 61 S.Ct. 179,
85 L.Ed. 139, 132 A.L.R. 956; Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477,
87 L.Ed. 645; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530,
69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L.Ed. 1520; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69
S.Ct. 1235, 93 L.Ed. 1524; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,
76 S.Ct. 273; and cases cited in the text below

Wells v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 132 F.2d 316, denominating the
Louisiana remedy procedural and nonenforceable in Texas, rests upon the issue
of conflict of laws, next discussed in the text, and does not consider the direct
Erie-Tompkins problem

See dissenting opinion of Jackson, J., in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345
U.S. 514, 519, 73 S.Ct. 856, 97 L.Ed. 1211; Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions of the Erie Case, 31 Ky.L.J. 99; Cook, The Federal Courts and the
Conflict of Laws, 36 Ill.L.Rev. 493, reprinted in Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws, c. 5 (1942); Note, 67 Harv.L.Rev. 91, 150. For a
more favorable view of the Klaxon rule, see Wolkin, Conflict of Laws in the
Federal Courts: Thirteen Years of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 3 Syracuse L.Rev.
47. For a pre-Klaxon comment, see 52 Harv.L.Rev. 1002

See in general Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision--More on the Erie Case,

30 Ky.L.J. 3; Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L.J. 267, reprinted in

Jurisprudence in Action 59, 102 (1953); Corbin, The Laws of the Several
States, 50 Yale L.J. 762; Harnett & Thornton, Precedent in the Erie-Tompkins
Manner--A Decade in Retrospect, 24 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 770; Keeffe, Gilhooley,
Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 Corn.L.Q. 494; Note, 35 Corn.L.Q. 420
7

Wis.Stat. 85.93, construed in Kujawa v. American Indemnity Co., 245 Wis.

361, 14 N.W.2d 31, 151 A.L.R. 1133

See West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122; Jackson v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 So.2d 177. See also Note, 39
Va.L.Rev. 655; Robbins v. Short, La.App.1936, 165 So. 512; Stephenson v.
List Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 182 La. 383, 162 So. 19. Cf. Belanger v. Great
American Indemnity Co. of New York, 5 Cir., 188 F.2d 196
Home Ins. Co. v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 222 La. 540, 62 So.2d 828, cited
by defendant, construes the statute as procedural and remedial in a decision
upholding the right of the subrogee of the injured party to maintain a direct
action against the tort-feasor's insurer. Clearly this is far afield from the conflict
of laws.

Restatement, Conflict of Laws 584 (1934)

10

See generally John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57
S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 54 S.Ct. 634, 78 L.Ed. 1178

11

Restatement, Conflict of Laws 588 (1934)

12

Restatement, Conflict of Laws c. 12, Introductory Note (Procedure), 699-701

(1934)

13

See Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 Yale L.J. 656