Piccininni Vs Hajus, 180 Conn. 369, 429 A.2d 886 (1980)

Piccininni v.
Hajus
Annotate this Case
180 Conn. 369 (1980)
ROBERT L. PICCININNI v. MARIE A. HAJUS
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued January 17, 1980.
Decision released April 22, 1980.
COTTER, C. J., LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, PETERS and HEALEY, JS.
*370 Gordon R. Raynor, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Diane D. Ruben, for the appellee (defendant).
BOGDANSKI, J.
This appeal involves the sufficiency of the second count set forth in the plaintiff's
complaint. In essence, it alleges that as the result of fraudulent representations made by
the defendant to the plaintiff to the effect that she would marry him and that they would
occupy, as their home, the house owned by the defendant, the plaintiff was induced to
spend approximately $40,000 in renovating, improving and furnishing that house.
The defendant, asserting that the count was one not for fraud but for breach of promise
to marry and, as such, was outlawed by 52-572b of the General Statutes, moved to
strike it. The trial court granted the motion to strike the challenged count.
The court concluded that General Statutes, 52-572b, known as the "Heart Balm Act"
(hereinafter the Act) bars the plaintiff's action. The Act, passed in 1967, which is before
this court for the first time, provides that: "No action shall be brought upon any cause
arising after October 1, 1967, from alienation of affections or from breach of a promise
to marry."
*371 An early discussion of the Heart Balm Acts pointed out that "courts cannot escape
the burden of construing legislation as sweeping as this, so as to eliminate the evils
aimed at without destroying rights not considered by the legislature, whose continued
existence may be important to society and to individuals." See Feinsinger, "Legislative
Attack on `Heart Balm,'" 33 Mich. L. Rev. 979, 1000 (1935). See also Morris v. MacNab,
25 N.J. 271, 135 A.2d 657 (1957).
In Mack v. White, 97 Cal. App. 2d 497, 500-501, 218 P.2d 76 (1950), the plaintiff
transferred property to the defendant upon his promise to marry her; he never intended
to do so and the plaintiff sought return of the property. In awarding judgment to the
plaintiff the court pointed out that the action was not one for breach of promise to marry
but was "an action for obtaining money upon fraudulent representations" and was
therefore not within the terms of the California Heart Balm Act. See also Norman v.
Burks, 93 Cal. App. 2d 687, 209 P.2d 815 (1949).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an opinion construing a similar statute,
declared: "The act was passed to avert the perpetration of fraud by adventurers and
adventuresses in the realm of heartland. To allow [the defendant] to retain the money
and property which she got from [the plaintiff] by dangling before him the grapes of
matrimony which she never intended to let him pluck would be to place a premium on
trickery, cunning and duplicitous dealing. It would be to make a mockery of the law
enacted by the legislature in that very field of happy and unhappy hunting.
*372 "The Act of 1935 aimed at exaggerated and fictional claims of mortification and
anguish purportedly attendant upon a breach of promise to marry. The legislation was
made necessary because of the widespread abuse of the vehicle of a breach of promise
suit to compel overly-apprehensive and naive defendants into making settlements in
order to avoid the embarrassing and lurid notoriety which accompanied litigation of that
character. The legislation was intended to ward off injustices and incongruities which
often occurred when, by the mere filing of breach of promise suits innocent defendants
became unregenerate scoundrels and tarnished plaintiffs became paragons of lofty
sensibility and moral impeccability. It was not unusual in threatened breach of promise
suits that the defendant preferred to buy his peace through a monetary settlement
rather than be vindicated by a trial which might leave his good name in shreds." Pavlicic
v. Vogtsberger, 390 Pa. 502, 508, 136 A.2d 127 (1957).
The predominant view is that Heart Balm statutes should be applied no further than to
bar actions for damages suffered from loss of marriage, humiliation, and other direct
consequences of the breach, and should not affect the rights and duties determinable
by common law principles. In Re Marriage of Heinzman, 579 P.2d 638 (Colo. App.
1978), aff'd, 596 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1979); Gill v. Shively, 320 So. 2d 415 (Fla. App. 1975);
Norman v. Burks, supra; Beberman v. Segal, 6 N.J. Super. 472, 69 A.2d 587 (1949);
Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, supra.
Furthermore, the majority rule appears to be that a gift made in contemplation of
marriage is conditional upon a subsequent ceremonial marriage; In Re Marriage of
Heinzman, 596 P.2d 61 (Colo. *373 1979); DeCicco v. Barker, 339 Mass. 457, 159
N.E.2d 534 (1959); Semenza v. Alfano, 443 Pa. 201, 279 A.2d 29 (1971); Pavlicic v.
Vogtsberger, supra; Guffin v. Kelly, 191 Ga. 880, 14 S.E.2d 50 (1941); and that the
existence of a Heart Balm Act does not affect common law principles governing a gift to
a fiancee made on condition of marriage, which condition is broken by the donee. In Re
Marriage of Heinzman, supra, 64; Norman v. Burks, supra; Gill v. Shively, supra;
Beberman v. Segal, supra. See also annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 579, "Effect of Heart Balm Act,"
16-18.
In our view, the Act was designed to do away with excessive claims for damages, claims
coercive by their very nature and, all too frequently, fraudulent in character; the purpose
was to prevent the recovery of damages based upon contused feelings, sentimental
bruises, blighted affections, wounded pride, mental anguish and social humiliation; for
impairment of health, for expenditures made in anticipation of the wedding, for the
deprivation of other opportunities to marry and for the loss of the pecuniary and social
advantages which the marriage offered.
The plaintiff here is not asking for damages because of a broken heart or a mortified
spirit. He is asking for the return of things which he bestowed in reliance upon the
defendant's fraudulent representations. The Act does not preclude an action for
restitution of specific property or money transferred in reliance on various false and
fraudulent representation, apart from any promise to marry, as to their intended use. A
proceeding may still be maintained which although occasioned by a breach *374 of
contract to marry, and in a sense based upon the breach, is not brought to recover for
the breach itself. DeCicco v. Barker, supra.
Denial of recovery of property transferred in contemplation of marriage is not necessary

to the accomplishment of the object of this legislation, and to so hold would have the
undesirable effect of placing it within the power of a recipient to renounce a promise and
yet retain property bestowed in anticipation of performance.
In sum, the gravamen of the second count is that the plaintiff was induced to transfer
property to the defendant in reliance upon her fraudulent representations that she
intended to marry him and that the property transferred would be used for their mutual
benefit and enjoyment. The plaintiff does not here assert that the defendant wronged
him in failing to marry him; rather, he is asserting that the defendant wronged him in
fraudulently inducing him to transfer property to her. The plaintiff's complaint is based on
what the defendant did, and not on what she refused to do. The court erred in granting
the defendant's motion to strike.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case remanded with direction to
overrule the motion to strike.
In this opinion LOISELLE and HEALEY, Js., concurred.
PETERS, J. (dissenting). The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant on three
theories: breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. The
defendant's motion to strike was granted with respect to the second count *375 only, the
count alleging fraudulent misrepresentation. I cannot agree with my brethren that the
trial court was in error in granting this motion to strike.
The language of General Statutes 52-572b, the "Heart Balm Act," does not, it is true,
provide clear guidance about what forms of actions are brought within its prohibition of
suits "from alienation of affections or from breach of a promise to marry." Nonetheless, I
do not believe that the statute's purpose to ban vexatious litigation arising out of aborted
plans to marry should be circumvented by a mere allegation that the defendant had no
present intention that she (or he) would ever marry the plaintiff. It is entirely too easy to
make such an allegation, and as Professor Clark points out, entirely too likely that triers
of fact will fail to distinguish between breach of contract and intention not to perform a
contract. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations 1.5, and esp. p. 17 (1968). In addition,
I fear that a cause of action in deceit carries with it the capacity to generate claims for
mental distress and punitive damages; see Brower v. Perkins, 135 Conn. 675, 680-81,
68 A.2d 146 (1949); that will only exacerbate the opportunity for blackmail that the Heart
Balm Act was intended to prevent. For these reasons, recognizing the fact that the case
law is divided, I would prefer to follow the cases such as Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318
Mass. 72, 75-76, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945), that deny relief for suits based upon fraud.
Clark, op. cit., p. 17.
Even if the second count of the plaintiff's complaint is struck, as I believe it should be,
the plaintiff is far from remediless. Since the plaintiff would still be able to proceed in his
count for unjust enrichment, the defendant will not be able to retain money *376 or
property obtained through "trickery, cunning and duplicitous dealing," as the Pavlicic
court feared. Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 390 Pa. 502, 508, 136 A.2d 127 (1957). The
plaintiff is also entitled, regardless of our holding on count two, to recover property given
on condition of marriage, just as any plaintiff could recover any other gift given on
condition not fulfilled. That is the import of Brady v. Anderson, 110 Conn. 432, 438, 148
A. 365 (1930), and the holding of the majority of the American cases reported in Clark,
The Law of Domestic Relations 1.6 (1968), and annotation, "Rights in Respect of
Engagement and Courtship Presents when Marriage Does not Ensue," 46 A.L.R.3d
578-611 (1972).
I would find no error.
In this opinion COTTER, C. J., concurred.
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