225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir.

2000)

Larry BOLIN, Kenneth David Pealock, et al., PlaintiffsAppellants,

v.
Richard W. STORY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-13880
Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.
September 6, 2000.
September 18, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia.(No. 99-00024-CV-RLV-2), Robert L. Vining, Jr., Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

After being convicted of certain criminal offenses, plaintiffs brought this civil
rights action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against numerous judges
and prosecutors, as well as an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") agent.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of plaintiffs' recusal motions and the
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their action based upon absolute immunity. Upon
review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND

A.Criminal Prosecution of Plaintiff Thompson

In 1995, Plaintiff Lloyd Thompson was convicted of a drug conspiracy in

violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. Thompson's conviction and sentence were affirmed
by this Court in an unpublished opinion on July 15, 1996. Thompson
subsequently filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255.
See United States v. Thompson, Civil Action No. 1:97-cv-1815-WCO.

Magistrate Judge John R. Strother issued a report and recommendation in which

he recommended that the motion to vacate be denied. United States District
Judge William C. O'Kelley adopted the report and recommendation and
subsequently declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Thompson alleges
that he appealed this ruling, but no ruling has been made by this Court.
4

In addition, Thompson asserts that "in the course of reviewing his paperwork,
[he] found the following entry on his master docket sheet":

11/6/9772 ORDER by Mag Judge John R. Strother Jr. as to defendant Lloyd

Barry Thompson directing clerk to shred sealed material. (yrm) [Entry date
11/20/97]

Finally, Thompson asserts that "[i]t was patently obvious from the ruling of
defendant district judge William C. O'Kelly [sic] that he had not read any of
plaintiff Lloyd Barry Thompson's 2255 petition" and that "predictably" his
arguments will not be read by Article III judges in this Court either.

B.Criminal Prosecution of Plaintiffs Pealock and Bolin

In 1997, plaintiffs Kenneth Pealock and Larry Bolin, among others, were
indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States. See United States v.
Pealock, 2:97- cr-29-RWS. Pealock and Bolin were tried before United States
District Judge Richard W. Story, and found guilty on March 15, 1999. Pealock
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and Bolin had yet to be sentenced as
of the time of the district court's ruling in this case.1 Defendant Assistant
United States Attorney David M. Leta handled the case for the government.

Pealock and Bolin allege that the only reason charges were brought against
Pealock was so that Leta could "score 'career points' by obtaining a
$3,000,000.00 forfeiture of plaintiff Kenneth Pealock's property." Further,
Pealock and Bolin allege that "either defendant district judge Richard W. Story
is being completely dishonest in his rulings or someone else (i.e., the
prosecutor) is writing his opinions for him."2
C.The Civil Complaint

10

Plaintiffs brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Judges
O'Kelley and Story, Magistrate Judge Strother, most of the active and senior
judges of this Court,3 Assistant United States Attorney Leta, the United States

Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, Richard Deane, Ted Robertson,
an IRS agent who was allegedly involved in Pealock and Bolin's federal
criminal trial, and unnamed law clerks and staff attorneys for this Court.
Plaintiffs state that "[t]he gravamen of plaintiffs' Complaint is that the
defendant federal judges do not READ anything submitted by pro se litigants,
thereby defrauding them of the judgments that are rightfully theirs." In addition,
"[t]his case also addresses perjury by a government witness before a grand jury,
capricious prosecution, denial of the right to have a disinterested prosecutor,
withholding of Brady material, and judicial dishonesty."
11

The complaint asserts that both this Court and the "Northern District of
Georgia" treat pro se litigants differently than licensed attorneys in that
magistrate judges in the district court make reports and recommendations
which are then adopted by district judges who have not read the pro se
pleadings. Further, the complaint alleges that "[i]t has been clearly established
that appellate court judges in the Eleventh Circuit routinely do not read pro se
briefs, but allow staff attorneys to make 'summaries' for them instead." The
plaintiffs base this assertion on the testimony of both former Chief Judges
Joseph Hatchett and Gerald Tjoflat at a March 28, 1998 public hearing of the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals in
Atlanta, Georgia.

12

Plaintiffs' complaint appears to allege that the failure of the defendant judges to
read pro se pleadings violates their right to equal protection, denies them access
to the courts, and amounts to obstruction of justice. In addition, the complaint
appears to allege that this practice constitutes a fraud on the court and permitted
Leta to present false testimony in the prosecution of Pealock and Bolin, thus
perpetuating the fraud on the court. Finally, the complaint alleges that the
defendant judges, court personnel, and U.S. Attorneys comprise an enterprise
which persists in a pattern of racketeering activity to obstruct justice.

13

Plaintiffs' complaint seeks declarations that (1) pro se litigants "are entitled to
the same consideration in adjudication of their actions as any lawyer from any
'blue chip' law firm," (2) "the practice of allowing staff attorneys to make
presentations to appellate panels too involved in other things" is
unconstitutional, (3) "the practice of issuing an Opinion without first reading
the pleadings of a pro se litigant" is unconstitutional, and (4) Defendant Judges
Story and Strother are "mentally incompetent by reason of bias." Plaintiffs also
seek to enjoin defendants to provide (1) a report by this Court to Congress, (2)
"extensive discovery ... in order to uncover and document the fraud in the
judgments rendered against them and the pathological bias of defendant federal
district court judge Richard W. Story, defendant senior district court judge

William C. O'Kelly [sic], and federal magistrate judge John R. Strother, Jr.,"
and (3) an investigation by a grand jury into the "criminal depredations of the
defendants." Further, plaintiff Thompson seeks to void the judgment in
Thompson v. United States, Case No. 1:97-cv-1814-WCO.
D.Proceedings in the District Court
14

This action was before the Honorable Robert L. Vining, Jr., United States
District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia. The defendant Judges and
U.S. Attorneys filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' action on the basis of
sovereign immunity on April 22, 1999. An additional motion to dismiss was
filed by Defendant Ted Robertson on August 31, 1999. Prior to the district
court's ruling on these motions, plaintiffs filed a motion for the recusal of Judge
Vining on March 25, 1999. The district court denied that recusal motion on
May 3, 1999. The plaintiffs filed another motion to recuse on June 17, 1999.

15

In an order dated September 27, 1999, the district court denied plaintiffs'
second motion for recusal and granted defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint. Specifically, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the
defendant Judges and U.S. Attorneys on the basis of absolute immunity and the
claims against I.R.S. agent Robertson for failure to state a claim.4 Plaintiffs
appeal the district court's orders denying recusal and dismissing this action.
II. DISCUSSION

16

Plaintiffs raise several issues on appeal. Because plaintiffs have named most of
the active and senior judges of this Court as defendants, however, we must first
address our ability to decide this appeal before reaching the merits of these
issues.
A.Recusal by this Court

17

In ordinary circumstances, each of us would be disqualified from hearing this

appeal by virtue of being named as defendants. See 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(5)(i)
(providing that a federal judge "shall ... disqualify himself [when] [h]e ... is a
party to the proceeding"). There is an exception to this rule, however, in cases
where "the case cannot be heard otherwise." United States v. Will, 449 U.S.
200, 213, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). Under this "rule of necessity,"
a judge is not disqualified due to a personal interest if there is no other judge
available to hear the case. See id.; Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct.Cl. 186, 556
F.2d 1028, 1036 (Ct.Cl.1977).

18

The rule of necessity is generally invoked in cases in which no judge in the

country is capable of hearing the case. See In re Petition to Inspect and Copy
Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (11th Cir.1984). At least two
courts have found, however, that where a plaintiff indiscriminately sues all of
the judges in a circuit, the fact that it is possible to convene a panel of
disinterested judges outside the circuit does not require transfer of the case or
preclude the application of the rule of necessity. See Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d
1255 (10th Cir.2000); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter et al., 185 F.3d 8 (2d Cir.1999).
Specifically, in Tapia-Ortiz, a pro se prisoner brought a RICO action against the
judges of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and its staff attorneys claiming
that they had failed, and would fail, to address properly the issues raised in
cases on appeal. The Second Circuit found that the fact that "it is possible to
convene a disinterested panel in another circuit does not require transfer here,
where appellant has indiscriminately named all then-current Second Circuit
judges as defendants, even those who had no role in deciding either of his
appeals." Tapia-Ortiz, 185 F.3d at 10.

19

Similarly, in Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir.2000), the court
determined that it did not have to recuse in the appeal of the denial of a 2254
habeas petition. The petitioner in that case previously filed a pro se RICO
action against all of the active and senior judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, two district court judges of the Federal District Court for the District
of Colorado, a magistrate judge, the U.S. Attorney for Colorado, the Clerk of
the Tenth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit's Chief Staff Counsel. In the RICO
action, the petitioner alleged that the defendants conspired to obstruct justice in
that no Article III judge read the filings in his prior 1983 and habeas cases, nor
did they read the orders and judgments issued in his 1983 case, as the rulings
on pro se filings are routinely authored by law clerks and staff attorneys and
signed by judges without review. The Tenth Circuit followed the Second
Circuit's reasoning in concluding that "under our duty to sit and the rule of
necessity, a lawsuit brought indiscriminately against all the active and senior
judges on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals does not operate automatically to
render the court unable to hear and decide an appeal brought by the
plaintiff/petitioner." Id. at 1258. In addition, the Tenth Circuit applied this
holding "both to appeals in which the judges are named and to associated or
subsequent appeals in which the plaintiff/petitioner is a party but the judges are
not named." Id.

20

We are faced with a similar situation in this case. Because only one judge
currently serving on this Court was not named as a party, it is impossible to
convene a three-judge panel in which none of the judges have a personal
interest in this case. Further, plaintiffs have indiscriminately named all, except

one, of the current judges of this circuit regardless of their involvement in any
of their appeals. Given the similarity of the situation, and the persuasive nature
of the Second and Tenth Circuits' reasoning, we follow both Tapia-Ortiz and
Switzer in concluding that the rule of necessity allows at least those judges on
this Court who have not been involved in plaintiffs' prior appeals to hear this
appeal. We therefore turn to the merits of the issues raised by plaintiffs.
B.Recusal by the District Court
21

Before reaching the merits of the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' action,
we review the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motions for recusal by that
court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a), a judge "shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The
standard under 455 is objective and requires the court to ask "whether an
objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the
grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about
the judge's impartiality." McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678
(11th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. 455, it is well settled that
the allegation of bias must show that "the bias is personal as distinguished from
judicial in nature." United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1002 (5th Cir. Unit
B 1981), superseded on other grounds, United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d
1309 (5th Cir.1992);5 Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., etc ., 637 F.2d 1014,
1019-20 (5th Cir.1981). As a result, except where pervasive bias is shown, a
judge's rulings in the same or a related case are not a sufficient basis for recusal.
See Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1002-03.

22

Plaintiffs' motions offer no factual evidence of the type of personal bias that
would sustain a doubt about Judge Vining's impartiality and require recusal in
this case. Plaintiffs base their motions upon the fact that Judge Vining has sat
by designation on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the past, has a long
term working relationship with a large majority of the defendants, and oversaw
a grand jury investigation of one of the plaintiffs. We conclude that these
allegations are not sufficient to cause an objective, disinterested, lay observer to
entertain a significant doubt about Judge Vining's impartiality. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motions for recusal.
C.Absolute Judicial Immunity

23

Plaintiffs also challenge the district court's grant of absolute immunity from
plaintiffs' claims of injunctive relief to the defendant judges. Judges are entitled
to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are

acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the " 'clear absence of all
jurisdiction.' " Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55
L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (11th
Cir.1996). This immunity applies even when the judge's acts are in error,
malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction. See Stump, 435 U.S. at
356, 98 S.Ct. 1099.
24

In Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984),
however, a divided Supreme Court held that judicial immunity did not protect a
state judge from claims for injunctive relief in a 1983 action. In making this
determination, the Court concluded that, consistent with the development of
immunity in English common law, American courts had never adopted a rule of
absolute judicial immunity to claims for injunctive relief. Id. at 536, 104 S.Ct.
1970. In addition, the Court noted that, as of the time of its opinion, seven
Circuits had indicated that there was no immunity from prospective injunctive
relief and that the limitations already imposed by the requirements for obtaining
injunctive relief "severely curtail the risk that judges will be harassed and their
independence compromised by the threat of having to defend themselves
against suits by disgruntled litigants." Id. at 537-38, 104 S.Ct. 1970. Finally, the
Court addressed the concern that allowing federal judges to grant injunctive
relief against state judges under 1983 would be inconsistent with the doctrines
of comity and federalism. In this regard, the Court stated that nothing in 1983
indicates that Congress intended to insulate state judges completely from
federal review of their actions, and, because that statute allowed for suits
against state officials and did not limit the relief available against judges, the
Court declined to create such a limit. See id. at 540-42, 104 S.Ct. 1970.

25

The dissent in Pulliam disagreed with the majority's analysis of English

common law, arguing instead that the common-law remedies pointed to by the
majority were not analogous to suits for injunctive relief against judges and
therefore did not support the majority's position that such relief was available.
Further, the dissenting Justices were of the opinion that the prerequisites for
injunctive relief did not provide a sufficient protection to judicial independence
from the threat of vexatious litigation and pointed to the case before them as an
example. As a result, the dissent concluded that there was "no principled reason
why judicial immunity should bar suits for damages but not for prospective
injunctive relief." Id. at 557, 104 S.Ct. 1970.

26

The precise question of whether this Pulliam limit on judicial immunity applies
to federal judges as well, when sued pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29
L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), is one of first impression in our circuit. It has been

addressed, however, by several district courts and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. See Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir.1987); Kampfer v. Scullin, 989 F.Supp. 194,
201-02 (N.D.N.Y.1997); Stephens v. Herring, 827 F.Supp. 359, 361-65
(E.D.Va.1993); Page v. Grady, 788 F.Supp. 1207 (N.D.Ga.1992); Wightman v.
Jones, 809 F.Supp. 474 (N.D.Tex.1992); Neville v. Dearie, 745 F.Supp. 99
(N.D.N.Y.1990); see also Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir.1987).
Most of these courts have held that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity
serves to protect federal judges from injunctive relief as well as money
damages.
27

In Mullis, the Ninth Circuit pointed out several "anomalies" in the potential
application of the Pulliam exception to judicial immunity to federal judges.
Specifically, the court stated that in cases in which a federal judge meets the
preconditions for judicial immunity-that he or she acted in his or her judicial
capacity-there will "invariably" be an adequate remedy at law through either
ordinary appeals or an extraordinary writ. Further, the court stated that the
availability of these alternate remedies would diminish a plaintiff's ability to
show a serious risk of irreparable harm as well. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392.

28

The Mullis court also noted that to allow injunctive relief against federal judges
would be to permit a "horizontal appeal" from one district court to another or
even "reverse review" of a ruling of the court of appeals by a district court. Id.
at 1392-93. The court then went on to conclude that these problems suggested
that the Pulliam exception should not apply in suits against federal judges.
Finally, the Mullis court noted that this conclusion was supported by the
absence of explicit statutory authority for a suit against a federal judge as was
present in the 1983 action against a state judge at issue in Pulliam. Id. at 139394.

29

Similarly, in Page v. Grady, 788 F.Supp. 1207 (N.D.Ga.1992), the Northern

District of Georgia concluded that the rationale of Pulliam does not apply in
suits against federal judges. In Page, the court noted that suits against state
officials are explicitly allowed by 1983 and that suits for injunctive relief
against state judges were necessary to effectuate the historical practice of
federal court oversight of state courts. 788 F.Supp. at 1211. Because these
policies are not at issue in suits against federal judges, and Bivens actions
against federal officials are judicially-created remedies anyway, the Page court
found that it was inappropriate to limit absolute judicial immunity in Bivens
suits against federal judges. Id. at 1211-12. The court also noted that to find
otherwise would be to allow a new method of oversight of federal court actions
by co-equal or inferior federal courts. See id. at 1212; Stephens, 827 F.Supp. at

361-65; Wightman, 809 F.Supp. at 476-79.

30

There is an opposing position that warrants discussion, however. Specifically,

the dissent in Mullis quotes Pulliam 's conclusions that the absence of
immunity from prospective relief prior to that time had not chilled judicial
independence and that such independence was adequately protected by the
requirements for injunctive relief as follows:

31

We never have had a rule of absolute judicial immunity from prospective relief,
and there is no evidence that the absence of that immunity has had a chilling
effect on judicial independence ... The limitations already imposed by the
requirements for obtaining equitable relief against any defendant-a showing or
an inadequate remedy at law and of a serious risk of irrevocable harm (citations
omitted),-severely curtail the risk that judges will be harassed and their
independence compromised by the threat of having to defend themselves
against suits by disgruntled litigants.

32

Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1394-95 (O'Scannlain, J. dissenting) (alterations in

original); see Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir.1989)
(questioning Mullis ' need for reliance upon absolute immunity when the
court's conclusion that an adequate remedy at law existed led to the same
result), abrogated on other grounds, Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508
U.S. 429, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993); Dorman v. Higgins, 821
F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir.1987) (citing Pulliam, without discussion, for the
proposition that a federal probation officer's quasi-judicial immunity from
damages claims regarding the preparation of a pre-sentence report did not bar
similar claims for injunctive relief); Neville v. Dearie, 745 F.Supp. 99, 102
(N.D.N.Y.1990) (citing Dorman for the proposition that judicial immunity does
not bar claims for injunctive relief against federal judges).

33

In addition, the Supreme Court has previously held that it is inappropriate to

create a distinction between state and federal officials for the purposes of
immunity as follows:

34

There is no basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity

from liability when sued for a constitutional infringement as authorized by
Bivens than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation
under 1983. The constitutional injuries made actionable by 1983 are of no
greater magnitude than those for which federal officials may be responsible.

35

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).

We have similarly stated that the immunities provided federal officials in

Bivens actions are coextensive with those provided state officials from 1983
actions. See Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir.1995); Charles v.
Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 666 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d
1107, 1122 (5th Cir.1981).6 Thus, this issue is a closer one than it would seem
at first blush. After considering both sides of the issue, however, we find the
stronger argument favors the grant of absolute immunity to the defendant
federal judges in this case. Thus we affirm the district court's dismissal of the
claims against the defendant judges.
36

Further, even assuming arguendo that the Pulliam decision applies equally in
Bivens actions against federal judges, that decision has been partially abrogated
by statute. Specifically, in 1996, Congress enacted the Federal Courts
Improvement Act ("FCIA"), Pub.L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996), in
which it amended 1983 to provide that "injunctive relief shall not be granted" in
an action brought against "a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable." At least two district courts have determined
that this amendment also limits any injunctive relief available against federal
judges. See Jones v. Newman, No. 98 CIV. 7460 (MBM) (S.D.N.Y. June 30,
1999); Kampfer v. Scullin, 989 F.Supp. 194 (N.D.N.Y.1997). As the court in
Jones explained, there are two reasons supporting the applicability of this
amendment in Bivens actions. First, as a general matter federal courts
incorporate 1983 law into Bivens actions. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,
Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 n. 5, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993). In
addition, to the extent that federal judicial officers are not immune from suits
for injunctive relief, their liability is based on 1983 law as set out in Pulliam.
As a result, even assuming arguendo that Pulliam does apply to federal judges,
the 1996 amendment to 1983 would limit the relief available to plaintiffs to
declaratory relief. As discussed below with regard to the defendant prosecutors,
plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief as there is an adequate remedy at
law. Therefore, for this reason as well, the district court properly dismissed
plaintiffs claims against the defendant judges.
D.Defendant Prosecutors

37

Prosecutors are also entitled to absolute immunity from damages for acts or
omissions associated with the judicial process, in particular, those taken in
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the government's case. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Jones v.
Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir.1999); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d
553, 558-59 (11th Cir.1984). Our predecessor court has held that prosecutors

are not immune from claims for injunctive relief, however. See Tarter v. Hury,
646 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir.1981) ("[P]rosecutors do not enjoy absolute
immunity from [declaratory and injunctive relief] claims."). Further, we have
found no case distinguishing between state and federal prosecutors in this
regard as has been done between state and federal judges. However, we do not
resolve this question because the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs claims
against the defendant prosecutors may so clearly be upheld on an alternate
ground.
38

In order to receive declaratory or injunctive relief, plaintiffs must establish that

there was a violation, that there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury
if the relief is not granted, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law. See
Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.1982). As aptly noted by the
Ninth Circuit in Mullis, there is an adequate remedy at law for the violations
alleged by plaintiffs in their complaint. Specifically, plaintiffs may appeal any
rulings, or actions taken, in their criminal cases not only to this Court but also to
the Supreme Court. In addition, plaintiffs may seek an extraordinary writ such
as a writ of mandamus in either this Court or the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C.
1651. Accordingly, there is an adequate remedy at law and plaintiffs are not
entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief in this case. As a result, the district
court was correct in dismissing plaintiffs' claims, albeit for a different reason.7

39

E.Dismissal of Claims Against Defendant Robertson

40

Plaintiffs also allege that the district court erred in dismissing their claims
against defendant Robertson. The district court dismissed these claims for
failure to state a claim based upon the fact that plaintiffs' complaint fails to
allege any specific misconduct by Robertson. Plaintiffs assert that there is
ample evidence in the record to prove their allegations of misconduct against
Robertson and refer the court to materials filed in the criminal case against
plaintiff Pealock. Regardless of whether the district court could have properly
taken judicial notice of these materials in ruling upon Robertson's motion to
dismiss, we note that the same alternate remedies available to plaintiffs for
their claims against the defendant judges and prosecutors are also available for
their claims against Robertson. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not entitled to
declaratory or injunctive relief against Robertson either and we affirm the
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against him as well.
III. CONCLUSION

41

The district court did not err in denying plaintiffs' motions for recusal. We also

conclude that the defendant judges are entitled to absolute immunity and
plaintiffs cannot show the absence of an adequate remedy at law for their
claims and therefore are not entitled to the declaratory or injunctive relief
sought in their complaint. As a result, we affirm the district court's dismissal of
this action.
42

AFFIRMED.

NOTES:
1

Court records indicate that Bolin was sentenced to a forty-eight month term of
imprisonment on November 24, 1999.

Plaintiffs also attach a "Summary of Events" to their complaint describing what

they allege to be specific incidents of misconduct during the criminal
prosecution of Pealock and Bolin.

There is only one judge on this Court, Judge Charles R. Wilson, who is not a
named defendant in this case as he was sworn in as a member of this Court after
the filing of plaintiffs' complaint.

In response to the defendants' motions to dismiss, plaintiffs clarified that their

claims were against defendants in their individual capacity. As a result, the
district court found that sovereign immunity was not at issue. Similarly,
plaintiffs only assert claims against defendants in their individual capacity on
appeal, and thus no issue of sovereign immunity is presented to this Court
either.

In Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.1982), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted decisions of the former Fifth Circuit, Unit B, rendered after
September 30, 1981, as binding precedent.

None of these cases directly addresses the scope of absolute judicial immunity,
however. Abella merely contains a general comment on the coextensiveness of
remedies and immunities under 1983 and Bivens, Charles discusses witness
immunity, and Barker involves qualified immunity. Indeed, Abella contains a
footnote explicitly stating that the court does not address the issue of absolute
immunity. See Abella, 63 F.3d at 1065-66 n. 3.

Even were the defendant judges not entitled to absolute immunity, the
remaining claims for declaratory relief against them would be properly
dismissed for this reason as well.