APPLICATION

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175746. March 12, 2008.]
CHARLES L. ONG, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the April

25, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside the
January 16, 2002 Decision 2 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration
Case No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006
Resolution 3 which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner)
in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of
his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed
an Application for Registration of Title 4 over Lot
15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred
seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They
alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot;
that the subject lot is their exclusive property having
acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that
the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot
in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30)
years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent
Republic of the Philippines (respondent), represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
application for registration of title. Respondent
asserted that neither applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or
earlier as required by Section 48 (b) of

Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants
failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their
claims; that the tax declaration appended to the
application does not appear genuine and merely
shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that
the application was filed beyond the period allowed
under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of
the public domain which cannot be the subject of
private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a
Decision in favor of petitioner and his brothers, viz:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant
indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the
applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the whole
parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellera
and Abella Charmine who acquired the same by virtue
of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho,
Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho. Later,
they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C.
Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same
land to herein applicants.
The same parcel of land has been declared in the
name of the applicant and her predecessors-ininterest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.
The said circumstances further show that the
possession and ownership of the applicant and her
(sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of
land has (sic) been continuous and peaceful under
bona fide claim of ownership before the filing of the
instant application for registration on [July 1, 1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General
Default, the Court hereby orders and decrees the
registration of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap01-004897 approved by the Bureau of Land(s)
situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four
(574) square meters, subject of the application for
registration of title, in accordance with Presidential
Decree No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his
behalf and as representative of his brothers namely,
ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L.
ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the
Solicitor General, Makati City, Metro Manila, the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty.
Celestino Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land
Registration Authority, Quezon City, as well as the

applicant.
SO ORDERED. 5
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision of the court a quo granting
the application for registration of title of applicantsappellees is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals found that the subject lot is part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that
they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for
the duration required by law. However, petitioner
failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest
have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in
the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as
mandated by Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that
the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented
is dated 1971. Consequently, petitioner could not
fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971.
Neither was petitioner able to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject
lot prior to the filing of the application. Thus, the trial
court erred in granting the application for registration
of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH
HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO
L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE
OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT
MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023,
AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSION OF THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH
DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS
CORRECT. 7
The petition lacks merit.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration
Decree"), as amended, provides
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons

may file in the proper Court of First Instance an

application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law,
applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that
the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. 8 These requisites involve questions
of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on
certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are
generally binding on this Court except for certain
recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the
trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at
conflicting findings. 9 After a careful review of the
records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of
the Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Report 10 dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau
of Lands stated that the subject lot is "within the
alienable and disposable zone as classified under
Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and
classified as such on November 21, 1927." 11 This
finding is, likewise, embodied in the Report 12 dated
January 7, 1999 of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue
print Copy 13 of the plan covering the subject lot.
However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
The records show that petitioner and his brothers
bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and
Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998, 14 who in turn
purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and
Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997. 15 The latter
bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr.,

Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July

10, 1979. 16 The earliest tax declaration which was
submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 25606
17 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin
Cacho and Eufrosinia Bautista. While tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
and a claim of title over the subject property. 18 Even
if we were to tack petitioner's claim of ownership over
the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-ininterest, spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia
Bautista in 1971, still this would fall short of the
required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals,
possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to
alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and occupation. As held in
Republic v. Alconaba: 19
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since
these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be
a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
own property. 20
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers
bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and
Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers
actually occupied the subject lot. 21 No
improvements were made thereon and the most that
they did was to visit the lot on several occasions. 22
Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista
testified that he and his wife never actually occupied
the subject lot from the time they bought the same
from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in
1997. 23 Aside from these two testimonies, no other
evidence was presented to establish the character of
the possession of the subject lot by petitioner's other
alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioner's
evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership

to substantiate the claim that he and his

predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the
subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.
The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on
the applicant who must show by clear, positive and
convincing evidence that his alleged possession and
occupation of the land is of the nature and duration
required by law. 24 Unfortunately, petitioner's
evidence do not constitute the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this
nature. 25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not
err in reversing the Decision of the trial court and in
denying his application for registration of title over
the subject lot.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIED. The April 25, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which reversed and
set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in
Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November
20, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
||| (Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, [March 12,
2008], 571 PHIL 588-596)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154080. January 22, 2008.]
NELSIE B. CAETE, RONA ANAS, MILAGROSA APUAN,
ERLINDA AQUINO, GODOFREDO AQUINO, CORITA
BARREDO, TESSIE BARREDO, JESUS BATRINA,
ALBERTO BUENAVENTURA, BONIFACIO
BUENAVENTURA, EUSEBIO CAPIRAL, MARIO CAPIRAL,
LOLITA CAPIRAL, ELENA CAPIRAL, LETICIA CAPIRAL,
RENATO CAPIRAL, ELY CABANGON, ERWIN CATALUNA,
JESSIE CONRADO, JOEL CONRADO, NARCISIO
CONRADO, RICARDO CALAMPIANO, ALUMNIO
CORSANES, NILO COLATOY, MARJETO DAYAN, HENRY
DIAZ, SALVACION ESMANDE, REYNALDO
FUENTEBELLA, GERRY GEQUILLANA, DELSIE GARCIA,
NERISSA GONZALES, VISITACION JUNSAY, ESTELA
JOVEN, JOSE LANZUELA, MARLON MALANGAYON,
RENATO MARCELO, ANITA MARZONIA, MARCELINO
MONTALBO, AMADO MULI, JR., LEONITA MULI,
EDUARDO OLVIDO, ALMARIO PACON, ASUNCION
PACON, SALVACION PAGAYUNAN, ESTER PANTALEON,
SHERLITA RABE, ANITA REYES, MEDELYN RIOS,
BERTITO RIVAS, ENGRACIA RIVERA, GERALYN RIVERA,
ARMANDO RIVERA, MA. MERCY SHERVA, ALEXANDER
SANGALAN, ERNESTO SANTIAGO, JOY SANTIAGO,
ELENA TALION, JOE RANDY TRESVALLES, ELIAS
VALENZUELA, GERRY VALENZUELA, LILIBETH
VALENZUELA, JOSEPHINE VICTORINO, JOJO
VICTORINO, MAXIMINO VICTORINO, NOEL VICTORINO,
REYNANTE VICTORINO, ROBERTO VICTORINO and
JOVITO VILLAREAL, represented by NELSIE B. CAETE,
petitioners, vs. GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC.,
respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside
the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated January
9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled "Genuino Ice
Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie
B. Caete, et al.," and its Resolution 2 dated June 26,
2002, dismissing petitioners' "Second Amended
Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 filed in
Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
TaCDcE
Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners
filed a complaint for cancellation of title to property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N140441; 3 14399; 4 RT-94384 (292245); 5 RT-94794

(292246); 6 and 292247. 7 Petitioners alleged that

said titles are spurious, fictitious and were issued
"under mysterious circumstances," considering that
the holders thereof including their predecessors-ininterest were never in actual, adverse and physical
possession of the property, rendering them ineligible
to acquire title to the said property under the Friar
Lands Act. 8 Petitioners also sought to nullify Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from which the
foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or
were derived.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to
dismiss 9 on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action because petitioners are not real
parties-in-interest; that no relief may be granted as a
matter of law; and that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, but it was denied by the trial
court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied.
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a "Second
Amended Complaint" 10 which sought to annul, in
addition to the titles already alleged in the original
complaint, TCT Nos. 274095 and 274096; 11 274097
and 274098; 12 and 274099. 13
The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following
causes of action, as well as the remedy sought to be
obtained, thus:
4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessorsin-interest are among those who have been in actual,
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in
concept of owners of unregistered parcels of land
situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat, Quezon
City, Metro Manila, which parcels of land are more
particularly described as follows: aCIHcD
(1) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 668,
situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City . . . ."
(2) "A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 669,
situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City . . . ."
5. That the above-described real property is a portion
of a friar land known as "Piedad Estate," which
property is intended for distribution among the bona
fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having
originated or derived from Original Certificate of Title
No. 614 were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, which transfer certificates of title are in
truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and null and void,

for the following reasons: (a) that no record of any

agency of the government shows as to how and in
what manner was OCT 614 issued; (b) that no record
of any proceedings whatsoever, whether judicial or
administrative, can support defendants' claim that the
above-described property originated from OCT 614;
and (c) that the transfer certificates of title over the
above-described property were issued under
mysterious circumstances for the above-named
defendants and their so-called predecessors-ininterest never had any actual, adverse, physical
possession of the said property, thus, not allowed to
acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant to
the Friar Lands Act.
7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates
of title of the above-described property, which
transfer certificates of title are null and void, for
reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6 hereof .
. .; CAIHaE
8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said
transfer certificates of title in violation of the Friar
Lands Act and other existing laws are prejudicial to
plaintiffs' rights over the above-described property.
9. That equity demands that defendants' transfer
certificates of title as specified in Paragraph 7 hereof
be declared fictitious, spurious and null and void ab
initio.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendants:
(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and
all transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;
(2) Declaring as null and void defendants' transfer
certificates of title over the property in litigation;
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel defendants' transfer certificates of title
and all transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of
the property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of
the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws. 14
Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint on the following grounds:
a) The complaint states no cause of action because:

(1) on the allegations alone, plaintiffs (petitioners) are

not real parties in interest who may bring suit to
cancel defendants' (including respondent) titles; (2)
based on the allegations and prayer of the complaint,
no relief, as a matter of law, may be granted; CaDATc
b) Prescription has set in;
c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos.
Q-95-22834 and Q-95-23111) filed by a different set
of plaintiffs against a different set of defendants but
which involve the same subject matter, cause of
action and allegations of the plaintiffs, with respect to
the cancellation of OCT 614 and succeeding titles
derived from it. Said complaints have since been
dismissed by Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, the dismissal of which is the subject of a
pending certiorari proceeding in the appellate court.
15
On January 3, 2001, 16 the trial court denied
respondent's motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied hence respondent filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court granted respondent's petition for
certiorari and dismissed petitioners' Second Amended
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following
issues:
A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-99-36483 DOES
NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;
B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST;
C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
THE DOCTRINE OF "EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES"; and,
D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIED PETITIONERS'
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DISMISSED THEIR
COMPLAINT. 17
We deny the petition.
The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon
City, a Friar Land acquired on December 23, 1903 by
the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar

Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad

Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate
Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the
Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public Act No. 1120
(Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904. 18
CAHaST
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614
in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910
under the provisions of Act 496, the area was
subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of
subsequent surveys executed in the course of
disposition, the number of lots increased to 1,305.
Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of
Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early
as 1910 and records show that even before the
Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have
been disposed of. 19 The Piedad Estate has long been
segregated from the mass of the public domain and
has become private land duly registered under the
Torrens system following the procedure for the
confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496.
Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer
lands of the public domain. 20
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as
well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim
successional rights to purchase by reason of
occupation from time immemorial, as this
contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were
bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States,
approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons
but from certain companies, a society and a religious
order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers
and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by
the Government" were given preference to lease,
purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the
settlement and occupation of persons before the
government acquired the lands. 21
The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure
require that every pleading shall contain in a
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the
case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts. 22 And in all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake must be stated with particularity. 23
It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint
determine the nature of the action, and consequently,

the jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the

complaint must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is
better established than that which requires the
complaint to contain a statement of all the facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
Additionally, Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court
provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity. In the case at bar, while
there are allegations of fraud in the above quoted
complaints, the same are not particular enough to
bring the controversy within the SEC's jurisdiction.
The said allegations are not statements of ultimate
facts but are mere conclusions of law. DTaSIc
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to
the rights of action or defense asserted, as
distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or
conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract
is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are
mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a
contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires,
or against public policy, without stating facts showing
its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. 24
"Ultimate facts" means the essential facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action, or such facts as are so
essential that they cannot be stricken out without
leaving the statement of the cause of action
inadequate. 25 "Cause of action" has been defined as
an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of the other; 26 and its essential
elements are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; 2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3) an act or omission on the part of the named
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages. If these elements are
not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action. 27 In the resolution of a motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action,
only the facts alleged in the complaint as well as its
annexes must be considered. 28 The test in such case
is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the
complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant
to the prayer therein. 29

Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint

states a cause of action against a defendant or the
action is premature is one of law. The trial court can
consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes,
motions and the evidence on record. However in so
doing, the trial court does not rule on the truth or
falsity of such documents. It merely includes such
documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review
of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these
documents would not involve a calibration of the
probative value of such pieces of evidence but would
only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was
properly applied given the facts and these supporting
documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise
from such a review are pure questions of law, and not
questions of fact. HEISca
The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes
and jurisprudence in determining whether the
allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action.
While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly
cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a
motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance
of decisions this Court has rendered because they are
proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The said
decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal
system, and failure of any court to apply them shall
constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a
dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground
for administrative action against an inferior court
magistrate. 30
Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the
need for particularity and incipient substantiation in
the petitioners' Second Amended Complaint.
First, their initial claim that OCT 614 of which all
the other subject titles are derivatives is null and
void, has been proven wrong. As has been held in
Pinlac and other cases, OCT 614 did legally exist and
was previously issued in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496.
Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of
Natural Resources, which was specifically tasked to
investigate the historical background of the Piedad
Estate, found that as early as the period prior to the
Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had
already been disposed of.
Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the
Torrens system of land registration, which means that

all lots therein are titled. IEaATD

Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who
acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his
successors-in-interest, may not claim successional
rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial, which means that petitioners' claimed
actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession
of the subject property is really of no moment unless
it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were
actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands
were acquired by the Government, and whose rights
were not disregarded even though they were in
occupation of the same before the government
acquired the land; yet, no period of time in relation to
adverse possession is alleged.
Petitioners' Second Amended Complaint betrays no
more than an incomplete narration of facts
unsupported by documentary or other exhibits; the
allegations therein partake of conclusions of law
unsupported by a particular averment of
circumstances that will show why or how such
inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete
with sweeping generalizations and inferences derived
from facts that are not found therein. While there are
allegations of fraud upon the claim that the subject
titles were fictitious, spurious and obtained under
"mysterious circumstances," the same are not specific
to bring the controversy within the trial court's
jurisdiction. There is no explanation or narration of
facts as would show why said titles are claimed to be
fictitious or spurious, contrary to the requirement of
the Rules that the circumstances constituting fraud
must be stated with particularity; otherwise, the
allegation of fraud would simply be an unfounded
conclusion of law. In the absence of specific
averments, the complaint is defective, for it presents
no basis upon which the court should act, or for the
defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer.
As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that
they are bona fide occupants of the subject property
within the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act,
having allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful
and continuous possession of the property, although it
is not stated for how long and since when. In their
second amended complaint, they seek judgment
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of
the property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of
the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws. (Emphasis
supplied) TADCSE

They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject

property despite their alleged adverse possession
but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide
occupants" thereof. In other words, petitioners
concede the State's ownership of the property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real
parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining the
suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of
Appeals is correct in declaring that only the State,
through the Solicitor General, may institute such suit.
Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled and the
issue need not be belabored. Thus
The Court also holds that private respondents are not
the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The
complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the
transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the
ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT
No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title.
While private respondents did not pray for the
reversion of the land to the government, we agree
with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint
will have the same result of reverting the land to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs.
Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to
this relief. The Court in that case held:
"The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated
on Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of
Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the
plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand the
cancellation or amendment of the defendant's title,
because, even if the said title were canceled or
amended, the ownership of the land embraced
therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the
amendment, would revert to the public domain. In his
amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at
all that any part of the land covered by the
defendant's title was privately owned by him or by his
predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is admitted therein
that the said land was at all times a part of the public
domain until December 18, 1964, when the
government issued a title thereon in favor of
defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity to
relief, it can only be the government. aHTCIc
In the case at bar, the plaintiff's own averments
negate the existence of such right, for it would appear
therefrom that whatever right might have been
violated by the defendant belonged to the
government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant

argues that although his complaint is captioned as

one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless
stated therein several causes of action based on his
alleged rights of possession and ownership over the
improvements, on defendant-appellees alleged
fraudulent acquisition of the land, and on the
damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiffappellant) in relation to the improvements. These
matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of
whether or not defendant-appellee's title should be
canceled or amended, and they may not be leaned
upon in an effort to make out a cause of action in
relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal
relief prayed for in the amended complaint is the
cancellation or amendment of defendant-appellee's
title." 31
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real
party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest"
within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The
interest of the party must also be personal and not
one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest,
on the other hand, means a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or
a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest. 32
If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a
mere inchoate interest in the properties covered by
the subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned
upon the fact that if the questioned titles are
cancelled and the property is reverted to the State,
they would probably or possibly be given preferential
treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the
property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly
is not the "interest" required by law that grants them
license or the personality to prosecute their case.
Only to the State does the privilege belong. SACHcD
On the issue of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, suffice it to state that since petitioners do
not possess the necessary interest to prosecute the
case for cancellation of title in the courts, neither do
they have the right to pursue administrative remedies
outside thereof. They are not the owners; nor are they
qualified applicants therefor. It has not been shown by

their complaint that they have previously taken steps

to avail of the benefits under the Friar Lands Act,
since all they seek, should the questioned titles be
nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of the
property covered by the questioned titles. Neither is
there any indication that they possess the
qualifications necessary to enable them to avail of the
preference granted under the Act.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that
respondent belatedly filed the petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, and that the appellate
court gravely abused its discretion when it
entertained and resolved the same.
The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001
denying respondent's motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint was received by the respondent
on January 16, 2001. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was
denied on February 28, 2001. Respondent received
the order denying its motion for reconsideration on
March 27, 2001. On the same day, it filed a Notice to
File Petition for Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the
petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence, the
appellate court correctly entertained the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 64337 dismissing petitioners' "Second
Amended Complaint" in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483
and the Resolution dated June 26, 2002 denying the
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. cda
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Corona, * Nachura and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
||| (Caete v. Genuino Ice Co., Inc., G.R. No. 154080,
[January 22, 2008], 566 PHIL 204-224)

JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION ON IMPERFECT OR

INCOMPLETE TITLES

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 24066. December 9, 1925.]
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGELA RAZON
and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC LANDS; ACQUISITION BY OCCUPANCY. An
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a
land of the public domain from time immemorial by a
private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public, to
become private, property.
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. To acquire a right to a
certificate of title over a land of the public domain,
under the provisions of Chapter VI of Act No. 926, as
amended by Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, an open,
adverse, public and continuous possession from July
26,1894, is sufficient, provided the possessor makes
application therefor under the provisions of section 47
of Act No. 2874. The possessor under such
circumstances acquires by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the government, and
the actual issuance of a title is not necessary in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY. As the
possessor of a public land under the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs acquires the
land by operation of law as a grant from the State, the
land ceasing to be of public domain, to become
private property, at least by presumption, it follows
that it can no longer be sold by the Director of Lands
to another person, and if he does, the sale is void, and
the said possessor may recover the land from any
person holding it against his will.
DECISION
VILLA-REAL, J p:

This action was commenced in the Court of First

Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin
Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands,
praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole
and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in
the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling
the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private
property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d)
sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500
as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands
denied each and every allegation contained therein
and, as special defense, alleged that the land in
question was a property of the Government of the
United States under the administration and control of
that of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela
Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both
parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to
the possession of the land, annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title
issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon.
From this judgment the Director of Lands took this
appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit:
(1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior
case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela
Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling
in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled
to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the
annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands
to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate
of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province
of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new
trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880,
Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish
pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the
sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the
same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession
thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond
having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin
Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the

deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price

and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of
the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of
the sale of which he had paid the price of the
property. The possession and occupation of the land in
question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on
September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after
considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the
court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and
against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint
(Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain
possession of the land in question through the court,
Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the
purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C).
Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed
an opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting
his possession of the land for twenty-five years
(Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the
opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela
Razon (Exhibit S). By virtue of said grant the register
of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued
the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed
with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin
Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused
to do so, she brought an action for forcible entry and
detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua,
Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property
(Exhibits F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this
action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider
the questions raised by the appellant in his
assignments of error.
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi
has been in possession of the land in question openly,
continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and
through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is,
for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela
Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the
Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela
Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in
possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela

Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin

Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirtyfour years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio
Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when
he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be
estimated when he began to possess and occupy it,
the period of time being so long that it is beyond the
reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Cariilo vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands (212 U. S., 449 1 ), is applicable here. In favor
of Valentin Susi, there is, more over, the presumption
juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right
to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question
by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of
the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did
not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in
question being of the public domain, the plaintiffappellee cannot maintain an action to recover
possession thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which
is in dispute, had already become, by operation of
law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking
only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has
the right to bring an action to recover the possession
thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in

the judgment appealed from the same is hereby
affirmed in all its parts, without special
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand,
Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., did not take part.
||| (Susi v. Razon, G.R. No. 24066, [December 9,
1925], 48 PHIL 424-429)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73002. December 29, 1986.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, J p:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in
favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of
title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(The Public Land Act). as amended; and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in
said proceedings in this wise:
"1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented
by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented
by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties
pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its
secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-1');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration
proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the
Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place
on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land
relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to

generation until the same came into the possession of

Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public
from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession
of the Infiels who were granted from whom the
applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962,
hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial;
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private
land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the
non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its
ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land
sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for
the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., and the negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon,
Isabela (Exh. 'N-1'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979."
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these
findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this,
he asserts that, the registration proceedings have
been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after
the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter
is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of
its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares
(a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution
which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the
lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible

error to decree registration in favor of Acme.

Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of the chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who
by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof."
The Petition for Review does not dispute indeed, in
view of the quoted findings of the trial court which
were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate
Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court
the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29,
1962, are members of the national cultural minorities
who had, by themselves and through their
progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands
since time immemorial, or for more than the required
30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled
to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the
Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed.
Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the
successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to

acquire and register ownership of said lands under

any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than
Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is
whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred
to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the
latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the
1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in
mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain
except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the
character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then
still part of the public domain, it must be answered in
the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where
a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila
Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than
60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned,
had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from
the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by
the vendors and, before them, by their predecessorin-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak
of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976,
Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots.
The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco,
a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for
registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to
public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
". . ., the said land is still public land. It would cease to
be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it
under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and
the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or
has to be dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx

"Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional

prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which
no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other
hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to
judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish,
we should not make any distinction or qualification.
The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section
48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
`presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs.
Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA
641, 644)."
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent,
tracing the line of cases beginning with Cario in
1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4
which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better and, indeed, the correct, view becomes
evident from a consideration of some of the principal
rulings cited therein.
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in
Cario, involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. It was ruled that:
"It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5
attributes title to those `who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the
argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion
that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he
had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten), as well or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon
to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained

would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,

was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. .
. ."
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character
because expressed in more categorical language, in
Susi:
". . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph
(b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government were complied with, for he has
been in actual and physical possession, personally
and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question
by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of
the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did
not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be
mentioned, like Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7
Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and
Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the
Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely
affirmative: 11
". . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-

in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner

so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the
Public Land Act as by free patent. . . .

Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the

1973 Constitution which came into effect later)
prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
private lands.

xxx xxx xxx

Even on the proposition that the land remained

technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title
in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
no serious question of Acme's right to acquire the
land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the
1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect"
title. The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
right already vested before that law came into effect,
or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
proper, This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair
vested rights.

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions

as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does
not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent." 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the
State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title . . ." No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character
and length of time; and registration thereunder would
not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert
the land from public to private land, but only confirm
such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in
Cario, ". . . (T)here are indications that registration
was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would
be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted as it must be that the land was
already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962
when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also
be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make
such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935

"We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14

has no retroactive application to the sales application
of Bian Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the
time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the

effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open
to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public
Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect
of segregating the said land from the public domain.
The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land
is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123
Phil. 919)." 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings
were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under
either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only
a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would
deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-ininterest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of

vested rights. `A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police power' (16 C.J.S.
1177-78).

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view,

and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must
be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line
of cases already referred to, is that alienable public
land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at
the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being
at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as
a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial
and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

xxx xxx xxx

"6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be

abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx

application on the technicality that the Public Land

Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title
would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was
a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that
there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to
the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of
their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great
cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

which has passed the test of searching examination

and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the
1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential, limited to a brief paragraph in the
main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered
as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore,

by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
the names of the original persons who as natural
persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged."

Gutierrez, Jr., J ., I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco

v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from

reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter
from themselves applying for confirmation of title
and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this
would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a
liberal application of the rule on amendment to
conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in
Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling
of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it
breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and reestablished, as it were, doctrines the soundness of

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the

appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in
this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano,
JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that
my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and
Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better . . . and indeed the
correct view." My dissent was anchored on the
landmark 1909 case of Cario 2 through the 1925
case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein
to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is
established doctrine . . . that an open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of a land of the public
domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in
Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ])
by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
public domain and becomes private property." I
hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's

sake. But since we are reverting to the old abovecited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases
which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in amplification
of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act,
such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter."
The Court thus held in Susi that under the
presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the
rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only
a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for
it is not necessary that certificate of title should be
issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefor is sufficient . . . If
by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land
in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain, and had become
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and
beyond his authority to sell to any other person]." 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the
pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for
the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Cario
(the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of
ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his
application for registration) which reversed the
dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that
under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880,
"The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better,
in view of the other provisions, might be taken to
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of
it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect
of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns
the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto
which failed to adhere to the aforecited established
doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently
applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco

decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the

established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription
of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by
operation of law without the necessity of a prior
issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure
ceases to be of the public domain and becomes
private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent
corporation. (As stressed in Herico, supra, "the
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of
public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act
and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified
corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is
no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's
prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring
title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation
purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16,
1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which
contained no prohibition against corporations holding
public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike
the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
absolute prohibition, Even on the erroneous
assumption that the land remained public land
despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners
from time immemorial, respondent corporation's
lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and
P45 million investments redounding presumably to
the welfare and progress of the community,
particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to
which it donated part of the land for the townsite
created a vested right which could not be impaired by
the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as
sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been
ipso jure converted into private land and they had a
legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by
the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act
(which needed only to be established in confirmation
of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of
the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending

the period for the filing of such applications for

judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete
titles to alienable and disposable public lands
expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy
of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication
and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands,"
i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and
notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record
such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such
application which would have originally expired first
on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31,
1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended
to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to
December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons
may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in
effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis
mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform
to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold
and own private lands) and granting the applications
for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along
the same line from the majority ruling therein and
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court
would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the
applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than
the natural persons-transferors, under the particular
circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable
obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by
analogy, although the facts could be distinguished,
the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case,
was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of
our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solution would be to decide the matter as if the

application under Section 48(b) were filed by the

Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such
disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired,
while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in
effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on
the question of substance, and stated his opinion that
"the lots which are sought to be registered have
ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time
they were acquired by the petitioner corporation.
They are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and
all that is needed is the confirmation of the title.
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain is inapplicable." 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of
such applications to natural citizens who may prove
their undisputed and open possession of public lands
for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking
on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that
only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical
persons such as corporations, can actually, physically
and in reality possess public lands for the required
statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or
corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the
natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory
period of possession, the Act confers on them a
legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable
to follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title, although
they have lawfully transferred their title to the land.
But such procedural failure cannot and should not
defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the
above-cited opinions, that the lands are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by
the corporation's predecessors and the realistic
solution would be to consider the application for
confirmation as filed by the natural personstransferors, and in accordance with the evidence,
confirm their title to the private lands so converted by
operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to
the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to
the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a
round-about way and have the corporation reassign
its rights to the private land to natural persons (as I
understand), was done after the decision in the
Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the
purpose of complying on paper with the technicality
of having natural persons file the application for

confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or in interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) . . .
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
(c) . . .
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in
part, provides:
"SEC. 11. . . . No private corporation or association
may hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area;
nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in
excess of five hundred hectares . . ."
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and
constitutional provision prevent a corporation from
directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. CastroBartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva,
114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119
SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of
Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in
simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for

a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they
can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title,
it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for
the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous
"literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first
apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards
transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following
excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982].
"To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land
Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are
natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title
would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was
a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against
their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco.
and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such
natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of
law and the conclusive presumption therein provided
in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals
at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in
their names and adding to the overcrowded court
dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies
the statutory provision that only citizens (natural
persons) can apply for certificates of title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of
the public domain. That interpretation or construction
adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature"

(New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino

[UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v.
Alpers, 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in
73 Am. Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
"In the construction of statutes, the courts start with
the assumption that the legislature intended to enact
an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment
of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the
courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to
give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under
which the statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the act,
while the other will defeat it, the former construction
is preferred, One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory, or of
no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule
against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be
extended beyond the precise words used in the law,
and words or phrases may be altered or supplied,
where this is necessary to prevent a law from
becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a
statute is general, everything which is necessary to
make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication." (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com.
11 III 2d 456, 143 NE 2d 47; cited in 73 Am. Jur. 2d pp.
422-423).
The statutory provision and the constitutional
prohibition express a public policy. The proper course
for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest
manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a
construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this
Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA
799 [1982] and related cases.
||| (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 73002, [December 29, 1986], 230 PHIL 590615)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON
NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to
review the Decision 1 of the Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of
both the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 2 Branch 8, of
Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) 3 of Ibajay-Nabas,
Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the
application for registration of a parcel of land of
Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal
age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the
MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy.
Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated
as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374
square meters. The application seeks judicial
confirmation of respondent's imperfect title over the
aforesaid land. aTEACS
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on
the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for
the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the
heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a
later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed
a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February
20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default
against the whole world except as to the heirs of
Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel
of land was originally declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under
Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. 4 On July 9,
1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor
of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein
he renounced all his rights to the subject property and
confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming

sometime in 1955 or 1956. 5 Subsequently, the heirs

of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of respondent Naguit who thereupon started
occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco,
Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted
trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees
in addition to existing coconut trees which were then
50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes
due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels
of land surrounding the subject land which have been
issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and
her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for
registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the
public prosecutor manifested that the government did
not intend to present any evidence while oppositor
Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico
Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite
notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a
decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought
under the operation of the Property Registration
Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that
the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name
of Naguit. 6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land
applied for was declared alienable and disposable
only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from
Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region VI. 7 However, the court denied the motion for
reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.
8
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and
the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its
decision, dismissing the appeal. 9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court
rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by
the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision
of the RTC.

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure

question of law was filed by the Republic on
September 4, 2000. 10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
contending that the appellate court gravely erred in
holding that there is no need for the government's
prior release of the subject lot from the public domain
before it can be considered alienable or disposable
within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit
had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the
concept of owner for the required period. 11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether it
is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property.
Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant's possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court 12 in arguing that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject
land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section
14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to
1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the
OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
governing original registration proceedings, bears
close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws. ASEcHI
xxx xxx xxx
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an

application for registration of title under Section 14(1)

that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the
alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the
provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a
bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located. 13 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would
result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting
the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14
virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation
would even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in
the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already

an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its

exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in
Republic v. Court of Appeals. 14 Therein, the Court
noted that "to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute." 15 In that case, the
subject land had been certified by the DENR as
alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court
concluded that the alienable status of the land,
compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927,
sufficed to allow the application for registration of the
said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner
admits that the subject property was released and
certified as within alienable and disposable zone in
1980 by the DENR. 16

the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to

original registration through ordinary registration
proceedings. The right to file the application for
registration derives from a bona fide claim of
ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by
reason of the claimant's open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,
but those titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of

Appeals, 17 wherein the Court noted that while the
claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was
only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified
as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at
registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the
claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9)
years before the property was declared alienable and
disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application
was made years after the property had been certified
as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does
not apply.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.

A different rule obtains for forest lands, 18 such as

those which form part of a reservation for provincial
park purposes 19 the possession of which cannot
ripen into ownership. 20 It is elementary in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot
be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v.
Court of Appeals, 21 forestland is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
22 In the case at bar, the property in question was
undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable;
hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals. 23

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in

1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to
vest the right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced from July 26,
1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.
1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of
ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.
This new starting point is concordant with Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

It must be noted that the present case was decided

by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of

Indeed, there are no material differences between

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural

lands of the public domain," while the Property

Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain." It must be
noted though that the Constitution declares that
"alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands." 24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are
of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree
and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which governs and authorizes the application of
"those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. 25 There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.
26 With such conversion, such property may now fall
within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable
public land commenced on a date later than June 12,
1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may
have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be local in nature, it
having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old. 27 The inherent nature of the land but
confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application
of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that Naguit had been in possession in the
concept of owner for the required period. The
argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the
assertion shown earlier to be unfounded-that there
could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior
to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable
or disposable.

We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both

the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the
right to apply for registration owing to the continuous
possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of
the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is
primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the
factual findings made by lower courts. Notably,
possession since 1945 was established through proof
of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although
tax declarations and realty tax payment of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession
in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property and announces his adverse claim against
the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership. 28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel
of land by the respondent can be traced back to that
of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced
since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed
beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title
thereto which may be properly brought under the
operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in
possession of the land in the concept of an owner,
open, continuous, peaceful and without any
opposition from any private person and the
government itself makes her right thereto
undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection
under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057,
[January 17, 2005], 489 PHIL 405-420)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November
2002, 1 which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21
December 1999, 2 granting the application for land
registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto
brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC,
on 23 September 1998, a single application for
registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and
8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu
(Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee
simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan, on 25 June 1976. 3 Together with their
application for registration, respondents submitted
the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name
of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of
Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David; 4
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots; 5
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the
need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots; 6
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu
City on the absence of certificates of title covering the
Subject Lots; 7
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its
finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963; 8
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real
Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of
Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and
ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David,

covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994; 9 and

TEHDIA
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling
the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to
their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and
David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias,
while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David. 10
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the
respondents' application for registration of the Subject
Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply
with the period of adverse possession of the Subject
Lots required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of
title were not genuine and did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide
acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject
Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and were not subject to private
appropriation. 11
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999
at 8:30 a.m. 12 All owners of the land adjoining the
Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial
Hearing. 13 A copy of the Notice was also posted on
27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject
Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal
building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots
were located. 14 Finally, the Notice was also
published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999
15 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December
1999. 16
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the
MTC issued an Order of Special Default, 17 with only
petitioner Republic opposing the application for
registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents,
through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark
documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts.
The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive
further evidence from the respondents and to submit
a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its
Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation
of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422
and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It
subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000
declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999,
final and executory, and directing the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a

decree of registration for the Subject Lots. 18

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated
21 December 1999, to the Court of Appeals. 19 The
Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November
2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning
thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the
land sought to be registered has been classified as
within the alienable and disposable zone since June
25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of
the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things
which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of
patrimonial character shall not be the object of
prescription" and that "Ownership and other real
rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith."2005cdtai
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench,
their parents already acquired the subject parcels of
lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950
and that they cultivated the same and planted it with
jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees
(Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it
is undisputed that herein appellees or their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed
the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming
arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned
only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject
lots had been classified as within the alienable and
disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant
does not hold water. CTacSE
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being
alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report
dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of
prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By
express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with
much greater right, entitled to apply for its
registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529
which allows individuals to own land in any manner
provided by law. Again, even considering that
possession of appellees should only be reckoned from
1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject
lands alienable, herein appellees have been
possessing the subject parcels of land in open,
continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35
years already when they filed the instant application

for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such,

this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the
court a quo. 20
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review
and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the
following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject
Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. According to the petitioner Republic,
possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963
cannot be considered in determining compliance with
the periods of possession required by law. The Subject
Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only
on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also
alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked
the ruling in Republic v. Doldol, 21 where this Court
declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is
presently phrased, requires that possession of land of
the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or
earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from
fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and
separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner
Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that
the application for registration of title to land shall be
filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file
a single application only in case they are co-owners.
While an application may cover two parcels of land, it
is allowed only when the subject parcels of land
belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case
the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are
situated within the same province. Where the
authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a
statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction
is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the
proceedings will be utterly void. Since the
respondents failed to comply with the procedure for
land registration under the Property Registration
Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void,
as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court
finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with
and hear the application for registration filed by the
respondents but for reasons different from those
presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does
not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and
proceed with respondents' application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration
of the Subject Lots even though they were not coowners. Respondents Jeremias and David were
actually seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
CSEHcT
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural
irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal
to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's
pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 22 to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which
constitute non-compliance with the above-cited
sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not
invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to
proceed with the case because the manner or mode
of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute
which is mandatory has not been strictly followed,
thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and
void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner
Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse
committed by the respondents should not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their
application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree 23 recognizes and
expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing
of a single application by several applicants for as
long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land
sought to be registered; 24 and (2) the filing of a
single application for registration of several parcels of
land provided that the same are located within the
same province. 25 The Property Registration Decree is
silent, however, as to the present situation wherein
two applicants filed a single application for two

parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and

individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to
provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to
the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of
action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree
itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar
as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree,
be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases
by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient."
Considering every application for land registration
filed in strict accordance with the Property
Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then
the defect in the joint application for registration filed
by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a
misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of
a single or joint application for registration,
respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately,
should have filed separate applications for
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not
involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear
and proceed with the case. 26 They are not even
accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. 27 Instead,
under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of
action and parties involve an implied admission of the
court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the
court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or
on its own initiative, to order the severance of the
misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action);
and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of
any claim against said misjoined party, also to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the
present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC
motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It
is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect
the misjoinder when the application for registration
was still pending before it; and more regrettable that
the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the
MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the
causes of action and parties, raising the issue of
misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the

publication requirements mandated by the Property

Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested
with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and
parties in the present Petition did not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration
proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a
defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents'
application for registration. ASDTEa
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, 28
and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless
there be constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice. 29
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree
requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial
Hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be
made in the following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time
for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to
be published once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines:
Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time to show cause why
the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
CEDHTa
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted
Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree
expressly provides that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court, it still affirms its
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals 30
that publication in a newspaper of general circulation
is mandatory for the land registration court to validly
confirm and register the title of the applicant or
applicants. That Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree enumerated and described in

detail the requirements of publication, mailing, and

posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such
requirements, including publication of the Notice in a
newspaper of general circulation, is essential and
imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the
same case, this Court expounded on the reason
behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation,
thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of
general circulation should be deemed mandatory
when the law already requires notice by publication in
the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting,
all of which have already been complied with in the
case at hand. The reason is due process and the
reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read
and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes
delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested
parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties
may not be owners of neighboring properties, and
may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the
all encompassing in rem nature of land registration
cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as
possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting. 31
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by
the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999
at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in
the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August
1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it
was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily
newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the
province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas
and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than
three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after
the date of the initial hearing, would already be
worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as
it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had
a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due
process for it was already too late for him to appear
before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to
oppose respondents' application for registration, and
to present his claim and evidence in support of such
claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the
claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on

the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and

would forever be barred from contesting respondents'
application for registration and even the registration
decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact,
the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03
September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in
the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to
no publication at all, having the same ultimate result.
Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice,
the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots
and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents'
application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC
Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of
respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422
and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order,
dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21
December 1999 final and executory, and directing the
LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having
been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period
of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial
confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete
title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did
not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration, this Court
nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal
issue on the required period of possession for
acquiring title to public land. TAEDcS
Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not
state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject
Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title
to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents,
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25
June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony,
claimed that his parents had been in possession of
the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since
1950. 32
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification,
submitted by respondents themselves, the Subject
Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I,
Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion,

Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No.

4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside
Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest
Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932
dated June 29, 1992." 33 The Subject Lots are thus
clearly part of the public domain, classified as
alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public
land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied, from the government; 34
and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to
public land should show that his title was acquired
from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. 35
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of
the public domain, except timber and mineral lands,
friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted
to the State. 36 It explicitly enumerates the means by
which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). 37
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by
separate chapters of the Public Land Act because
there are specific requirements and application
procedure for every mode. 38 Since respondents
herein filed their application before the MTC, 39 then
it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the
judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect
or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares,
40 may be availed of by persons identified under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for

confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a

certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
TIAEac
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural
minorities, respondents may only be entitled to
judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect
or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended,
now requires adverse possession of the land since 12
June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the
Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on
25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the
date when the Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession; such possession can never ripen
into ownership and unless the land had been
classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto.
41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not
have complied with the period of possession required
by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject
Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of
Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that

respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots

under the Property Registration Decree. According to
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property
Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in
any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that
the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots,
by themselves and through their predecessors-ininterest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998,
when they filed their application, have acquired title
to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription
under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of
the Civil Code. 42
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference
between the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration
Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed
by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for
pertains to the State, and that the occupants and
possessors only claim an interest in the same by
virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and
notorious possession. 43 As established by this Court
in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots
respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
and respondents may have acquired title thereto only
under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though
respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title
to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their
application for judicial confirmation or legalization
thereof must be in accordance with the Property
Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land
Act reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal
representatives or successors in right, claiming any
lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this
chapter, must in every case present an application to
the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the
validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into
and that a certificate of title be issued to them under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act. 44
Hence, respondents' application for registration of the
Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial
requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act and the procedural requirements under the
Property Registration Decree.

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription

of ownership and other real rights apply in general to
all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically
governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one
another, the Public Land Act may be considered a
special law 45 that must take precedence over the
Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of
statutory construction that between a general law and
a special law, the special law prevails Generalia
specialibus non derogant. 46
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November
2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of
Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21
December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February
2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents'
application for registration is DISMISSED. EAIcCS
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., is out of the country.
||| (Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, [May 26,
2005], 498 PHIL 227-247)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179987. September 3, 2013.]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN (Represented by Sally
A. Malabanan), petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J p:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for
reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the
ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application
of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that
they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to
the registration in accordance with either Section 14 (1) or
Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree). SIcEHC
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with
an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30
years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of
his title. 1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial
a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No.
9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.

Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite

containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. 2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan's application for land
registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application
for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-040173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy
One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN,
who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. aDACcH
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred
in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA declared that under Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Noting
that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property
had been declared alienable and disposable only on March
15, 1982, Velazco's possession prior to March 15, 1982 could
not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan's period
of possession.

Due to Malabanan's intervening demise during the appeal in

the CA, his heirs elevated the CA's decision of February 23,
2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning
of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in
Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject
of the application for registration as alienable and disposable
should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere
obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab
initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
AacCIT
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the property
had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason
of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years. According to them,
what was essential was that the property had been
"converted" into private property through prescription at the
time of the application without regard to whether the
property sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on
certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his
part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit
that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic 8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened
it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that

Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo

Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land
with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof;
that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article
1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that
when Malabanan filed the application for registration on
February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the
land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when
the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
ASTcaE
The Republic's Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to
obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the
decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be
imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of
the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to
ownership
Land, which is an immovable property, 10 may be classified
as either of public dominion or of private ownership. 11 Land
is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended
for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for
public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. 12 Land belonging to the
State that is not of such character, or although of such
character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. 13
Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal

concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State. 15 This
means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of
such patrimony. 16 All lands not appearing to be clearly
under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the
public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified
or alienated them to private persons. 17 HCEcAa
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and
disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution, 18 lands of the public domain were classified
into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. 19
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified
lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with
the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks. 20
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according
to the uses to which they may be devoted. 21 The
identification of lands according to their legal classification
is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the
Executive Department. 22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the
type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands
of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code, 23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only
be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or
timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of

alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as

agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is necessary
to enable such reclassification, 25 and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is
vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If,
however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public
land is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify
lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the
State no longer intends the land to be used for public service
or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian
Doctrine is applicable. cEaACD
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11 (4), in relation to Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession
by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, viz.:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the

land is located for confirmation of their claims and the

issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied) cDCEIA
Note that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act used the
words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or
national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act.
What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the
descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits
the coverage of Section 48 (b) to only the agricultural lands
of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations
under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the
following requirements in order for his application to come
under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, 28
to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-ininterest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is

vested with the authority to classify lands of the public

domain, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14 (1) of theProperty Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of
a public land as agricultural. HcaATE
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification
of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or
by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the
reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of
which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement
that the land subject of the registration should have been
classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived
only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. This means that the character of the property subject
of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it. Alienable
public land held by a possessor, either personally or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is

converted to private property by the mere lapse or

completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this
doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public
domain for as long as the lands were already converted to
private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the
Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need not be
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period
of possession. HaTDAE
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
at the time of the application for registration is necessary
only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also
serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant's possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the
Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the
courts. 31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public
Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands
in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years
prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should
always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) 33 in
order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in
the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified
applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations. 34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national

wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby

converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the
State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48 (b) of thePublic Land Act
but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree. 35 As such, prescription can
now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to
the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely: EaIDAT
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient

evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted
to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible
for registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or
the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no
longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth.

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered

alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the
mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48 (b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant's possession and occupation of the land dated back
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an
imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property. 37

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion

for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or

declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that
the land has been already converted to private ownership
prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a
condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article
1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription. HaSEcA

BRION, J.:

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relationship to a party.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I submitted my vote joining the
separate opinion of Justice Brion.
Brion, J., in the result: see separate opinion.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
Prefatory Statement
This Separate Opinion maintains my view that, on the merits,
the petition should be denied, as the petitioners, Heirs of
Mario Malabanan, failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have a right to the property applied
for through either ordinary or extraordinary prescription. I
share this view with the majority; hence, the Court is
unanimous in the result in resolving the issue presented to us
for our resolution. DSETac
As lawyers and Court watchers know, "unanimity in the
result" carries a technical meaning and implication in the

lawyers' world; the term denotes that differing views exist

within the Court to support the conclusion they commonly
reached. The differences may be in the modality of reaching
the unanimous result, or there may just be differences in
views on matters discussed within the majority opinion. A
little of both exists in arriving at the Court's present result,
although the latter type of disagreement predominates.
This Separate Opinion is submitted to state for the record my
own (and of those agreeing with me) view on the question of
how Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14 (1)
and (2) of the PRD should operate, particularly in relation
with one another, with the Constitution and with the Civil
Code provisions on property and prescription.
A critical point I make relates to what I call the majority's
"absurdity argument" that played a major part in our actual
deliberations. The argument, to me, points to insufficiencies
in our laws that the Court wishes to rectify in its perennial
quest "to do justice." I firmly believe though that any
insufficiency there may be particularly one that relates to
the continuing wisdom of the law is for the Legislature,
not for this Court, to correct in light of our separate and
mutually exclusive roles under the Constitution. The Court
may be all-powerful within its own sphere, but the rule of
law, specifically, the supremacy of the Constitution, dictates
that we recognize our own limitations and that we desist
when a problem already relates to the wisdom of the law
before us. All we can do is point out the insufficiency, if any,
for possible legislative or executive action. It is largely in this
sense that I believe our differing views on the grant and
disposition of lands of the public domain should be written
and given the widest circulation.
I wrap up this Prefatory Statement with a cautionary note on
how the discussions in this Resolution should be read and
appreciated. Many of the divergent views expressed, both the
majority's and mine, are not completely necessary for the
resolution of the direct issues submitted to us; thus, they are,
under the given facts of the case and the presented and
resolved issues, mostly obiter dicta. On my part, I
nevertheless present them for the reason I have given above,
and as helpful aid for the law practitioners and the law
students venturing into the complex topic of public land
grants, acquisitions, and ownership.
Preliminary Considerations
As a preliminary matter, I submit that:

1.the hierarchy of applicable laws must be given full

application in considering lands of the public domain.
Foremost in the hierarchy is the Philippine Constitution
(particularly its Article XII), followed by the applicable
special laws Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public
Land Act (PLA) and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree (PRD). The Civil Code and
other general laws apply suppletorily and to the extent called
for by the primary laws; and DCHaTc
2.the ponencia's ruling that the classification of public lands
as alienable and disposable does not need to date back to
June 12, 1945 or earlier is incorrect because:
a. under the Constitution's Regalian Doctrine, 1 classification
is a required step whose full import should be given full
effect and recognition. The legal recognition of possession
prior to classification runs counter to, and effectively
weakens, the Regalian Doctrine;
b. the terms of the PLA only find full application from the
time a land of the public domain is classified as agricultural
and declared alienable and disposable. Thus, the possession
required under Section 48 (b) of this law cannot be
recognized prior to the required classification and
declaration;
c. under the Civil Code,"[o]nly things and rights which are
susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." 2 Prior to the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot
be appropriated, hence, any claimed possession prior to
classification cannot have legal effects;

I likewise submit the following short overview as an aide

memoire in understanding our basic public land laws.
A. The Overall Scheme at a Glance
1. The Philippine Constitution
The Philippine Constitution is the fountainhead of the laws
and rules relating to lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. It starts with the postulate that all lands of the
public domain classified into agricultural, forests or
timber, mineral lands and national parks are owned by the
State. 4 This principle states the Regalian Doctrine, and
classifies land according to its nature and alienability.
By way of exception to the Regalian Doctrine, the
Constitution also expressly states that "[w]ith the exception
of agricultural lands [which may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted], 5 all
other natural resources shall not be alienated." 6 Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. 7
2. The Public Land Act
How and to what extent agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated and may pass into private or nonState hands are determined under the PLA, which governs
the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and, other than the
Constitution, is the country's primary substantive law on the
matter.
As a rule, alienation and disposition of lands of the public
domain are exercises in determining:

d. there are other modes of acquiring alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain under the PLA. This
legal reality renders the ponencia's absurdity argument
misplaced; and

a. whether a public land is or has been classified as

agricultural (in order to take the land out of the mass of lands
of the public domain that, by the terms of the Constitution, is
inalienable); CDcaSA

e. the alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of

the law and is a matter for the Legislature, not for this Court,
to address.

b. once classified as agricultural, whether it has been

declared by the State to be alienable and disposable. To
reiterate, even agricultural lands, prior to their declaration as
alienable, are part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain; and

In these lights, I submit that all previous contrary rulings

(particularly, Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals
[Naguit]) 3 should in the proper case be abandoned
and rejected for being based on legally-flawed premises and
as aberrations in land registration jurisprudence. HCEaDI
I.THE LAWS AFFECTING PUBLIC LANDS

c. whether the terms of classification, alienation or

disposition have been complied with. In a confirmation of
imperfect title, there must be possession since June 12, 1945
or earlier, in an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
manner, by the applicant himself or by his predecessor-in-

interest, of public agricultural land that since that time has

been declared alienable and disposable, as clearly provided
under PD No. 1073.
The Civil Code provides that "[o]nly things and rights which
are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." 8 Prior to the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot
be appropriated, hence, any claimed possession cannot have
legal effects;
d. upon compliance with the required period and character of
possession of alienable public agricultural land, the possessor
acquires ownership, thus converting the land to one of
private ownership and entitling the applicant-possessor to
confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA and
registration under Section 14 (1) of the PRD.
3. Classification under the Civil Code
Separately from the classification according to the nature of
land under the Constitution, another system of classification
of property is provided under the Civil Code.
The Civil Code classifies property (as a general term,
compared to land which is only a species of property, labeled
under the Civil Code as immovable property) 9 in relation
with the person to whom it belongs. 10 AcCTaD
Property under the Civil Code may belong to the public
dominion (or property pertaining to the State for public use,
for public service or for the development of the national
wealth) 11 or it may be of private ownership (which
classification includes patrimonial property or property held
in private ownership by the State). 12 Significantly, the Civil
Code expressly provides that "[p]roperty of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." 13
What is otherwise a simple classification from the point of
view of the person owning it, assumes a measure of
complexity when the property is land of the public domain,
as the Constitution, in unequivocal terms, requires
classification and declarations on the means and manner of
granting, alienating, disposing, and acquiring lands of the
public domain that all originally belong to the State under the
Regalian Doctrine.
In a reconciled consideration of the Constitution and the
Civil Code classifications, made necessary because they have
their respective independent focuses and purposes, certain

realities will have to be recognized or deduced:

First. As a first principle, in case of any conflict, the terms of
the Constitution prevail. No ifs and buts can be admitted with
respect to this recognition, as the Constitution is supreme
over any other law or legal instrument in the land.
Second. A necessary corollary to the first principle is that all
substantive considerations of land ownership, alienation, or
disposition must always take into account the constitutional
requirements.

An important provision that should not be missed in

considering prescription is Article 1108 of the Civil
Code,which states that prescription does not run against the
State and its subdivisions. Article 1113 of the Civil Code is a
companion provision stating that "[a]ll things which are
within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription."

A piece of land may fall under both classifications (i.e.,

under the constitutional classification based on the legal
nature of the land and alienability, and under the civil law
classification based on the ownership of the land). This can
best be appreciated in the discussion below, under the topic
"The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription." 14 DEIHAa

The above-cited rules express civil law concepts, but their

results are effectively replicated in the scheme governing
lands of the public domain since these lands, by
constitutional fiat, cannot be alienated and are thus outside
the commerce of man, except under the rigid terms of the
Constitution and the PLA. For example, confirmation of
imperfect title the possession-based rule under the PLA
can only take place with respect to agricultural lands already
declared alienable and possessed for the required period
(since June 12, 1945 or earlier). ATCEIc

4. Prescription under the Civil Code

5. The PRD

Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is a mode of

acquiring ownership provided under the Civil Code,15 but is
not mentioned as one of the modes of acquiring ownership of
alienable public lands of the public domain under the PLA.
16

The PRD was issued in 1978 to update the Land Registration

Act (Act No. 496) and relates solely to the registration of
property. The law does not provide the means for acquiring
title to land; it refers solely to the means or procedure of
registering and rendering indefeasible title already acquired.

A point of distinction that should be noted is that the PLA,

under its Section 48 (b), provides for a system that allows
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier to ripen into
ownership. The PLA, however, does not refer to this mode as
acquisitive prescription but as basis for confirmation of title,
and requires a specified period of possession of alienable
agricultural land, not the periods for ordinary or
extraordinary prescription required under the Civil Code.
Ownership that vests under Section 48 (b) of the PLA can be
registered under Section 14 (1) of the PRD.

The PRD mainly governs the registration of lands and places

them under the Torrens System. It does not, by itself, create
title nor vest one. It simply confirms a title already created
and already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible. 17

Third. The classification and the requirements under the

Constitution and under the Civil Code may overlap without
any resulting violation of the Constitution.

The PRD, under its Section 14 (2), recognizes that

registration of title can take place as soon as ownership over
private land has vested due to prescription "[t]hose who
have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws." Thus, prescription
was introduced into the PRD land registration scheme but not
into the special law governing the grant and alienation of
lands of the public domain, i.e., the PLA.

In a side by side comparison, the PLA is the substantive law

that classifies and provides for the disposition of alienable
lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the PRD
refers to the manner of bringing registerable title to lands,
among them, alienable public lands, within the coverage of
the Torrens system; in terms of substantive content, the PLA
must prevail. 18 On this consideration, only land of the
public domain that has passed into private ownership under
the terms of the PLA can be registered under the PRD.
II.THE CASE AND THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
The Case.
Before the Court are the motions separately filed by the
petitioners and by the respondent Republic of the
Philippines, both of them seeking reconsideration of the

Court's Decision dated April 29, 2009 which denied the

petitioners' petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The Underlying Facts
The present case traces its roots to the land registration case
instituted by the petitioners' predecessor, Mario Malabanan
(Malabanan). On February 20, 1998, Malabanan filed an
application for the registration of a 71,324-square meter land,
located in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite, with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite Tagaytay City, Branch 18. 19
Malabanan alleged that he purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco. The property was originally part of a 22hectare land owned by Lino Velazco (Velazco), who was
succeeded by his four sons, among them, Eduardo Velazco.
20
Apart from his purchase of the property, Malabanan
anchored his registration petition on his and his predecessorsin-interest's open, notorious, continuous, adverse and
peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years.
Malabanan claimed that the land is an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, presenting as proof the
Certification dated June 11, 2001 of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The
Certification stated that the land was "verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 21
ACaTIc
The Issue Before the Court.
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit
that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into
patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos, 22 Menguito v. Republic, 23
and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 24 they argue that
the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code;
that Malabanan had purchased the property from Velazco,
believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-ininterest had been the real owners of the land, with the right to
validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the 10-year period prescribed by Article 1134
of the Civil Code,in relation with Section 14 (2) of the PRD,

applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed his

application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had
already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years,
reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
inalienable and disposable by the State.
The respondent seeks the partial reconsideration in order to
seek clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Republic of the Phils. v. Herbieto. 25 It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to regi stration

only when the land subject of the application had

been declared alienable and disposable since June 12,
1945.
As presented in the petition and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration, the direct issue before the
Court is whether there had been acquisition of title,
based on ordinary or extraordinary prescription, over
a land of the public domain declared alienable as of
March 15, 1982. The issue was not about confirmation
of an imperfect title where possession started on or
before June 12, 1945 since possession had not been
proven to have dated back to or before that date.
The Antecedents and the Ruling under Review
On December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment
favoring Malabanan, approving his application for
registration of the land "under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or PD 1529." 26 aSHAIC
The respondent, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision
with the Court of Appeals (CA). The OSG contended
that Malabanan failed to prove: (1) that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and (2) that he had not been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. During the pendency of the appeal
before the CA, Malabanan died and was substituted
by the petitioners.
In its decision dated February 23, 2007, the CA
reversed the RTC decision and dismissed Malabanan's
application for registration. Applying the Court's ruling
in Herbieto, the CA held that "under Section 14 (1) of
the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as
alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession." 27 Since the land was classified
as alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982,

any possession prior to this date cannot be

considered.
The petitioners assailed the CA decision before this
Court through a petition for review on certiorari. On
April 29, 2009, the Court denied the petition. The
Court's majority (through Justice Dante Tinga)
summarized its ruling as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the PRD,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and
confirms that "those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands
based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession
since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. cHDAIS
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code,prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property
is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code.And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which

patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least
ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. 28
Based on this ruling, the majority denied the petition,
but established the above rules which embody
principles contrary to Section 48 (b) of the PLA and
which are not fully in accord with the concept of
prescription under Section 14 (2) of the PRD, in
relation with the Civil Code provisions on property and
prescription.
In its ruling on the present motions for
reconsideration, the ponencia essentially affirms the
above ruling, rendering this Separate Opinion and its
conclusions necessary. DSAICa
III.DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENTED ISSUES
A.Section 48 (b) of the PLA: Confirmation of Imperfect
Title
Section 48 (b) of the PLA is the core provision on the
confirmation of imperfect title and must be read with
its related provision in order to fully be appreciated.
Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the
authority to administer and dispose of alienable public
lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands open to
disposition or concession, and the requirement that
they should be officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very
significant provision, states that
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement
(2) By sale
(3) By lease
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title:
(a) By judicial legalization
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
[emphases ours]

Finally, Section 48 of the PLA, on confirmation of

imperfect title, embodies a grant of title to the
qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public
land, under the following terms:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit: IEcaHS
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the . . . United States have applied for
the purchase, composition or other form of grant of
lands of the public domain under the laws and royal
decrees then in force and have instituted and
prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith,
but have[,] with or without default upon their part, or
for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied
and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing
of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
except as against the Government, since July twentysixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof. [emphasis
ours]
Subsection (a) has now been deleted, while
subsection (b) has been amended by PD No. 1073 as
follows:

Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section

48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-ininterest, under a [bona fide] claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.

lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable

because, in the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified public land that fully
belongs to the State. This is fully supported by
Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the PLA. 31 If the land is
either mineral, timber or national parks that cannot
be alienated, it defies legal logic to recognize that
possession of these unclassified lands can produce
legal effects.

Based on these provisions and a narrow reading of the

"since June 12, 1945" timeline, the ponencia now
rules that the declaration that the land is agricultural
and alienable can be made at the time of application
for registration and need not be from June 12, 1945 or
earlier. 29 This conclusion follows the ruling in Naguit
(likewise penned by Justice Tinga) that additionally
argued that reckoning the declarations from June 12,
1945 leads to absurdity. cATDIH

Parenthetically, PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry

Code states that "Those [lands of public domain] still
to be classified under the present system shall
continue to remain as part of the public forest." 32 It
further declares that public forest covers "the mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest
purposes and which are not." 33 EDIHSC

For the reasons outlined below, I cannot agree with

these positions and with the Naguit ruling on which it
is based:

Thus, PD No. 705 confirms that all lands of the public

domain that remain unclassified are considered as
forest land. 34 As forest land, these lands of the
public domain cannot be alienated until they have
been reclassified as agricultural lands. For purposes of
the present case, these terms confirm the position
that re/classification is essential at the time
possession is acquired under Section 48 (b) of the
PLA.

First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The

Constitution classifies public lands into agricultural,
mineral, timber lands and national parks. Of these,
only agricultural lands can be alienated. 30 Without
the requisite classification, there can be no basis to
determine which lands of the public domain are
alienable and which are not. Hence, classification is a
constitutionally-required step whose importance
should be given full legal recognition and effect.
Otherwise stated, without classification into
disposable agricultural land, the land continues to
form part of the mass of the public domain that, not
being agricultural, must be mineral, timber land or
national parks that are completely inalienable and, as
such, cannot be possessed with legal effects. To
recognize possession prior to any classification is to
do violence to the Regalian Doctrine; the ownership
and control that the Regalian Doctrine embodies will
be less than full if the possession that should be
with the State as owner, but is also elsewhere without
any solid legal basis can anyway be recognized.
Note in this regard that the terms of the PLA do not
find full application until a classification into alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
is made. In this situation, possession cannot be
claimed under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Likewise, no imperfect title can be confirmed over

From these perspectives, the legal linkage between

(1) the classification of public land as alienable and
disposable and (2) effective possession that can ripen
into a claim under Section 48 (b) of the PLA can
readily be appreciated.
The Leonen Opinion
Incidentally, Justice Marvic F. Leonen opines in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that the Regalian
Doctrine was not incorporated in our Constitution and
that "there could be land, considered as property,
where ownership has vested as a result of either
possession or prescription but still, as yet
undocumented." 35
I will respond to this observation that, although
relating to the nature of the land applied for (land of
the public domain) and to the Regalian Doctrine, still
raises aspects of these matters that are not exactly
material to the direct issues presented in the present
case. I respond to correct for the record and at the
earliest opportunity what I consider to be an
erroneous view.

The Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in all the

Constitutions of the Philippines (1935, 1973 and
1987) and the statutes governing private individuals'
land acquisition and registration. In his Separate
Opinion in Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Natural
Resources, 36 former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
made a brief yet informative historical discussion on
how the Regalian Doctrine was incorporated in our
legal system, especially in all our past and present
organic laws. His historical disquisition was quoted in
La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos
37 and the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the
DENR, et al. v. Yap and Sacay, et al. v. The Secretary
of the DENR, 38 which were also quoted in Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin's Separate Opinion in his very brief
discussion on how the doctrine was carried over from
our Spanish and American colonization up until our
present legal system.
Insofar as our organic laws are concerned, La BugalB'laan confirms that: DcaECT
one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the
1935 Constitutional Convention [was the
nationalization and conservation of the natural
resources of the country.]
There was an overwhelming sentiment in the
Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership
of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was
seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the state's power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.
The delegates [to] the Constitutional Convention very
well knew that the concept of State ownership of land
and natural resources was introduced by the
Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it
was continued and applied by the Americans. To
remove all doubts, the Convention approved the
provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx

The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine.

The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII states: "All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State." 39

full import appears from PD No. 1073 that amended

Section 48 (b) of the PLA. While the resulting Section
48 (b) of the PLA did not expressly state what PD No.
1073 introduced in terms of exact wording, PD No.
1073 itself, as formulated, shows the intent to count
the alienability from June 12, 1945. To quote the exact
terms of PD No. 1073: CDISAc

In these lights, I believe that, at this point in our legal

history, there can be no question that the Regalian
Doctrine remains in the pure form interpreted by this
Court; it has resiliently endured throughout our
colonial history, was continually confirmed in all our
organic laws, and is presently embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of our present Constitution. Short of a
constitutional amendment duly ratified by the people,
the views and conclusions of this Court on the
Regalian Doctrine should not and cannot be changed.
cACEHI

Section 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section

48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-ininterest, under a [bona fide] claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphases and
underscores ours]

Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is

essentially a civil law term that can best be
understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence
of any specific definition in the PLA, other than in
terms of time of possession. 40
Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that "[o]nly
things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior
to the declaration of alienability, a land of the public
domain cannot be appropriated; hence, any claimed
possession cannot have legal effects. In fact, whether
an application for registration is filed before or after
the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if,
in one as in the other, no effective possession can be
recognized prior to and within the proper period for
the declaration of alienability.
To express this position in the form of a direct
question: How can possession before the declaration
of alienability be effective when the land then
belonged to the State against whom prescription does
not run?

On January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand E.

Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new
Constitution. Article XIV on the National Economy and
Patrimony contained provisions similar to the 1935
Constitution with regard to Filipino participation in the
nation's natural resources. Section, 8, Article XIV
thereof[.]

Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date

June 12, 1945. The ponencia concludes based on
its statutory construction reasoning and reading of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA that the June 12, 1945
cut-off is only required for purposes of possession and
that it suffices if the land has been classified as
alienable agricultural land at the time of application
for registration. 41

xxx xxx xxx

This cut-off date was painstakingly set by law and its

In reading this provision, it has been claimed that June

12, 1945 refers only to the required possession and
not to the declaration of alienability of the land
applied for. The terms of PD No. 1073, however, are
plain and clear even from the grammatical
perspective alone. The term "since June 12, 1945" is
unmistakably separated by a comma from the
conditions of both alienability and possession, thus,
plainly showing that it refers to both alienability and
possession. This construction showing the direct,
continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain to June 12,
1945 under the wording of the Decree is clear and
should be respected, particularly if read with the
substantive provisions on ownership of lands of the
public domain and the limitations that the law
imposes on possession.
Fourth. Other modes of acquisition of lands under the
PLA. The cited Naguit's absurdity argument that the
ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent than
real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for
the declaration of alienability will not render the grant
of alienable public lands out of reach.
The acquisition of ownership and title may still be
obtained by other modes under the PLA. Among other
laws, Republic Act (RA) No. 6940 allowed the use of
free patents. 42 It was approved on March 28, 1990;
hence, counting 30 years backwards, possession since
April 1960 or thereabouts qualified a possessor to
apply for a free patent. 43 Additionally, the other
administrative modes provided under Section 11 of
the PLA are still open, particularly, homestead

settlement, sales and lease.

Incidentally, the ponencia mentions RA No. 10023,
entitled "An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free
Patents to Residential Lands," in its discussions. This
statute, however, has no relevance to the present
case because its terms apply to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain (necessarily
agricultural lands under the Constitution) that have
been reclassified as residential under Section 9 (b) of
the PLA. 45 IEAacT
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom or the absurdity of
the law. This Court acts beyond the limits of the
constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in
giving Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by PD
No. 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain wording.
Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that
is not there even if the purpose is to avoid an absurd
situation.
If the Court believes that a law already has absurd
effects because of the passage of time, its role under
the principle of separation of powers is not to give the
law an interpretation that is not there in order to
avoid the perceived absurdity. If the Court does, it
thereby intrudes into the realm of policy a role
delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If
only for this reason, the Court should avoid expanding
through the present ponencia and its cited cases
the plain meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as
amended by PD No. 1073.
In the United States where the governing
constitutional rule is likewise the separation of powers
between the Legislative and the Judiciary, Justice
Antonin Scalia (in the book Reading Law co-authored
with Bryan A. Garner) made the pithy observation
that:
To the extent that people give this view any credence,
the notion that judges may (even should) improvise
on constitutional and statutory text enfeebles the
democratic polity. As Justice John Marshall Harlan
warned in the 1960s, an invitation to judicial
lawmaking results inevitably in "a lessening, on the
one hand, of judicial independence and, on the other,
of legislative responsibility, thus polluting the
bloodstream of our system of government." Why
these alarming outcomes? First, when judges fashion
law rather than fairly derive it from governing texts,
they subject themselves to intensified political
pressures in the appointment process, in their

retention, and in the arguments made to them.

Second, every time a court constitutionalizes a new
sliver of law as by finding a "new constitutional
right" to do this, that, or the other that sliver
becomes thenceforth untouchable by the political
branches. In the American system, a legislature has
no power to abridge a right that has been
authoritatively held to be part of the Constitution
even if that newfound right does not appear in the
text. Over the past 50 years especially, we have seen
the judiciary incrementally take control of larger and
larger swaths of territory that ought to be settled
legislatively. IcHTED
It used to be said that judges do not "make" law
they simply apply it. In the 20th century, the legal
realists convinced everyone that judges do indeed
make law. To the extent that this was true, it was
knowledge that the wise already possessed and the
foolish could not be trusted with. It was true, that is,
that judges did not really "find" the common law but
invented it over time. Yet this notion has been
stretched into a belief that judges "make" law through
judicial interpretation of democratically enacted
statutes. Consider the following statement by John P.
Dawson, intended to apply to statutory law:
It seems to us inescapable that judges should have a
part in creating law creating it as they apply it. In
deciding the multifarious disputes that are brought
before them, we believe that judges in any legal
system invariably adapt legal doctrines to new
situations and thus give them new content.
Now it is true that in a system such as ours, in which
judicial decisions have a stare decisis effect, a court's
application of a statute to a "new situation" can be
said to establish the law applicable to that situation
that is, to pronounce definitively whether and how the
statute applies to that situation. But establishing this
retail application of the statute is probably not what
Dawson meant by "creating law," "adapt[ing] legal
doctrines," and "giv[ing] them new content." Yet
beyond that retail application, good judges dealing
with statutes do not make law. They do not "give new
content" to the statute, but merely apply the content
that has been there all along, awaiting application to
myriad factual scenarios. To say that they "make law"
without this necessary qualification is to invite the
taffy-like stretching of words or the ignoring of
words altogether. 46
In the Philippines, a civil law country where the

Constitution is very clear on the separation of powers

and the assignment of constitutional duties, I believe
that this Court should be very careful in delineating
the line between the constitutionally-allowed
interpretation and the prohibited judicial legislation,
given the powers that the 1987 Constitution has
entrusted to this Court. As a Court, we are given more
powers than the U.S. Supreme Court; under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, we are supposed
to act, as a matter of duty, on any grave abuse of
discretion that occurs anywhere in government. While
broad, this power should nevertheless be exercised
with due respect for the separation of powers doctrine
that underlies our Constitution.
B. Registration under Section 14 (1) and (2) of the
PRD
Complementing the substance that the PLA provides
are the provisions of the PRD that set out the
registration of the title that has accrued under the
PLA. Section 14 of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives: CIScaA
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law. [emphasis and
italics ours]
As mentioned earlier, the PLA is the substantive law
on the grant and disposition of alienable lands of the
public domain. The PRD, on the other hand, sets out
the manner of bringing registrable lands, among them
alienable public lands, within the coverage of the
Torrens system. In this situation, in terms of
substantive content, the PLA should prevail.

1. Section 14 (1) of the PRD is practically a reiteration

of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, with the difference that
they govern two different aspects of confirmation of
imperfect title relating to alienable lands of the public
domain. The PLA has its own substantive focus, while
Section 14 (1) of the PRD, bearing on the same
matter, defines what title may be registered. For this
reason, the discussions of Section 48 (b) apply with
equal force, mutatis mutandis, to Section 14 (1) of the
PRD.
2. Section 14 (2) of the PRD is another matter. By its
express terms, the prescription that it speaks of
applies only to private lands. Thus, on plain reading,
Section 14 (2) should not apply to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain that Section 14
(1) covers. This is the significant difference between
Section 14 (1) and 14 (2). The former Section 14
(1) is relevant when the ownership of an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain vests in the
occupant or possessor under the terms of Section 48
(b) of the PLA, even without the registration of a
confirmed title since the land ipso jure becomes a
private land. Section 14 (2), on the other hand,
applies to situations when ownership of private lands
vests on the basis of prescription. DcAaSI
The prescription that Section 14 (2) of the PRD speaks
of finds no application to alienable lands of the public
domain specifically, to Section 48 (b) of the PLA
since this provision, as revised by PD No. 1073 in
January 1977, simply requires possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier, regardless
of the period the property was occupied (although
when PD No. 1073 was enacted in 1977, the property
would have been possessed for at least 32 years by
the claimant if his possession commenced exactly on
June 12, 1945, or longer if possession took place
earlier).
Parenthetically, my original April 29, 2009 Opinion
stated that the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 appeared
to be devoid of legal significance as far as the PLA
was concerned. This statement notwithstanding, it
should be appreciated that prior to PD No. 1073,
Section 48 (b) of the PLA required a 30 year period

of possession. This 30-year period was a

requirement imposed under RA No. 1942 in June
1957, under the following provision:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession

and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure[.]
When PD No. 1073 was enacted in 1977, it was
recognized that a claimant who had possessed
the property for at least 30 years (in compliance
with RA No. 1942) might not be entitled to
confirmation of title under PD No. 1073 because
his possession commenced only after June 12,
1945. This possibility constituted a violation of
his vested rights that should be avoided. To
resolve this dilemma, the Court, in Abejaron v.
Nabasa, 47 opined that where an application has
satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of
the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942 (prior to
the effectivity of PD No. 1073), the applicant is
entitled to perfect his or her title even if
possession and occupation do not date back to
June 12, 1945. CcaASE
What this leads up to is that possession of land
"for the required statutory period" becomes
significant only when the claim of title is based
on the amendment introduced by RA No. 1942.
The 30-year period introduced by RA No. 1942
"did not refer or call into application the Civil
Code provisions on prescription." 48 In fact, in
The Director of Lands v. IAC 49 and the opinion
of Justice Claudio Teehankee in Manila Electric
Co. v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, etc., et al., 50
cited by the ponencia, 51 both pertained to the
RA No. 1942 amendment; it was in this sense
that both rulings stated that mere lapse or
completion of the required period converts
alienable land to private property.
In sum, if the claimant is asserting his vested
right under the RA No. 1942 amendment, then it
would be correct to declare that the lapse of the
required statutory period converts alienable land
to private property ipso jure. Otherwise, if the
claimant is asserting a right under the PD No.

1073 amendment, then he needs to prove

possession of alienable public land as of June 12,
1945 or earlier. Although a claimant may have
possessed the property for 30 years or more, if
his possession commenced after January 24,
1947 (the adjusted date based on Abejaron), the
property would not be converted into private
property by the mere lapse of time.
3. As a last point, the ponencia effectively claims
52 that the classification of property as
agricultural land is only necessary at the time of
application for registration of title.
This is completely erroneous. The act of
registration merely confirms that title already
exists in favor of the applicant. To require
classification of the property only on application
for registration point would imply that during the
process of acquisition of title (specifically, during
the period of possession prior to the application
for registration), the property might not have
been alienable for being unclassified land (or a
forest land under PD No. 705) of the public
domain. This claim totally contravenes the
constitutional rule that only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated.
To translate all these arguments to the facts of
the present case, the land applied for was not
classified as alienable on or before June 12, 1945
and was indisputably only classified as alienable
only on March 15, 1982. Under these facts, the
ponencia still asserts that following the Naguit
ruling, possession of the non-classified land
during the material period would still comply
with Section 48 (b) of the PLA, provided that
there is already a classification at the time of
application for registration. cSIADH
This claim involves essential contradiction in
terms as only a land that can already be
registered under Section 48 (b) of the PLA can
be registered under Section 14 (1) of the PRD.
Additionally, the ponencia, in effect, confirmed
that possession prior to declaration of
alienability can ripen into private ownership of a
land that, under the Constitution, the PLA, and

even the Civil Code,is not legally allowed.

The ponencia's position all the more becomes
legally preposterous if PD No. 705 is considered.
To recall, this Decree states that all lands of the
public domain that remain unclassified are
considered forest lands that cannot be alienated
until they have been reclassified as agricultural
lands and declared alienable. 53 Applying this
law to the facts of the present case, the land
applied for, prior to March 15, 1982, must have
still been forest land that, under the
Constitution, cannot be alienated.
The deeper hole that the ponencia digs for itself
in recognizing possession prior to declaration of
alienability becomes apparent when it now cites
Naguit as its authority. Unnoticed perhaps by the
ponencia, Naguit itself explicitly noted PD No.
705 and expressly and unabashedly pronounced
that "[a] different rule obtains for forest lands,
such as those which form part of a reservation
for provincial park purposes the possession of
which cannot ripen into ownership. It is
elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forestland cannot be owned by
private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of
Appeals, forest land is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private property, unless
such lands are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable." 54
How the ponencia would square this Naguit
statement with the realities of PD No. 705 and
its present ruling would be an interesting
exercise to watch. It would, to say the least, be
in a very confused position as it previously
confirmed in Naguit the very same basic precept
of law that it now debunks in its present ruling,
citing the same Naguit ruling. AaSIET
C. The PLA, the Civil Code and Prescription
In reading all the provisions of Book II of the Civil
Code on the classification of property based on
the person to whom it belongs, it should not be
overlooked that these provisions refer to

properties in general, i.e., to both movable and

immovable properties. 55 Thus, the Civil Code
provisions on property do not refer to land alone,
much less do they refer solely to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. For this
latter specie of property, the PLA is the special
governing law and, under the Civil Code itself,
the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in case
of deficiency. 56
Whether, as in the present case, land of the
public domain can be granted and registered on
the basis of extraordinary prescription (i.e.,
possession by the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of at least
30 years), the obvious answer is that the
application can only effectively be allowed upon
compliance with the PLA's terms. Classification
as agricultural land must first take place to
remove the land from its status as a land of the
public domain and a declaration of alienability
must likewise be made to render the land
available or susceptible to alienation; the
required possession, of course, has to follow and
only upon completion does the land pass to
"private" hands.
Whether land classified as "agricultural" and
declared "alienable and disposable" can already
be considered "patrimonial" property does not
yield to an easy answer as these concepts
involve different classification systems as
discussed above. To be sure, the classification
and declaration of a public land as alienable
public agricultural land do not transfer the land
into private hands nor divest it of the character
of being State property that can only be
acquired pursuant to the terms of the PLA.
Separate from this requirement, a property
although already declared alienable and
disposable may conceivably still be held by
the State or by any of its political subdivisions or
agencies for public use or public service under
the terms of the Civil Code.In this latter case,
the property cannot be considered patrimonial
that is subject to acquisitive prescription.

Based on these considerations, the two concepts

of "disposable land of the public domain" and
"patrimonial property" cannot directly be
equated with one another. The requirements for
their acquisition, however, must both be
satisfied before they can pass to private hands.
aIAEcD
An inevitable related question is the manner of
enforcing Article 422 of the Civil Code that
"[p]roperty of the public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State," in light of the implication that patrimonial
property may be acquired through prescription
under Article 1113 of the Civil Code ("Property of
the State or any of its subdivision not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription "). This position, incidentally, is
what the original decision in this case claims.
A first simple answer is that the Civil Code
provisions must yield when considered in
relation with the PLA and its requirements. In
other words, when the property involved is a
land of the public domain, the consideration that
it is not for public use or for public service, or its
patrimonial character, initially becomes
immaterial; any grant or alienation must first
comply with the mandates of the Constitution on
lands of the public domain and with the
requirements of the PLA as a priority
requirement.
Thus, if the question is whether such land,
considered patrimonial solely under the terms of
Article 422 of the Civil Code,can be acquired
through prescription, the prior questions of
whether the land is already alienable under the
terms of the Constitution and the PLA and
whether these terms have been complied with
must first be answered. If the response is
negative, then any characterization under Article
422 of the Civil Code is immaterial; only upon
compliance with the terms of the Constitution
and the PLA can Article 422 of the Civil Code be
given full force. If the land is already alienable,

Article 422 of the Civil Code,when invoked, can

only be complied with on the showing that the
property is no longer intended for public use or
public service.
For all these reasons, alienable and disposable
agricultural land cannot be registered under
Section 14 (2) of the PRD solely because it is
already alienable and disposable. The
alienability must be coupled with the required
declaration under Article 422 of the Civil Code if
the land is claimed to be patrimonial and
possession under Section 14 (2) of the PRD is
invoked as basis for registration. AIHaCc
As an incidental matter, note that this PRD
provision is no longer necessary for the
applicant who has complied with the required
possession under Section 48 (b) of the PLA (i.e.,
that there had been possession since June 12,
1945); he or she does not need to invoke
Section 14 (2) of the PRD as registration is
available under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. On
the other hand, if the required period for
possession under Section 48 (b) of the PLA (or
Section 14 [1] of the PRD) did not take place,
then the applicant's recourse would still be
under the PLA through its other available modes
(because a land of the public domain is
involved), but not under its Section 48 (b).
Section 14 (2) of the PRD will apply only after
the land is deemed to be "private" or has passed
through one of the modes of grant and
acquisition under the PLA, and after the requisite
time of possession has passed, counted from the
time the land is deemed or recognized to be
private. In short, Section 14 (2) of the PLA only
becomes available to a possessor of land
already held or deemed to be in private
ownership and only after such possessor
complies with the requisite terms of ordinary or
extraordinary prescription. In considering
compliance with the required possession, prior
to the declaration of alienability cannot of
course be recognized or given legal effect, as
already extensively discussed above.

To go back and directly answer now the issue

that the petitioners directly pose in this case, no
extraordinary prescription can be recognized in
their favor as their effective possession could
have started only after March 15, 1982. Based
on the reasons and conclusions in the above
discussion, they have not complied with the
legal requirements, either from the point of view
of the PLA or the Civil Code. Hence, the denial of
their petition must hold.

already been classified as alienable and

disposable since March 15, 1982. 5

LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:

The Republic appealed the Decision to the Court

of Appeals. It argued that Malabanan failed to
prove that the subject land had already been
classified as alienable and disposable. The
Republic insisted that Malabanan did not meet
the required manner and length of possession
for confirmation of imperfect title under the law.
8

I concur with the denial of the Motions for

Reconsideration.
I concur with the original Decision penned by
Justice Dante Tinga promulgated on April 29,
2009. I also concur with the Resolution of Justice
Lucas Bersamin with respect to the Motions for
Reconsideration, but disagree with the
statements made implying the alleged
overarching legal principle called the "regalian
doctrine."
Mario Malabanan filed an application for
registration of a parcel of land designated as Lot
9864-A in Silang, Cavite based on a claim that
he purchased the land from Eduardo Velazco. He
also claimed that Eduardo Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years. 1
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. 2
Malabanan's witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified
that Lot 9864-A was originally part of a 22hectare property owned by his greatgrandfather. 3 His uncle, Eduardo Velazco, who
was Malabanan's predecessor-in-interest,
inherited the lot. 4
Malabanan also presented a document issued by
the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the Department of Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR) on June 11, 2001. The
document certified that the subject land had

The Solicitor General, through Assistant

Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr., affirmed
the truth of Aristedes Velazco's testimony. 6
Malabanan's application was not challenged. 7
HCEcaT
The RTC granted Malabanan's application on
December 2, 2002.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of

the RTC. The CA held that under Section 14 (1)
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree, possession before the
classification of land as alienable and disposable
should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. 9 Therefore, possession
before March 15, 1982 should not be considered
in the computation of the period of possession.
This is also in accordance with the ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto. 10
Malabanan's heirs (petitioners) appealed the
Decision of the CA. 11 Relying on Republic v.
Naguit, 12 petitioners argued that the period of
possession required for perfecting titles may be
reckoned prior to the declaration that the land
was alienable and disposable. 13 Open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of an alienable land of public domain for more
than 30 years ipso jure converts it into private
property. 14 Previous classification is immaterial so
long as the property had already been converted to
private property at the time of the application. 15

We dismissed the Petition because there was no clear

evidence to establish petitioners' or their
predecessors-in-interest's possession since June 12,
1945. 16 Moreover, while there was evidence that the

land had already been declared alienable and

disposable since 1982, there was no evidence that the
subject land had been declared as no longer intended
for public use or service. 17
Both petitioners and respondent ask for the
reconsideration of Our Decision on April 29, 2009.
CDAHaE
I agree that Malabanan was not able to prove that he
or his predecessors-in-interest were in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
subject land since June 12, 1945. We already noted in
the original Decision that Malabanan offered no deed
of sale covering the subject lot, executed by any of
the alleged predecessors-in-interest in his favor. 18
He only marked a photocopy of a deed of sale
executed by Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez
and Benjamin Reyes. 19
On that note alone, no title can be issued in favor of
Malabanan or petitioners.
However, I do not agree that all lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State 20 or that lands remain part of
the public domain if the State does not reclassify or
alienate it to a private person. 21 These presumptions
are expressions of the Regalian Doctrine.
Our present Constitution does not contain the term,
"regalian doctrine." What we have is Article XII,
Section 2, which provides:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated . . . .
There is no suggestion in this section that the
presumption in absolutely all cases is that all lands
are public. Clearly, the provision mentions only that
"all lands of the public domain" are "owned by the
state."
This is not the only provision that should be
considered in determining whether the presumption
would be that the land is part of the "public domain"
or "not of the public domain." ECSHID
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty

or property without due process of law, nor shall any

person be denied equal protection of the laws.
This section protects all types of property. It does not
limit its provisions to property that is already covered
by a form of paper title. Verily, there could be land,
considered as property, where ownership has vested
as a result of either possession or prescription, but
still, as yet, undocumented. The original majority's
opinion in this case presents some examples.
In my view, We have properly stated the
interpretation of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 or the Public Land Act as amended 22 in
relation to Section 14 (1) and 14 (2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
Our ratio decidendi, therefore, should only be limited
to the facts as presented in this case. We also
properly implied that the titling procedures under
Property Registration Decree do not vest or create
title. The Property Registration Decree simply
recognizes and documents ownership and provides
for the consequences of issuing paper titles.
We have also recognized that "time immemorial
possession of land in the concept of ownership either
through themselves or through their predecessors in
interest" suffices to create a presumption that such
lands "have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land."

23 This is an interpretation in Cario v. Insular Government

24 of the earlier version of Article III, Section 1 in the
McKinley's Instructions. 25 The case clarified that the
Spanish sovereign's concept of the "regalian doctrine" did not
extend to the American colonial period and to the various
Organic Acts extended to the Philippines. cDSAEI
Thus, in Cario:
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the
universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the
Crown. . . It is true also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United
States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it
does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States assets that Spain had such
power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a
question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new
sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize

actual facts, are matters for it to decide.

Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it
does not follow that, in view of the United States, [plaintiff
who held the land as owner] had lost all rights and was a
mere trespasser when the present government seized the
land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial
of native titles throughout an important past of Luzon, at
least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would
not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.
No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal
administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives,
not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic
Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the
property and rights acquired there by the United States are to
be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
26 (Emphasis supplied) DISTcH
And with respect to time immemorial possession, Cario
mentions:
The [Organic Act of July 1, 1902] made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws.'
5.In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from
12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready
to declare in the next breath that . . . it meant by "property"
only that which had become such by ceremonies of which
presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard,
and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by
native custom and by long association one of the
profoundest factors in human thought regarded as their
own.
xxx xxx xxx
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when,
as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it
will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land. 27 CTSHDI

Cario is often misinterpreted to cover only lands for those

considered today as part of indigenous cultural communities.
However, nothing in its provisions limits it to that kind of
application. We could also easily see that the progression of
various provisions on completion of imperfect titles in earlier
laws were efforts to assist in the recognition of these rights.
In my view, these statutory attempts should never be
interpreted as efforts to limit what has already been
substantially recognized through constitutional interpretation.
There are also other provisions in our Constitution which
protect the unique rights of indigenous peoples. 28 This is in
addition to our pronouncements interpreting "property" in the
due process clause through Cario.
It is time that we put our invocations of the "regalian
doctrine" in its proper perspective. This will later on, in the
proper case, translate into practical consequences that do
justice to our people and our history.
Thus, I vote to deny the Motions for Reconsideration.
||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987,
[September 3, 2013])

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 181502. February 2, 2010.]
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC of the
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J p:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for
the third time) of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this
Court denying the petition for review filed by
petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.
Petitioner's late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an
application for registration of a vast tract of land 1
located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the
then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva
Ecija on August 12, 1976. 2 She alleged that she
possessed the land as owner and worked, developed
and harvested the agricultural products and benefits
of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for
more or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application because the land in question was within
the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR),
established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237
(Proclamation 237) 3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable
as it formed part of the public domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court
already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes 4 that the
property subject of Garcia's application was
inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation.
Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information
Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a
certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which
therein respondent Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation anchored its claim on the
land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of
registration issued in its favor was declared null and
void.
Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia's favor
in a decision 5 dated July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the
CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its decision 6
dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza (Mendoza decision), 7 the appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA

found that Reyes was applicable to petitioner's case

as it involved the same property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her
ownership of the land in question to Possessory
Information Title No. 216. As Garcia's right to the
property was largely dependent on the existence and
validity of the possessory information title the
probative value of which had already been passed
upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land
was situated inside a military reservation, the CA
concluded that she did not validly acquire title
thereto. IDASHa
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia
passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of
whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in
the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the
records from the former CFI. Without acting on the
motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with
Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution 9
upholding petitioner's right to recall the records of the
case.
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the
parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter
and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and
finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise
agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on
the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside
the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her
application for the portion of the property inside the
military reservation. They filed a motion for approval
of the amicable settlement in the CA. 10

resolution (amended resolution) 13 annulling the

compromise agreement entered into between the
parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of
the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) . . .
(2) . . .
(3) . . .
(4) . . .
(5) . . .
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of
this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated
May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the
Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of
the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the
said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be
without force and effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently, SET
ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which
ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of
title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee
Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject
property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its
Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999
approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and
the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending
the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and

On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the

compromise agreement. 11 On January 12, 2000, it
directed the Land Registration Administration to issue
the corresponding decree of registration in
petitioner's favor. 12 cSATDC

(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992

dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz' registration
herein.

However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty.

Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the
issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG
informed the appellate court that the tract of land
subject of the amicable settlement was still within the
military reservation.

(Emphasis supplied) DHIaTS

On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first
time, she assailed the validity of the Mendoza
decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted
to in the CA's amended resolution. She alleged that
Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general
during the initial stages of the land registration
proceedings in the trial court and therefore should

have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA.

His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice
against her constitutional right to due process. Thus,
the Mendoza decision should be declared null and
void. The motion was denied. 14
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari 15 in this Court. It was denied for raising
factual issues. 16 She moved for reconsideration. 17
This motion was denied with finality on the ground
that there was no substantial argument warranting a
modification of the Court's resolution. The Court then
ordered that no further pleadings would be
entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of
judgment to be made in due course. 18
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift
entry of judgment and motion for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and to refer the
case to the Supreme Court en banc. 19 The Court
denied 20 it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. 21
Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to the banc
was likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate
court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions
may be appealed. 22 We reiterated our directive that
no further pleadings would be entertained and that
entry of judgment be made in due course.
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote
identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself. 23 The body of
the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion
for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its
entirety:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in
order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is
suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is
the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15,
2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R.
N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is
humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will
result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a
MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last
plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to
the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court
exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea.

For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto

attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable
Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice
Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio. EHTSCD
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice
Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became
possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the
court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice
Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals
Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court,
notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor
General, was the very person who appeared on behalf
of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same
land registration proceedings in which he lost.

judicial system.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in
the original).
The language of petitioner's letter/motion is
unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely
worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into
giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise
legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of
being vilified in the media and by the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny
petitioner's letter/third motion for reconsideration.
SHCaEA
APPLICABILITY
OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republic's position that
Reyes is applicable to this case.

In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor

and judge in the very same case.

To constitute res judicata, the following elements

must concur:

In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was

outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who admitted
having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by
the Secretary of Justice.

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of

violation of my constitutional right. It is simply
immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the
prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse
the very decision in which he had lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly
evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the
Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was
tempted to pursue such course of action. I however
believe that such an action will do more harm than
good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice
Mendoza.
I fully support your call for "moral force" that will
slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its
destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in
which we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief
Justice continues to fight the dark forces that surround
us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure
that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that
the next person who seeks justice will not experience
the pain and frustration that I suffered under our

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;

(3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. 24
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been
complied with. However, petitioner takes exception to
the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of
identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in
this Court, she contends that since the applicants in
the two cases are different, the merits of the two
cases should, accordingly, be determined
independently of each other. 25
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble
those in Aquino v. Director of Lands. 26 In that case,
Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a
considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession
thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually
reached this Court, we affirmed the trial court's
decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in
question was part of the public domain. Quintin's
successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite
knowledge of the proceedings did not participate

therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno

S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in
his name. The question in that case, as well as in this
one, was whether our decision in the case in which
another person was the applicant constituted res
judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in
registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an
incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an
application for registration and declaring the land as
part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not
only against the adverse claimant, but also against all
persons. 27
We also declared in Aquino that:
From another point of view, the decision in the first
action has become the "law of the case" or at least
falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication
should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It
was taken and should be taken as the authoritative
view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is
indispensable to the due administration of justice
especially by a court of last resort that a question
once deliberately examined and decided should be
considered as settled and closed to further
argument. . . . 28 aIcCTA
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI
came out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July
1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier
ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty
was inalienable as it formed part of a military
reservation. Thus, petitioner's argument that the
findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable
title are binding on us on the principle that findings
of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and
bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it was
incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this
Court's ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's
findings in Reyes (which should have been a matter of
judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still
insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the
Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land
as forming part of a military reservation, and thus
outside the commerce of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge
virtually nullified the decision of this Court and
therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion. 29

Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of

discretion is void and does not exist in legal
contemplation. 30
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in
this case, ought to be reminded that it is their duty to
obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct
becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious
awareness of the position they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As
eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is
only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other
courts should take their bearings." 31
ACQUISITION OF
PRIVATE RIGHTS
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237
itself recognizes that its effectivity is "subject to
private rights, if any there be."
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that
the property where the military reservation is situated
is forest land. Thus:
Before the military reservation was established, the
evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is
shown by the evidence that the land involved is
largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact,
at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of
public forest. . . . (Emphasis supplied) 32
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind
petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable
under CA 141.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141,
as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are
excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable
of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether
such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty
or under the present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied). 33
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered
when they have been reclassified as alienable by the
President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the
recommendation of the proper department head who
has the authority to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands) 34 coupled with possession by the
claimant as well as that of her predecessors-ininterest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able

to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her

occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-ininterest, could not have ripened into ownership of the
subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of
forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning
compliance with the thirty-year possession
requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141)
or the Public Land Act. 35 This was our ruling in
Almeda v. CA. 36 The rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released through an official
proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain. 37 HDTSIE
Coming now to petitioner's contention that her
"private rights" to the property, meaning her and her
predecessors' possession thereof prior to the
establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the
same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already
recognized the same land to be public forest even
before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was established, the
evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is
shown by the evidence that the land involved is
largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact,
at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of
public forest. . . .
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30
years, it could never ripen to ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was
alienable land before it was established as a military
reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of
evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner
and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30
years. In Reyes, we noted:
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9,
1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the
informacion possessoria, could not have converted
the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years
after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the
Spanish Mortgage Law.
xxx xxx xxx
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small
portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the
'kaingin' system, while some portions were used as

grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria

Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had
about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the
Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by
the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious
as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
While grazing livestock over land is of course to be
considered with other acts of dominion to show
possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing
livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or
other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to
support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.
The possession of public land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against
the State unless the occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State. 38 TcCEDS
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information
title on which petitioner also bases her claim of
ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes, 39
thus rendering its probative value suspect, further
militates against granting her application for
registration.
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
On the compromise agreement between the parties,
we agree with the CA that the same was null and
void.
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement
is in the nature of a contract and must necessarily
comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following
requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract;

(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the
consent of the Republic, through the appropriate
government agencies, i.e., the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Land
Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and
the Office of the President, was secured by the OSG
when it executed the agreement with her. 40 The lack
of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the
compromise agreement between the parties null and
void because although it is the duty of the OSG to
represent the State in cases involving land
registration proceedings, it must do so only within the
scope of the authority granted to it by its principal,
the Republic of the Philippines. 41
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to
appear as counsel for respondent, it was never given
the specific or special authority to enter into a
compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in
violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of
the Rules of Court which requires "special authority"
for attorneys to bind their clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients.
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their client's litigation,
or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but
the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied). ECaITc
Moreover, the land in question could not have been a
valid subject matter of a contract because, being
forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the
commerce of men, including future things, may be the
object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy may
likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of
the obligation contrary to law and against public

policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration

of petitioner's withdrawal of her application for
registration of title from that portion of the property
located within the military reservation, respondent
was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land
situated outside said reservation. The Republic could
not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject
matter of the agreement was outside the commerce
of man.
PETITIONER'S CONTEMPT
OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses
justice, cannot reasonably be expected to just sit by
and do nothing when it comes under attack.
That petitioner's letter-motion constitutes an attack
against the integrity of this Court cannot be denied.
Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by
stating:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in
order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is
suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is
the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15,
2009, page 1)[.]
It, however, quickly progressed into a barely
concealed resentment for what she perceived as this
Court's failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in
rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case.
Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R.
N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is
humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will
result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a
MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last
plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to
the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court
exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea.
For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto
attached as Annex "A". DcaCSE
The issue that was brought before the Honorable
Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice
Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice
Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became

possible for him to discharge the minimum

requirement of due process, [i.e.,] the ability of the
court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice
Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals
Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court,
notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor
General, was the very person who appeared on behalf
of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same
land registration proceedings in which he lost.
(Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes
to shove, she has no choice but to expose the
irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the
media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration
that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly
evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the
Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such
course of action. I however believe that such an
action will do more harm than good, and even destroy
the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do
not happen again, so that the next person who seeks
justice will not experience the pain and frustration
that I suffered under our judicial system.
When required to show cause why she should not be
cited for contempt for her baseless charges and veiled
threats, petitioner answered:
xxx xxx xxx
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled
threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the
Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed
against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys"
case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose
L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the trimedia, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases
pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the
lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of
the appellate court and ended up reversing the very
decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her
[c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play for
no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a
judge without transgression of the due process

clause. This is basic.

Petitioner confesses that she may have been
emotional in the delivery of her piece, because
correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are
irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery,
she has offended your honors' sensibilities, she is
ready for the punishment, and only prays that his
Court temper its strike with compassion as her letter
to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of
threatening the Court. HEaCcD
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain
redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon
her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.
The Court now puts an end to petitioner's
irresponsible insinuations and threats of "going
public" with this case. We are not blind to petitioner's
clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating with
false concern for the reputation of this Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has
consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor
favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after
a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this
case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The
records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent
issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and
sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this
Court in their respective resolutions.
As to petitioner's complaint regarding this Court's
denial of her petition through a mere minute
resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due
process as the Court did not issue a full-blown
decision stating the facts and applicable
jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not
duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by
the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even
minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority,
depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a
legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed
by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies
or dismisses a petition or motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed
decision or order, together with all its findings of fact
and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. 42
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her
case in this Court by filing three successive motions

for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject

of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings
that "no further pleadings shall be entertained in this
case." Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter
defiance of this Court's orders and an abuse of the
rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled
threats to leak her case to the media to gain public
sympathy although the tone of petitioner's
compliance with our show-cause resolution was
decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters
constitutes contempt of court.
In Republic v. Unimex, 43 we held:
A statement of this Court that no further pleadings
would be entertained is a declaration that the Court
has already considered all issues presented by the
parties and that it has adjudicated the case with
finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from
filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders
of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the
parties. It should not be circumvented by filing
motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.
A FEW OBSERVATIONS
If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only
guarding her constitutional right to due process, then
why did she question the validity of the Mendoza
decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her
motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its
subsequent annulment of the compromise
agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only
when her case became hopeless that her present
counsel frantically searched for some ground, any
ground to resuscitate his client's lost cause,
subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a
statement in her petition to this Court that: CAIaDT
It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of
the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of Appeals
that places in doubt the entire proceedings it
previously conducted, which led to the rendition of
the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped
the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L.
Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante
Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando
A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia's
successor-in-interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G.
Garcia. 44 (Emphasis supplied).
The above cited statement does not help petitioner's
cause at all. If anything, it only proves how desperate
the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.

WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26,

2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is hereby treated as
a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is
DENIED considering that a third motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea
utterly lacks merit.
Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court.
Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is hereby
imposed on her, payable within ten days from receipt
of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any
repetition hereof shall be dealt with more severely.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, * Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.
||| (Diaz v. Republic, G.R. No. 181502, [February 2,
2010], 625 PHIL 243-268)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 173423. March 5, 2014.]
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA,
petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed
by the petitioners, spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna,
assailing the decision dated May 16, 2005 2 and the
resolution dated June 27, 2006 3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and set
aside the decision dated May 7, 2001 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application
for registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot
No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union.
The application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC
No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally
owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was
succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones.
Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972,
Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor
of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo
Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the
spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4,
1984.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves
and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet,
peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No.
4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the
lot's survey plan, technical description, and certificate of
assessment. cSEAHa
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), opposed the application, 5 it did not present any
evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private
opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an
order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the

whole world, except the Republic. 6

Section 14 (1) of the PRD. 12

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, 7 the RTC granted the

application for registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna.
The RTC declared that "[the spouses Fortuna] have
established [their] possession, including that of their
predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered,
has been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the
whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or
for a period of over fifty (50) years." 8

The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued
on January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the
PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January
2, 1979. On the basis of the Court's ruling in Taada, et al. v.
Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al., 13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and
the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977
and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they
claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under
the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora's possession
dates back, at the latest, to 1947.

The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA,

arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not present an official
proclamation from the government that the lot has been
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It
also claimed that the spouses Fortuna's evidence Tax
Declaration No. 8366 showed that possession over the lot
dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12,
1945 cut-off period provided under Section 14 (1) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree (PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005, 9 the CA reversed and set
aside the RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses
Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and disposable
nature of the land, 10 they failed to show that they complied
with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e., since
June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic's argument that
Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses
Fortuna's predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she
had been in possession of the land only since 1948.
The CA denied the spouses Fortuna's motion for
reconsideration of its decision in its resolution dated June 27,
2006. 11
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a
review of the CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA),
as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942
amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title
over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year
period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead
required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945.
The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in

They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was

made in 1948, this does not contradict that fact that Pastora
possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to present
documentary evidence proving possession earlier than 1948
was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the
Provincial Assessor's Office, who testified that the records
were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War
II. IcESaA
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier
than 1948, the spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists
indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948.
First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement
that it is a new tax declaration. Second, the annotation found
at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that "this
declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]" 14 Since Tax
Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947,
indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of
the lot before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one
Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was also
commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos.
4462, 27066, and 27098, 15 which were also originally
owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject Lot No.
4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided
in a place a few meters from the three lots. She stated that
she regularly passed by these lots on her way to school since
1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because
the latter's family had constructed a house and planted fruitbearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis
of Macaria's testimony and the other evidence presented in
LRC No. 2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortuna's
application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098 in its decision of January 3, 2005. 16 The RTC's
decision has lapsed into finality unappealed.

The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria's testimony in LRC

No. 2373 should be considered to prove Pastora's possession
prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373 is a separate
registration proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the
subject property, Lot No. 4457, and belonged to the same
predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure to present
Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC No.
2372, the spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the
reception of evidence . . . that [they] were able to trace and
establish the identity and competency of Macaria[.]" 17
Commenting on the spouses Fortuna's petition, the Republic
relied mostly on the CA's ruling which denied the
registration of title and prayed for the dismissal of the
petition. DEScaT
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to
sufficiently prove their compliance with the requisites for the
acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain
are owned by the State. 18 Of the four classes of public land,
i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands, mineral lands,
and national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
19 Public land that has not been classified as alienable
agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration
of title to land derived through a public grant to establish
foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The
PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable
public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48 (b), will find
application only from the time that a public land has been
classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and
disposable.
Under Section 6 of the PLA, 20 the classification and the
reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the
Executive Department. The President, through a presidential
proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a
land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and

disposable. 21 Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that

an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public
land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by
establishing the existence of a positive act of the government,
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the
land was established by the notation in the survey plan, 22
which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per
Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940.
It is outside any civil or military reservation. 23
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from
the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public
land application filed nor title previously issued for the
subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find that neither of the
above documents is evidence of a positive act from the
government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate
proof of the covered properties' alienable and disposable
character. 25 These notations, at the very least, only establish
that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved alienable and disposable area per
verification through survey by the proper government office.
The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as
proclaimed by the President. 26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan
Fabio, 27 the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO 28 or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as
declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the
President.

The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not

proof that the President or the DENR Secretary has
reclassified and released the public land as alienable and
disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not
the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of
the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public
land as alienable and disposable. 29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No.
4457 has been reclassified as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive
Department, the spouses Fortuna's claim of title through a
public land grant under the PLA should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to
establish the alienable and disposable character of Lot No.
4457 serves as sufficient ground to deny the petition and
terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to address
the other important legal issues raised in the petition.
caIEAD
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and
disposition of alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11
of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be
disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition of
title is governed by Section 48 (b) of the PLA, the original
version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, except as against the Government, since July
twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when

prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be

conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[emphasis supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was
replaced by a 30-year period of possession under RA No.
1942. Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No.
1942, read:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and
underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year
period of possession by requiring possession since June 12,
1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in
the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessorin-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32
years from 1945 up to its enactment in 1977 is
required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of
applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession
required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose
possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12,
1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To
remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa 30 that
"Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessorsin-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on
January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24,
1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect
or incomplete title under Sec. 48 (b) of the [PLA]." January

24, 1947 was considered as the cut-off date as this was

exactly 30 years counted backward from January 25, 1977
the effectivity date of PD No. 1073. cdll
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD
No. 1073 was enacted; based on the certification from the
National Printing Office, 31 PD No. 1073 was published in
Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than its
enactment or on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted fact
materially affects the cut-off date for applications for judicial
confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the
PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree
shall take effect upon its promulgation," the Court has
declared in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. 32 that
the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its
effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature." 33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073
should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only
upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore,
moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48 (b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants
must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at
least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove
that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May
8, 1947
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the
spouses Fortuna's application for registration of title would
still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they
possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna's allegation that: (1) the absence of a
notation that Tax Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax
declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax Declaration
No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both
indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior to 1948 or, at
the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration

No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner that was

subscribed on October 23, 1947. 34 While these
circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947,
none proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May
8, 1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates possession
since 1947, it does not show the nature of Pastora's
possession. Notably, Section 48 (b) of the PLA speaks of
possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated
by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks
to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction." 35 Nothing in Tax
Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of
possession and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing
off the land. Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal." 36
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax
Declaration No. 8366 by relying on Macaria's testimony in a
separate land registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373.
Macaria alleged that she passed by Pastora's lots on her way
to school, and she saw Pastora's family construct a house,
plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area. However, the
Court is not convinced that Macaria's testimony constituted
as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases
of this nature.
The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired
adjoining parcels of land, all of which are claimed to have
previously belonged to Pastora. These parcels of land were
covered by three separate applications for registration, to wit:
ScAIaT
a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a
total area of 2,961 sq.m., commenced by Emeteria;
b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098, with a total area of 4,006 sq.m., commenced by the
spouses Fortuna; and
c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No.
4457, with a total area of 2,597 sq.m.
As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that
belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest, the spouses

Fortuna alleged that the final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278

and 2373, 37 upholding Pastora's ownership, be taken into
account in resolving the present case.
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are
claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564
sq.m. This is too big an area for the Court to consider that
Pastora's claimed acts of possession and occupation (as
testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the lots.
Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21
in 1947) could competently assess and declare that its
entirety belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of
possession and occupation in what must have been but a
limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366
described Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could
not have also been referring to Lot No. 4457 when she said
that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.
The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and
2373, upholding Pastora's possession, do not tie this Court's
hands into ruling in favor of the spouses Fortuna. Much to
our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not
even show that the lots have been officially reclassified as
alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature and
duration of Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the
PLA, thus, failing to convince us to either disregard the rules
of evidence or consider their merits. In this regard, we
reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De los Santos: 38
Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the
conservation no less than the utilization of the natural
resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care
applications to private ownership of real estate. To be
granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be
forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim
with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of
whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated
in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as
dominus.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated
May 16, 2005 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED
insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda
Fortuna's application of registration of title on the basis of
the grounds discussed above. Costs against the spouses

Fortuna. LLpr
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
||| (Spouses Fortuna v. Republic, G.R. No. 173423, [March 5,
2014])

FIRST DIVISION

Ruling of the RTC

III

[G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012.]

On May 10, 2000, 4 the RTC granted the application for land
registration, disposing:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT

APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED
THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE
OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A
PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit
made through the effects of the current of the water
belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of
rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not
accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State
as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner,
unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten
years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan)
applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B
(the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Paraaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San
Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast
by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the
Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by
Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. 1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for
land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latter's co-ownership of the property. He
alleged that the property had been formed through accretion
and had been in their joint open, notorious, public,
continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. 2
aICHEc
The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for
land registration, stating that it needed the property for its
flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that
assuming that the property was not covered by the legal
easement, title to the property could not be registered in
favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from
accretion. 3

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants,

ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE
and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for
which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of
Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045)
square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan
Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case
4, Paraaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the
registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following
technical description, to wit:

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC. 6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion on October 20, 2003. 7 HAICET
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that: 8
I

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the
corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be
issued.

RESPONDENTS' CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT

PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING
LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER
IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS
CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

SO ORDERED.

II

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), appealed. THIAaD

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE

REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE
PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD
AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF
THE CIVIL CODE.

xxx xxx xxx

Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to
the RTC, 5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN
ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED
BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF
APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID
PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE
GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE
CURRENT OF THE RIVER.

III

II

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE

APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE
APPELLEE'S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE
SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE.

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT

RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY,
PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30)
YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH
INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE. HSDIaC

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE
AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS
FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil

Code was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents
could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription
pursuant to Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).

lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous

in the face of the fact that respondents' evidence did not
establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the
Paraaque River.

Ruling

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried

the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application
by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such
evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than
that offered in opposition to it. 11 They would be held
entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its
registration under the Torrens system only if they established
that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

The appeal is meritorious.

I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457
of the Civil Code to respondents' benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners
of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents
of the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the
Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this
application which was previously a part of the Paraaque
River which became an orchard after it dried up and further
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is
owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was
obtained by him through inheritance from his mother,
Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.
Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is
provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank
of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters." 9 AaSTIH
The CA upheld the RTC's pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio
Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the
land which was previously part of the Paraaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot
4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant
which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision,
p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both

The Republic's submission is correct.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along

the banks of rivers. 12 The deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking
place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. 13 Accordingly,
respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements
of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land
registration. DAcaIE
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of
proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the
river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence
revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Paraaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to
themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was
previously part of the Paraaque River . . . (and) became an
orchard after it dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did
not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in
their mother's name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about
only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the
Paraaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be
that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near
Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque River, resulting in the
formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one,
respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of
the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along
a river bank. There are several other causes, including the
drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed

was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts

herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all
that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current.
Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume
of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of
1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and
imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span
of about 20 to 30 years the span of time intervening
between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of
their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet
in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents' witness
Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them
to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible
explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988B was the dried-up bed of the Paraaque River. Confirming
this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.'s own testimony to the
effect that the property was previously a part of the
Paraaque River that had dried up and become an orchard.
AaITCH
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.'s own
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the
uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B
had been formed by the drying up of the Paraaque River.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of
the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot
therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by
Dried River Bed." 14 That boundary line of "SW along line
5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which
was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1,
Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr.
(Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast." 15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up
river bed as an accretion that became respondents' property
pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a
river to form dry land involved the recession of the water
level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not
equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the
current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and was
more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian
owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article
457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to

accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and

categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that
where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there
is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application. 16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is
then to apply the law. 17

have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential

to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also,
oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled
thereto, not having presented any witness. TEcCHD

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be

divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil
Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are
public dominion of the State. 18 It follows that the river beds
that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State
as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express
law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong
to some other person. 19 aSAHCE

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents' application for land
registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken
possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessorin-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land
along the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination,
viz.: 20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the
applicants became the owners thereof, they took possession
of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their
predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the
subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the
fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per
subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly
approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that
Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC-Chief, Surveys Division Land
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject
property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts
to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants
in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the
Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration
Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14 (1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which
pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 14 (1), then, applicants for confirmation of
imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that
respondents "took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than
thirty (30) years." 22 ICTacD
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the
highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed
on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive
on the Court, 23 the Court has consistently recognized
exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on

a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are

conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference
made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review
the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open,
public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30
years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the
applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of
the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than thirty years because their
predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the
subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the
fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed
per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was
duly approved by the Land Management Services and the
fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the
subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and
that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court
opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents' period of
supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the
fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining
owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision
nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed
showing their possession of the property "continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The
decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and
had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us,
was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because,
firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove

the payor's ownership of the land the taxes were paid for, 25
the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a
claim of ownership; 26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys
of the property involved was not itself an of continuous,
open, public and adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the
gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act
of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in
that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the
alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that
the deposit created by the current of the water becomes
manifest 27 has no applicability herein. This is simply
because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion.
Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank
by respondents' predecessor-in-interest did not translate to
possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive
prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous,
open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not
even validated or preponderantly established. The admission
of respondents themselves that they declared the property for
taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only
from 1999 28 signified that their alleged possession would at
most be for only nine years as of the filing of their
application for land registration on March 7, 1997. SIaHTD
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that
respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years
in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire
the land by prescription or by other means without any
competent proof that the land was already declared as
alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that
declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its
public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being
either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article
420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part
of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public
use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code
declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public

dominion.

only after paying their value.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to

acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court
resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero, 29 a
case involving the registration of land found to be part of a
dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the
Court held:

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the
present Civil Code are applicable only when "[r]iver beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both
the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive
Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the
construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held:

As for petitioner's claim of ownership over the subject land,

admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on
(1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her
predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to
October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining
property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under
Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article
461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce
of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may
be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions
of the public domain. It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm
extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow
of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the
Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is
property of the public domain which is not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And,
absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of
the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable
character. IcAaEH
xxx xxx xxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up
after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land
would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-ininterest since under the aforementioned provision of Article
461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the
owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for

interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural
change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do
not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial
drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by
the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370
does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios
cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public domain
which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
ownership. . . . (Emphasis supplied) SEAHcT
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where
there has been a change in the course of a river, not where
the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even
alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such
a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river
bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases
supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. 30 No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore,
that there is a showing of a title from the State. 31
Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title. 32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil
Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto

belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new

course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots
the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso
facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the
natural change of course of the waters only after paying their
value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and
cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable and
disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to
be already declared to be alienable and disposable,
respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already
classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.
They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and
disposable the following notation found on the survey plan,
to wit: 33 aSIHcT
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE
OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the

alienability and disposability of public land, we said in
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap 34 that: cCaATD
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must
still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paraaque Cadastre.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,

administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court
cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private
claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot
4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development
on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property's nature as
alienable and disposable public land?

In Menguito v. Republic, 35 which we reiterated in Republic

v. Sarmiento, 36 we specifically resolved the issue of
whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient
evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of
public land, to wit:

To prove that the land subject of an application for

registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the Government,
such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of
Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

To prove that the land in question formed part of the

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This
survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area,
Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the
Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on
Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 00760448 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENROFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Dev't. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. . . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners
in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable. HISAET
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic
engineer's notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does
not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor
has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners
have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has
been declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 37 we dealt with the
sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial
Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community
Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of
public land was alienable and disposable in the following
manner, viz.:
. . . it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that
a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Respondent failed to do so because the certifications

presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that
the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the
certifications submitted by respondent. The government
officials who issued the certifications were not presented
before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial
court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in
evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that
the land is alienable and disposable.
xxx xxx xxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their
mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such
government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section
23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie
evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they
do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Emphasis supplied) ECSaAc
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the
survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that
the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Dev't" did not prove that Lot 4998-B
was already classified as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive
prescription of Lot 4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27,
2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio
C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot
4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or
less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City,
Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively
belonging to the State for being part of the dried-up bed of
the Paraaque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes,

JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Santos III, G.R. No. 160453, [November 12,
2012], 698 PHIL 275-297)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 192896. July 24, 2013.]
DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION,
INC., represented by its Incumbent President, GREG
SERIEGO, petitioner, vs. BASES CONVERSION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
Before us on Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Decision 2 dated September 10, 2009
and Resolution 3 dated July 13, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85228 nullifying and setting aside
for lack of jurisdiction the Resolution 4 dated April 28, 2004
of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No. 99-500. The fallo of the
assailed COSLAP Resolution reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the subject property, covering an area of 78,466
square meters, now being occupied by the members of the
Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. to be outside
of Swo-00-0001302 BCDA property.
2. In accordance with the tenets of social justice, members of
said association are advised to apply for sales patent on their
respective occupied lots with the Land Management Bureau,
DENR-NCR, pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730.
3. Directing the Land Management Bureau-DENR-NCR to
process the sales patent application of complainants pursuant
to existing laws and regulation. EDIHSC
4. The peaceful possession of actual occupants be respected
by the respondents.
SO ORDERED. 5
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc.
(Dream Village) claims to represent more than 2,000 families
who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in
Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of
owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously." 6 The lot
used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban (Maricaban),
owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered under a

Torrens title, 7 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291,

issued on October 17, 1906 by the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal. 8 Maricaban covered several parcels of land with a
total area of over 2,544 hectares spread out over Makati,
Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and Paraaque. 9
Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of
the United States of America (USA) early in the American
colonial period, to be converted into the military reservation
known as Fort William Mckinley, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in the name of the USA to
cancel OCT No. 291. 10 The US government later
transferred 30 has. of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad
Company, for which TCT No. 192 was cancelled by TCT
Nos. 1218 and 1219, the first in the name of the Manila
Railroad Company for 30 has., and the second in the name of
the USA for the rest of the Maricaban property. 11
On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. 1688, and later that year, on September
15, 1914, TCT No. 1688 was cancelled and replaced by TCT
No. 2288, both times in the name of the USA. 12 On
December 6, 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William
Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and
on September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. 61524, this time in the name of the
Republic. 13 On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia
issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or
settlement the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley,
now renamed Fort Bonifacio, and reserving them for military
purposes. 14 aAEIHC
On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort
Bonifacio alienable and disposable 15 in the manner
provided under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 274 and 730, in
relation to the Public Land Act, 16 thus allowing the sale to
the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan,
Signal Village, and Western Bicutan. 17
On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 172 amending Proclamation No. 2476 by
limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the
areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition. 18
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed 19 creating
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA)
to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic
military reservations and their extension camps (John Hay

Station, Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station,

San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay
Station) to productive civilian uses. Section 8 20 of the said
law provides that the capital of the BCDA will be provided
from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in nine (9) military
camps in Metro Manila, including 723 has. of Fort Bonifacio.
The law, thus, expressly authorized the President of the
Philippines "to sell the above lands, in whole or in part,
which are hereby declared alienable and disposable pursuant
to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing
sales of government properties," 21 specifically to raise
capital for the BCDA. Titles to the camps were transferred to
the BCDA for this purpose, 22 and TCT No. 61524 was
cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887,
23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, now in the name of
the BCDA. 23 DCIEac
Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a)
approximately 148.80 has. reserved for the National Capital
Region (NCR) Security Brigade, Philippine Army officers'
housing area, and Philippine National Police jails and
support services (presently known as Camp Bagong Diwa);
b) approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base for the
Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron of helicopters for the
NCR and respective security units; c) twenty one (21) areas
segregated by various presidential proclamations; and d) a
proposed 30.15 has. as relocation site for families to be
affected by the construction of Circumferential Road 5 and
Radial Road 4, provided that the boundaries and technical
description of these exempt areas shall be determined by an
actual ground survey. 24
Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to
Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to
summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among
the residents, 25 on November 22, 1999, the latter filed a
letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its assistance in
the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property,
which they claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and
thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that
they have been occupying the area for thirty (30) years "in
the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously for several years," and have built their houses of
sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved roads,
drainage and recreational and religious facilities. Dream
Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those
transferred to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore

patent applications by the occupants should be processed by

the Land Management Bureau (LMB).
On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint
by filing an Amended Petition 26 in the COSLAP. Among
the reliefs it sought were:
d. DECLARING the subject property as alienable and
disposable by virtue of applicable laws; aDHScI
e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO13-000298, situated in the barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, which is presently being occupied by herein
petitioner as within the coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476
and 172 and outside the claim of AFP-RSBS INDUSTRIAL
PARK COMPLEX and/or BASES CONVERSION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.
f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau to process the
application of the ASSOCIATION members for the purchase
of their respective lots under the provisions of Acts Nos. 274
and 730. 27 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent BCDA in its Answer 28 dated November 23,
2000 questioned the jurisdiction of the COSLAP to hear
Dream Village's complaint, while asserting its title to the
subject property pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. It argued that
under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561 which created the
COSLAP, its task is merely to coordinate the various
government offices and agencies involved in the settlement
of land problems or disputes, adding that BCDA does not fall
in the enumeration in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it being
neither a pastureland-lease holder, a timber concessionaire,
or a government reservation grantee, but the holder of
patrimonial government property which cannot be the subject
of a petition for classification, release or subdivision by the
occupants of Dream Village.
In its Resolution 29 dated April 28, 2004, the COSLAP
narrated that it called a mediation conference on March 22,
2001, during which the parties agreed to have a
relocation/verification survey conducted of the subject lot.
On April 4, 2001, the COSLAP wrote to the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office-NCR requesting
the survey, which would also include Swo-00-0001302,
covering the adjacent AFP-RSBS Industrial Park established
by Proclamation No. 1218 on May 8, 1998 as well as the
abandoned Circumferential Road 5 (C-5 Road). 30

On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of

the verification survey and a blueprint copy of the survey
plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director
for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR
report states: TcEaAS
3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream
Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1,
Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13,
Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square
meters. Likewise, the area actually is outside Swo-000001302 of BCDA. 31 (Emphasis ours and underscoring
supplied)
COSLAP Ruling
On the basis of the DENR's verification survey report, the
COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA,
and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus
directed the LMB of the DENR to process the applications of
Dream Village's members for sales patent, noting that in view
of the length of time that they "have been openly,
continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property
in the concept of an owner, . . . they are qualified to apply for
sales patent on their respective occupied lots pursuant to
R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the provisions of the
Public Land Act." 32 DHSCEc
On the question of its jurisdiction over the complaint, the
COSLAP cited the likelihood that the summary eviction by
the BCDA of more than 2,000 families in Dream Village
could stir up serious social unrest, and maintained that
Section 3 (2) of E.O. No. 561 authorizes it to "assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are
critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the
large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence
of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action," even as Section 3 (2) (d) of
E.O. No. 561 also allows it to take cognizance of "petitions
for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the
public domain," exactly the ultimate relief sought by Dream
Village. Rationalizing that it was created precisely to provide
a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of
land problems "in general," the COSLAP invoked as its
authority the 1990 case of Baaga v. COSLAP, 33 where this
Court said:
It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the
COSLAP may take cognizance of cases which are "critical

and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large

number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action." However, the use of the word
"may" does not mean that the COSLAP's jurisdiction is
merely confined to the above mentioned cases. The
provisions of the said Executive Order are clear that the
COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more
effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land
problems in general, which are frequently the source of
conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.
Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from the abolished
PACLAP whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power
and authority to act on, decide and resolve land disputes
(Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed by it. The said
Executive Order No. 561 containing said provision, being
enacted only on September 21, 1979, cannot affect the
exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial
Committee of Koronadal on September 20, 1978. Neither can
it affect the decision of the COSLAP which merely affirmed
said exercise of jurisdiction. 34 SDcITH
In its Motion for Reconsideration 35 filed on May 20, 2004,
the BCDA questioned the validity of the survey results since
it was conducted without its representatives present, at the
same time denying that it received a notification of the
DENR verification survey. 36 It maintained that there is no
basis for the COSLAP's finding that the members of Dream
Village were in open, continuous, and adverse possession in
the concept of owner, because not only is the property not
among those declared alienable and disposable, but it is a
titled patrimonial property of the State. 37
In the Order 38 dated June 17, 2004, the COSLAP denied
BCDA's Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that it had due
notice of the verification survey, while also noting that
although the BCDA wanted to postpone the verification
survey due to its tight schedule, it actually stalled the survey
when it failed to suggest an alternative survey date to ensure
its presence.
CA Ruling
On Petition for Review 39 to the CA, the BCDA argued that
the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the COSLAP
because of the land's history of private ownership and
because it is registered under an indefeasible Torrens title; 40
that Proclamation No. 172 covers only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-

13-000298 in Western Bicutan, whereas Dream Village

occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302,
which also belongs to the BCDA; 41 that the COSLAP
resolution is based on an erroneous DENR report stating that
Dream Village is outside of BCDA, because Lots 10, 11, and
portion of Lot 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are within the BCDA;
42 that the COSLAP was not justified in ignoring BCDA's
request to postpone the survey to the succeeding year
because the presence of its representatives in such an
important verification survey was indispensable for the
impartiality of the survey aimed at resolving a highly volatile
situation; 43 that the COSLAP is a mere coordinating
administrative agency with limited jurisdiction; 44 and, that
the present case is not among those enumerated in Section 3
of E.O. No. 561. 45 caTIDE
The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3
(2) (e) of E.O. No. 561 provides that it may assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes in "other
similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude," 46
and the present case is one such problem.
The CA in its Decision 47 dated September 10, 2009 ruled
that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the complaint
because the question of whether Dream Village is within the
areas declared as available for disposition in Proclamation
No. 172 is beyond its competence to determine, even as the
land in dispute has been under a private title since 1906, and
presently its title is held by a government agency, the BCDA,
in contrast to the case of Baaga relied upon by Dream
Village, where the disputed land was part of the public
domain and the disputants were applicants for sales patent
thereto.
Dream Village's motion for reconsideration was denied in the
appellate court's Order 48 of July 13, 2010.
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, Dream
Village interposes the following issues:
A
IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP IN
COSLAP CASE NO. 99-500, THE HONORABLE [CA]
DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT
CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT; cIDHSC
B

THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN RULING THAT

COSLAP HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES HEREIN[.]49
The Court's Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys

were conducted by the Bureau of Lands to delimit the
boundaries of the areas excluded from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 423: AEScHa
Survey Plan

Date Approved

SWO-13-000253

October 21, 1986

SWO-13-000258

May 13, 1986

SWO-13-000258

May 13, 1986

The BCDA holds title to Fort

Bonifacio.
Lower
Bicutan
That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long
been
decided with finality. In Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa
Makati, Inc. v. BCDA, 50 it was categorically ruled as
follows:
First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and
now the BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio.
Bicutan
The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles andWestern
Deeds of
Pasay City, Pasig and Makati is final and conclusive on the
ownership of the then Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the
Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the
ownership of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to
rest. Other than their view that the USA is still the owner of
the subject lots, petitioner has not put forward any claim of
ownership or interest in them. 51
The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are
essentially not much different from the controversy below.
There, 20,000 families were long-time residents occupying
98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City, who vainly sought
to avert their eviction and the demolition of their houses by
the BCDA upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA
under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme Court found that TCT
No. 2288 had in fact been cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in
the name of the Republic, which title was in turn cancelled
on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886,
22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, all in the name of the
BCDA. The Court ruled that the BCDA's aforesaid titles over
Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond question,
since TCT No. 61524 was cancelled in favor of BCDA
pursuant to an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227, the
legal basis for BCDA's takeover and management of the
subject lots. 52 HIaSDc
Dream Village sits on the
abandoned C-5 Road, which lies
outside the area declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as
alienable and disposable.

SWO-13-000298

January 15, 1987 53

However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13000298, shows that Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 thereof are inside the
area segregated for the Libingan ng mga Bayani under
Proclamation No. 208, which then leaves only Lots 1 and 2
of Swo-13-000298 as available for disposition. For this
reason, it was necessary to amend Proclamation No. 2476.
Thus, in Proclamation No. 172 only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13000298 are declared alienable and disposable. 54 DCcHAa
The DENR verification survey report states that Dream
Village is not situated in Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 but
actually occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-000001302: ". . . [Dream Village] is outside Lot 1, SWO-[13]000298 and inside Lots 10, 11 & portion of Lot 13, SWO[00]-0001302 with an actual area of 78466 square meters.
The area is actually is [sic] outside SWO-00-0001302 of
BCDA." 55 Inexplicably and gratuitously, the DENR also
states that the area is outside of BCDA, completely oblivious
that the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio,
even as the BCDA asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO00-0001302 are part of the abandoned right-of-way of C-5
Road. This area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of Swo13-000298 and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-13-000298
(Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan ng mga Bayani, and
the boundary line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really
the proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which was abandoned
when, as constructed, it was made to traverse northward into
the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream Village has not disputed
this assertion.

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross
Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by deviating it northward
to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does
not signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed
lots, nor that these lots would then become alienable and
disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as
it is significant that under Section 8 (d) of R.A. No. 7227, a
relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families
affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere
claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part
of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the
south, 56 making them commercially valuable to BCDA, a
farther argument against a claim that the government has
abandoned them to Dream Village.
While property of the State or any
of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of
prescription, those "intended for
some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth" are considered property of
public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription." Articles 420 and 421
identify what is property of public dominion and what is
patrimonial property: EScHDA
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property. aITECD
One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by
Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition by prescription.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 57 it was pointed

out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the
subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and
disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands
did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law
makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in
order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the
purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or
"the development of national wealth" under Article 420 (2)
of the Civil Code,such that the lands remain property of the
public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and
disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon
their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the
BCDA law that they become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion: 58

than 400 has. of Maricaban in Upper and Lower Bicutan,

Signal Village, and Western Bicutan as alienable and
disposable; Proclamation No. 518 (1990) formally exempted
from Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of Cembo, South
Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and
Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared them open for
disposition. aECTcA

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although

already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth." 59

Ownership of a land registered

under a Torrens title cannot be lost
by prescription or adverse
possession.

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code,public domain

lands become patrimonial property only if there is a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together
with an express government manifestation that the property
is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service
or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run. Also under Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive
prescription can commence, the property sought to be
registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State
that it is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth, or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express
declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of
public dominion. 60 cIHSTC
Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast
portions of the former Maricaban have been legally disposed
to settlers, besides those segregated for public or government
use. Proclamation No. 1217 (1973)established the Maharlika
Village in Bicutan, Taguig to serve the needs of resident
Muslims of Metro Manila; Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as
amended by Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared more

The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio

remains property of public dominion of the State, because
although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military
reservations in the country to productive civilian uses. 61
Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by
Dream Village has not even begun to run.

Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDA's claim that

Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are the
abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road, which is within the
vast titled territory of Fort Bonifacio. We have already
established that these lots have not been declared alienable
and disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title
cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 62
Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration
Decree, expressly provides that no title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. And,
although the registered landowner may still lose his right to
recover the possession of his registered property by reason of
laches, 63 nowhere has Dream Village alleged or proved
laches, which has been defined as such neglect or omission
to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as
will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in
the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another
because of the inequity founded on some change in the
condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on
public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that
relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could
be a valid claim. 64 TSacCH

The subject property having been

expressly reserved for a specific
public purpose, the COSLAP
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village
settlers.
BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction to hear Dream Village's complaint. Concurring,
the CA has ruled that questions as to the physical identity of
Dream Village and whether it lies in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of
Swo-00-0001302, or whether Proclamation No. 172 has
released the disputed area for disposition are issues which are
"manifestly beyond the scope of the COSLAP's jurisdiction
vis- -vis Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561," 65
rendering its Resolution a patent nullity and its
pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said, under Section 3 of
E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP's duty would have been to refer
the conflict to another tribunal or agency of government in
view of the serious ramifications of the disputed claims:
STIcaE
In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. It would have
been more prudent if the COSLAP has [sic] just referred the
controversy to the proper forum in order to fully thresh out
the ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is, the impugned
Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which
rendered it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the pronouncements
contained therein are void. "We have consistently ruled that a
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect." 66 (Citation omitted)
We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared
specific public purpose under R.A. No. 7227, which
unfortunately for Dream Village does not encompass the
present demands of its members. Indeed, this purpose was
the very reason why title to Fort Bonifacio has been
transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which
takes the dispute out of the direct jurisdiction of the
COSLAP. A review of the history of the COSLAP will
readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes over
public lands not reserved or declared for a public use or
purpose. cAaDHT
On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251

creating the Presidential Action Committee on Land

Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the
investigation and resolution of all kinds of land disputes
between settlers, streamline and shorten administrative
procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land
problems, or recommend other solutions. 67 E.O. No. 305,
issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and
gave it exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public
lands and other lands of the public domain, 68 as well as
adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate,
coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes,
streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general, to
adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems
involving public lands and lands of the public domain." 69

settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities

to avoid social unrest. 70 Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O No.
561 now specifically enumerates the instances when the
COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:

On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the

PACLAP and enlarged its functions and duties. Section 2
thereof even granted it quasi judicial functions, to wit:

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency

having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute
referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission
may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve
land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of the
parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension
or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:

Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. The

PACLAP shall have the following functions and duties:
1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the
investigation work, of the various government agencies and
agencies involved in land problems or disputes, and
streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers
and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the
expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution
of such problems or disputes;

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have

the following powers and functions: SAHIDc
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation
work, of the various government offices and agencies
involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and
streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers
and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the
expense and time consuming delay attendant to the solution
of such problems or disputes;

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement

holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government

2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute

brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member
agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the
Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution,
order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall
be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the
member agency having jurisdiction thereof;

reservation grantees;

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the

speedy investigation and resolution of land disputes or
problems at provincial level, if possible. (Underscoring
supplied)

Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and

demolition by the BCDA and the seriousness and urgency of
the reliefs sought in its Amended Petition, Dream Village
insists that the COSLAP was justified in assuming
jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. 99-500. But in Longino v.
Atty. General, 71 it was held that as an administrative
agency, COSLAP's jurisdiction is limited to cases
specifically mentioned in its enabling statute, E.O. No. 561.

On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the

PACLAP and created the COSLAP to be a more effective
administrative body to provide a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of land problems among small

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or

applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude. cEaCTS

The Supreme Court said:

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of
limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are
specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. . . . .
LLphil
xxx xxx xxx
Under the law, [E.O. No. 561], the COSLAP has two options
in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it,
namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume
jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in
paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and
explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of
the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action. In resolving whether to assume
jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular
agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the
nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate
and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and
damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest
jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or
problem. 72 (Citation omitted) ITScHa
The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent
COSLAP cases, among them Davao New Town
Development Corp. v. COSLAP, 73 Barranco v. COSLAP,
74 NHA v. COSLAP, 75 Cayabyab v. de Aquino, 76 Ga, Jr.
v. Tubungan, 77 Machado v. Gatdula, 78 and Vda. de Herrera
v. Bernardo. 79
Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot
invoke Section 3 (2) (e) of E.O. No. 561 to assume
jurisdiction over "other similar land problems of grave
urgency," since the statutory construction principle of
ejusdem generis prescribes that where general words follow
an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind as those
specifically mentioned. 80 Following this rule, COSLAP's
jurisdiction is limited to disputes involving lands in which
the government has a proprietary or regulatory interest, 81 or
public lands covered with a specific license from the
government such as a pasture lease agreements, a timber

concessions, or a reservation grants, 82 and where moreover,

the dispute is between occupants/squatters and pasture lease
agreement holders or timber concessionaires; between
occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
and between occupants/squatters and public land claimants
or applicants.
In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the
Philippine National Railways. The high court rejected
COSLAP's jurisdiction, noting that the disputed lot is not
public land, and neither party was a squatter, patent lease
agreement holder, government reservation grantee, public
land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural
minority, nor was the dispute critical and explosive in nature
so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical
situation which required immediate action. 83
In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the
COSLAP has no concurrent jurisdiction with the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in respect of disputes concerning
the implementation of agrarian reform laws, since "[t]he
grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters on the DAR implies that no other court,
tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly
cognizable by the DAR." 84 Thus, instead of hearing and
resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply referred
private respondents' complaint to the DAR or DARAB.
According to the Court: cDCSET

boundary dispute between two local government units, that

its decision is an utter nullity correctible by certiorari, that it
can never become final and any writ of execution based on it
is void, and all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. 87
In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP
does not extend to disputes involving the ownership of
private lands, or those already covered by a certificate of
title, as these fall exactly within the jurisdiction of the courts
and other administrative agencies." 88
In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over controversies relating to ownership and
possession of private lands, and thus, the failure of
respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP decision
before the appropriate court was held not fatal to the petition
for certiorari that they eventually filed with the CA. The
latter remedy remained available despite the lapse of the
period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision. 89
In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no
jurisdiction in disputes over private lands between private
parties, reiterating the essential rules contained in Section 3
of E.O. No. 561 governing the exercise by COSLAP of its
jurisdiction, to wit:

In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures

encroaching into private property. The Supreme Court ruled
that COSLAP may resolve only land disputes "involving
public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered
with a specific license from the government such as a pasture
lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant."
86 TcSCEa

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in

acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g.,
COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of
those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law.
Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In
resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to
refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP
considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land
involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the
questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent
action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not
vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume
jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under
EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land
disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or
those covered by a specific license from the government,
such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or
reservation grants. 90 (Citations omitted) aSIDCT

In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a

In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a

The abovementioned proviso [Section (3)(2) of E.O. No.

561], which vests COSLAP the power to resolve land
disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to
assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined
only to disputes over lands in which the government has
proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute
in Baaga involved parties with conflicting free patent
applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to
resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively
cognizable by the DAR. 85

complaint for "interference, disturbance, unlawful claim,

harassment and trespassing" over a private parcel of land.
The CA ruled that the parties were estopped to question
COSLAP's jurisdiction since they participated actively in the
proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting from the complaint
that the case actually involved a claim of title and possession
of private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC has
jurisdiction since the dispute did not fall under Section 3,
paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, was not critical and
explosive in nature, did not involve a large number of parties,
nor was there social tension or unrest present or emergent. 91
In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Baaga to assert its
jurisdiction. There, Guillermo Baaga had filed a free patent
application with the Bureau of Lands over a public land with
an area of 30 has. Gregorio Daproza (Daproza) also filed a
patent application for the same property. The opposing
claims and protests of the claimants remained unresolved by
the Bureau of Lands, and neither did it conduct an
investigation. Daproza wrote to the COSLAP, which then
opted to exercise jurisdiction over the controversy. The high
court sustained COSLAP, declaring that its jurisdiction is not
confined to the cases mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of
E.O. No. 561, but includes land problems in general, which
are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers,
landowners and cultural minorities.
But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the
other cases aforecited, the land dispute in Baaga was
between private individuals who were free patent applicants
over unregistered public lands. In contrast, the present
petition involves land titled to and managed by a government
agency which has been expressly reserved by law for a
specific public purpose other than for settlement. Thus, as we
have advised in Longino, the law does not vest jurisdiction
on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem, but it has
to consider the nature or classification of the land involved,
the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and
the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent
injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED. IaDSEA
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Villarama,
Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Bases

Conversion Development Authority, G.R. No. 192896, [July
24, 2013], 715 PHIL 211-244)

FORMS AND CONTENTS

SURVEY OF THE LAND
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 169397. March 13, 2007.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
RESTITUTO SARMIENTO, represented by his
attorney-in-fact, MAGDALENO SARMIENTO,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
Restituto Sarmiento (respondent) through his brotherattorney-in-fact Magdaleno Sarmiento (Magdaleno)
filed on November 29, 2000 with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Taguig, Metro Manila an application
for registration 1 of a parcel of land, delineated as Lot
535-D under Approved Survey Plan Swo-13-000465
with a total land area of 2,664 square meters and
located at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila (the
lot).
Respondent claimed to have acquired the lot through
donation under a Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob 2 dated
July 16, 1988 executed by his father, Placido
Sarmiento (Placido), which lot formed part of Lot 535
that was allegedly inherited by Placido from Florentina
Sarmiento (Florentina).
Respondent further claimed that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public
possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years. 3
Together with his application for registration,
respondent submitted the following documents:
1. Blueprint copy of the Conversion and Subdivision
Plan Swo-13-000465 of Lot 535 as surveyed for
Magdaleno Sarmiento, et al; 4
2. Photocopy of Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; 5
3. Technical Description of Lot 535-D; 6
4. Owner's Copy of Tax Declaration No. EL-009-01681
in the name of Restituto A. Sarmiento; 7
5. Photocopy of the Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated
July 16, 1988; 8 and

6. Special Power of Attorney executed by Restituto

Sarmiento appointing Magdaleno Sarmiento as his
attorney-in-fact. 9
On January 17, 2001, the Solicitor General, through
the Prosecutor of Taguig who was deputized to assist
in the case, filed, as counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), an Opposition 10 to
respondent's application for registration. Contending
that (1) neither the applicant nor his predecessors-ininterest were in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lot since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto, as required under
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The
Public Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree
(P.D) No. 1073; 11 (2) respondent's muniments of title
and/or tax declarations and tax payment receipts do
not appear to be genuine and do not anyway
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of his
bona fide acquisition of the lot in the concept of an
owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (3) the
claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by
respondent as he failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within six months from
February 16, 1976, as required under P.D. No. 892; 12
and (4) the lot is part of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, not subject
to private appropriation. SCDaET
At the initial hearing of the application on April 4,
2001, respondent offered and marked in evidence
documents proving compliance with jurisdictional
requirements, following which the MeTC issued an
order of general default against the whole world,
except against the government. 13
After the conclusion of the testimonies of
respondent's brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno 14
and adjoining lot owner Rodolfo Sta. Ana, 15 the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), through the Assistant Regional Director for
Legal Services and Public Affairs, filed its Report 16
dated April 16, 2001 reiterating respondent's claims
as set forth in his application for registration.
The Land Registration Authority, through the Director
of the Department of Registration, also filed a report
with the MeTC with the information that it was not in a
position to verify whether the lot was already covered
by a land patent or a previously approved isolated
survey. 17

Respondent's formal offer of evidence 18 did not

merit comment/opposition from petitioner which in
fact waived the presentation of evidence for the
government. 19
By Decision 20 of May 27, 2002, the MeTC granted
respondent's application for registration. Thus it
disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the
allegations in the application to have been sufficiently
established by the applicant's evidence, this Court
hereby confirms the title of applicant Restituto
Sarmiento, Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to
Betty Sarmiento and a resident of No. 11, Guerrero
Street, Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila over the subject
parcel of agricultural land known as Lot 535-D,
MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping under
Conversion and Subdivision Plan Swo-13-000465
situated at Barangay Wawa, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila, consisting of Two Thousand Six Hundred
Sixty Four (2,664) square meters and hereby order
the registration thereof in his name.
After the finality of this Decision and upon payment of
the corresponding taxes due on the said lot, let an
order for the issuance of decree of registration be
issued.
SO ORDERED. 21
In granting respondent's application, the MeTC found
that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the lot in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years, viz:
The subject lot was a portion of the parcel of land
previously declared for taxation purposes in the name
of its original owner Florentina Sarmiento under Tax
Declaration (T.D.) No. 4995 (Exhibit "N"). Upon the
death of Florentina Sarmiento, a portion of said land
was inherited by Placido Sarmiento, the father of the
herein applicant Restituto Sarmiento, while the other
portion went to Placido's [s]ister Teodora Sarmiento.
On July 16, 1988, Placido Sarmiento transferred the
portion of the parcel of land inherited by him from
Florentina Sarmiento to his children, namely: herein
applicant Restituto Sarmiento, Magdaleno Sarmiento
and Conigunda Sarmiento by virtue of a deed
denominated as "Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob" (Exhibits
"O" and "O-5"). (TSN, June 16, 2001).
On April 24 and June 25, 1998, Magdaleno Sarmiento,
among others, caused the survey of the entire area of

the parcel of land . . . According to the said plan, the

said survey is inside alienable and disposable area,
Project No. 27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry (Exhibit "K2", supra).
The said property was being planted to rice,
watermelons, and other vegetables by Florentina
Sarmiento and her successors-in-interest themselves
and by their hired helpers for about fifty years (50)
years already. It is not tenanted and there are no
other persons having a claim over the said property
since the Japanese occupation. The said parcel of land
is about two (2) kilometers away from the Laguna
Lake but it gets flooded for about two (2) months
during the rainy season and sometimes up to three
(3) months if the town proper (poblacion) of Taguig is
itself underwater. (TSN, June 6, 2001). . . .
Applicant Restituto Sarmiento and his predecessorsin-interest had been in possession of the subject
parcel of land continuously, uninterruptedly, openly,
publicly, adversely and in the concept of owners for
more than thirty (30) years now. . . . 22
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, faulting
the MeTC for granting the application despite
respondent's failure to comply with the mandatory
requirement of submitting the original tracing cloth
plan in evidence. 23 Petitioner advanced that
according to the survey of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA), the lot is located
below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50
meters, hence, a part of the Laguna Lake bed which is
incapable of private appropriation. 24
By Decision 25 of May 20, 2005, the appellate court
held that as the lot was sufficiently identified by the
blue print copy of the plan and the technical
description, the presentation of the original tracing
cloth ceased to become indispensable for the grant of
the application. 26
The appellate court further held that petitioner's claim
that the lot forms part of the Laguna Lake bed cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal, and even
assuming that it was properly raised, the purported
ground survey of the LLDA had no probative value
since it was not a certified original copy. 27
The appellate court thus affirmed the decision of the
MeTC. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having
been denied by Resolution 28 of August 19, 2005,
petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition

for review on certiorari.

It is well settled that no public land can be acquired
by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government, and it is indispensable
that the person claiming title to public land should
show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 29
While respondent did not state in his application the
statutory basis of his application, it can reasonably be
inferred that he seeks the judicial confirmation or
legalization of his imperfect or incomplete title over
the lot 30 which he claims to be a riceland.
Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is, under the
Public Land Act, one of the means by which public
agricultural lands may be disposed. 31
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. 1073, 32 provides:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Under the above-quoted provision, an applicant for
confirmation of imperfect title must prove that (a) the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945. 33

To support its contention that the lot does not form

part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, petitioner submitted before the appellate
court the technical survey data and topographic map
of the LLDA showing that the lot is situated below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters. Since that
was the first time petitioner raised the issue, the
appellate court correctly glossed over it, for offending
basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. 34 In
any event, an examination of what purports to be the
technical survey data of the LLDA shows that it is not
a certified original copy but a mere photocopy, the
veracity and genuineness of which cannot be
ascertained by this Court.
The absence or weakness of the evidence for
petitioner notwithstanding, respondent still bears the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the lot he
seeks to register forms part of the alienable
agricultural land of the public domain. 35
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue
print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan
approved by the DENR Center which bears the
notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area,
Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic 36 teaches, however, that
reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is
alienable is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that it remains part of the inalienable
public domain.
To prove that the land in question formed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read:
"This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant
(petitioners in this case) must overcome the

presumption that the land sought to be registered

forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent
such evidence, the land sought to be registered
remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyorgeodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit "E" indicating
that the survey was inside alienable and disposable
land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of
the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that
the land in question has been declared alienable. 37
(Citations omitted; Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
But even assuming that respondent has proven that
the lot is alienable, his application would still be
denied for failure to comply with the period of
possession requirement.
Originally, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
required applicants to have been in possession and
occupation of lands applied for since July 26, 1894.
The law was later amended by Republic Act (RA) 1942
38 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period. 39 RA 1942 has, however, already been
amended by P.D. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977, which requires applicants to have been in
possession and occupation of the lands applied for
since June 12, 1945.
At the time respondent filed his application on
November 29, 2000, he had only been in possession
of the lot for more than 12 years, following his
acquisition of ownership thereof from Placido by
Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob 40 dated July 16, 1988.
Respondent seeks to tack his possession with that of
his predecessors-in-interest, however.
From respondent's evidence, his grandmother
Florentina (from whom his father allegedly inherited
the lot which was in turn donated to him) registered
the lot for estate tax purposes in 1948. 41

From an examination of this 1948 tax declaration,

photocopy of which was marked as Exhibit "N" 42 by
respondent, not only does it bear no number or the
number is illegible; the area of the "palayero"
(riceland) cannot be determined as what is entered
under the column "Area" is "1-25-48" which
apparently stands for June 25, 1948, the date of
registration for estate tax purposes. While this tax
declaration names Florentina as the owner, there is a
notation after her printed name reading DECEASED.
And it names Lucio and Jose Buenaflor as the
administrators of the lot.
From the other tax declarations, Exhibits "N-1" up to
"N-12" 43 inclusive, presented by respondent, it
appears that Lucio and Jose Buenaflor acted as the
property administrators only until February 17, 1966
when Tax Declaration No. 8842 (Exhibit "N-2"), which
was registered on January 14, 1966, was cancelled by
Tax Declaration No. 8952 (Exhibit "N-3") whereon, for
the first time, Placido and Teodoro Sarmiento were
named administrators of the lot. On March 30, 1966,
Tax Declaration No. 8952 was cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 9631 (Exhibit "N-4") on which Placido
appears as the owner of Lot No. 535 of which the lot
in question forms part.
To this Court, Tax Declaration No. 9631-Exhibit "N-4"
does not constitute competent proof of Placido's title
over Lot 535. For one, respondent failed to prove that
Placido is an heir of Florentina. For another,
respondent failed to prove the metes and bounds of
the "palayero" allegedly owned by Florentina and that
the lot actually forms part thereof.
But even assuming arguendo that, as found by the
MeTC, Placido was an heir and inherited Lot 535 from
Florentina, respondent still failed to provide proof, nay
allege, that Florentina possessed Lot 535 since June
12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of
ownership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 20,
2005 and August 19, 2005, respectively, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for
registration filed by respondent, Restituto Sarmiento,
over Lot 535-D, with a total area of Two Thousand Six
Hundred Sixty Four (2,664) square meters situated at
Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Tinga, J., took no part, close relation to a party.

||| (Republic v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 169397, [March
13, 2007], 547 PHIL 157-169)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166577. February 3, 2010.]
SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and SOCORRO CARPO,
petitioners, vs. AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED,
respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
In the instant petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set
aside and annul the Decision 1 dated December 22,
2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61784, which reversed and set aside the Summary
Judgment 2 dated December 22, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 255. Also
subject of the present petition is the CA Resolution 3
dated December 16, 2004 which denied the motion
for reconsideration of the earlier decision.
A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of
the case, follows:
On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and
Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting
of Title 4 with the RTC of Makati City against Ayala
Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation
(APVC), and the Register of Deeds of Las Pias,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-292.
In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the
owners of a 171,209-square meter parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
296463 issued in their names. 5 They further alleged
that Ayala Corporation was claiming to have titles
(specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T4368) over the property covered by the Carpos' TCT
No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporation had made
such property its equity contribution in APVC to be
developed into a residential subdivision. Attached as
annexes to the complaint were photocopies of:
(a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the
name of the Carpos, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3,
plan Psu-56007) located in the Barrio of Almanza, Las
Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters;
(b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the
name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land
(Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886) located in Bo. Tindig na
Manga, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square
meters; EcTCAD

(c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the

name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land
(Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May
Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of
218,523 square meters; and
(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the
name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land
(Lot 3, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of May
Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of
155,345 square meters.
No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the
complaint.
According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366,
T-4367 and T-4368 and their derivatives "appear to
have been issued in the name of Ayala and purport to
cover and embrace the Carpo's property or portion
thereof duly covered registered under the already
indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463
are inherently invalid and enforceable (sic) for not
being the duly issued derivatives of the Carpos' title."
6 The Carpos additionally applied for a restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Ayala
Corporation and APVC from doing construction and
development works on the properties in purported
violation of the Carpos' rights.
The complaint prayed that the trial court render
judgment:
(1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T4366, T-4367, T-4368 and all alleged derivatives
thereof, issued in the name of Ayala Corporation
and/or APVC over the properties or portion thereof
embraced in the Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and issuing
a writ of possession in favor of the Carpos and/or
ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to surrender to
the Carpos the properties or portion thereof being
occupied by the said corporations under inherently
invalid or void titles; (2) declaring TCT No. 296463
issued in their names as valid and the Carpos as the
owners of the property described therein "including
the parcels of land being claimed and occupied by
Ayala [Corporation] and APVC withou[t] valid and
enforceable titles"; and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation
and APVC to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P100,000 as attorney's fees plus costs of suit and
litigation expenses. 7
On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an
answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint,
impleading respondent Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI)

in lieu of Ayala Corporation after purportedly verifying

with the Register of Deeds of Las Pias that the title to
the subject property was registered in the name of ALI
and not Ayala Corporation. 8
On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed
its Answer with Counterclaims and Opposition to
Application for Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction 9 and Pre-trial Brief with Motion
to Admit Amended Answer, 10 respectively. EAHcCT
In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no
longer exists having been merged with ALI in 1991.
ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT Nos. T4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the
Carpos' claimed property and the dispute pertained
only to the land covered by the Carpos' TCT No.
296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Pias
Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No.
125945 in the name of Ayala Corporation. It appeared
that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to
LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI.
Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of the
property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back
its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242
issued in 1950 while the Carpos' title was derived
from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also
claimed the Carpos' complaint was barred by res
judicata in view of the 1941 decision of this Court in
Guico v. San Pedro 11 which upheld the ownership of
a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property as
Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain
Florentino Baltazar who was asserting ownership of
the same under his plan, Psu-56007.
During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in
its own name, TCT No. T-41262, over the property
previously covered by TCT No. T-5333. 12
In the Order 13 dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC
ruled that the present case was an action in rem and
directed the transfer of the case to the RTC of Las
Pias where the disputed property is located. The
case was thereafter assigned to Branch 255 of the Las
Pias RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082.
On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on the ground that there was
allegedly no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the only issue for the court to resolve was a purely
legal one which of the two (2) titles should be
accorded priority. According to ALI, the parties were
relying on their respective TCTs, and since ALI

admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242 which was

issued more than twenty (20) years earlier than the
Carpos' predecessor's title (OCT No. 8575), its title is,
thus, superior. Expectedly, the Carpos filed an
opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
arguing that there were "genuine issues and
controversies to be litigated."
In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALI's
motion for summary judgment. This denial was
challenged in a petition for certiorari with the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 44243.
In a decision 14 dated September 25, 1997, the CA
granted ALI's petition and ordered the RTC to render a
summary judgment. Both parties moved for
reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI filed a motion
for partial reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to
render the summary judgment in the interest of
judicial economy and on a claim that the sole issue
was legal. The Carpos, in their motion, insisted that
there were genuine issues in this case that must be
threshed out in a trial. Both motions were denied in
the CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998. 15 ECISAD
Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in
separate petitions for review on certiorari. In G.R. No.
132259, ALI assailed the CA's refusal to render a
summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the
Carpos assailed the CA's ruling that trial was
unnecessary.
In separate minute Resolutions, 16 the Court denied
both petitions. Both parties' motions for
reconsideration were likewise denied.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment
dated December 22, 1998, finding the Carpos' title
superior to that of ALI and ruling, thus:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to
concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No.
T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their
complaint. A reading of the defendant's answer
reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property
surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to
allege that the same was approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to
be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No.
242. In original land registration cases, it is
mandatory that the application should be
accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied
for registration, duly approved by the Director of the

Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval

of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the
character of being of dubious origin and it is not
therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The
property being claimed by the defendant ALI,
allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to
have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any
title issued emanating from a survey plan without the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is
tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in
Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme
Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly
approved by the Director of Lands the same is of
dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence.
Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its
alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be
rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement
of mandatory character and unless the plan and its
technical description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of much value
(Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it
was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has
no authority to approve original survey plans
(Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador
Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which
defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from
OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the Director
of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared
and approved by the then Land Registration
Commissioner and under the law, the same is void.
It will also be noted that aside from the admissions
made by defendant ALI in its answer, it clearly
appears in its title TCT No. T-5333 that the date of
survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs' property
covered by TCT No. 296463 was surveyed on January
4-6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs' predecessor-ininterest had claimed ownership of the property ahead
of that of defendant ALI's predecessor-in-interest. The
principle of prior registration cannot be applied in this
case because the land previously surveyed cannot
anymore be the subject of another survey, and there
is already a record of a prior survey in the Bureau of
Lands. This is precisely the reason why the survey
plan has to be approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands. This must be the reason why the later

survey in favor of Ayala's predecessor-in-interest did

not anymore bear the approval of the Director of
Lands because had it been submitted for approval,
the records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an
earlier survey of the same land had already been
made and approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Lands. HTaSEA
Evidently, Ayala's claim of superiority of its title over
that of the plaintiffs' cannot therefore be sustained.
Be that as it may, the fact that cannot be disputed on
the basis of Ayala's answer is its admission that SWO
survey without the approval of the Director of the
Bureau of Lands was submitted in the alleged
registration proceedings, rendering the decree and
the title issued thereunder to be tainted with
irregularity and therefore void.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the
plaintiffs Spouses Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R.
Carpo as valid and legal, and superior to that of
defendant Ayala's TCT No. T-5333;
(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT
No. T-6055, TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No.
4368 and their derivatives as null and void;
(c) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the
sum of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) To pay the costs. 17
On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but
the same was dismissed by the CA in a Resolution 18
dated May 14, 1999 for failure to pay the full amount
of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI
pointed out that it paid the full amount assessed by
the cash clerk on duty at the RTC Las Pias. The
motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this
Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No.
140162. Finding ALI's petition meritorious, the Court,
in a Decision 19 dated November 22, 2000, reversed
the CA's dismissal of ALI's appeal and remanded the
same to the CA for further proceedings.
On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein
challenged decision in favor of ALI, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant
appeal is GRANTED, the assailed Summary Judgment

of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 255,

dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered as follows:

petition and concur with the CA that the Summary

Judgment rendered by the trial court should be
reversed and set aside.

(1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the

name of defendant-appellant Ayala Land,
Incorporated is hereby declared to be the VALID title
to the subject property;

Preliminary discussion regarding subject matter

of the controversy

(2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffsappellees is declared to be NULL and VOID;
(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby
ORDERED to cancel plaintiffs-appellees' TCT No.
296463, and any and all titles issued covering the
subject property, for being spurious and void, and of
no force and effect. 20
The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
December 16, 2004. Hence, the instant petition for
review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris
Carpo. 21 The Petition contained the following
assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS VALID EVEN
WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN APPROVED BY
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE RTC "RELIED HEAVILY" ON AN ALLEGED
"ADMISSION" BY RESPONDENT OF THE VALIDITY OF
THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED
PARCEL OF LAND.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST PETITIONERS
BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO, ET AL.,
72 PHIL 415, WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE ARE DIRECTLY
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE
ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT. 22
Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision:
(a) reversing and setting aside the CA Decision dated
December 22, 2003 and Resolution dated December
16, 2004; (b) reinstating and affirming in toto the
RTC's Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998;
or in the alternative (c) remanding the case to the RTC
for further proceedings. aDSIHc
After a thorough review of the records, we deny the

At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in

its Summary Judgment declared null and void (a) TCT
No. T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT No. [125945] T6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of
171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a
land area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T4367 with a land area of 218,523 square meters; and
(d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land area of 155,345 square
meters, despite the lack of evidence of identity of the
properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367 and
T-4368 with the property covered by the Carpos' TCT
No. 296463 or any portion of said property claimed by
petitioners. This was grievous and palpable error on
the part of the trial court considering that the
property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT
No. 296463 had an area of only 171,309 square
meters and the total area of the properties in the
titles invalidated by the trial court was 799,262
square meters.
It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243,
involving the same parties, the CA ruled that:
On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive
pleading did not deny the existence of a title in the
name of the plaintiffs/private respondents. Instead, it
alleged:
"14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463,
issued in the name of the plaintiffs, completely
overlaps the property covered by ALI's TCT No. T5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No.
8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970, long after
OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALI's TCT No. T-5333
was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis
of Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No.
43516). Hence, ALI's TCT No. T-5333 is superior to TCT
No. 296463. . . . ."
This is an admission that the private respondents
have a title to the property in question, and that the
property described in private respondents' TCT No.
296463 completely overlaps the title of petitioner ALI.
This fact is further substantiated by an affidavit
of Jose Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who,
after attesting to his qualifications, competence
and experience, declared under oath:

"9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was

requested to find out, based on the technical
descriptions in their respective titles, if the lots
described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463,
overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT No. 41262
(formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of LPVI, and, more
previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of
Ayala Corporation), TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and
TCT No. 4368, . . . . HETDAC
'9.1. To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the
plotting of the technical descriptions found in the
plaintiffs' and ALI's respective titles. The standard
operating procedure, adopted by Affiant in this
particular instance, in plotting properties is to study
the technical description in the titles and at the same
time, to get all the available survey plans described in
the titles for reference.
'9.2. To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted,
Affiant prepared a Sketch Plan reflecting Plaintiffs' title
vis-a-vis ALI's title. Attached hereto as Annex "G" is an
original copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the
Affiant.
'9.3. The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan
indicates the area covered by the title of the plaintiffs
and it is clearly shown in this plan that plaintiffs'
claimed property entirely overlaps ALI's
property delineated in TCT No. T-41262.
Plaintiffs' claimed property (Lot 3, PSU-56007)
is in fact identical to ALI's lot (Lot 3, PSU80886).
'9.4. The blue, pink and green lines on the
Sketch Plan indicate the boundaries of ALI's TCT
Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368, respectively, and it
is clearly shown that these do not overlap with
plaintiffs' claimed property.'"
The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly
indicates the overlapping and identical
boundaries between the private respondents'
TCT No. 296463 and petitioner's TCT No.
125945, (formerly TCT No. T-5333). 23 In addition
to the affidavit of the Geodetic Engineer, the
petitioner likewise attached to its Motion for Summary
Judgment copies of the following titles:
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, the private respondents never
controverted the petitioner's allegation that their
(private respondents') title, TCT No. 296463 traces its

origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12, 1970,

while that of the petitioner has its origin in OCT No.
242, issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover, the private
respondents attached no supporting document
to its Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of
summary judgment appear to have been
satisfied . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since the existence of two titles over the same
property, as well as the fact of overlapping of
the technical descriptions of the two titles are
admitted in the pleadings, and substantiated by
the supporting documents attached by the
defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its
Motion for Summary Judgment, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all,
the sole issue is a legal one, to wit: whose title
(as to the conflicting ones) is superior and must
be upheld. This issue may be decided on the
basis of the affidavits and supporting
documents submitted by the parties, as well as
the applicable law and jurisprudence on the
matter. In other words, there need not be a protracted
trial thereon, since all that the trial court should do is
to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration
the documents attached by the parties in their
respective pleadings and/or submitted together with
the motion or the opposition thereto. The same is
true with the other defenses raised by the
petitioner in its responsive pleading, to wit: res
judicata, prescription and laches which may
likewise be resolved without going to trial. 24
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) ETHSAI
The foregoing CA decision became final and executory
after the separate petitions for review filed with this
Court by the parties were denied with finality. The
parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the
CA's factual finding therein that the only lots whose
technical descriptions overlap are those covered by
the Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and ALI's TCT No. T-5333
which later became TCT No. T-41262. There was
simply no basis for the trial court to invalidate all the
ALI titles mentioned in the complaint.
The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI
titles in the Summary Judgment is even more evident
in the case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035)

and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035).

Petitioners' claims with respect to these properties are
already barred by res judicata. In Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 25
petitioner Morris Carpo already asserted his purported
ownership of these two properties based on a transfer
certificate of title with the same survey plan number
(Psu-56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty,
his claim was discredited by the Court when it held
that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty), ALI's
predecessor in interest, 26 is the one with valid title
to these properties. The relevant portions of the
Realty Decision are quoted here:
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza,
Las Pias, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of
373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala
Alabang Project and BF Homes Paraaque are covered
by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name
of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was derived
from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958, pursuant
to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758
and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the
name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT
No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant to
decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27,
1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and
Financing Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931
which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC
Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII,
presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera
(hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration
of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408."
Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,
Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land
Registration. . . . . TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao
Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-ininterest of Realty, who originally filed on June 24,
1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case

No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of

First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels
of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the
instant litigation among Carpo, Realty and
QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two
other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No.
43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758,
GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar,
as the three cases involved identical parcels of land,
and identical applicants/oppositors.
xxx xxx xxx
Carpo bought the disputed property from the
Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of
a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary
Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are
heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the
original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in
1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the
title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino
Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such
successors of Florentino, they could not
pretend ignorance of the land registration
proceedings over the disputed parcels of land
earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino
Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the
decisions rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the
name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty
derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve
years before the issuance of the title in the
name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general
rule is that in the case of two certificates of
title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails . . . . In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who
is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was
the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof . . . ." 27 (Emphasis and

underscoring ours; citations omitted.)

We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the
petition.
First Assignment of Error
Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that
the title of respondent is valid even without the
requisite survey plan approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands.
Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately
misread the CA's ruling on this point. It is the CA's
view that the trial court's pronouncement that OCT
No. 242 was issued without an approved survey plan
was unwarranted in view of the presumption of
regularity that said title enjoys. SIcTAC
We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon
perusing the following portion of the Summary
Judgment:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to
concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No.
T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their
complaint. A reading of the defendant's answer
reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property
surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to
allege that the same was approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this court to
be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No.
242. In original land registration cases, it is
mandatory that the application should be
accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied
for registration, duly approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands. A survey plan without the approval
of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the
character of being of dubious origin and it is not
therefore worthy of being accepted as evidence. The
property being claimed by the defendant ALI,
allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to
have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any
title issued emanating from a survey plan without the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is
tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in
Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme
Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly
approved by the Director of Lands the same is of
dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence.
Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its

alleged results are not entitled to credit and should be

rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement
of mandatory character and unless the plan and its
technical description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of much value
(Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it
was ruled that the Land Registration Commission has
no authority to approve original survey plans
(Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador
Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which
defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from
OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the Director
of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared
and approved by the then Land Registration
Commissioner and under the law, the same is void. 28
To begin with, a perusal of the defendant's answer or
amended answer would show that, contrary to the
trial court's allusions thereto, there is no admission on
the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a
survey plan that was duly approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Lands. There is likewise no evidence on
record to support the trial court's finding that the
survey plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT
No. 242 in the 1950 land registration proceedings was
approved only by the Land Registration Commissioner
and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion
that OCT No. 242 was issued without a duly approved
survey plan simply because the notation "SWO"
appeared in the technical description of the said title
which was attached to the answer and due to ALI's
failure to allege in its pleadings that the survey plan
submitted in support of the issuance of OCT No. 242
was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
29 cDHAaT
It is incomprehensible how the trial court could
conclude that the survey plan mentioned in OCT No.
242 was unapproved by the appropriate authority all
from the notation "SWO" which appeared beside the
survey plan number on the face of the title or from a
failure to allege on the part of ALI that a duly
approved survey plan exists. We quote with approval
the discussion of the CA on this point:
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred
when, in ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242 is
dubious, it gave emphasis to defendant-appellant's

failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242

was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of
Lands. It is admitted that a survey plan is one of the
requirements for the issuance of decrees of
registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it
can most certainly be assumed that said requirement
was complied with by ALI's original predecessor-ininterest at the time the latter sought original
registration of the subject property. Moreover,
the land registration court must be assumed to have
carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree
in favor of ALI's predecessor-in-interest, under the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by public officers. The court upon
which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to
have all the necessary powers to exercise such
jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively. This
is as it should be, because once a decree of
registration is made under the Torrens system, and
the time has passed within which that decree may be
questioned the title is perfect and cannot later
on be questioned. There would be no end to
litigation if every litigant could, by repeated actions,
compel a court to review a decree previously issued
by another court forty-five (45) years ago. The very
purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if
the same land may be subsequently brought under a
second action for registration, as what the court a quo
did when it faulted ALI's failure to allege that its
predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in
the original land registration case.
The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to
allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its
predecessor-in-interest complied with the
requirements for the original registration of the
subject property. A party dealing with a registered
land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title
to determine the true owner thereof so as to
guard or protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI
was not required to go beyond what appeared in the
transfer certificate of title in the name of its
immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did,
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued for
the subject property and the law will in no way
oblige it to go behind the certificate of title to
determine the condition of the property. This is
the fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land
registration, to give the public the right to rely upon
the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to

dispense with the need of inquiring further. 30

(Underscoring ours; citations omitted.)

indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless

verbiage. (Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No.

242 was a result of the registration decree of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land
registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its
derivatives, including ALI's TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the
presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or
prove that its title was regularly issued. That is
precisely the nature of such a presumption, it
dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court provides: DCAHcT

The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the

registration decree issued in Case No. 976 and OCT
No. 242 includes the presumption that all the
requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been
complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a
duly approved survey plan accompanied the issuance
of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It is
the party who seeks to overcome the presumption
who would have the burden to present adequate and
convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners
did not even attempt to do.

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following

presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:

We cannot accept petitioners' proposition that they

did not have the burden of proof of showing the
irregularity of ALI's title since the burden of proof
purportedly did not shift to them since no full-blown
trial was conducted by the RTC.

xxx xxx xxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in
the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a
case were laid before the court and passed upon by it;
and in like manner that all matters within an issue
raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid
before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; . . . .
Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao,
Laguna: 31
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763,
showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March
3, 1911, is presumed to have been regularly
issued by the accountable public officers who
enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions. Thus, the
proceedings that led to the issuance of Decree
No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao
cannot be overturned without any
countervailing proof to the contrary. In the words
of Tichangco v. Enriquez: 32
To overturn this legal presumption carelessly more
than 90 years since the termination of the case will
not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate
the underlying principle of the Torrens system.
Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal

This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule

131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides: ADTCaI
Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the
duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by
the amount of evidence required by law.
With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should
already have alleged all the bases of their cause of
action, particularly their allegation that ALI's title is
null and void and that such title should be cancelled.
However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that
petitioners never alleged the purported lack of an
approved survey plan as a defect of ALI's title. All that
the complaint alleged is that ALI's titles should be
declared void for not being derivatives of the Carpos'
title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners were
relying solely on the supposed priority of their own
title over ALI's. It stands to reason then that ALI did
not have to allege in its Answer that its mother title,
OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved
survey plan when petitioners did not raise the same
as an issue in their complaint or in any other pleading
filed with the trial court.
Indubitably, in view of the CA's Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 44243, this controversy has been reduced to the
sole substantive issue of which between the two
titles, purporting to cover the same property,
deserves priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As
petitioners themselves are aware, in Realty, it was
held that:

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general

rule is that in the case of two certificates of
title, purporting to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails . . . . In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is
issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest;
and that person is deemed to hold under the
prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest
certificate issued in respect thereof . . . ." 33
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite, 34 we
held that "[w]here two certificates of title purport to
include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the
better approach is to trace the original certificates
from which the certificates of title were derived."
In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible
error when it applied the principle "Primus Tempore,
Portior Jure" (First in Time, Stronger in Right) in this
case and found that ALI's title was the valid title
having been derived from the earlier OCT.
Second Assignment of Error
Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the
CA to rule that their cause of action has been barred
by prescription and laches. According to them, since
the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for
want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause of
action did not prescribe. However, as discussed
above, the conclusion of the trial court that OCT No.
242 is void was not sufficiently borne out by the
evidence on record. Verily, the premise upon which
petitioners build their theory of imprescriptibility of
their action did not exist.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CA's finding
that:
As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALI's
predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or
forty-five (45) years before plaintiffs-appellees filed
their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the
Court's firmly held view that plaintiffs-appellees' claim
is barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.
CTSAaH
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become
incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from

the time a decree of registration was issued, any

action for reconveyance that plaintiffs-appellees could
have availed of is also barred. Although plaintiffsappellees' complaint was for quieting of title, it is in
essence an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust, considering that
plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in said complaint
that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the
issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALI's predecessorin-interest. It is now well-settled that an action for
reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name, must be
filed within ten years from the issuance of the title,
since such issuance operates as a constructive notice.
Since ALI's title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950,
the ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not
involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is
principally an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In the
instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as well as their
predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they
have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from
which ALI's title was derived, for forty-five (45) years.
To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would
be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied
on the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers
for value, who are protected by the precise provisions
of P.D. 1529, thus:
"SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration;
Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised . . .
subject, however, to the right of any person . . . to file
in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not
later than one year from and after the date of entry of
such decree of registration, but in no case shall such
petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or
an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or
an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be
deemed to include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or
other encumbrances for value." 35

Third Assignment of Error

The next assigned error involves the question of
whether the trial court, in rendering the Summary
Judgment, indeed relied heavily on the alleged
admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos' title,
as declared by the CA. Specifically, the CA stated as
follows:
In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily
on the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the
existence and validity of plaintiffs-appellees' title. We
have read the pertinent pleading and We find ALI's
statement to be of no moment. aTHCSE
Nowhere in ALI's statement was there an admission of
the validity of plaintiffs-appellees' title. . . . .
The Court cannot comprehend where and how the
court a quo could have gotten the impression that ALI
was admitting not only the existence, but also the
validity of plaintiffs-appellees' certificate of title. . . . .
36
An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial
court would readily show that indeed the trial court
relied on ALI's supposed admission of the existence of
Carpos' title in ruling which of the conflicting titles
was valid. Pertinently, the trial court merely declared:
The existence of plaintiffs' TCT No. 296463 has been
admitted by defendant Ayala in its answer to have
been originated from OCT No. 8575 which was issued
on August 12, 1970. It is very significant that
defendant ALI admitted it in its answer that OCT No.
8575 and plaintiffs' TCT No. 296463 both originated
from Decree No. 131141 issued on October 15, 1969
in the name of Apolonio Sabater as Annex "G" to
defendant ALI's answer. This admission made by
the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon
it. It cannot therefore take position contrary to
or inconsistent with its answer, and the facts
are to be taken as true (Westminister High School
vs. Sto. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5,
1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255).
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to
concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No.
T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any
admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their
complaint. . . . . 37
Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly
state that ALI admitted the validity of Carpos' title
with its admission of the said title's existence, that is

the unmistakable import of the trial court's

statements that ALI's admission of the existence of
Carpo's title "are conclusive upon it" and bars ALI
from taking a "position contrary to or inconsistent
with its answer" followed by the statement that the
trial court is "not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim
of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No.
242, absent of (sic) any admission to that effect by
the plaintiffs." This is yet another non sequitur
argument on the part of the trial court which the CA
correctly pointed out in its own Decision.
Fourth Assignment of Error
As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the decision in the case of Guico v. San
Pedro 38 was binding on the Carpos as it proceeded
to discuss, thus:
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved
the conflicting claims over a tract of land situated in
barrio Tindig na Manga, Paraaque, Rizal, which was
subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The subject land was
sought to be registered by a certain Eduardo C. Guico
on the basis of an accompanying plan Psu-80886,
which interestingly is also the basis of ALI's TCT No. T5333, now TCT No. 41262. Guico's application was
opposed by, among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the
basis of plan Psu 56007, under which plaintiffsappellees' title was derived. HTCESI
It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico
on the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter
of the instant case), Lot 10 in favor of Baltazar on the
basis of Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees'
title was based, and the rest to the heirs of Narciso
Mayuga. While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of
his Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the Lot was
adjudicated to Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.
It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffsappellees have on the subject property on the basis of
Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their predecessor-ininterest, Florentino Baltazar, the same had been
clearly and finally denied by the Supreme Court in
Guico vs. San Pedro.
For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it
must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it
must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and (4) there must be, between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter

and of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only have

objections with respect to the fourth requisite,
offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such
decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico
vs. San Pedro and the instant case. 39
We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from
an examination of Guico and the evidence on record
that indeed the predecessors-in-interest of ALI and
the Carpos with respect to the subject property are
Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially
since the parties' respective OCTs were not issued in
these persons' names but rather a certain Alberto
Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be
categorically said that there was identity of parties
between the Guico case and the instant case. Clearly,
one of the elements of res judicata, i.e., that there
must be, between the first and the second actions,
identity of parties, is lacking. In any event, the CA's
questioned Decision had sufficient basis in fact and
law even without relying on the Guico case.
In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in setting aside the
patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals' Decision dated December 22, 2003 and the
Resolution dated December 16, 2004 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Bersamin and Villarama,
Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Spouses Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No.
166577, [February 3, 2010], 625 PHIL 277-304)