Grand Slam

A Battle of Lost
Opportunities
Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC does a
detailed analysis of Pakistan Armys attempt to capture AKHNUR in 1965.
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to discuss Operation Grand Slam in the overall context of the
1965 War, assessing its strategic significance, and the various controversies surrounding it.
The Kashmir problem shaped the future of Indo-Pak Sub-Continental politics from 1947
onwards and led to the militarisation of India and Pakistan. The Poonch Valley link road
connecting Jammu with Poonch Valley, the second largest valley of Kashmir, was a hot
favourite military objective of military planners in Pakistan, right from 1947-48. One of the
major military objectives of the 1947-48 War was to harass Indian communications around
Jammu in areas Akhnur and Kathua.1 Beri Pattan Bridge over River Tawi a few miles southeast of Nowshera on this road was the main objective of a planned Pakistani armoured
brigade and infantry brigade attack code named Operation Venus in December 1948.2 As a
matter of fact one of the reasons which motivated the Indian Government, in 1948, into
requesting for a complete ceasefire may have been its anxiety to avoid a major battle,
opposite its communications to the Poonch Valley.3 The Pakistani governments, calling off
the projected Operation Venus, and acceptance of this ceasefire offer and final ceasefire
with effect from night 31 December 1948 and 1st January 1949, was later much criticised in
Pakistan. Claims were made that the Pakistani Government agreed to a ceasefire to the
armys horror at a time when military victory was within Pakistans grasp!4 A Pakistani
officer who was then commanding the infantry brigade strike force tasked to execute
Operation Venus, much later in 1976 claimed that, had the operation been launched, he
could have been in Jammu within 24 hours and into Pathankot and Gurdaspur in the next 24
hours! 5
Thus when Operation Grand Slam was conceived and launched in 1965 history was
repeating itself and as later events turned out, ironically history repeated itself, in terms of
irresolution and indecisiveness on part of Pakistans highest military and political leadership.
The bluff self-promoted Field Marshal from a so-called martial area proved himself as
indecisive as the Hindustani Muslim Prime Minister of 1948 who was much criticised by
many intellectuals in Pakistan6 for indecisiveness and timidity in the 1947-48 War. History
repeated itself for the second time in 1999 when a smaller scale military operation was called

off in Kargil. The man accused of timidity on this occasion was a Punjabi (Kashmiri) Prime
Minister! The 35th anniversary of the 1965 War demands that we in the Indo-Pak SubContinent must re-assess the validity of the historical life scripts into which past experiences
have programmed us! It is a vain hope since most human beings despite all advancement in
civilisation are dominated by absurd urges!
OPERATION GRAND SLAM
Background
1965 was an eventful year in Indo-Pak history. The Pakistani military ruler Ayub emerged
victorious in the Presidential elections held in January 1965 amidst allegations of rigging.
This factor created a desire in Ayub to improve his political image by a limited gain in the
realm of foreign relations. He got an opportunity to do so in April 1965 over a minor border
dispute with India in the Rann of Kutch area. The Pakistan Army dominated the skirmishes in
the Rann area as a result of which a climate of overconfidence was created in the Pakistani
military and political establishment.7
In May 1965 following the jubilation in Pakistan because of the Rann affair Ayub became
keen to launch the proposed Operation Gibraltar: a proposed plan to launch guerrillas into
Indian held Kashmir with the objective of creating a popular uprising, finally forcing India to,
abandon Kashmir. Ayub went to Murree on 13 May 1965 to attend a briefing on the conduct
of Operation Gibraltar.8 We will not go into the controversy surrounding this plan, which is
basically an exercise in futility, and mud slinging initiated by some self-styled experts,
motivated largely by personal rivalry and ulterior biases, since the prime aim of this article is
to discuss the military significance of Operation Grand Slam and its connection with
Operation Gibraltar. In this briefing Ayub examined the Operation Gibraltar plan
prepared by Major General Akhtar Malik, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 12
Division. The 12 Division was responsible for the defence of the entire border of Pakistan
occupied Kashmir from Ladakh in the north till Chamb near the internationally recognised
border to the south. It was during this briefing that Ayub suggested that the 12 Division
should also capture Akhnur.9 This attack was codenamed Operation Grand Slam. General
Musa, the then C in C Army and Altaf Gauhar the then Information Secretary and Ayubs
close confidant, the two principal defenders of Ayub have not given any explanation about
what exactly was the strategic rationale of Grand Slam and what was its proposed timing in
relation to Operation Gibraltar. We will discuss this aspect in detail in the last portion of
this article.
OPERATION GIBRALTAR
The confusion in history writing in Pakistan may be gauged from the fact that Shaukat Rizas
book on 1965 War, despite being Pakistan Armys official account does not contain the two
words Operation Gibraltar! It appears that the idea of launching a guerrilla war in Indian
held Kashmir was in vogue since the 1950s. Major General Mitha confirms in his GHQ
inspired book, written soon after publication of Gul Hassan Khans memoirs10 that had
outraged the Pakistani GHQ that he heard ideas that such an operation should be launched
since 1958.11 Mitha claims that from 1958 to 1961 he had advised that such operations had
no chance of success and each time F.M Ayub Khan had agreed with me and vetoed the
suggestions.12 General Gul Hassan states that the secret Kashmir Cell formed by the
Foreign Office on Ayubs orders consisting of various key officials including the DMO i.e

Gul Hassan was informed by the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad that the President had
ordered GHQ to prepare two plans to encourage/provide all out support sabotage/guerrilla
operations in Indian Held Kashmir. Gul states that the decision to mount guerrilla operations
with active Pakistan Army involvement was taken after the Rann of Katch skirmish. Altaf
Gauhar who was the Information Secretary at that time claims that the Foreign Secretary Aziz
Ahmad had convinced himself that Pakistan was in a position to dislodge the Indians from
Kashmir and that Once trained Pakistani soldiers went inside Kashmir the people of the
Valley would spontaneously rise in revolt and that fear of China would prevent the Indians
from provoking an all out war that would give Pakistan army the opportunity to drive the
Indians out of Kashmir just as it had done in the Rann of Kutch. Gauhar further claimed that
the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and the Foreign Office drew up the plan for
Operation Gibraltar.13
Pakistani expectations, and this does not include Bhutto alone, as many self-styled experts
based on personal rivalry would much later claim; were raised to unrealistic heights after the
Rann affair and Ayub was convinced that Gibraltar would succeed! In a written
communication before the war Ayub asserted that As a general rule Hindu morale would not
stand more than a couple of blows delivered at the right time and place. Such opportunities
should, therefore, be sought and exploited.14
Gauhar states that Mr Z.A Bhutto the Foreign Minister was so convincingly persuasive in his
advocacy of Operation Gibraltar that he convinced many Pakistan Army officers serving in
the GHQ, who in turn urged the Pakistani C in C Musa to bite the bullet.15 Further Musa,
the C in C much later in 1983 claimed that Bhutto had Brainwashed his officers.16 These
two assertions if true means that either Bhutto was a military genius or those army officers
who he convinced had no grey matter and that the Pakistani C in C was a glorified headclerk
whose function was that of a rubber stamp rather than anything to do with higher military
strategy or operational planning.
This article is not about Operation Gibraltar but Grand Slam, however, no discussion or
analysis of Grand Slam is possible if Gibraltar is not discussed, although in brief. Operation
Gibraltar envisaged guerrilla operations inside Indian Occupied Kashmir by a number of
guerrilla groups of roughly a battalion strength comprising of Kashmiri Volunteers trained by
Pakistan Army, Pakistan Army Special Services Group (SSG) Commando personnel and
some regular infantry troops.17 The total strength of the Gibraltar Force was not more than
5,000 to 7,000 men subdivided into five forces i.e (1) Salahuddin Force operating in
Srinagar Valley, (2) Ghaznavi Force in Mendhar-Rajauri area, (3) Tariq Force in DrasKargil area, (4) Babar Force in Nowshera-Sundarbani area, (5) Qasim Force in
Bandipura-Sonarwain area, (6) Khalid Force in Qazinag-Naugam area, (7) Nusrat Force
in Tithwal-Tangdhar area, (8) Sikandar Force in Gurais area and (9) Khilji Force in KelMinimarg area.18 The mission assigned to the various Gibraltar forces was warfare in the
enemys rear including harassing enemy communications, destruction of bridges, logistic
installations, headquarters with a view to create conditions of an armed insurrection in
Kashmir finally leading to a national uprising against Indian rule leading to liberation of
Kashmir or at least parts of it.19
The infiltration operation of the Gibraltar Force commenced from first week of August
1965.20 General Harbaksh Singh the C in C Indian Western Command described the
infiltration operation as brilliant in conception.21 The Gibraltar Forces mission was too
ambitious and its achievement was beyond its means, however, in words of Indian military

writer Major K.C Praval Although the Gibraltar Force failed to raise a revolt, they did
succeed in creating a great deal of confusion and disorder by acts of sabotage, violence and
murder.22 Praval praised Nusrat Force which was operating in Tithwal area which in his
words caused a great deal of damage before it could be pushed back over the ceasefire
line.23 Indian General Harbaksh Singh in the typical Indo-Pak style of not being
intellectually honest once dealing with assessment of enemy actions, inadvertently admitted
the mental dislocation that the Gibraltar Force had caused in the headquarters of Indian 15
Corps. Harbaksh thus stated General Officer Commanding 15 Corps gave the following
assessment of the prevailing situation: The maximum success gained by the infiltrators
was in the Mandi area where they had secured local support24 .......... General Officer
Commanding 15 Corps in a personal signal to me recommended the abandonment of the
Hajipir offensive .....on account of the serious tactical situation in that sector. 25 This
happened on 15th August! On 17th August 1965 General Harbaksh Singh noted that the 15
Indian Corps Commanders assessment of operational situation in Kashmir was rather too
grim and gloomy.26 Even Joginder Singh who later wrote a book to refute most of
Harbakshs assertions admitted in his book that GOC XV Corps Lt Gen Katoch appeared to
be overwhelmed by the scale of infiltration.27 The reader may note that all this was
happening despite an overwhelming Indian numerical superiority in troops. A small example
being the 25 Indian Division area where the Indians had some 20 infantry battalions 28 at a
time when the total strength of the 12 Pakistani Division responsible for all 400 miles of
Kashmir was not more than 15 infantry battalions! 29
The local population of Indian Held Kashmir did not co-operate with the Gibraltar Force and
by 18th August the operations of the Gibraltar Force were considerably reduced. The Indians
brought in additional troops and the infiltration operation was checked by 20th August. As
discussed earlier the Indian 15 Corps Commander was unnerved, however, the C in C
Western Command Harbaksh Singh exhibited greater resolution and spurred the 15 Indian
Corps into launching two major counter infiltration attacks inside Pakistan Held Kashmir to
destroy the logistic bases in Hajipir Bulge and Neelam Valley areas. Both these attacks
succeeded since the 12 Division was already over stretched with single infantry battalions
holding frontages varying from 10 to 20 miles. 30 There is absolutely no doubt that Gibraltar
was an undoubted failure! The loss of Hajipir Pass, the principal logistic base of the
infiltrators on 28th August and Indian successes in the Neelam Valley and opposite Uri on 2931st August 1965 unnerved the Pakistani GHQ who assumed that Muzaffarabad was about to
be attacked!31 The supposed liberators of Indian Held Kashmir were more worried now
about what they had held before commencement of hostilities! It was under these
circumstances that the Pakistani GHQ ordered execution of Grand Slam with the aim of
relieving Indian pressure against Muzaffarabad! Shaukat Riza the official historian of the
1965 War admitted that by 31 August the Indians had ruptured 12 Divisions defences and
this was the main reason why the GHQ decided to attack Chamb to ease pressure on 12
Division. Shaukat also quoted Musa and the Chief of General Staff Sher Bahadur in stating
that the main reason why Grand Slam was launched was that there was danger of Indians
capturing Muzaffarabad.32 Musa in his roundabout way of saying things did not mention
Muzaffarabad but merely stated that the main object of launching Grand Slam was
reducing pressure in the north by capturing Chamb and threatening Akhnur.33
THE BATTLE OF CHAMB-JAURIAN-AKHNUR
Significance of Akhnur

Akhnur Class 18 bridge 34 on the fast flowing Chenab River was the key to Indian
communications from Jammu and mainland India a group of valleys lying south south of the
Pir Panjal Range and West of Chenab River, most prominent of which was the Poonch River
Valley. The bridge was the sole all weather lifeline of one oversized Indian infantry division,
with at least twenty infantry battalions, defending Poonch, Rajauri, Jhangar and Nauhshera
and one Independent Infantry Brigade defending Chamb-Dewa Sector. Possession of Akhnur
could enable an attacker to threaten Jammu the key to all Indian communications from
Pathankot to Srinagar/lLadakh etc.
Orientation with the area
Chamb-Jaurian Sector is bounded by the ceasefire line from Dewa till Burjeal in the west, the
international border from Burjeal till River Chenab in the south, various branches of River
Chenab from Phulkean Salient till Akhnur in the south and Southwest, and a range of hills
between the height of 1000 to 3000 feet running in a roughly east-west direction in the north.
Some ridges run from this range of hills downwards in a north-south direction, most
prominent of which are Phagla-Sakrana Ridge located about between a mile and two miles,
eastwards from the border, followed by Tam Ka Tilla, east of Pallanwalla and the Fatwal
Ridge four miles west of Akhnur. Average relative height of each ridge varied from 40 to 80
feet. These ridges on the face value were minor features, however, in terms of fields of fire
and observation; their value was immense for a defender engaged in opposing tanks. The
gradient rose from north to south as well as from west to east, and the area to the north
restricted tank movement, while the area in the south with minor boggy patches afforded
excellent manoeuvrability for tanks. Two small ridges known as Mandiala North and South
dominated Chamb village itself. The Munawar Wali Tawi running from north to south into
the Chenab River divided the sector into two halves, was located about 7 to 8 Kilometres
from the border. The Nala had a wide bed varying from 100 yards in the north to 300 yards in
the south and steep banks, which made it a partial tank obstacle. There were various crossing
places on the Nala notably at Chamb, Mandiala, Darh and Channi from north to south
respectively. The Nala had a lot of water in summers but maximum water depth in September
was not more than four feet, thus making it negotiable for all types of tanks. Only one
partially constructed bridge spanned the Nala near Chamb in 1965. Road Akhnur-Jaurian
Chamb to the south and Road Akhnur-Kalit-Mandiala, both running in a east-west general
alignment were two metalled roads running almost parallel to each other connected Chamb
with Akhnur. The area of manoeuvre for tanks from the west was restricted to a 12 Kilometre
gap between Burjeal and Dewa Hills and a 7 to 8 kilometre tract from Burjeal to the Chenab
River which became relatively more boggy as one went closer to Chenab River. Both the
roads leading from Chamb to Akhnur were intersected by Nalas running from north to south
at a distance of two to four kilometres with small ridges in between, thus reducing tank speed,
but were no obstacle for tanks. The ground all along was thus broken as well as interspersed
with dry Nalas. These Nalas restricted the cross-country mobility of wheeled vehicles once
off road. There were mango groves and wild orchards at places, which provided adequate
cover. The area was well cultivated and in September 1965 the fields had four feet high
standing crops of millet and maize. River Chenab running from north-east to south west in
the south and the line of hills running in an east-west direction provided natural built-in flank
protection against any tank threat, for any tank force advancing from west to east but also
restricted the movement of a tank force. In terms of tank manoeuvrability and space for
manoeuvre the area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a cylinder
which is about 12 kilometres wide on the extreme western side at its western entrance and
gets progressively narrower as one advances from west of east by virtue of a line of hills in

the north and Chenab River in the south both of which successively get progressively closer
narrowing the north-south space reducing the north south open space gap from 12 kilometre
in the west to about 3 to 4 kilometre at Akhnur. Thus in terms of tank warfare, the defenders
task became easier, as the attacker advanced from west to east since space for manoeuvre was
reduced by some one fourth.35
Indian and Pakistani Force Composition and Plans
Indian Force Composition and Plans. Till August 1965 the Indian force defending Chamb
Jaurian consisted of the 191 Independent Infantry Brigade Group consisting of four infantry
battalions and no armour.36 In addition the border posts were manned by two irregular
battalions of Punjab Armed Police and Jammu and Kashmir Militia Battalion. These two
battalions, however, had nominal military value like the Pakistani Rangers, by virtue of being
poorly trained/equipped. In May 1965 as part of Operation Ablaze (Indian plan of
mobilisation/shifting forward of forces in Punjab in May 1965) the Indians placed a tank
squadron of AMX-13 Light tanks under command 191 Brigade.37 Activities of the Gibraltar
Force Infiltrators in Chamb-Jaurian forced the Indians to bring in two additional infantry
battalions by end of August 1965, 38 however, both infantry battalions reverted to their
parent formations after successfully dealing with the Gibraltar Force infiltrators by end of
August.39 In 1956, 80 Indian Infantry Brigade responsible for defence of area NaushahraRajauri-Jhangar had pointed out that 191 Brigade defending Chamb-Jaurian Sector to his left
constituted a vulnerable left flank.40 The same officer as Brigadier General Staff 15 Indian
Corps Kashmir had concluded that Pakistani troops attacking from opposite Chamb could
capture Chamb and had recommended stationing of a tank regiment in the sector, upgrading
191 Infantry Brigade to a division and construction of an alternate bridge over the Chenab at
Riasi.41 None of these recommendations except upgradation of Akhnur Bridge to carry
AMX-13 tanks were accepted by the Indian higher headquarters! The Indian military
planners till 1965 had firmly believed that Pakistan would not cross the international border
between Chenab and Burjeal and thus regarded the southern half of Chamb Salient as
sacrosanct.42 The Indian planners had hypothesised that the most likely area of Pakistani
attack in South Kashmir was the Jhangar-Nowshera Sector.43 The Indian defences in ChambJaurian were thus not as extensive as in other sectors of Kashmir. The Indian artillery
consisted of just one field regiment and a troop of medium guns.44 In August 1965 in the
wake of Operation Gibraltar the Indian High Command finally decided to upgrade ChambJaurian Sector to a divisional command, however, till 1st September 196545 the area was
defended by 191 Independent Infantry Brigade directly under command 15 Indian Corps. The
10 Division headquarters staff designated to take over the area was at this time being
organised at Bangalore in the Indian south.46 The 10 Division headquarters was assigned a
time frame of three weeks in August 1965 and ordered to take over the command of 80
Brigade and 191 Brigade by 15 September 1965 and had reached Akhnur by 28th August
1965. The headquarters had no communication equipment and nominal staff on 1st
September 1965.47 The Indian armour consisting of a squadron of AMX-13 Light tanks
which was assigned the responsibility of anti tank defence of the main tank approach west of
Chamb. It was deployed in an extended form two troops on a ridge between Daur and Palla
responsible for the defence of the area from Paur in the north till a little east of Burjeal in the
south, one troop in the south in Munawar area and one troop in reserve at Barsala. On 1st
September, however, three tanks were under repair in the rear. All Indian infantry battalion
anti-tank recoilless guns were grouped under 15 Kumaon and tasked with the anti-tank
defence of the Mandiala crossing. The border was manned by the border force irregular
battalions and 3 Mahar and 6 Sikh Light Infantry as shown on the map with 15 Kumaon and

6/5 Gurkha in depth. 15 Kumaon was deployed on the pivotal Mandiala Heights and 6/5
Gurkha was deployed till 1st September on the Kalidhar Ridge east of River Tawi. This Ridge
it may be noted was an important feature which dominated both the Chamb-Jaurian-Akhnur
Road from the north and overlooked the Akhnur-Naushera-Rajauri-Poonch Road from the
south.
Pakistani Force Composition and Plans. Pakistans 12 Division Headquarters which was also
responsible for the defence of entire Kashmir and was facing three Indian divisions and two
independent brigades was tasked to command the Grand Slam attack force. The division was
commanded by Major General Akhtar Malik described by Shaukat Riza as a largehearted
man and a natural leader. One whose subordinates never felt crowded by him, or inhibited
in speaking out their minds.48 Another military historian described Akhtar Malik as an
avid bridge player.49 Akhtar Malik was assigned two tank regiments (from 6 Armoured
Division then deployed in Gujranwala area), an independent artillery brigade (Artillery 4
Corps) consisting of three medium regiments, one field regiment, two heavy batteries of 155
mm guns and 8 inch guns respectively, a Light Anti-Aircraft gun battery, a corps artillery
locating regiment, another artillery brigade (Artillery 7 Division) consisting of two field
regiments and one locating regiment. His infantry component consisted of three infantry
brigades i.e Number 4 Sector (3 and a quarter infantry battalions of the semi-regular AKRF),
10 Brigade (Two regular battalions) detached from 7 Division and placed under command 12
Division for Grand Slam and his own divisions, 102 Brigade (three infantry battalions).50
Akhtar Malik moved to Kharian on 28th August with a small tactical headquarters.
Arrangements were made to exercise command of the Grand Slam force through the
communication system of the 4 Corps Artillery Brigade. The Pakistani plan was based on
three phases i.e an initial breakthrough by two infantry brigades each supported by a tank
regiment along two points capturing the Chamb salient east of Tawi Nala, followed by
capture of Akhnur by 10 Brigade Group (including a tank regiment) and finally a northward
advance by the 102 Brigade on axis Akhnur-Jhangar linking up with Pakistans 25 Brigade
operating against Indian communications in Naushera-Jhangar area with the final objective of
capturing Rajauri51 which Pakistan had lost earlier to an Indian tank squadron on 12 April
1948.52
Comparison of Strength. It is an unfortunate trait of Indo-Pak history to magnify enemy
strength and to omit mentioning own strength. The operational situation in Chamb was thus
later described in words like the Indians held the Chamb Valley strongly53, or Chamb was
very well guarded. Apart from its very strong fortifications, the Indians had by then increased
their forces in Chamb to seven battalions.54 The following table comparing Indian and
Pakistani strengths is self explanatory:

INFANTRY
(Battalions)

PAKISTAN

INDIA

RATIO

REMARKS

8.25

2:1

Two Battalions of border

police have not been
counted as these were like
the Pakistani Rangers. One
Indian infantry
battalion included in the
total i.e the 6/5 Gurkha was
deployed at Kali Dhar in the
rear and had nothing to do

with the fighting on

1st September 1965.
TANKS
6

6:1

(Squadrons)

ARTILLERY
18

3.5

(Batteries)

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Ad hoc
through
artillery
headquarters

Same since
10 Div HQ
was newly
raised

6:1

Pakistani tanks were far

superior to Indian tanks in
terms of firepower, mobility
as well as protection.
The Pakistani total does
not include one anti aircraft
battery that enhanced air
defence and two regiments
of locating artillery which
severely reduced the Indian
artillerys capability to
retaliate, by virtue of
locating enemy guns and
neutralising them by
counter bombardment.
Pakistani batteries included
nine field batteries, seven
medium batteries and two
heavy batteries while
Indians had three field and a
troop of medium guns.
10 Div HQ was brought
from Bangalore to Akhnur
on 28th August 1965 and
was in the raising/formation
process.

Execution of Operation Grand Slam.

We will not discuss each and every detail of Grand Slam operations but stick to the salient
facts relevant to the overall context and scope of the operation. The Pakistani attack
commenced at 0500 hours 1st September 1965 supported by a terrific pre-H-Hour artillery
bombardment executed in the words of the Pakistani official historian by nine field, seven
medium and two heavy batteries which had commenced belching fire 55 at 0330 hours. The
artillery was deployed so boldly that medium and 8 inch howitzers were deployed ahead of
field guns 56 thus increasing their range and ability to support operations for a longer
duration without redeployment. Pakistani armour which was divided into squadrons did not
do well on the 1st September and was effectively engaged by Indian anti-tank guns and
AMX-13 tanks. 11 Cavalry was checked in the south by the two three tank troops of 20
Lancers while 13 Lancers attacking in the north was also checked by the brilliant anti-tank
gun screen under 15 Kumaon and a single tank troop of 20 Lancers. The infantry brigade
commanders took greater interest in the work of battalions and the first major tactical blunder
of the day was committed once the southern attacking infantry brigade i.e the 102 Brigade
Commander wasted the entire day by insisting that Burjeal a minor position must be captured
despite clear instructions of General Akhtar Malik to bypass it.57 Thus half of 102 Brigade
and a squadron of 13 Lancers was committed to clear the Rome that Burjeal was! Burjeal was
finally captured at 1500 hours!58 Shaukat Riza states that it was defended by two infantry
companies of 6 Sikh but also adds that only 14 Indian soldiers were captured once it (Burjeal)
was finally cleared!59 Shaukats verdict on the operations of 1st September is accurate once
he states that The Indians had only covering troops on border outposts but the Pakistanis

failed to cross the Tawi on 1st September as their artillery fire was distributed.60 This is
only a partial explanation since the artillery fire was distributed because armour was
distributed and the 12 Division failed to cross the Tawi on the first day because of the delay
of 102 Brigade at Burjeal. In any case by evening of 1st September the 191 Indian Infantry
Brigade despite all the Pakistani blunders was at its last gasp! Its sole field artillery regiment
i.e the 161 Field Artillery Regiment (14 Field Regiment as per K.C Praval) had abandoned its
guns61 as a result of effective Pakistani artillery counterbombardment. Thus by afternoon the
Indians were supported by just one troop of Medium guns! By 6.30 in the evening 13 Lancers
finally reached the line of Tawi Nala but made no attempt to cross it.62
The Indian 10 Division which had assumed command by evening of 10th September ordered
the 191 Indian Infantry Brigade to withdraw to Akhnur the same night. It also ordered 3
Mahar and 6/5 Gurkha to continue holding defences in the Kalidhar area in the north. 191
Brigade was now tasked with defence of Akhnur, while 41 Mountain Brigade which was
concentrating at Akhnur was ordered to occupy the Jaurian-Troti position as quickly as
possible.63 Chamb which had been captured by evening of 1st September 1965 was
occupied by an infantry unit of the 102 Brigade at 0800 hours 2nd September 1965.64 On
2nd September 1965 while General Akhtar Malik was finalising arrangements for advance
towards Jaurian the command of the C in C General Musa arrived in the area of operations in
a helicopter and ordered change of command of Grand Slam, replacing General Akhtar by
General Yahya the GOC of 7 Division which was also in the same area of operations since
28th August 1965. This happened around 1130 hours on the morning of 2nd September 1965.
65 Brigadier Gulzar who was provided access to official records of the GHQ66 and whose
book was published in August 1968 i.e some 18 years before Shaukat Rizas account, states
that change of command took place at 1100 hours.67 The Indians were equally surprised and
their military historian noted that because of this change of command the Pakistanis gave 24
hours to the Indians to strengthen their defences!68 Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry well
summed up the feelings of the Grand Slam Force as Bitterly disappointed and completely at
a loss to understand!69 Yahya proceeded in a leisurely manner calling an orders group at
1430 hours and gave orders for crossing Tawi which was not held by any troops, the 191
Indian Brigade having withdrawn to Akhnur the previous night! The 10 Brigade supported by
13 Lancers crossed the Nala without any trouble in Shaukat Rizas words by 2130 hours
2nd September. Thus the Indian defences continuity was not compromised despite the fact
that their 191 Brigade had withdrawn in a near rout situation. In polite language the Indians
were thus not routed but pushed back and given a grace period of 24 hours to prepare a
brigade strong defensive position on line Troti-Jaurian over which more Pakistani blood was
to be shed on 3rd September 1965. The critical time span was not seized by the forelock and
what could have been accomplished with ease on 2nd September was postponed to
3rd September! The readers may note that the Indians were still outgunned in terms of
armour and artillery by six to one and thus in no position to resist a determined onslaught.
The Pakistanis had, however, lost the first major opportunity to impose strategic dislocation
on the 10 Division by the 24 hour pause on 2nd September 1965. Thus when the Pakistanis
resumed advance on 3rd September the 41 Mountain Brigade reported that it was in position
at Troti-Jaurian reasonably well prepared to oppose the enemy!70 Another tank squadron of
20 Lancers was also in the same position. The Indians were not strong enough to stay in this
position but it was a good bargain since they were trading space for time as their strategic
reserves were swiftly moving into position to launch a Riposte. On 3rd September Yahya
ordered 10 Brigade (three battalions) with a tank regiment under command to attack and
secure Jaurian by last light of the same day.71

The Indian 10 Division assumed command of the 191 Brigade and 80 Brigade by the evening
of 1st September.72 The Indian 15 Corps made frantic efforts to remedy the situation and
ordered 41 Mountain Brigade (Corps reserve) to occupy an intermediate position at line
Troti-Jaurian. It also ordered 20 Lancers (AMX-13) less two squadrons to move from
Pathankot and occupy a defensive position under command 41 Mountain Brigade at TrotiJaurian.73 10 Brigade was to attack from Pallanwala area on two axis i.e an infantry battalion
and two tank squadrons on axis Chamb-Akhnur in the north and a battalion and a tank
squadron on a southern axis heading towards Nawan Hamirpur and thereafter advancing
along the northern bank of River Chenab with a view to outflank the Indians from the
south.74 The 10 Brigade Commander issued his orders at 1130 hours and advance
commenced at 1300 hours. The advance made very slow progress due to broken terrain
interspersed by a growing number of north to south aligned watercourses (Nalas) and the
Indian position at Troti-Jaurian was contacted by 13 Lancers by approximately 1700 hours in
the evening. The right axis force reached Nawan Hamirpur by 1800 hours. The Indians now
brought in their third brigade i.e the 28 Brigade (two battalions) deploying it in another
position in the rear of 41 Brigade at Fatwal Ridge about 4 kilometres west of Akhnur.
On morning (0800 hours) 4th September Yahya ordered 6 Brigade of 7 Division to
relieve 102 Brigade till then deployed at the line of Tawi Nala and 102 Brigade to move
forward and concentrate at area Pahariwala. 10 Brigade commenced its attack on 41 Brigade
position from 1130 hours. 13 Lancers attempted to outflank the Indian 41 Brigades defences
between Kalit and Troti, and made some progress but was delayed by two Indian AMX-13
Tank troops till last light. The Indians realised that they could not hold the 41 Brigade
position for long and ordered withdrawal of 41 Brigade to Akhnur during the night of 4/5
September 1965.75 The 102 Brigade also moved forward and two of its battalions attacked
Sudhan Ki Dhok on the Tam Ka Tilla Ridge on 5th September 1965. By evening 5th
September 1965 the leading elements of the 13 Lancers were in contact with the 28 Brigade
position on the Fatwal Ridge just four miles west of Akhnur. It was at this stage that Musa
sent the message about teeth into the enemy and should bite deeper and deeper, in all
probability drafted by a staff officer who had read the exact text of Auchinlecks message to
the 8th Army during the Tobruk battle! But later events proved that the Pakistani GHQ,
including the self- promoted field marshal of peace, only had Ritchies, Cunninghams and
Mclellans, but no Auchinlecks! The whole situation changed on 6th September once India
attacked all along the international border opposite Sialkot, Lahore and Kasur. The 7th
Division was ordered to transfer 11 Cavalry, HQ 4 Corps Artillery Brigade and 39 Field
Regiment to 1 Corps in Ravi-Chenab Corridor.76 Grand Slam was over!
ANALYSIS
The Origins of the Grand Slam and Gibraltar Controversy in Pakistani Military
History
The Grand Slam and Gibraltar controversy instead of being handled like a military failure
unfortunately degenerated into a highly personalised affair. As a result instead of
dispassionate and constructive analysis, the real reasons for failure of the 1965 war were
substituted for analysis of minor tactics and in settling personal scores. Mr Bhutto the
principal leader of the pro-war party in the Pakistani leadership was dismissed by Ayub from
the post of Foreign Minister and very soon became a major political opponent of Ayub. Ayub
tasked his Information Secretary and right hand man Mr Altaf Gauhar to initiate a campaign
of character assassination of Bhutto. Bhutto by no definition an angel, like any politician also

indulged in personal attacks. The controversy was soon overtaken by the 1968-69 political
agitation, which resulted in the exit of Ayub, and to a second military government in Pakistan.
Since Yahya the military dictator who succeeded Ayub was one of the key figures in the
Grand Slam drama the issue was tactfully avoided by all politicians. The emergence of
Bhutto in 1970 elections as the principal leader of the West Pakistan Wing once again ignited
the 1965 controversy, but again the issue became a low key affair once Bhutto became the
Prime Minister from 1971 to 1977.
Grand Slam once again made headlines once Brigadier Amjad Ali Chaudhrys book was
published in 1977.77 Chaudhry raised doubts that Ayub may have been influenced by USA
into not capturing Akhnur and that the change of command was merely a tactful way of
slowing down the pace of operations. Amjad also quoted Yahya as saying that he did not
capture Akhnur, which as per Amjad was within Yahyas grasp, simply because he was
ordered by the then army high command not to do so! 78 Amjads book infuriated the then
government of the military usurper Zia who was engaged in a life and death political
confrontation with Bhutto and like all military governments of Pakistan, including the present
one, idolised the Ayub Government! Amjad had also accused the US government of
pressurising Ayub into not capturing Akhnur and this was also regarded by the Zia regime as
improper! The readers may note that the change of command on 2nd September was an
outrageous decision that had shocked the participants of Grand Slam! As per a participant the
change of command question was debated with so much passion that GHQ had to issue
instructions outlawing such talk.79 There is substance in this assertion. Brigadier Riazul
Karim a more credible authority states that soon after the ceasefire a rumour went around
that our senior officers were unnecessarily panicky and that the war had been fought by
brigadiers and below....this caused a storm in the GHQ.80
Later on Musa the most affected party, cooked up another story that the operations of 12
Division on 2nd September were delayed since artillery was not deployed well forward to
support further advance. This false assertion was challenged by Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry
who was a direct participant and was the man on the spot.81 Systematic efforts as part of a
totally political plan of character assassination of Bhutto, without realising that Grand Slam
was Pakistan Armys failure, were undertaken during the 11-year old Zia government to rewrite the history of Pakistan. General Musa was actively assisted in writing two books which
were published some six years after Amjads book. Musa made up a story to cover up the
change of command on 02 September, stating that it was a pre-arranged issue.82 The same
story was repeated by Shaukat Riza in his GHQ dictated trilogy on the Pakistan
Army.83 This was 1984-85. Finally in 1993 Gul Hassan the then Director Military
Operations memoirs were published. Gul exposed the cover up and dismissed the idea that
change of command had been pre-planned!84
Soon after publication of Guls book another defender of Ayub came on the scene ! He
alleged that Grand Slam was a failure in any case! The learned author is an intelligent man!
But so was Bhutto, Aziz and many others! The trouble starts when one intelligent man is at
loggerheads with another! Thus the resultant subjectiveness of this book, since much of it is
about another intelligent man, and defence of a benefactor who was injured by this intelligent
foe of the learned author! Above all one who was the author in questions enemy, without
doubt a terrible enemy!85 One about whom a close friend once said that with friends like
him one does not need enemies!86 The reasons for failure of Grand Slam given by this
author, thus, were emotional but not substantial! 10 Division, which came from Bangalore
consisted of just three or four officers who organised a headquarters at a garbage dump in

Akhnur and was a still born baby on 1st September 1965. One whose GOC was sacked for
incompetence in 1965 war! 87 It was again a case of mixing Bhutto with Akhtar Malik and
the intricacies of the art of war! The net result was thus a good biography of a benefactor
while simultaneously exposing the machinations of a Machiavellian evil genius! It may have
been a best seller but was certainly not good military history! The worst part about writing
of history in Pakistan is the fact that those who took part in the actual conduct of operations
either did not have the ability to express themselves in writing, were too disgusted or
disillusioned to do so, or did not have the funds to get their accounts published! Military
history has thus to date been distorted!
A case of failure at the highest level
Lack of resolution as well as military talent in Ayub was the most serious drawback as far
as Pakistan Armys conduct in 1965 War in general and Grand Slam in particular was
concerned. Subconsciously Ayub was the last man who wanted war despite all the
propaganda of Kashmir dispute. It is possible that this hesitation had some link with Ayubs
poor or insignificant war record in WW Two. On various occasions Ayub avoided military
action. In the 1947-48 period when many officers in Pakistan were volunteering for
participating in the Kashmir war Ayub did not show any inclination to participate in the
Kashmir war. Ayub exhibited extreme timidity88 when the Chinese asked Pakistan to take
advantage of the India-China War and settle the Kashmir dispute by exercising the military
option. Seven years in power, however, somewhat emboldened Ayubs spirits and by 1965 he
felt confident enough that the Hindu who Ayub mistakenly thought as more timid than the
Pakistani would not dare to start a conventional war even if Pakistan pinched the Hindu
damsel at will, sometimes in the Rann and sometimes in Kashmir! Even in 1965 Ayub was
not interested in a war which he wanted to avoid at all cost. This was a case of the desire to
gain the glory of martyrdom in battle without actually getting killed in action! It was Ayubs
misfortune that he was surrounded by more resolute, ruthlessly ambitious, albeit militarily
relatively naive, advisors like Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad who did not have any of Ayubs
timidity. Musa, Ayubs handpicked Chief was the weakest link in the whole chain of
command. The last person to wish for a war in which he would be forced to exercise his
intellect in the actual conduct of modern war involving tanks divisions and corps etc, about
whose employment Musa had very rudimentary ideas. A limited war i.e. a war in which
fighting remained confined to Kashmir was seen by Ayub as a political opportunity to
enhance his prestige which had suffered because of allegations of rigging in the 1965
elections. Thus Operation Gibraltar which visualised a Guerrilla War leading to Kashmir was
seen by Ayub as a golden means of winning Kashmir without war and getting all the glory
reserved for the victor of a war without ever starting an all out war! Ayub did not have the
resolution to start an all out war in 1965! He also did not have the long-term vision to
understand that India would retaliate militarily against the infiltrators sent into Kashmir by
Pakistan. Ayub thus unwittingly set fire to the fuse which triggered a series of actions and
counteractions which ultimately led to an all out war. Later critics blamed Bhutto for doing
the right things for the wrong reasons! As a matter of fact all major actors were doing the
right things for the wrong reason! But that is what the game of power is all about! Ayub was
militarily naive enough to think that India would not start an all out war if Pakistan went for
what Ayub himself called Indias jugular vein89 i.e. Akhnur. Critics think that Ayub lost his
nerves later and made an attempt to halt the Pakistani advance by ordering change of
command of the force, since he suddenly realised that an all out war was likely if Pakistan
captured Akhnur. If this was Ayubs motive then once again it was too late and Ayubs half
measures and half hearted conduct of military operations in Grand Slam harmed the Pakistani

military cause in two ways. Firstly, it provoked India to launch an all out war which Ayub did
not have the resolution to fight and which Musa did not have the military genius to conduct!
Secondly, as a result of this indecision Pakistan failed to capture Akhnur whose loss would
have led to a serious operational imbalance in the Indian dispositions in Kashmir and would
have weakened Indias resolve to attack Lahore and opposite Chawinda without first
redressing the serious imbalance opposite Kashmir. Thus Pakistani military/political
leadership failed in both aims; ie to sever the jugular and to prevent an all out war; and
primarily because of irresolution on part of their own higher leadership rather than enemy
resistance. Thus Ayub and his team were not propelled by a burning desire to defeat the
enemy by decisive conduct of operations but by an essentially defensive attitude. Thus even
after 6th September they viewed Pakistani thrusts inside India not as actions taken to strike a
decisive blow on the enemy but merely as measures to reduce Indian pressure on Lahore.
The GHQ simply did not have a forward command and control set up designed
to vigorously prosecute the war but essentially a distant headquarter modelled on colonial
principles from where orders were issued for defence of India. The war on the Pakistani side
was thus conducted disinterestedly because the higher leadership was simply irresolute and
was not prepared or interested in fighting the war which came as a rude shock to them once
the Indians attacked Lahore. Pakistani military writers like Shaukat Rizas claim that the
Pakistan Army never wanted a war in 1965 but war broke out in 1965 largely because of
those accursed Machiavellian schemers i.e. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad; does not speak very
highly about the standard of resolution of Ayub or Musa.What is the aim of an army if it
never wanted to fight a war to settle a just cause or to recover a territory which was at least
as official propaganda went some sort of a Pakistani Alsace or Lorraine. It is an open secret
that till this day the Pakistan Army claims that it was the Foreign Office who got them
involved in 1965. So what did the armys leadership want; to rule their own people, in
uninterrupted peace,creating large business empires which made many far more prosperous
than they were in 1958! Perhaps the only positive impact of the 1965 war was the realisation
in the otherwise politically naive and docile Pakistani masses that their leaders were
essentially making a fool out of them and Kashmir was just a cheap slogan to galvanise the
masses! Unfortunately, that is what history is about! The masses have always been mobilised
by great actors who were great leaders! Kashmir was never regarded as an issue by Ayub but
was forced upon him by the hawks like Bhutto and Aziz, off course again for the wrong
reasons, more subjective than objective, aided by military advice of Akhtar Malik. It is an
irony of Pakistani military history that these civilian hawks possessed much greater resolution
than the two soldiers leading the countrys government and the army! Once a man lacks
resolution his conduct is vacillating and indecisive and all decisions that he makes are
compromises and half measures. But even worse is the case when a man in total power lacks
military talent or that animal instinct or talent that enabled civilians like Cromwell, Hitler,
Stalin or Mao to do great things in the military sphere! It was a case of military incompetence
at the highest level combined with lack of resolution! This essentially was the tragedy of the
Pakistan Army in 1965. A time when it was still possible to settle the so-called Kashmir
dispute by exercising the military option. It is best to quote Clausewitz who gave guidelines
about the philosophy of war at least seventy five to ninety years before Ayub and Musa were
born, but whose ideas perhaps were not digested by both of them. Clausewitz said; No war
is commenced, or, at least no war should be commenced, if people acted wisely, without first
seeking a reply to the question, what is to be attained? The first is the final object; the other is
the immediate aim. By this chief consideration the whole course of the war is prescribed, the
extent of the means and the measure of energy are determined; its influence manifests itself
down to the smallest organ of action.90 The Pakistani leadership and the sycophants who
courted them later laid the entire blame for starting the war on one who had nothing to do

with soldiering and one who was not in any case the right authority for asking the question
whether the Indians would start an all out war even if their jugular was severed !It was an
irony that a soldier and not a naive civilian was leading the country at this stage. One who
was far more naive than even Shaastri the civilian who knew much less about soldiering but
understood grand strategy in a crystal clear manner. The Indians however dumb their
execution of war at least started it with clear cut and definite rationale and did achieve their
aim of putting an end to military adventurism in Kashmir. The Pakistani leadership, and this
included the army chief turned president, was confused and as a result conducted the war
with most inexplicably.
Responsibility for Operation Gibraltar and possible motivation of various principal
characters
Operation Gibraltar conceived by the ISI91 as Gauhar has stated and perhaps by Akhtar
Hussain Malik and/or other people and were in vogue since 1958 was approved by President
Ayub in July 1965 and executed from 1st August 196592. This means that the operation was
not a conspiracy by the Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto alone or a pet of General Akhtar
but had the blessings of Ayub. Since 1977 many Pakistani intellectuals have been wasting a
lot of stationery in proving that Ayub was an innocent bystander who was duped by his
Machiavellian Foreign Minister! This is an exercise in futility and it is high time that it is
stopped. Above all it proves that the intellectual calibre of the Pakistani GHQ was so low that
responsibility for conceiving military operations had been abdicated to the Foreign Office!
The idea was too idealistic and naive but before it was launched its advocates included almost
everybody who mattered in the Pakistani military and political hierarchy! Off course later
with the benefit of hindsight almost all participants tried to lay the entire blame on the
Pakistani Foreign Office and Mr Z.A Bhutto.
After 1965 War an exercise was initiated to prove that Ayub Khan was duped by his Foreign
Minister into war with India! One opponent of Bhutto propelled by a body chemistry of pure
and unadulterated venom alleged that it was a conspiracy on part of Bhutto, so that Pakistan
may lose the 1965 War as a result of which Bhutto would succeed Ayub as Pakistans next
ruler!93
In the final analysis it was Ayub who bears the ultimate responsibility for ordering Gibraltar!
Failure is no crime! Churchill one of the greatest names in modern history has been accused
of ordering the Gallipoli landing, which turned out to be a blunder in terms of fallacious
execution! But the idea was brilliant, and this mind you is Liddell Harts verdict! It was in
execution that it failed! Continuing on this line of thinking Ayub or Bhutto cannot be accused
of blundering! War as Clausewitz says is directed on assumptions and All action in war is
directed on probable, not on certain results. Whatever is wanting in certainty must be left to
fate or chance, call it, which you will. We may demand that what is so left should be as little
as possible, but only in relation to the particular case.... To thus rephrase Clausewitz with
special reference to Gibraltar or Grand Slam, initiating both operations was not a crime as
many including the Pakistani official historian Shaukat Riza were trying to prove! It was
failure to achieve success which was possible to achieve due to various military
organisational strategic and operational lapses, which was a crime!
The aim of Gibraltar and Grand Slam was after all to internationalise or defreeze the Kashmir
issue . The positive aspect about Grand Slam was the fact that unlike the most recent
operation Kargil of 1999 Pakistans means were more balanced in relation to its objectives.

A word about the motivation of various principal characters in launching Gibraltar and
Grand Slam. Ayub viewed Gibraltar and Grand Slam as acts of limited aggression like the
Rann of Kutch skirmish which would force India into negotiating on Kashmir at best and
redeem his political position at worst. Bhutto and Aziz also had similar ambitions on a
smaller scale! Akhtar Malik may have been motivated by the lust for glory, a perfectly
honourable aspiration as per Clausewitz . His minority status and humble origins , having
risen from the ranks may have made this urge stronger!
Intelligence Failure on both sides
There were intelligence failures on both sides. The Indians failing to discover the move of 7
Division and heavy concentration of armour and artillery opposite Chamb and the 6
Armoured Divisions existence. The Pakistanis failing to discover the true extent of Indian
preparations and its firm intention to launch an all out war.
The breakdown of command issue
The breakdown of command issue has not been understood by many civilian and military
writers who have discussed Grand Slam. Confusion, uncertainty and breakdown of
information are the norms rather than the exception in war. Breakdown of command was
rationalised later by apologists of Ayub to justify the change of command. Wireless failures,
communication breakdowns and loss of key commanders are a normal occurrence in military
history! In 1971 war an infantry unit in the same sector went missing just before the attack
despite having all the wireless sets. In the, same sector in 1971 a brigades units were missing
and a brigade attack had to be postponed for twenty four hours. In the same sector in 1971
despite having all the communication and divisional command arrangements two infantry
brigades kept feeding their divisional headquarters. Anyone who has a doubt may read the 23
Divisions second principal staff officer Lieutenant Colonel Saeed Ahmads book Battle of
Chamb-1971.94 Clausewitz throughout his work On War states that Breakdown of
command is the most normal condition in war. It appears that a breakdown of
communication did take place on 1/2 Sept 1965.
However, some direct participants hold the view that even then, the delay of 24 hours was
avoidable in case change of command had not taken place. To conclude, it was a choice of
four to six hours breakdown of command and control and 24 to 36 hours change of command
between Akhtar Maliks continuing as commander or Yahyas take over as the commander.
The only serious point that can be brought against Akhtar Malik is delay in resuming
operations on 2nd September 1965. The Indians had commenced their withdrawal from
Chamb at 2050 hours on 1st September 1965. 12 Division had nothing in print after 2400
hours 1st September, 1965 and should have commenced its advance towards Jaurian by 0700
hours involving 2nd Sept 1965. At 1100 hours when change of command was ordered 12
Division was still on the west bank of Tawi.
Concentration of Resources and All Arms Cooperation
The advantage of overwhelming superiority in armour was, however, not utilised in the initial
plan by distributing armour over two axes under infantry brigades who in turn dished out
squadrons to their infantry battalions for the dirty work of close support! This meant that
artillery fire could not be concentrated and the artillery general Shaukats caustic but accurate
observation that artillery fire on 1st September 1965, although initially concentrated, was

naturally distributed into targets spread over a 30,000 yards front 98 after the Pre-H-Hour
bombardment. There is a discrepancy in accounts of Shaukat Riza and Amjad Chaudhry
about utilisation of artillery .Shaukat claims that artillery fire after the H-Hour was distributed
and thus relatively ineffective, however, Chaudhry states that even after H-Hour some Indian
strongpoints were attacked with as many as 13 batteries of all calibre 99. It is true that
armour was not properly employed on 1st September 1965 but the superiority in tanks when
combined with overwhelming artillery support even then was so immense that the 191
Brigade was no longer a fighting force by the night of 1st September 1965.
Smaller Controversies in conduct of operations.
Some participants were of the view that Yahya assessed that the Indian 41 Brigade position
required a deliberate and planned attack and this delayed the attack on 41 Brigade position at
Troti by few hours. This, however, is a matter of assessment and no general in war is a
prophet who knows the DS solution.
Failure to create strategic dislocation
The important factor which salvaged their position was the fact that dislocation was not
imposed on them. This factor can only be understood in the classic Clausewitzian scenario of
diminishing force of attack. The Pakistanis were attackers and their capability of offensive
action was fast being reduced due to casualties and successive narrowing down of space for
manoeuvre. On the other hand the Indian defensive capability was improving. Their 191
Brigade was dislocated but the Pakistanis had failed to dislocate the equilibrium of the 10
Division; something which was well within their grasp, had no change of command taken
place on the 2nd of September.
Chances of Pakistani success in Grand Slam
The Pakistani chances of success in Grand Slam were very high, had the change of command
not occurred on 2nd September 1965. The Indians described Grand Slam as bold and
masterly in conception.100 The Indians found the 24 hour delay on from morning of 2nd to
3rd September inexplicable at a time when in words of their highest operational commander
the sudden collapse of 191 Brigade had created a critical situation.101 The Indians thus
were confounded and one of their leading historians remarks i.e There was a pause in
operations (referring to Pakistans 12 Division) because, for some accountable reasons, the
Pakistanis relieved 12 Infantry Division and handed over conduct of further operations to
Major General Yahya Khan.102 Another Indian direct participant and chief of staff of
Western Command, no relative of Bhutto or Akhtar Malik noted At 1100 hours on 2nd
September an event of great significance took place. The enemy came to our rescue. There
was a change in the command of Pakistans operational force in Chamb. HQ 7 Infantry
Division replaced HQ 12 Infantry Division. With the inevitable procedural delay that such
changes involves, we got a breather of 36 hours. Our forces reeling under the impact of
relentless onslaught so far regained a measure of balance. It was a providential reprieve.
Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan took over the command of operations as he thought
it was a sure success and wanted all the glory for himself. GOC 12 Div Major General Akhtar
Hussain Malik was sent back to look after the Hill Sector.103 The Indians were in a bad
shape on the morning of 2nd September. Contrary to Pakistani writers writing with ulterior
motives of settling personal scores assertion that the Indians had been building up their
strength for defence of Munawar gap through which Pakistan could attack Akhnur.104 The

reader may gauge this so-called build up from direct quotes from Indian military historians:
C squadron 20 Lancers (the only Indian tank force between Tawi and Akhnur on 2nd
September) had only three tanks left.105 The only reinforcements were at Pathankot some
80 miles from Akhnur and these consisted of another light tank squadron of 20 Lancers which
had no ability to withstand Pakistans two tank regiments of five Patton Squadrons. The 191
Brigade was marching to Akhnur since 2050 hours night 01 September and the 41 Brigade
which later established a position at Jaurian by morning of 3rd September was at Akhnur. The
Indian armoured corps historian described the change of command of 12 Division as a
Godsend for 41 Mountain Brigade which improved and consolidated its defences.106
Employment of Armour
Armour was not correctly employed on 1st September 1965. Regardless of all rhetoric about
Grand Slams brilliance, armour was under-utilised and poorly employed. The vast numerical
advantage of six to one in armour, was partially nullified by dividing the two tank regiments
between two brigades who in turn dished out each tank squadron to one infantry battalion.
Thus instead of using the armour as a punch it was used like a thin net, as a result of which its
hitting power was vastly reduced while the Indians were able to engage tank squadrons made
to charge them in a piecemeal manner! Thus while the Pakistani victory, thanks to tank
numerical and qualitative superiority was a foregone conclusion, the cost in terms of
equipment and loss of manpower was too high as the following figures prove. 11 Cavalry lost
19 killed alone in Grand Slam and all 19 of these brave men were killed on 1st September
1965!107 The readers may note that this figure exceeds killed casualties of all regular
infantry units which fought the Grand Slam battle from 1st September till ceasefire except 9
Punjab which lost 24 killed. But then the total effective strength of an armoured regiment is
around 400 while that of infantry battalion is around 800. The reader, however, is cautioned
not to jump to false conclusions about Grand Slam from this single example. Some units like
14 Punjab lost as few as 3 killed while the total killed of all regular infantry and tank
regiments did not exceed the figure of 104 killed.108 The reader may note that the casualties
of the 10 Indian Division were 246 killed and 240 missing most of whom were killed.109 On
the other hand the fighting on 1st September was in prepared defences and far more difficult
than later. Armours mishandling was affordable on 1st September 1965 and was improper
but not lethal as was the case with change of command on 2nd September.
Organisational Failures
It appears that in mid-May 1965 when Ayub attending the Murree briefing earlier discussed
the idea that 12 Divisions task was too big to defend Kashmir as well as conduct Grand Slam
did not occur to Ayub! This man commanded the corps without ever having thought how his
corps with five divisions with one river dividing his command and with divergent and
different roles fight their battles in war.Kashmir with 400 miles of difficult terrain was left to
be commanded by one divisional headquarters though we have seen that as early as 1948 the
Indians keeping in view the terrain requirements had subdivided the area into two divisional
commands. Raising another divisional headquarters was not that much of an expensive issue
so as to require US aid! Similarly it was taken for granted that one corps headquarter with a
not very intellectually gifted commander was enough to control four divisions; two in
defence in two different areas with a major river in between and two divisions which were
supposed to carry the war into enemy territory, one of which was an armoured division! To
say that by 1965 it was already too late, to raise another divisional headquarters, after the plan
to launch Gibraltar was made, does not hold any substance. The Indians as late as 1st

September 1965 brought in a new divisional headquarters to command and control the
operations in Chamb-Akhnur area. Pakistan had the 8 Division Headquarters which had been
stripped of all its brigades and was doing nothing at Kharian.This headquarter could have
been tasked to take care of Grand Slam.It required imagination and common sense and it is
not just enough to blame Mr Shoaib the Finance Minister for not having another divisional
headquarter!110 Ayub Khan did not change the command arrangement in Kashmir after he
became the C in C in 1951 and the same situation i.e. Kashmir being entrusted to one
divisional headquarter continued till 1958. Ayubs understanding of basic principles of
command and organisation can be gauged from the fact that he thought that one divisional
headquarter was enough to control 25 battalions of infantry organised under five sector
(brigade) headquarters spread over 400 miles of the most difficult mountainous terrain in the
world! Shaukat Riza does not find anything wrong in this arrangement. This command
arrangement contained the seeds of disaster of many failures of 1965 war as far as Operation
Grand Slam was concerned. The problem was not that of lack of US dollars but essentially
lack of perception on part of the hero of Burma fame! Creating two or three divisional
headquarters did not require US aid but operational vision, a quality which Ayub lacked. In
1990 a British General who knew Ayub well, having served in Indian Army in WW Two; hit
the nail in the head once he wrote without off course mentioning the 12 Divisional
Headquarters Command Organisational Fiasco that as C in C Ayub was an adequate
administrator but without operational experience....and devoid of tactical flair and
organisational understanding.111 This statement cannot be taken lightly. Shaukat Hayat and
Sher Ali as Ayubs opponents may be accused of being subjective in their criticism.
Lieutenant General Sir James Wilson cannot be put in this category. Wilson also observed
Ayub from close quarters while serving as General Graceys Private Secretary in 1949. If
Akhtar Hussain Malik broke down soon after change of command and wept, while blaming
no one it was not because he had failed but because he was too much of a gentleman to blame
anyone! God Bless his soul! While the senior Indian generals have admitted that change of
command was crucial in saving Akhnur, we have been downgrading the achievements of very
few great generals in our history! This self-defeating exercise was conducted by all, the
military establishment and the civilians, and for various reasons, all of which had nothing to
do with military history! These few great men who we have been unjustly criticising, left
footprints, not business empires on the sands of time! Thats why their sons are not ministers
or members of national assembly! Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself!
Assessment of 12 Divisions Role in 1965 . War at the strategic level and Influence of
Operation Gibraltar and Grand Slam on Indian Military Operations in Kashmir
It is a tragedy of Pakistani military history that the futile mudslinging matches between
various mandarins and political opponents of Bhutto, in the process of pursuance and as part
of a war of egos has clouded the true contribution of 12 Division at the strategic level in the
1965 War. Grand Slam was a military operation approved by all who mattered at the highest
level in the Pakistani decision making circles. The exercise of downplaying 12 Divisions role
in 1965 is a classic case of misinformation through verbal sophistry but without concrete
knowledge. One in which self-styled experts well described in the English verse Never set a
squadron in the field, Nor the division of battle knew, More than a spinster, indulged in a
battle of words, assigning to their opponent, more Machiavellian qualities than he could have
humanly possessed! The vastness of Akhtars task may be gauged from the fact that his
command was spread over a 400 mile area containing mountains between 3,000 to 28,000
feet and his 25 battalions were facing more than 38 Indian infantry battalions. The reader may
note that the total Indian battalions in Ravi-Sutlej corridor opposite Lahore, Barki, Bedian

and Kasur never exceeded 30 while the entire Indian 1 Corps and 26 Divisions total strength
between Chenab and Ravi never exceeded 29 infantry battalions. On the other hand Kashmir,
north of Chenab observed around 38 and perhaps more infantry battalions. The following
table is self-explanatory:111a

SUMMARY OF RELATIVE STRENGTH IN 1965

PAKISTAN

INDIA

TANKREGIME INFANTRYBATTAL TANKREGIME INFANTRYBATTAL

NTS
IONS
NTS
IONS
1

15 (Incl 11 AK
Battalions)

2/3 Regt

38

CHENAB-RAVI
CORRIDOR

7 (Including 2
TDU)

12

6 1/3

29

RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR

10 (Including 2
TDU)

17

30

NIL

1/3

18

49

1401/3

103

NORTH OF CHENAB

SOUTH OF SUTLEJ

TOTAL

The Foreign Involvement Dimension and the Change of Command Controversy

Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry raised some doubts that the change of command took place
because of US pressure. This is the realm of speculation. It is highly improbable that this was
the reason for change of command. Of all the people Ayub had the maximum to gain from
success of Grand Slam. It appears that change of command had more to do with Ayubs lack
of military insight than with superpower interference! Yahya as later events proved was his
hot favourite and was being groomed to take over as the next chief as Musas book From
Jawan to General proves. Musa writes in his memoirs that Yahya was not his first choice as
Army C in C but was selected by Ayub overruling Musas reservations about Yahyas
character.112 Musas book prove that he did not like Akhtar Malik. So, here there was a
convergence of objectives. Musa not liking Akhtar since he was close to Bhutto and Ayub
liking Yahya having made up his mind to groom him for higher ranks. The situation on night
1st September 1965 was excellent. So why not let Yahya have the credit. It was ignorance and
naivety of the worse kind on part of both Ayub and Musa to decide on the change of
command!

Grand Slam-Some other viewpoints:This scribe interviewed certain direct participants, who for reasons in comprehensible are still
terribly afraid of being quoted. One direct participant stated that even after 6 Brigade had
replaced 10 Brigade on 6/7 September 1965 Eftikhar Khan (6 Bde Comd) told General Yahya
that he could capture Akhnur since his forward troops are at Mahwali Khad. Yahya,
however, told Eftikhar to stay put and to forget about Akhnur.
Some participants from 7 Division alleged that Gen Malik was not tracable on 1st & 2nd Sept
1965 and reasons for this absence according to the participants were ones which cannot be
written. This school of thought holds the view that Amjad Chaudhry was covering Akhtars
absence since they were from the same community ! This scribe met a retired colonel many
years ago and discussed this question with him. The colonel who again did not wish to be
quoted stated that General Akhtar retained the same alertness and clarity of mind even after
chemical factors had produced significant changes in the body chemistry, thus dismissing
doubts that the general was not sober on night 1/2 September 1965! The colonel was the
generals district mate and from the same battalion! Allegations of such type have been
levelled against General Grant, Mustafa Kemal etc and are beyond the scope of this brief
article.
The Rationale of Grand Slam and its timing
The million dollar question that no one including Ayubs latest biographer has answered is
about the timing and strategic rationale of Grand Slam! Shaukat Riza the official historian of
the Pakistan Army has nothing to say except that the aim of Grand Slam was to force the
Indian Army to throw up its gains in 12 Division area. If this was the aim then Grand Slam
was a miserable failure since the Indians did not evacuate an inch of territory in Kashmir
because of Grand Slam! It did so only after Tashkent but so did Pakistan! So at the strategic
level Grand Slam, in the manner it was launched had no strategic aim but merely a mid- level
operational aim and one that provoked India into launching an all out war! This fact proves
Ayubs lack of strategic insight! Shaukat Riza also states in his very disjointed history that the
aim of Grand Slam was limited (again a compliment to Ayubs strategic acumen!) i.e to
relieve pressure against 12 Division.113 Shaukat also notes that the army was a part of the
wishful thinking when he states that General Sher Bahadur admitted that it was wishful on
our part to believe that Indian reaction to Grand Slam would be restricted to Kashmir.114
Musa does not give any strategic rationale for Grand Slam in his book. But then Musa was
not expected to have anything to do with strategy! Gauhar admits the ambiguity about the
plans strategic rationale and timing when he writes the purpose of Grand Slam was never
clearly defined.115
All this lack of strategic acumen is no compliment to Ayub! Altaf then praises Ayub at this
point for selecting Akhnur as an objective in his book but fails to note that Ayub despite being
a soldier never appreciated that there is a military term known as Riposte which means
Strike a vulnerable point thus forcing the enemy to abandon his attack.116 War is not an
isolated attack and the higher the level, the broader is the requirement to examine a matter
from all angles. Akhtar Hussain Malik the GOC of 12 Division had to think only about his
division but Ayub as Supreme Commander had to think about the whole country. The fact that
Ayub as a soldier at least by length of service if not by virtue of having seen much of combat,
failed to realise that if one adversary goes for anothers jugular vein as Ayub called Akhnur,
speaks volumes for Ayubs comprehension of a strategic issue, also keeping in mind the fact

that the enemy in question had already redeployed his striking force and reserve divisions
within 10 to 50 miles of the main Indo-Pak border since mid-1965!
Ayub approved both Operation Gibraltar as the infiltration campaign was called and
Operation Grand Slam as the thrust against Akhnur was later to be called.117 The Army
and men like Altaf Gauhar and Shaukat Riza were to later blame the Foreign Office for
provoking India to attack Pakistan!
Who conceived the Grand Slam plan:
Altaf Gauhar insists that it was Ayub who made the brilliant choice of Akhnur as an objective
and that everyone praised him for doing so!118 Amjad Chaudhry and many in the army state
that Akhnur was Akhtar Maliks choice. Here Musa has come to our help although somewhat
unwittingly! Musa first states that The push towards Akhnur was not part of it (The original
Gibraltar plan). However it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have
to undertake, as we felt that our activities would have an escalating effect.119 This proves
that the attack on Akhnur was already forwarded by 12 Division as one of the contingencies
in the initial planning. Musa did not want to say it but inadvertently admitted this reality!
Musa later in the same book also states that Ayub did say in the same meeting Why dont
you go for Akhnur, but the first part of the paragraph in Musa s book proves that the Grand
Slam idea i.e choice of Akhnur as an objective had originated from the 12 Division.
Grand Slam compared with Battle of Chamb-1965
It is an ironic fact of history that Grand Slam has attracted far more attention than the
Battle of Chamb of 1971. Chamb was a far more difficult to enter in 1971 than in 1965!
Four Indian brigades were deployed on ground to defend it unlike 1965 when the only Indian
troops in 1965 holding the area consisted of one overstretched brigade. In 1971 two Indian
tank units of technically better tanks than the two attacking Pakistani units were defending it!
The Pakistani artillery was inferior to Indian artillery in 1971 both in technical as well as
numerical terms. The Pakistani commander Eftikhar Khan was far more dynamic than
anything that Pakistani army has seen from 1947 till to date! In 1971, keeping in view the
near parity of all types of forces/equipment even capturing Chamb was an achievement! In
1965 not capturing Akhnur, keeping in view the overwhelming Pakistani superiority in tanks
and artillery was the worst operational and strategic crime in Pakistani military history!
Ultimate Responsibility for failure to take Akhnur
The ultimate responsibility for failure in not taking Akhnur rests on Ayub. Yahya in case he
obeyed Ayubs orders for not taking Akhnur was merely obeying orders. Amjad Chaudhry,
however, blamed Yahya alone since some critics hold that Yahya had not considered him fit
to be promoted to general rank. The principal responsibility for not taking Akhnur lies with
Ayub.
CONCLUSION
Ambition, lust for glory etc are perfectly reasonable aspirations where they are matched with
military talent pertaining to operational strategy, low intensity operations, strategic insight or
statesmanship! All these were sadly lacking at all levels, except unit level bravery and
enthusiasm! Gibraltar failed because of pure and unadulterated military incompetence and

Akhtar Malik bears the principle responsibility for Gibraltar! The Grand Slam story was
different! It was not a case of balanced distribution of lack of talent at all levels that
resulted in the failure of Grand Slam! The principle reason why Grand Slam failed was delay
in initial launching and change of command!
Pakistani victory in Grand Slam keeping in view the immense superiority in armour and
artillery was a foregone conclusion, just like the Indian victory in East Pakistan! Any
divisional commander with a medium calibre could have captured Akhnur! The fatal error
was change in command! Victory despite all the imperial blunders committed by 12 Division
on 1st September was within Pakistans grasp, had not Ayub and Musa ordered change of
command! The issue was not that Akhtar was brilliant or Yahya incompetent but simply that
the very act of change of command was against all sound military axioms even if Yahya was
Akhtar and Akhtar Yahya!
There is nothing that can describe Operation Grand Slam more accurately and briefly than
Schillers quotation i.e What is lost in a moment, is lost for eternity! The dilemma that
destroyed the Pakistani chances of victory or at least strategic dominance were also summed
up long ago by another great philosopher Sun Tzu who described the most essential condition
for victory as a general who has the military capacity and is not interfered with by his
sovereign!
This article is not the defence of any individual but a humble attempt to see military facts as
they were! It was written because a person who I hold in very high esteem asked me to do so.
The only point that pinches a dispassionate student of the art of war is the fact that Grand
Slam was launched some three to four days late and the change of command on 2nd
September gave the Indians 24 valuable hours to dig a position at line Jaurian-Troti! The
seeds of its failure were planted many years before when soldiers strayed into politics and
became more interested in creating business of power, devolution of power and basic
democracies, rather than in military theory, strategy, operational strategy, doctrine and
military reorganisation! Grand Slam was Pakistans failure, Pakistan Armys failure! It
was not Ayubs failure alone, nor Bhuttos failure, nor Akhtar Maliks failure! Operation
Gibraltar was an altogether different affair but this article is about Grand Slam! All the
reasons for Pakistans foreign policy of appeasing USA were rendered null and void on 6th
September 1965! War is a continuation of policy but only so when those who conduct it have
military talent! This was sadly lacking in the Pakistan Army and the Pakistani supreme
commander at the strategic level! Pity the army that blames its foreign minister for military
failures! Foreign policy whatever its quality or failures gave the Pakistan Army Pattons,
locators and 8 inch howitzers to blast a hole in the bloody valley of Munawar Tawi! The true
failure was Ayubs and Musas in failure to function as army chiefs and national leader, so as
to ensure that political questions could be settled with military effectiveness! Ayub had the
maximum to gain from Grand Slam! Ayub erred in this case not because of irresolution alone
but more because of lack of strategic, operational and organisational insight! The change of
command, as we have discussed, and delay in launching the operation, was the main reason,
if not the only reason, why Grand Slam failed! n
REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES
1 Page-21-Raiders in Kashmir- Ex Major General Akbar Khan, D.S.O-First Printed 1970-Karachi-Reprinted by
Jang Publishers-Lahore-1992.Page-214-The Nation that Lost its Soul-Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan-Jang
Publishers-Lahore-April 1995. Shaukat Hayat states that Akhnur was an objective assigned to the 1947

irregulars tasked to invade Kashmir from Pakistan in 1947, while Akbar Khan who is relatively more credible
states that the objective was Kathua-Jammu Road.
2 Page - 266-The Kashmir Campaign-1947-48-Historical Section-General Staff Branch-General HeadquartersRawalpindi-1970.
3 Page-295 & 296-The Pakistan Army-1947-1949- Major General Shaukat Riza -Printed by Wajid Alis
(Private) Limited-Lahore and distributed by Services Book Club-General Headquarters-Rawalpindi-1989. The
signal initiated on orders of General Bucher the Indian C in C to General Gracey the Pakistani C in C and signed
by Brigadier General Staff Manekshaw was thus worded; In view of political development my government
thinks continuation of moves and countermoves too often due to misunderstanding accompanied by firesupport
seems senseless and wasteful in human life besides only tending to embitter feelings. My Government
authorises me to state I will have their full support if I order Indian troops to remain in present positions and to
ceasefire. Naturally I cannot issue any such order until I have assurance from you that you are in a position to
take immediate reciprocal and effective action.Please reply, most immediate.If you agree I shall send you by
signal verbatim copies of any orders issued by me and I will expect you to do the same.This signal was dated
30th December and the Pakistani artillery had just bombarded the Beri Pattan Bridge.
4 Page-115- The Story of the Pakistan Army- Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan-Oxford University
-Karachi- 1963. Page-120-The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan-Major General
Nawabzada Sher Ali Pataudi-First Published Lahore-1976-Reprinted by Syed Mobin Mahmud and CompanyLahore-1988. Page-117-Akbar Khan-Op Cit. Page-15, 16 & 17-September 65-Before and After-Brigadier
Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Ferozsons Limited -Lahore-1976. The reader may note that Fazal Muqeems book
was written in 1963 with the direct blessing of the ruling military clique in Pakistan. Muqeem who was later to
criticise Ayub Khan the then Pakistani President, in this book hailed Ayub as Pakistans saviour!
5 Page-120-Sher Ali-Op Cit.
6 Page-343- Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan-S.M Ikram-Shiekh Mohammad Ashraf-Kashmiri
Bazar Lahore-Second Edition-July 1965. S.M Ikram was a Punjabi Muslim civil servant whose book is a
landmark study of Indian Muslim politics and highlights the Punjabi Muslim point of view about modern
Muslim history. His book again had the blessing of Ayub and was reprinted in a revised form at a time when
Ayub was involved in a political confrontation with his opponents led by Mr Jinnahs sister. As a result Ayub
enlisted the services of many paid intellectuals in order to reduce Jinnahs role in the Pakistani history and
projection of Iqbal in his place as a greater leader. (Refers-Page-140-The Military in Pakistan-Image and
Reality-Brigadier A.R Siddiqi-Vanguard Books Pvt Limited-Lahore-1996).
7Pages-84 to 92-Brigadier A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit. General Gul Hassan Khan who was the Pakistani Director of
Military Operations in 1965 and later rose to the post of Pakistan Armys C in C also thought that in May 1965
the Indian Armys morale was at its lowest ebb following the Rann Skirmish (Refers-Page-179-Memoirs of
General Gul Hassan Khan-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993). This was also the opinion of Aziz Ahmad
the then Foreign Secretary who according to Gauhar was convinced that India could be dislodged from Kashmir
by a guerrilla war in which Pakistan Army actively participated (Refers-Page-319-Ayub Khan-Pakistans First
Military Ruler-Altaf Gauhar-Sang-E-Meel Publications-Lahore-1993).
8 Page-321-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit.
9 Page-36-My Version -Indo Pakistan War-1965-General Musa Khan-Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1983-Page322-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit-Page-183-Gul Hassan-Op Cit.
10 The book enjoyed official patronage and was distributed to military libraries and units by the Army
Education Directorate Edn-4 (Lib). See Note on first page bearing no number-Fallacies and Realities-Major
General Aboobaker Osman Mitha-Maktaba Fikr-O-Danish (which has no future in Indo Pak!)-Lahore-1994.
11 Page-43-Ibid. This disproves the theory that the idea about Operation Gibraltar originated from outside the
army!
12 Ibid. Mitha does not explain why that angel of a man Ayub later agreed to launch Operation Gibraltar!

13 For Guls statement regarding the time when the decision to launch Gibraltar was taken, see Page-116,167 &
168-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit. For Gauhars statement regarding Aziz Ahmads assessment of the Kashmir
situation see Page-319-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit.
14Annexure-G to GHQ Letter Number 4050/5/MO-1 Dated 29 August 1965.Directive from President Ayub
Khan to General Mohammad Musa, Commander in Chief Pakistan Army. Quoted by Stanley Wolpert -Page-91
of main text and page-338 of Bibliographical Notes-Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan-His Life and Times-Stanley
Wolpert-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993.
15 Page-323-Ibid.
16 Page-10-Musa Khan -Op Cit.
17Page-65-Pakistan -Bharat Jang-September 1965- Lieutenant Colonel Mukhtar Ahmad Gillani-142 Harley
Street- Rawalpindi-July 1998.
18 Pages-65 & 66-Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20Page-67-Ibid. Colonel Gilani claims that it commenced from 15th August 1965. Musa states that the operation
was put into effect from 7th August 1965 (Refers-Page-35-Musa Khan-Op Cit. Gauhar whose authenticity of
facts is less reliable since he was a civilian states that all the forces commenced movement from 24 July and
reached their destinations (in Indian Held Kashmir) by 28 July 1965 (Refers-Page-323-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit).
Brigadier Z.A Khan claims that movement commenced in late July and the ceasefire line was crossed from 1st
August 1965, while 7th August 1965 was the date set for commencement of operations (Refers- Page -155-The
Way it Was-Brigadier Z.A Khan-Dynavis Private Limited-Pathfinder Fountain -Karachi-1998. The Indian
account dates the beginning of infiltration from 5th August (Refers-Page-26- War Despatches- Lieutenant
General Harbaksh Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1991.) and larger moves from 8/9 August 1965
(refers-pages-30 & 31-Ibid).
21 Page-26-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
22Page-251-The Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C Praval-First Published in 1987-Lancer
International-New Delhi-Paperback Edition Reprinted in 1993.
23 Ibid.
24 Page-41- Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
25 Page-36-Ibid
26 Page-38-Ibid.
27 Page-127-Behind the Scenes-An Analysis of Indias Military Operations-1947-71-Major General Joginder
Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1993.
28 Page-43-Ibid.
29 Pages-105 to 110-The Pakistan Army-War 1965- Major General Shaukat Riza -Printed for Army Education
Press by M/S Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1984.
30 Pages-104 to 109-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit.
31 Page-39-Musa Khan -Op Cit and Page-110-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit.

32Page-111-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit. For Shaukats quoting Musa and Sher Bahadur about danger of loss of
Muzaffarabad see Page-113-Ibid.
33 Page-39-Musa Khan-Op Cit.
34Page-344- The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971- Major General Gurcharan
Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-1993.
35 The description of terrain is based on narratives of K.C Praval and Gurcharan Singh Sandhu op cit, ArticleBattle Lore-Breakthrough in Chamb- in Soldier Speaks-Selected Articles from Pakistan Army Journal-19561981-Army Education Press-General Headquarters-First Edition-1981.The Battle of Chamb-Lt Col Saeed-Army
Education Press-GHQ-1979.
36Page-345-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Op Cit.
37Page-334 and 345-Ibid. For explanation of Code name Operation Ablaze see Page-89-Joginder Singh-Op
Cit.
38 Page-345-Ibid and Page-36-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
39 Page-345-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
40 Page-26-Joginder Singh-Op Cit.
41 Pages-36 & 37-Ibid
42 Pages-343 & 334-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
43 Page-344-Ibid.
44 Page-345-Ibid and Page-257-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
45 Page-255-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
46 Page-257-Ibid
47 Ibid.
48 Page-104-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit.
49 Footnote Number One-Page-46-Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Op Cit.
50 Pages114 & 115-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit.
51 Page-117 & 118-Ibid.
52 Page -297-Gurcharan Singh -Op Cit.
53 Page-39-Musa Khan-Op Cit.
54 Page-48-Amjad Chaudhry -Op Cit..
55 Page-116-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

56 Ibid. This was achievement of the indomitable gunner Amjad Chaudhry who was later not promoted for
doing well in war ! Amjad was assisted by another extremely able artillery officer Aleem Afridi who was later
famous in removing Yahya by threatening him with a march of 6 Armoured Division to Rawalpindi immediately
after the surrender at Dacca and later in the Attock Conspiracy case to overthrow Mr Bhutto in 1972.
57 Page-49-Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit.Shaukat Riza , who was more interested in the artillery aspect of all
operations , does not state anything about the delay that was caused due to Burjeal , and its overall negative
effect on the overall conduct of operations on the 1st September 1965 , but merely states that Burjeal had been
bypassed by 13 Punjab and Brigadier Zafar ordered 8 Baluch to clear the position forthwith . (Refers-Page120-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit).
58 Page-121-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
59 Ibid.
60 Page-123-Ibid.
61 Page-62-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit . Harbaksh states that this was a blemish on the fair name of 161 Field
Regiment as well as 10 Division .Also seePage-50-Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit. It was here that Pakistani
locating regiments proved their worth by locating Indian guns through modern US sound ranging devices
.Chaudhry states that many 25 Pounders of this Indian unit received direct Pakistani artillery shell hits .K.C
Praval says it was 14 Field Regiment ( Pages-260 & 261-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit).
62 Page-348-Gurcaharan Singh-Op Cit.
63 Page-60 & 61-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
64 Page-121-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
65 Ibid.
66 See page-11 of Preface-Brig Gulzar Ahmad-Op Cit.
67 Page-151-Ibid.
68 Page-261-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
69 Page-55-Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit.
70 Page-61-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
71 Page-124-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
72 Page-348-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit
73 Page-60-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
74 Page-124-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.
75 Page-62-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
76 Page-131-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. Auchinlek had passed a message saying During three days at your advance
headquarter, I have seen and heard enough to convince me, though I did not need convincing, that the
determination to beat the enemy of your commanders and troops could not be greater, and I have no doubt
whatever that he will be beaten . His position is desperate , and he is trying by lashing out in all directions to
distract us from our object which is to destroy him utterly.we will not be distracted. And he will be

destroyed.You have got your teeth into him.hang on and bite deeper and deeper and hang on till he is finished .
give him no rest .The general situation in North Africa is EXCELLENT.There is only one order ATTACK AND
PURSUE.ALL OUT EVERYONE. C. AUCHINLECK GENERAL C IN C. (Refers-Pages-312 & 313-The Sidi
Rezegh Battles-1941-J.A.I Agar Hamilton and L.C.F Turner-Oxford University Press-Cape Town-1957.
77 Page-64-Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit.
78 Page-63-Ibid.
79Page-46-Letter from a major from Lawrencepur dated 1st September 1975 to Editor Defence Journal KarachiDefence Journal-No 11-Decemeber 1975-Volume Number-One-Karachi-1975.
80Pages-13 & 14-Article-Higher Conduct of 1965 War-Brigadier Riazul Karim Khan-Defence Journal-Special
Issue-Volume Ten-Numbers-1-2-1984- Karachi.
81 Page-55-Brigadier Chaudhry-Op Cit.
82 Pages-39 & 40-Musa Khan -Op Cit.
83 Page-121-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit.
84 Explained in detail by Gul-Page-201-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.
85 Bhutto later implicated Gauhar in a trumped up case on ridiculous grounds i.e possession of a bottle
containing about 12 ounces of Scotch Whiskey and an old Playboy issue.
86 Remarks of a friend of Mr Bhutto who had served in Burma Shell quoted by Akhund (Memoirs of a
Bystander) or Rafi Raza (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan) published by Oxford University Press Karachi in
1997. The inability to provide an exact reference is regretted since I lost both the books which I had bought in
1997 and was unable to find a copy to locate the exact page number.
87 Pages-257 & 305-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
88Page-918 to 920-Shahab Nama-Qudratullah Shahab-Sang-E-Meel Publications-Lahore-1994.Shahab who
was with Ayub at that time as a civilian staff officer has given a detailed account of this incident. Shahab who
later became very religious (as many men in their old age !!!!) was a sycophant par excellence who competed
with,but was finally surpassed by another in playing the sycophant courtier with Ayub. Qudrat was notorious in
sycophancy with Ayub and also wrote the notorious The New Leaf that appeared in the Pakistan Times issue
of 19th April 1959. (Page-102-Pakistan-Military Rule or Peoples Power-Tariq Ali-Jonathan Cape-London1970 ). Shahab was also notorious in initiating a campaign against Justice M.R Kayani (Page-4-Preface to M.R
Kayanis collected works by Iftikhar Ahmad Khan-The Whole Truth-M.R Kayani-Pakistan Writers cooperative Society-Lahore-1988). A case of two typical lower middle class civil servants employing sycophancy
as a tool for advancement! Herein lies the secret of success of many Pakistani successful civil servant families
who later amassed great wealth despite being from basically humble or middle class background!
89Page-322-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit.
90Page-367-On War-Edited by Anatol Rapoport-Pelican Books-London-1974.
91Page-321-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit.
92Page-155-Brig Z.A Khan-Op Cit.
93Page-112-The First Round-Indo Pakistan War-1965-M. Asghar Khan-Islamic Information Services LimitedLondon 1979.

94Battle of Chamb-Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Saeed-Army Education Press-GHQ Rawalpindi-1979.

95Page-45-Letter to the Editor Defence Journal from Major Khursheed Ahmad (Retired) , Hyderabad-Dated 26
Otober 1975 -Defence Journal-No 11-Decemeber 1975-Volume Number-One-Karachi-1975.
96Page-47-Letter to Editor Defence Journal from Lieutenant Colonel M.R Hassan (Retired) dated 06 October
1975.
97 Page-53 & 54-Amjad Chaudhry -Op Cit.
98 Page-123-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit
99 Page-48-Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit.
100 Page-255-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
101 Page-61-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.
102 Page-349-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
103 Page-118-Major General Joginder Singh-Op Cit.
104 Page-331-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit.
105 Page-349-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Op Cit.
106 Page-349-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.
107 Page-45-History of 11 Cavalry (FF)-Lieutenant Colonel Khalid Gujjar-Quetta Cantt-1999.
108Calculated from total regular infantry casualties given by Lieutenant Colonel Mukhtar Gilani (Page-109Colonel Mukhtar Gillani -Op Cit), total casualties of 11 Cavalry (Refers- page-45 of 11 Cavalry History-Op Cit)
and total casualties of 13 Lancers i.e 16 killed (Refers-Page-160-Brig Z.A Khan -Op Cit).
109 Pages-404, 405 and 409-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
110 Page-182-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit. Till 18th September this Headquarters was doing nothing sitting in
Kharian and in words of Shaukat Riza engaged in line of communication pursuits.
111Page-428-Article-Pakistan- Memories of the Early Years- Lieutenant General Sir James Wilson-in-Army
Quarterly and Defence Journal -Volume-120-Issue Number Four-Tavistock Street-London-October-1990.
111aPage-230-Footnote 68-The Pakistan Army Till 1965-Major A.H Amin-P.O Box 13146-Arlington-VA22219-USA-17 August 1999.
112 Page-187- Jawan to General-General Mohammad Musa- East and West Publishing Company-Karachi-1984.
113 Page-113-Shauakat Riza-1965-Op Cit.
114 Page-114-Ibid.
115 Page-327-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit.
116 Page-39-An Introduction to Strategy-General Andre Beaufre-Faber and Faber-London-1965. Altaf praised
Ayub in the following words; everyone admired Ayub for giving the operation a real edge and a new

dimension (Page-322-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit).In the Army and Civil Service as in the Corporate Sector the
sycophants are always admiring their bosses.Psychologists have concluded that , Flattery pays and it does
gets you into better places. See Pages-321 to 328- of the Research Essay-Flattery Will Get You
Somewhere:Styles and Uses of Ingratiation-Edward.E.Jones-in Readings About the Social Animal-Edited by
Ariel Aronson-W.H Freeman and Company-San Francisco-1973.It is one thing to make a plan on the map and
another to execute it.Ayub did not have the Resolution to capture Akhnur as we shall discuss in greater detail
later.
117 Page-322-Altaf Guahar-Ibid.
118 Page-322-Altaf Gauhar-Op Cit.
119 Page-35 and 36-Musa Khan-Op Cit.

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