The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol

Architecture
Abstract
The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol is a protocol for secure remote login and other
secure network services over an insecure network. This document describes the
architecture of the SSH protocol, as well as the notation and terminology used in
SSH protocol documents. It also discusses the SSH algorithm naming system that
allows local extensions. The SSH protocol consists of three major components:
The Transport Layer Protocol provides server authentication, confidentiality, and
integrity with perfect forward secrecy.
The User Authentication Protocol authenticates the client to the server.
The Connection Protocol multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical
channels. Details of these protocols are described in separate documents.
Table of Contents

1. Introduction
Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote login and other secure network
services over an insecure network. It consists of three major components:
o The Transport Layer Protocol [SSH-TRANS] provides server authentication,
confidentiality, and integrity. It may optionally also provide compression. The
transport layer will typically be run over a TCP/IP connection, but might also be used
on top of any other reliable data stream.
o The User Authentication Protocol [SSH-USERAUTH] authenticates the
client-side user to the server. It runs over the transport layer protocol.
o The Connection Protocol [SSH-CONNECT] multiplexes the encrypted tunnel
into several logical channels. It runs over the user authentication protocol.
The client sends a service request once a secure transport layer connection
has been established. A second service request is sent after user authentication is
complete. This allows new protocols to be defined and coexist with the protocols
listed above.

The connection protocol provides channels that can be used for a wide range
of purposes. Standard methods are provided for setting up secure interactive shell
sessions and for forwarding ("tunneling") arbitrary TCP/IP ports and X11
connections.

2. Contributors
3. Conventions Used in This Document
4. Architecture
4.1. Host Keys
Each server host SHOULD have a host key. Hosts MAY have multiple host
keys using multiple different algorithms. Multiple hosts MAY share the same host
key. If a host has keys at all, it MUST have at least one key that uses each
REQUIRED public key algorithm (DSS [FIPS-186-2]).
The server host key is used during key exchange to verify that the client is
really talking to the correct server. For this to be possible, the client must have a
priori knowledge of the server's public host key.
Two different trust models can be used:
o The client has a local database that associates each host name (as typed by the
user) with the corresponding public host key. This method requires no centrally
administered infrastructure, and no third-party coordination. The downside is that
the database of name-to-key associations may become burdensome to maintain.
o The host name-to-key association is certified by a trusted certification authority
(CA). The client only knows the CA root key, and can verify the validity of all host
keys certified by accepted CAs.
The second alternative eases the maintenance problem, since ideally only a
single CA key needs to be securely stored on the client. On the other hand, each
host key must be appropriately certified by a central authority before authorization
is possible. Also, a lot of trust is placed on the central infrastructure.
The protocol provides the option that the server name - host key association
is not checked when connecting to the host for the first time. This allows
communication without prior communication of host keys or certification. The
connection still provides protection against passive listening; however, it becomes
vulnerable to active man-in-the-middle attacks. Implementations SHOULD NOT
normally allow such connections by default, as they pose a potential security

problem. However, as there is no widely deployed key infrastructure available on

the Internet at the time of this writing, this option makes the protocol much more
usable during the transition time until such an infrastructure emerges, while still
providing a much higher level of security than that offered by older solutions (e.g.,
telnet
[RFC0854] and rlogin [RFC1282]).
Implementations SHOULD try to make the best effort to check host keys. An
example of a possible strategy is to only accept a host key without checking the
first time a host is connected, save the key in a local database, and compare
against that key on all future connections to that host.
Implementations MAY provide additional methods for verifying the
correctness of host keys, e.g., a hexadecimal fingerprint derived from the SHA-1
hash [FIPS-180-2] of the public key. Such fingerprints can easily be verified by using
telephone or other external communication channels.
All implementations SHOULD provide an option not to accept host keys that
cannot be verified.
The members of this Working Group believe that 'ease of use' is critical to
end-user acceptance of security solutions, and no improvement in security is gained
if the new solutions are not used. Thus, providing the option not to check the server
host key is believed to improve the overall security of the Internet, even though it
reduces the security of the protocol in configurations where it is allowed.

4.2. Extensibility
We believe that the protocol will evolve over time, and some organizations
will want to use their own encryption, authentication, and/or key exchange
methods. Central registration of all extensions is cumbersome, especially for
experimental or classified features. On the other hand, having no central
registration leads to conflicts in method identifiers, making interoperability difficult.
We have chosen to identify algorithms, methods, formats, and extension
protocols with textual names that are of a specific format. DNS names are used to
create local namespaces where experimental or classified extensions can be
defined without fear of conflicts with other implementations.
One design goal has been to keep the base protocol as simple as possible,
and to require as few algorithms as possible. However, all implementations MUST
support a minimal set of algorithms to ensure interoperability (this does not imply
that the local policy on all hosts would necessarily allow these algorithms). The
mandatory algorithms are specified in the relevant protocol documents.

Additional algorithms, methods, formats, and extension protocols can be

defined in separate documents. See Section 6, Algorithm Naming, for more
information.

4.3. Policy Issues

The protocol allows full negotiation of encryption, integrity, key exchange,
compression, and public key algorithms and formats. Encryption, integrity, public
key, and compression algorithms can be different for each direction.
The following policy issues SHOULD be addressed in the configuration
mechanisms of each implementation:
o Encryption, integrity, and compression algorithms, separately for each direction.
The policy MUST specify which is the preferred algorithm (e.g., the first algorithm
listed in each category).
o Public key algorithms and key exchange method to be used for host
authentication. The existence of trusted host keys for different public key
algorithms also affects this choice.
o The authentication methods that are to be required by the server for each user.
The server's policy MAY require multiple authentication for some or all users. The
required algorithms MAY depend on the location from where the user is trying to
gain access.
o The operations that the user is allowed to perform using the connection protocol.
Some issues are related to security; for example, the policy SHOULD NOT allow the
server to start sessions or run commands on the client machine, and MUST NOT
allow connections to the authentication agent unless forwarding such connections
has been requested. Other issues, such as which TCP/IP ports can be forwarded and
by whom, are clearly issues of local policy. Many of these issues may involve
traversing or bypassing firewalls, and are interrelated with the local security policy.

4.4. Security Properties

The primary goal of the SSH protocol is to improve security on the Internet.
It attempts to do this in a way that is easy to deploy, even at the cost of absolute
security.
o All encryption, integrity, and public key algorithms used are well-known, wellestablished algorithms.
o All algorithms are used with cryptographically sound key sizes that are believed
to provide protection against even the strongest cryptanalytic attacks for decades.
o All algorithms are negotiated, and in case some algorithm is broken, it is easy to
switch to some other algorithm without modifying the base protocol.

Specific concessions were made to make widespread, fast deployment

easier. The particular case where this comes up is verifying that the server host key
really belongs to the desired host; the protocol allows the verification to be left out,
but this is NOT RECOMMENDED. This is believed to significantly improve usability in
the short term, until widespread Internet public key infrastructures emerge.

4.5. Localization and Character Set Support

For the most part, the SSH protocols do not directly pass text that would be
displayed to the user. However, there are some places where such data might be
passed. When applicable, the character set for the data MUST be explicitly
specified. In most places, ISO-10646 UTF-8 encoding is used [RFC3629]. When
applicable, a field is also provided for a language tag [RFC3066].
One big issue is the character set of the interactive session. There is no
clear solution, as different applications may display data in different formats.
Different types of terminal emulation may also be employed in the client, and the
character set to be used is effectively determined by the terminal emulation. Thus,
no place is provided for directly specifying the character set or encoding for
terminal session data. However, the terminal emulation type (e.g., "vt100") is
transmitted to the remote site, and it implicitly specifies the character set and
encoding. Applications typically use the terminal type to determine what character
set they use, or the character set is determined using some external means. The
terminal emulation may also allow configuring the default character set. In any
case, the character set for the terminal session is considered primarily a client local
issue.
Internal names used to identify algorithms or protocols are normally never
displayed to users, and must be in US-ASCII.
The client and server user names are inherently constrained by what the
server is prepared to accept. They might, however, occasionally be displayed in
logs, reports, etc. They MUST be encoded using ISO 10646 UTF-8, but other
encodings may be required in some cases. It is up to the server to decide how to
map user names to accepted user names. Straight bit-wise, binary comparison is
RECOMMENDED.
For localization purposes, the protocol attempts to minimize the number of
textual messages transmitted. When present, such messages typically relate to
errors, debugging information, or some externally configured data. For data that is
normally displayed, it SHOULD be possible to fetch a localized message instead of
the transmitted message by using a numerical code. The remaining messages
SHOULD be configurable.

5. Data Type Representations Used in the SSH Protocols

byte: A byte represents an arbitrary 8-bit value (octet).
boolean: A boolean value is stored as a single byte.
uint32: Represents a 32-bit unsigned integer.
uint64: Represents a 64-bit unsigned integer.
string: Arbitrary length binary string.
mpint: Represents multiple precision integers in two's complement format, stored
as a string.
name-list: A string containing a comma-separated list of names.

6. Algorithm and Method Naming

The SSH protocols refer to particular hash, encryption, integrity, compression,
and key exchange algorithms or methods by name. There are some standard
algorithms and methods that all implementations MUST support. There are also
algorithms and methods that are defined in the protocol specification, but are
OPTIONAL. Furthermore, it is expected that some organizations will want to use
their own algorithms or methods.
In this protocol, all algorithm and method identifiers MUST be printable USASCII, non-empty strings no longer than 64 characters. Names MUST be casesensitive.
There are two formats for algorithm and method names:
o Names that do not contain an at-sign ("@") are reserved to be assigned by IETF
CONSENSUS.
o Anyone can define additional algorithms or methods by using names in the
format name@domainname, e.g., "[email protected]".

7. Message Numbers
SSH packets have message numbers in the range 1 to 255. These numbers
have been allocated as follows:
Transport layer protocol:
1 to 19 Transport layer generic (e.g., disconnect, ignore, debug, etc.)

20 to 29 Algorithm negotiation
30 to 49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for different
authentication methods)
User authentication protocol:
50 to 59 User authentication generic
60 to 79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused for different
authentication methods)
Connection protocol:
80 to 89 Connection protocol generic
90 to 127 Channel related messages
Reserved for client protocols:
128 to 191 Reserved
Local extensions:
192 to 255 Local extensions

8. IANA Considerations
This document is part of a set. The instructions for the IANA for the SSH
protocol, as defined in this document, [SSH-USERAUTH], [SSH-TRANS], and [SSHCONNECT], are detailed in [SSH-NUMBERS]. The following is a brief summary for
convenience, but note well that [SSH-NUMBERS] contains the actual instructions to
the IANA, which may be superseded in the future.
Allocation of the following types of names in the SSH protocols is assigned by
IETF consensus:
o Service Names
* Authentication Methods
* Connection Protocol Channel Names
* Connection Protocol Global Request Names
* Connection Protocol Channel Request Names

o Key Exchange Method Names

o Assigned Algorithm Names

* Encryption Algorithm Names
* MAC Algorithm Names
* Public Key Algorithm Names
* Compression Algorithm Names

9. Security Considerations
In order to make the entire body of Security Considerations more accessible,
Security Considerations for the transport, authentication, and connection
documents have been gathered here.
The transport protocol [SSH-TRANS] provides a confidential channel over an
insecure network. It performs server host authentication, key exchange, encryption,
and integrity protection. It also derives a unique session id that may be used by
higher-level protocols.
The authentication protocol [SSH-USERAUTH] provides a suite of
mechanisms that can be used to authenticate the client user to the server.
Individual mechanisms specified in the authentication protocol use the session id
provided by the transport protocol and/or depend on the security and integrity
guarantees of the transport protocol.
The connection protocol [SSH-CONNECT] specifies a mechanism to multiplex
multiple streams (channels) of data over the confidential and authenticated
transport. It also specifies channels for accessing an interactive shell, for proxyforwarding various external protocols over the secure transport (including arbitrary
TCP/IP protocols), and for accessing secure subsystems on the server host.

9.1. Pseudo-Random Number Generation

This protocol binds each session key to the session by including random,
session specific data in the hash used to produce session keys. Special care should
be taken to ensure that all of the random numbers are of good quality. If the
random data here (e.g., Diffie- Hellman (DH) parameters) are pseudo-random, then
the pseudo-random number generator should be cryptographically secure (i.e., its
next output not easily guessed even when knowing all previous outputs) and,
furthermore, proper entropy needs to be added to the pseudo- random number
generator. [RFC4086] offers suggestions for sources of random numbers and
entropy. Implementers should note the importance of entropy and the well-meant,

anecdotal warning about the difficulty in properly implementing pseudo-random

number generating functions.
The amount of entropy available to a given client or server may sometimes
be less than what is required. In this case, one must either resort to pseudorandom number generation regardless of insufficient entropy or refuse to run the
protocol. The latter is preferable.

9.2. Control Character Filtering

When displaying text to a user, such as error or debug messages, the client
software SHOULD replace any control characters (except tab, carriage return, and
newline) with safe sequences to avoid attacks by sending terminal control
characters.

9.3. Transport
9.3.1. Confidentiality
It is beyond the scope of this document and the Secure Shell Working Group
to analyze or recommend specific ciphers other than the ones that have been
established and accepted within the industry. At the time of this writing, commonly
used ciphers include 3DES, ARCFOUR, twofish, serpent, and blowfish. AES has been
published by The US Federal Information Processing Standards as [FIPS-197], and
the cryptographic community has accepted AES as well. As always, implementers
and users should check current literature to ensure that no recent vulnerabilities
have been found in ciphers used within products. Implementers should also check
to see which ciphers are considered to be relatively stronger than others and should
recommend their use to users over relatively weaker ciphers. It would be
considered good form for an implementation to politely and unobtrusively notify a
user that a stronger cipher is available and should be used when a weaker one is
actively chosen.
The "none" cipher is provided for debugging and SHOULD NOT be used
except for that purpose. Its cryptographic properties are sufficiently described in
[RFC2410], which will show that its use does not meet the intent of this protocol.
The relative merits of these and other ciphers may also be found in current
literature. Two references that may provide information on the subject are
[SCHNEIER] and [KAUFMAN]. Both of these describe the CBC mode of operation of
certain ciphers and the weakness of this scheme. Essentially, this mode is
theoretically vulnerable to chosen cipher-text attacks because of the high
predictability of the start of packet sequence. However, this attack is deemed
difficult and not considered fully practicable, especially if relatively long block sizes
are used.
Additionally, another CBC mode attack may be mitigated through the
insertion of packets containing SSH_MSG_IGNORE. Without this technique, a

specific attack may be successful. For this attack (commonly known as the
Rogaway attack [ROGAWAY], [DAI], [BELLARE]) to work, the attacker would need to
know the Initialization Vector (IV) of the next block that is going to be encrypted. In
CBC mode that is the output of the encryption of the previous block. If the attacker
does not have any way to see the packet yet (i.e., it is in the internal buffers of the
SSH implementation or even in the kernel), then this attack will not work. If the last
packet has been sent out to the network (i.e., the attacker has access to it), then he
can use the attack.
In the optimal case, an implementer would need to add an extra packet only
if the packet has been sent out onto the network and there are no other packets
waiting for transmission. Implementers may wish to check if there are any unsent
packets awaiting transmission; unfortunately, it is not normally easy to obtain this
information from the kernel or buffers. If there are no unsent packets, then a packet
containing SSH_MSG_IGNORE SHOULD be sent. If a new packet is added to the
stream every time the attacker knows the IV that is supposed to be used for the
next packet, then the attacker will not be able to guess the correct IV, thus the
attack will never be successful.
9.3.2. Data Integrity
This protocol does allow the Data Integrity mechanism to be disabled.
Implementers SHOULD be wary of exposing this feature for any purpose other than
debugging. Users and administrators SHOULD be explicitly warned anytime the
"none" MAC is enabled.
So long as the "none" MAC is not used, this protocol provides data integrity.
Because MACs use a 32-bit sequence number, they might start to leak
information after 2**32 packets have been sent. However, following the rekeying
recommendations should prevent this attack. The transport protocol [SSH-TRANS]
recommends rekeying after one gigabyte of data, and the smallest possible packet
is 16 bytes. Therefore, rekeying SHOULD happen after 2**28 packets at the very
most.
9.3.3. Replay
The use of a MAC other than "none" provides integrity and authentication. In
addition, the transport protocol provides a unique session identifier (bound in part
to pseudo-random data that is part of the algorithm and key exchange process) that
can be used by higher level protocols to bind data to a given session and prevent
replay of data from prior sessions. For example, the authentication protocol ([SSHUSERAUTH]) uses this to prevent replay of signatures from previous sessions.
Because public key authentication exchanges are cryptographically bound to the
session (i.e., to the initial key exchange), they cannot be successfully replayed in
other sessions. Note that the session id can be made public without harming the
security of the protocol.

If two sessions have the same session id (hash of key exchanges), then
packets from one can be replayed against the other. It must be stressed that the
chances of such an occurrence are, needless to say, minimal when using modern
cryptographic methods. This is all the more true when specifying larger hash
function outputs and DH parameters.
Replay detection using monotonically increasing sequence numbers as input
to the MAC, or HMAC in some cases, is described in [RFC2085], [RFC2246],
[RFC2743], [RFC1964], [RFC2025], and [RFC4120]. The underlying construct is
discussed in [RFC2104]. Essentially, a different sequence number in each packet
ensures that at least this one input to the MAC function will be unique and will
provide a nonrecurring MAC output that is not predictable to an attacker. If the
session stays active long enough, however, this sequence number will wrap. This
event may provide an attacker an opportunity to replay a previously recorded
packet with an identical sequence number but only if the peers have not rekeyed
since the transmission of the first packet with that sequence number. If the peers
have rekeyed, then the replay will be detected since the MAC check will fail. For this
reason, it must be emphasized that peers MUST rekey before a wrap of the
sequence numbers. Naturally, if an attacker does attempt to replay a captured
packet before the peers have rekeyed, then the receiver of the duplicate packet will
not be able to validate the MAC and it will be discarded. The reason that the MAC
will fail is because the receiver will formulate a MAC based upon the packet
contents, the shared secret, and the expected sequence number. Since the
replayed packet will not be using that expected sequence number (the sequence
number of the replayed packet will have already been passed by the receiver), the
calculated MAC will not match the MAC received with the packet.
9.3.4. Man-in-the-middle
This protocol makes no assumptions or provisions for an infrastructure or
means for distributing the public keys of hosts. It is expected that this protocol will
sometimes be used without first verifying the association between the server host
key and the server host name. Such usage is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks. This section describes this and encourages administrators and users to
understand the importance of verifying this association before any session is
initiated.
There are three cases of man-in-the-middle attacks to consider. The first is
where an attacker places a device between the client and the server before the
session is initiated. In this case, the attack device is trying to mimic the legitimate
server and will offer its public key to the client when the client initiates a session. If
it were to offer the public key of the server, then it would not be able to decrypt or
sign the transmissions between the legitimate server and the client unless it also
had access to the private key of the host. The attack device will also,
simultaneously to this, initiate a session to the legitimate server, masquerading
itself as the client. If the public key of the server had been securely distributed to

the client prior to that session initiation, the key offered to the client by the attack
device will not match the key stored on the client. In that case, the user SHOULD be
given a warning that the offered host key does not match the host key cached on
the client. As described in Section 4.1, the user may be free to accept the new key
and continue the session. It is RECOMMENDED that the warning provide sufficient
information to the user of the client device so the user may make an informed
decision. If the user chooses to continue the session with the stored public key of
the server (not the public key offered at the start of the session), then the sessionspecific data between the attacker and server will be different between the clientto-attacker session and the attacker- to-server sessions due to the randomness
discussed above. From this, the attacker will not be able to make this attack work
since the attacker will not be able to correctly sign packets containing this sessionspecific data from the server, since he does not have the private key of that server.
The second case that should be considered is similar to the first case in that
it also happens at the time of connection, but this case points out the need for the
secure distribution of server public keys. If the server public keys are not securely
distributed, then the client cannot know if it is talking to the intended server. An
attacker may use social engineering techniques to pass off server keys to
unsuspecting users and may then place a man-in-the-middle attack device between
the legitimate server and the clients. If this is allowed to happen, then the clients
will form client-to-attacker sessions, and the attacker will form attacker-to-server
sessions and will be able to monitor and manipulate all of the traffic between the
clients and the legitimate servers. Server administrators are encouraged to make
host key fingerprints available for checking by some means whose security does not
rely on the integrity of the actual host keys. Possible mechanisms are discussed in
Section 4.1 and may also include secured Web pages, physical pieces of paper, etc.
Implementers SHOULD provide recommendations on how best to do this with their
implementation. Because the protocol is extensible, future extensions to the
protocol may provide better mechanisms for dealing with the need to know the
server's host key before connecting. For example, making the host key fingerprint
available through a secure DNS lookup, or using Kerberos ([RFC4120]) over GSS-API
([RFC1964]) during key exchange to authenticate the server are possibilities.
In the third man-in-the-middle case, attackers may attempt to manipulate
packets in transit between peers after the session has been established. As
described in Section 9.3.3, a successful attack of this nature is very improbable. As
in Section 9.3.3, this reasoning does assume that the MAC is secure and that it is
infeasible to construct inputs to a MAC algorithm to give a known output. This is
discussed in much greater detail in Section 6 of [RFC2104]. If the MAC algorithm
has a vulnerability or is weak enough, then the attacker may be able to specify
certain inputs to yield a known MAC. With that, they may be able to alter the
contents of a packet in transit. Alternatively, the attacker may be able to exploit
the algorithm vulnerability or weakness to find the shared secret by reviewing the

MACs from captured packets. In either of those cases, an attacker could construct a
packet or packets that could be inserted into an SSH stream. To prevent this,
implementers are encouraged to utilize commonly accepted MAC algorithms, and
administrators are encouraged to watch current literature and discussions of
cryptography to ensure that they are not using a MAC algorithm that has a recently
found vulnerability or weakness.
In summary, the use of this protocol without a reliable association of the
binding between a host and its host keys is inherently insecure and is NOT
RECOMMENDED. However, it may be necessary in non-security-critical
environments, and will still provide protection against passive attacks.
Implementers of protocols and applications running on top of this protocol should
keep this possibility in mind.
9.3.5. Denial of Service
This protocol is designed to be used over a reliable transport. If transmission
errors or message manipulation occur, the connection is closed. The connection
SHOULD be re-established if this occurs. Denial of service attacks of this type (wire
cutter) are almost impossible to avoid.
In addition, this protocol is vulnerable to denial of service attacks because an
attacker can force the server to go through the CPU and memory intensive tasks of
connection setup and key exchange without authenticating. Implementers SHOULD
provide features that make this more difficult, for example, only allowing
connections from a subset of clients known to have valid users.
9.3.6. Covert Channels
The protocol was not designed to eliminate covert channels. For example,
the padding, SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages, and several other places in the protocol
can be used to pass covert information, and the recipient has no reliable way of
verifying whether such information is being sent.
9.3.7. Forward Secrecy
It should be noted that the Diffie-Hellman key exchanges may provide
perfect forward secrecy (PFS). PFS is essentially defined as the cryptographic
property of a key-establishment protocol in which the compromise of a session key
or long-term private key after a given session does not cause the compromise of
any earlier session [ANSI-T1.523-2001]. SSH sessions resulting from a key exchange
using the diffie-hellman methods described in the section Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange of [SSH-TRANS] (including "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" and "diffiehellman-group14-sha1") are secure even if private
keying/authentication material is later revealed, but not if the session keys are
revealed. So, given this definition of PFS, SSH does have PFS. However, this
property is not commuted to any of the applications or protocols using SSH as a

transport. The transport layer of SSH provides confidentiality for password

authentication and other methods that rely on secret data.
Of course, if the DH private parameters for the client and server are
revealed, then the session key is revealed, but these items can be thrown away
after the key exchange completes. It's worth pointing out that these items should
not be allowed to end up on swap space and that they should be erased from
memory as soon as the key exchange completes.
9.3.8. Ordering of Key Exchange Methods
As stated in the section on Algorithm Negotiation of [SSH-TRANS], each
device will send a list of preferred methods for key exchange. The most-preferred
method is the first in the list. It is RECOMMENDED that the algorithms be sorted by
cryptographic strength, strongest first. Some additional guidance for this is given in
[RFC3766].
9.3.9. Traffic Analysis
Passive monitoring of any protocol may give an attacker some information
about the session, the user, or protocol specific information that they would
otherwise not be able to garner. For example, it has been shown that traffic
analysis of an SSH session can yield information about the length of the password [Openwall] and [USENIX]. Implementers should use the SSH_MSG_IGNORE packet,
along with the inclusion of random lengths of padding, to thwart attempts at traffic
analysis. Other methods may also be found and implemented.

9.4. Authentication Protocol

The purpose of this protocol is to perform client user authentication. It
assumes that this runs over a secure transport layer protocol, which has already
authenticated the server machine, established an encrypted communications
channel, and computed a unique session identifier for this session.
Several authentication methods with different security characteristics are
allowed. It is up to the server's local policy to decide which methods (or
combinations of methods) it is willing to accept for each user. Authentication is no
stronger than the weakest combination allowed.
The server may go into a sleep period after repeated unsuccessful authentication
attempts to make key search more difficult for attackers. Care should be taken so
that this doesn't become a self- denial of service vector.
9.4.1. Weak Transport
If the transport layer does not provide confidentiality, authentication
methods that rely on secret data SHOULD be disabled. If it does not provide strong
integrity protection, requests to change authentication data (e.g., a password
change) SHOULD be disabled to prevent an attacker from modifying the ciphertext

without being noticed, or rendering the new authentication data unusable (denial of
service).
The assumption stated above, that the Authentication Protocol only runs
over a secure transport that has previously authenticated the server, is very
important to note. People deploying SSH are reminded of the consequences of
man-in-the-middle attacks if the client does not have a very strong a priori
association of the server with the host key of that server. Specifically, for the case
of the Authentication Protocol, the client may form a session to a man-in- the-middle
attack device and divulge user credentials such as their username and password.
Even in the cases of authentication where no user credentials are divulged, an
attacker may still gain information they shouldn't have by capturing key-strokes in
much the same way that a honeypot works.
9.4.2. Debug Messages
Special care should be taken when designing debug messages. These
messages may reveal surprising amounts of information about the host if not
properly designed. Debug messages can be disabled (during user authentication
phase) if high security is required. Administrators of host machines should make all
attempts to compartmentalize all event notification messages and protect them
from unwarranted observation. Developers should be aware of the sensitive nature
of some of the normal event and debug messages, and may want to provide
guidance to administrators on ways to keep this information away from
unauthorized people. Developers should consider minimizing the amount of
sensitive information obtainable by users during the authentication phase, in
accordance with the local policies. For this reason, it is RECOMMENDED that debug
messages be initially disabled at the time of deployment and require an active
decision by an administrator to allow them to be enabled. It is also RECOMMENDED
that a message expressing this concern be presented to the administrator of a
system when the action is taken to enable debugging messages.
9.4.3. Local Security Policy
The implementer MUST ensure that the credentials provided validate the
professed user and also MUST ensure that the local policy of the server permits the
user the access requested. In particular, because of the flexible nature of the SSH
connection protocol, it may not be possible to determine the local security policy, if
any, that should apply at the time of authentication because the kind of service
being requested is not clear at that instant. For example, local policy might allow a
user to access files on the server, but not start an interactive shell. However,
during the authentication protocol, it is not known whether the user will be
accessing files, attempting to use an interactive shell, or even both. In any event,
where local security policy for the server host exists, it MUST be applied and
enforced correctly.

Implementers are encouraged to provide a default local policy and make its
parameters known to administrators and users. At the discretion of the
implementers, this default policy may be along the lines of anything-goes where
there are no restrictions placed upon users, or it may be along the lines of
excessively-restrictive, in which case, the administrators will have to actively make
changes to the initial default parameters to meet their needs. Alternatively, it may
be some attempt at providing something practical and immediately useful to the
administrators of the system so they don't have to put in much effort to get SSH
working. Whatever choice is made must be applied and enforced as required
above.
9.4.4 Public Key Authentication
The use of public key authentication assumes that the client host has not
been compromised. It also assumes that the private key of the server host has not
been compromised.
This risk can be mitigated by the use of passphrases on private keys;
however, this is not an enforceable policy. The use of smartcards, or other
technology to make passphrases an enforceable policy is suggested.
The server could require both password and public key authentication;
however, this requires the client to expose its password to the server (see the
section on Password Authentication below.)
9.4.5. Password Authentication
The password mechanism, as specified in the authentication protocol,
assumes that the server has not been compromised. If the server has been
compromised, using password authentication will reveal a valid username/password
combination to the attacker, which may lead to further compromises.
This vulnerability can be mitigated by using an alternative form of
authentication. For example, public key authentication makes no assumptions
about security on the server.
9.4.6. Host-Based Authentication
Host-based authentication assumes that the client has not been
compromised. There are no mitigating strategies, other than to use host-based
authentication in combination with another authentication method.

9.5. Connection Protocol

9.5.1. End Point Security
End point security is assumed by the connection protocol. If the server has
been compromised, any terminal sessions, port forwarding, or systems accessed on
the host are compromised. There are no mitigating factors for this.

If the client has been compromised, and the server fails to stop the attacker
at the authentication protocol, all services exposed (either as subsystems or
through forwarding) will be vulnerable to attack. Implementers SHOULD provide
mechanisms for administrators to control which services are exposed to limit the
vulnerability of other services. These controls might include controlling which
machines and ports can be targeted in port-forwarding operations, which users are
allowed to use interactive shell facilities, or which users are allowed to use exposed
subsystems.
9.5.2. Proxy Forwarding
The SSH connection protocol allows for proxy forwarding of other protocols
such as SMTP, POP3, and HTTP. This may be a concern for network administrators
who wish to control the access of certain applications by users located outside of
their physical location. Essentially, the forwarding of these protocols may violate
site- specific security policies, as they may be undetectably tunneled through a
firewall. Implementers SHOULD provide an administrative mechanism to control the
proxy forwarding functionality so that site-specific security policies may be upheld.
In addition, a reverse proxy forwarding functionality is available, which,
again, can be used to bypass firewall controls.
As indicated above, end-point security is assumed during proxy forwarding
operations. Failure of end-point security will compromise all data passed over proxy
forwarding.
9.5.3. X11 Forwarding
Another form of proxy forwarding provided by the SSH connection protocol is
the forwarding of the X11 protocol. If end-point security has been compromised,
X11 forwarding may allow attacks against the X11 server. Users and administrators
should, as a matter of course, use appropriate X11 security mechanisms to prevent
unauthorized use of the X11 server. Implementers, administrators, and users who
wish to further explore the security mechanisms of X11 are invited to read
[SCHEIFLER] and analyze previously reported problems with the interactions
between SSH forwarding and X11 in CERT vulnerabilities VU#363181 and
VU#118892 [CERT]. X11 display forwarding with SSH, by itself, is not sufficient to
correct well known problems with X11 security [VENEMA]. However, X11 display
forwarding in SSH (or other secure protocols), combined with actual and pseudodisplays that accept connections only over local IPC mechanisms authorized by
permissions or access control lists (ACLs), does correct many X11 security problems,
as long as the "none" MAC is not used. It is RECOMMENDED that X11 display
implementations default to allow the display to open only over local IPC. It is
RECOMMENDED that SSH server implementations that support X11 forwarding
default to allow the display to open only over local IPC. On single-user systems, it
might be reasonable to default to allow the local display to open over TCP/IP.

Implementers of the X11 forwarding protocol SHOULD implement the magic

cookie access-checking spoofing mechanism, as described in [SSH-CONNECT], as an
additional mechanism to prevent unauthorized use of the proxy.